

Philippine Politics and Governance

Challenges to Democratization & Development



Editors

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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN

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Department of Political Science
University of the Philippines Diliman
in collaboration with the
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Foreword

Ever since it offered its course on Philippine Government and Politics (Political Science 14), the Department of Political Science of the University of the Philippines has always acknowledged the need to come out with a basic introductory textbook on the subject. The opportunity finally came when the Department of Political Science was awarded a Commission on Higher Education (CHED) grant as a Center of Excellence (CoE) for Political Science, which enabled it to finally produce such textbook. For this, we express our deepest appreciation to CHED.

The textbook is a collective endeavor of the Department faculty and other colleagues within and outside the University. With the exception of three chapter writers of which two were formerly with the Department of Political Science, i.e., Temario Rivera, Cecile Serrano, and Julkipli Wadi, all the chapters were written and edited by the faculty members of the Department of Political Science, UP Diliman. The final chapters in these two volumes benefited from a series of monthly meetings and collegial discussions of the strengths and weaknesses of the chapter drafts. It was also a good opportunity for our faculty members to get together to exchange perspectives on how an introductory course on Philippine political science should be taught.

The Department would like to thank the following for their invaluable assistance in making this textbook possible: Laura Samson and her editorial team for taking on the arduous task of transforming the manuscripts into its final form; the administrative staff of the Department of Political Science—Lucena Mallare, Zenaida Salas, and Arcangel Francisco, and Research, Extension and Professional Staff of DPS—Clarissa Angeles—for their logistical support; the Commission on Higher Education under the chairmanship of Dr. Ester Albano Garcia; and Ms. Sol Logo of the CHED Humanities, Social Science, and Communications (HUSOCOM) for acting as liaison between the Department of Political Science and CHED for this project.

The Department certainly does not see this textbook as a final product; its members look forward to revising this textbook based on the critiques, comments, and suggestions of fellow political scientists, students and other interested readers, with regard to the manner in which we undertook an analysis of Philippine politics and government, its institutions, the relevant political actors, as well as

issues and problems. We would like to especially thank Patricio N. Abinales, Leonora Angeles Forster, Pia Bennagen, Edna Co, Sheila Coronel, Jose Magadia, Lorelei Mendoza, Perry Ong, Sabino Padilla, Samuel Tan, and Erik Villanueva for their initial comments and suggestions on pertinent chapters of the textbook.

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem
and Noel M. Morada
Editors

Introduction

Malaya C. Ronas

General Themes

As a collective work of the faculty of the Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman, the writing of this two-volume textbook had faced the difficult task of coordinating the work of twenty authors. Given the freedom to write their respective chapters in their best light, the outcome is a rich diversity of theoretical approaches and conceptual tools employed in the discipline of political science. These diverse perspectives, however, have been held together by the overall themes indicated in its subtitle—The Challenges to Democratization and Development. The different chapters are clustered into sections which include the societal context of Philippine government and politics, principal government institutions (the presidency, legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, military, and local governments) and policy, as well as the nongovernment organizations that have taken the cudgels to articulate the interests of the voiceless and invisible sectors—the rural and urban poor, many of whom are children, the elderly, indigenous peoples, and women. These sectors have been long sidelined at the periphery of the country's politics and economy dominated by the competing elite factions.

The marginalized sectors of the country highlight the slow and uneven nature of economic development. The result of this pattern of economic growth has been the widening gap between the high- and low-income groups in the country. Like most of the developing countries, the Philippines continues to be mired in poverty. It has been the intractable problem of the country from the post-World War II period up to the present. The rhetoric and policy of successive postwar administrations to wage war against poverty notwithstanding, most Filipinos (75 percent) continue to perceive themselves as being poor/very poor.¹

The First World, principally the United States and countries in Western Europe, had shown a path to development that is closely linked with the liberal political orientation. This link suggests that economic development is hastened by the norms of individual freedom, property rights, and the rule of law. These norms

1. Dr. Ana Marie Tabunda, Highlights of Ulat ng Bayan, Pulse Asia's October 2005 Ulat ng Bayan Survey, November 15, 2005, <http://www.pulseasia.com.ph>.

are embedded within the capitalist economic system. The periods of colonialism and neocolonialism have diffused this economic system to the whole world. In our time, this same process is characterized by transcontinental integration of production and rapid movement of information, money, and people driven by modern innovations in telecommunication and transportation technology. This new characteristic of the international diffusion of capitalism is more commonly known as globalization.

Globalization has served as the impetus to the so-called Asian Miracle. The relocation and integration of production in the 1970s and 1980s from the First World to the developing Asian countries, primarily because of the low cost of labor, saw the emergence of the "tiger economies" of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. These economies have since joined the developed countries of the First World. In the case of Singapore, this had been so proudly proclaimed by Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew. It was popular then among economic analysts to acknowledge the significant role played by the so-called Asian values in the rapid economic growth of the tiger economies. These values are rooted in Confucian ethics that emphasize obedience to authority and loyalty to the family. The Confucian values are so different, to say the least, from the norms of Western liberalism. Hence, the observation that economic development is not necessarily linked with the liberal political orientation of the West gained currency.

The debate about the appropriate ideological foundation for economic development is captured in the clashing perspectives between Lee Kuan Yew and Amartya Sen. In isolating the liberal political orientation from economic development, Lee in his speech to the 18th Philippine Business Conference in 1992 declared, "I do not believe democracy necessarily leads to development. I believe what a country needs to develop is discipline more than democracy."² This view sees the unrestrained individual freedoms of democracy as obstacles to economic development. These freedoms might be availed of later, upon the attainment of industrialization. Coming from the leader of the only political party that has ruled Singapore since its independence, this assertion justifies the authoritarianism of a one-party system. Among the four tiger economies that have successfully transformed into developed economies, South Korea and Taiwan have since democratized. Hong Kong's Basic Law has thus far implemented China's policy of "one country, two systems," guaranteeing its status as a "special autonomous region" up to 2047. Singapore, on the other hand, has remained as a "semi-democracy," i.e., the People's Action Party always wins its regular elections. To the pragmatists, however, these criticisms do not diminish the success of Singapore.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the impressive economic achievement of Singapore, Sen argues against the contention that "discipline more than democracy" is needed for economic development. He sees freedom as both the

2. Lee Kuan Yew, *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000* (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings, 2000), 342.

end and means of development.³ The end of development, he postulates, is the “expansion of freedom.” These freedoms include the freedom from hunger, ignorance, and diseases. This departs from the widely accepted view that the end of development is industrialization, indicated by significant increases in gross national product and per capita income. Sen does not discard this conventional view but rather subsumes it within the larger and more significant scope of development as freedom.

With regard to freedom as an instrument of development, Sen emphasizes the role of political and civil liberties, as well as social policies meant to help the marginalized sectors, as supportive of the larger end of development. He sees the “interconnectedness and complementarity” of these instruments as most crucial.⁴ This means that these instruments, in isolation from each other, might not spur development. However, development is more significantly driven by integrated and mutually reinforcing liberal norms like political and civil liberties, as well as welfare programs like unemployment benefits, and access to education and health care.

The case of the Philippines appears to be beyond the scope of these two perspectives—development as discipline and development as freedom. The country had pursued a liberal democratic regime from 1946 to 1972, an authoritarian regime from 1972 to 1986, and finally has been slowly democratizing since 1986. Yet through all these periods, the country has not experienced the rapid economic growth achieved by the tiger economies. In the 1980s, when most countries in Asia grew significantly, the Philippines was the glaring exception, and hence had been described as the “sick man of Asia.” Our inability to economically grow more rapidly under either an authoritarian or liberal political regime raises serious questions about the impact of a country’s political regime on development.

It is acknowledged that development has been driven by “a list of helpful policies” that apply to both authoritarian and liberal political regimes.⁵ These include “openness to competition, the use of international markets, a high level of literacy and school education, successful land reforms, and public provision of incentives for investment, exporting and industrialization.” Sen asserts, however, that notwithstanding this observation, the “freedom-centered development” remains preferable to authoritarianism because it makes the process participative and the outcome equitable.

This view raises the question: Why has our country’s development, in spite of its liberal orientation rooted in the ideals of the Propaganda Movement and the Spirit of 1896, not been participative and equitable? Two perspectives might help us understand this question, the theories of “state-society relations” in third world countries, and democratization. With regard to the perspective of “state-society relations,” third world states are seen as essentially contrived political units that emerged in the aftermath of imperialism.⁶ Hence, these states

3. Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999), 35-53.

4. *Ibid.*, 40-41.

5. *Ibid.*, 150.

6. Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 3-41.

have become merely one of the "mélange of social organizations" competing for social control with traditional power blocs—the landed gentry, tribal and religious leaders. This competition has diminished the state's capabilities and prevented it from exercising its extractive, integrative, and regulative functions.

These diminished capabilities have been shown by our own state since the postwar period relative to important policies "helpful" to development. The land reform program has not "emancipated the farmers from the bondage of the soil." Instead, a number of legal loopholes, such as conversion to industrial estate or stock option, have allowed the landlords to hold on to their vast landholdings. The quality of education has also declined so badly due to, among other reasons, lack of resources, low wages of teachers, and corruption. Moreover, the incentives to foreign investment and export promotion have not attained their aim of driving rapid economic growth.

The inability to spur rapid economic growth is confounded by the difficulty encountered in democratizing the country. The process of democratization that started in 1946 suffered a serious setback with the establishment in 1972 of the authoritarian regime under Marcos, which lasted until 1986. The ouster of Marcos through the direct action of the people along EDSA dismantled the authoritarian structure and has started another process of democratization. This phenomenon coincided with the emergence of "new democracies" in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. What is common among these "new democracies" and the Philippines is that all of them are envisioned to be moving toward a mature and stable democracy called "democratic consolidation." This goal has been described as the internalization of democratic beliefs and practices among both the elites and the masses, making "democracy the only game in town."⁷

Studies of democratization consider a number of factors that contribute to democratic consolidation. Among these factors are effective state institutions that promote democratic practices; the adherence of the elite, the middle class, and the marginalized sectors to democratic beliefs; broad entrepreneurship among the people; a highly educated population; and a free media.⁸ These factors, however, do not necessarily lead to democratic consolidation. The process is not mechanical as each country traverses its own path toward a stable and mature democracy. It is in this context that this textbook offers a description and explanation of the particularities of our country's experience in democratization.

7. Adam Przeworski (1991), cited in Andrew Heywood, *Politics*, 2nd edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 81.

8. Michael J. Sodaro, *Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), 215-41.

Theoretical Approaches and Conceptual Tools

The theoretical approaches and conceptual tools used in the various chapters of the book show the rich variety of perspectives in political science. The

dynamism of the discipline is highlighted by this diverse and at times, contending theoretical approaches and conceptual tools. Below are brief discussions of the analytical and explanatory tools written by the authors of the respective chapters.

Chapter 1: Philippine Social Movements before Martial Law

The three chapters on Philippine social movements focus on how social movements have pursued democratization and development during the different periods, i.e., before, during, and after Martial Law. In particular it looks at how social movements sought to either preserve, reform, or radically transform existing political, economic and social institutions and processes in the public interest.

In these chapters, social movements have been defined as "sustained and purposeful collective mobilized by an unidentifiable, self-organized group in confrontation with specific power structures and the pursuit of socioeconomic and political change."⁹ The chapters use two frameworks of analysis. One is the political opportunity structures (POS) framework which points attention to the resources that are available for social movements to mobilize. In particular, it looks at how a specific political environment may determine the course of a particular social movement. The second framework used to determine the influence of social movements is through the manner in which they "frame" the issues. As pointed out, social movements, "play important roles in framing movement agenda, cultivating and forming identity, and mobilizing collective actions."¹⁰

Chapter 1 shows how the emergence of social movements during the Spanish colonial period was generally brought about by the socioeconomic inequalities and social injustice that pervaded society. Social movements initially found expression through priest-led revolts and millenarian movements. During the American period, one witnessed the rise of socialist/communist movements. In the 1960s, social movements also found expression through the nationalist movements.

Chapter 2: Philippine Social Movements during Martial Law

This chapter discusses how socialist/communist movements remained dominant and how they continued to frame their issues within the context of the socioeconomic inequalities and social justice. A difference with the pre-Martial Law period was that the new Communist Party of the Philippines, carrying the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist line, dominated the social movement during this period. The focus is how social movements challenged the repression of the martial law regime and its failure to deliver on its economic promises. It was also during this period when the issue of ethnicity and identity entered into the

9. Alejandro Colas, *International Civil Society* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2002), 67.

10. Jackie Smith, "Chapter 12: Globalizing Resistance: The Battle of Seattle and the Future of Social Movements," in *Globalization and Resistance*, ed. Jackie Smith and Hank Johnston (United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), 210.

framing process of the social movements as in the case of the emergence of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Cordillera people's resistance to government, military, and economic incursions.

Chapter 3: Philippine Social Movements after Martial Law

This chapter examines the role of social movements in confronting the problems of socioeconomic inequality and social injustice in the transition to democracy. Although the CPP continues to exist and frame its issues on class and the strategy is through a national democratic revolution—i.e., the armed struggle—other visions and strategies emerged, particularly with the split in the communist movement, with former CPP members advocating for reforms instead of revolution. The framing of their concerns took into consideration not only “class politics” but also “new politics” with emphasis on non class-based issues. People empowerment was also used in framing issues.

Chapter 4: Religion, Church, and Politics in the Philippines

The chapter examines the concepts and the empirical political salience of religion and church in Philippine society, politics, and government with the use of behavioral and historical approaches in political analysis. With the view of religion as a system of beliefs and practices, the chapter focuses on Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism in the Philippines. Considering the church as the organization of believers in a particular religion, and related concepts of religious movements and church-based groups, the chapter analyzes the political behavior of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, the protestant member-churches of the National Council of Churches in the Philippines, and other key churches and religious organizations. Data from significant research and conceptual literature and other secondary information sources were used to bring out the political salience of religion and church in Philippine society and political culture. The chapter brings out the dynamics of political socialization, mobilization, and participation of churches and religious groups in different periods of Philippine history—in the process of state formation, democratization, and revolution and regime change.

Chapter 5: Islamic Nationalism and Philippine Politics

The chapter uses analytical and thematic approaches in explaining the development of nationalism that evolved among the Moro people in Southern Philippines. The two approaches are used to trace the roots and development of the Moro struggle and the eventual reconfiguration of Moro nationalism into

various strands and orientations. These approaches are also employed to reveal the major identity formations in Mindanao and the subsequent tension these identities elicited in Philippine politics.

Anchoring on the concept of “Islamic nationalism,” the author presents the major postulates of nationalism in Moro society by underscoring the notion of “quasi-ideological divide” in Islam that helps explain the varying ways on how nationalism are appropriated in the Muslim world. The variation is made to relate with the major frameworks of Moro nationalism and how the attendant contestation with Filipino nationalism and other identity formations provokes new thought on traditional discourse of identity and politics of nation building.

The chapter is an appraisal of nationalism among Moros, a historical people of various ethnolinguistic groupings in southern Philippines. As nationalism is currently subjected to debate in the Islamic world, the chapter provides an apt theoretical foundation that underscores the major perspectives of Islam on nation-states, nationalism, and nation building. It also delineates the major frameworks of Moro nationalism and explains the politics among major identity formations, particularly between majority Filipinos and minority Moros.

Chapter 6: Indigenous Peoples in Politics and Governance

The chapter uses the social movement approach, in particular, New Social Movements (NSM), to look at the role of indigenous peoples (IP) in governance and politics in the Philippines.

The concept of “political opportunity structures” has been used to explain how advocacy of indigenous peoples’ rights has been pursued in the Philippines.

The IPs rights movement in the Philippines is part of a global NSM for indigenous peoples’ rights. As with indigenous peoples worldwide, the issue of land is at the core of IP movement in the Philippines where the Regalian Doctrine and the corollary Torrens land titling system have effectively dispossessed indigenous peoples whose claim to land is based on ancestral law. The gains and setbacks of IPs movement in the Philippines can be understood in terms of the shifting political opportunity structures in Philippine politics.

Chapter 7: The Philippine Peace Process

The chapter is largely descriptive of the nature and elements of the Philippine peace process. It undertook a review and trends analysis of two aspects of the Philippine peace process, namely, civil-society peace building and political negotiations between the Philippine government and the different rebel groups.

Concepts introduced are peace and related terms—negative/positive peace, just peace, nonkilling society, peace process, peace building, peace movement, civil-society organizations, people's organization, peace organizations, peace zones, political negotiations. The chapter defines and gives examples of different types of peace-building actions: constituency building, conflict-reduction efforts, conflict-settlement efforts, peace research and training programs, and social development work.

The chapter reviews the contributions made by civil-society organizations in peace building in the Philippines, identifies the agreement made in the political negotiations with the different armed groups, and provides a preliminary analysis of the outcome of civil-society peace building and political negotiations.

Chapter 8: Media and Philippine Politics

Following Siebert's definition, "media" is understood as "press" in the broadest sense and embraces all the media of mass communication including television, radio, and newspaper. The chapter highlights the media's role as a powerful tool of the state and corporate elite. The elite approach was used to examine the ownership and control of the press throughout significant periods of Philippine political history. The chapter also depicts the media as a significant part of civil society. In particular, they play an important role in facilitating or hampering state-civil society relations.

The chapter examines the role of the media in Philippine politics and why they cannot be regarded as neutral in the Philippine political setting. This reality arises from their elite/owner-dependent existence and business-oriented nature. That the Philippine media are still the freest in Asia may be true but to describe them fully as the fourth and independent estate is questionable. The examination of press ownership shows that the media have not been independent. This chapter attempted to classify major newspapers in terms of Teodoro's mainstream or alternative categorization to highlight their role in either strengthening the status quo or facilitating growth of democracy during the different significant periods of Philippine political history.

Chapter 9: The Middle Classes in Philippine Politics

This chapter examines the politics of the middle classes in the Philippines, focusing on the postwar period up to the end of the Estrada administration. Clarifying the contested concept of the middle classes within both the gradational and relational frameworks of class, the study traces the historical and sociological bases of the emergence of middle classes in Philippine society. A summary of the findings of a focused survey completed in 1999 on the attitudes of the middle classes on key political and socioeconomic issues further enriches the study.

Consistent with other comparative studies of the middle classes, this study shows that the politics of this class is varied and unpredictable due to its contradictory location in the class structure of society. Its political practice and identity are further shaped by a unique combination of historical, economic, and political factors and could range from conservative to liberal-reformist and radical-revolutionary trajectories. For instance, in the Philippine context, middle-class leadership and participation are evident not only in such diverse political projects and movements such as electoral reform movements, Christian reformism and evangelical religious movements, most NGO and civil-society organizations but also in the armed communist and Islamic movements, and militancy in the military.

A large proportion of the middle classes work in the government bureaucracy, but this sector has not been as politically beholden to the government like its generally more passive counterparts in the newly industrializing countries of Southeast Asia. An interesting phenomenon is emerging with the development of a new social base for middle-class families nurtured by huge numbers of overseas workers. While relatively small in numbers because of the lack of sustained economic growth in the country, the middle classes, through their varying political and technical skills and alliances with either the dominant or dominated classes, have played important political roles in the country.

Chapter 10: Women and Politics in the Philippines

The chapter begins with an introduction to some important concepts and perspectives on gender and feminism, and the international context of human rights. The introduction is followed by an overview of the general status of women and the accompanying issues on Philippine society and politics, the available policies on women and their level of implementation, and finally, an assessment of the role and contributions of women and women's groups to Philippine society and politics. The chapter concludes that various women's groups have contributed to the attainment of women empowerment. These groups have developed legislation, institutions, and structures to increase gender awareness among the population as well as pave important inroads in the male-dominated field of politics. However, significant political reforms are still necessary in order to free women from marginalization, subordination, stereotyping, and violence. More importantly, the obstacles that hinder women, particularly those from the lower-income groups, from their right to participate need to be addressed.

Chapter 11: The Environmental Movement and Philippine Politics

The chapter introduces students to some views regarding the environment and the relationship between environment and politics, provides a background

on the state of the Philippine environment, discusses the emergence and development of the environmental movement in the Philippines, and identifies issues and challenges posed by democratization on environmental groups.

The chapter discusses concepts such as environment, the relationship between the environment and human beings, sustainable development, and the environmental movement. It also provides a brief description of the current state of the Philippine environment, focusing on the state of environmental crisis that is presently being experienced in the country. Important issues, such as the politics of deforestation, the depletion of marine resources, and toxic and garbage disposal, are discussed.

The chapter also gives an overview of environmental policy with regard to natural-resource protection and management. The various government institutions and policies are identified and briefly discussed. The emergence, development, and achievement of the Philippine environmental movement in protecting and managing the natural resources in the country are also tackled.

Chapter 12: The Cooperative as a Vehicle for Empowerment, Development, and Democratization

The chapter looks into the factors that make the cooperative a potent force for empowerment, democratization, and development of Philippine society.

The thesis of this chapter is that underdevelopment impedes the democratization process in the country because poverty subjects the impoverished sectors of society, e.g., the farmers, to an indecent standard of living which disempowers them to address factors that exploit them such as landlords, middle-traders, and usurers. The only way by which to address this is to pave the way for development in the rural areas, such as through the cooperatives, as well as empowering the farmers to attain this. Only when there is empowerment and development can democracy be attained in Philippine society. Such concern can also lead to more effective governance in the country. Governance here refers to "development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred."¹¹ Furthermore, the governance perspective also draws attention to the increased involvement of the private and voluntary sectors in service delivery and strategic decision making.¹²

This chapter has generally shown how the cooperative can be used as a means by which to uplift the lives of the farmers not only economically but also politically. As a vehicle for development, both the government and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and people's organizations (POs) have used the cooperative as a means for creating a source of livelihood for the farmers and a way by which to channel resources into the countryside with the major objective of alleviating poverty. There are, however, formidable challenges

11. Gerry Stoker, "From Government to Governance," in *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*, 9th edition, ed. Bernard E. Brown (New York: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000), 256. In Gerry Stoker, "Governance as Theory: Five Propositions," *International Social Science Journal*, no. 55 (March 1998), 187-95.

12. *Ibid.*, 258.

impinging on the cooperative movement that still have to be confronted. These include patronage politics; leadership dependence; the persistence of usurers, middle-traders, and the rice cartel; and the lack of government support, e.g., economic and technical assistance.

Chapter 13: Overseas Employment from the Philippines— The Nexus between Development and Governance

The pace of Philippine labor out-migration is becoming more and more phenomenal and complex. Since the 1900s, Filipinos have gone to work in numerous capacities and in different countries throughout the world. The chapter makes a distinction between temporary labor migration and other forms of migration (e.g., tourism, permanent migration, and refugee migration, among others). Its focus is on the more recent and dominant form of labor migration from the Philippines (i.e., between the mid-1970s up to the late 1990s and the turn of the twenty-first century).

The lucrative nature of overseas employment led to the proliferation of private recruitment agencies that facilitate the process of securing overseas job for Filipinos. Migration is not only an effect but can also cause new social and political issues to arise. Moreover, state authorities inevitably play a vital role in enhancing and sustaining overseas employment from the country. Throughout its experience with overseas employment, Philippine government agencies have undertaken essentially a policy outlook that seeks to benefit, in the main, from the contributions of migrant toward the achievement of ostensibly national development goals.

Philippine Social Movements before Martial Law

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem

*No uprising fails. Each one is a step in the right direction.*¹

– Salud Alagabre, Sakdal Leader

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, the student should be able to:

1. Discuss the reasons for the emergence of social movements during the pre-Martial Law period within the context of the democratization and development process in the Philippines.
2. Discuss the goals and objectives of social movements.
3. Discuss the strategies used by social movements to achieve their goals and objectives.
4. Identify the factors that facilitated the achievement of their goals and objectives.
5. Identify the factors that hindered the achievement of their goals and objectives.

Introduction

Philippine politics and the struggle to push for democratization and development are best demonstrated by the country's social movements that date back to the colonial period. In general, social movements are defined as

a sustained and purposeful collective mobilized by an identifiable, self-organized group in confrontation with specific power structures and in the pursuit of socioeconomic and political change.²

Furthermore, "a social movement must have the capacity to mobilize its constituency or membership and, second, such mobilization must be sustainable over a period of time."³ The attraction of social movements is that much of their

1. E. San Juan Jr., "One Hundred Years of Producing and Reproducing the 'Filipino'," *Amerasia Journal* 24, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 1-34.

2. Alejandro Colas, *International Civil Society* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2002), 67.

3. *Ibid.*

work entails linking alternative values or visions to the experiences or grievances of potential constituencies.⁴

This chapter will utilize two frameworks in analyzing social movements and their role in enhancing democracy and development. One is the political opportunity structures (POS) framework, which “calls attention to resources that are available for social movements to mobilize. In particular, it looks at how a specific political environment may determine the course of a particular social movement. Changes in political opportunity structures are monitored as these may either encourage or discourage social movements, and influence when or how struggles would lead to actual reforms.”⁵

Political opportunity structures include opening up of “access to power, shifts in ruling alignments brought about by cleavages within and among elites, and the availability of influential allies.”⁶

The second framework to assess the influence of social movements draws attention to the manner in which they “frame” the issues. Social movements “play important roles in framing movement agenda, cultivating collective identity, and mobilizing collective actions.”⁷

In understanding the emergence and the sustainability or eventual collapse of social movements, it becomes imperative to understand the “collective-action frames” used by movement participants and the processes through which these frames evolve and translate or fail to translate into collective action.⁸

Collective-action frames refer to the outcome of the framing process of individuals. That is, the manner in which individuals frame the nature of their problem, the sources of this problem and the means by which resolutions can be arrived at.

From Communal to National Resistance in the Spanish Period

The Spanish period aggravated the socioeconomic inequalities that existed in pre-Spanish Philippine society between the landed and the landless. The system was characterized as quasi-feudal in which two classes existed: the small minority of landholding chieftains and aristocrats (*datu*) and a large majority of landless peasants (*tao*).⁹

4. Elisabeth S. Clemens, “To Move Mountains: Collective Action and the Possibility of Institutional Change,” chap. 5 in *From Contention to Democracy*, ed. Marco G. Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1998), 118.

5. Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 6. *Ibid.*

7. Jackie Smith, “Globalizing Resistance: The Battle of Seattle and the Future of Social Movements,” chap. 12 of *Globalization and Resistance*, ed. Jackie Smith and Hank Johnston (United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), 210.

8. Dorisba Hilhorst, *The Real World of the NGOs: Discourse, Diversity, Development* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003).

9. US Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, “The Hukbalahap” (OIR Report No. 2509, September 27, 1950).

Peasant agitation was aggravated during the Spanish period when the King “gave tremendous land grants to the nobles and the friars for their monasteries and religious activities. Consequently, most of the land continued to be held by a relatively small group consisting of the native landed aristocracy, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Spanish nobility.”¹⁰

This arrangement resulted in the tenant’s low standard of living. The plots, for example, were so small and the methods of cultivation so primitive that “the average tenant could not earn enough to sustain himself and his family from one harvest to the next.” The peasants were forced to borrow from the only available sources—i.e., the landlords or the moneylenders—at usurious rates of interest. Inevitably, peasant debts grew to great proportions and were inherited by succeeding generations. This phenomenon at the time was felt greatest in Central Luzon.¹¹

The exploitative situation spawned early revolts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which can be broadly categorized into two types: those that aspired for a return to the pre-Spanish past, and those that were consequences of the extraction of surplus for colonial needs.

The first type was either political or religious in character. These were led by former chieftains who wanted to restore their political authority or regain the respect of their pre-Spanish position especially after agreements and treaties with the Spanish were violated. The perspective of these chieftain-led revolts was usually an appeal to community autonomy.¹²

“Similar revolts were carried out by local religious leaders who, aside from their political leadership, wielded immense power as ideologues of the community displaced by the friars and the onslaught of Catholicism.”¹³ There were thus priest-led revolts aimed at asserting community autonomy and unity through a return to the animism of the past.

The “restorative” revolts fell short of social movements because although they presented a concrete alternative (a return of the past), they were not successful because they were sporadic and isolated. Furthermore, the alternative system offered was more to benefit primarily the leaders and not the masses. Despite this, however, such revolts would reemerge all throughout history.¹⁴

Resistance in the form of millenarian movements

During the middle of the Spanish era, a new type of resistance emerged in the form of millenarian confrontation against Spanish colonialism. What links this millenarian movement to the other anti-Spanish movements is that although the revolts were millenarian in form, they primarily addressed “the more material problems encountered by the people like tribute exaction, forced labor, friar and military abuses and much later, the problem of land expropriation especially by the friars.”¹⁵ A major difference it had, though, with the previous popular

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*

12. Karina Constantino David, P. N. Abinales, and Teresa Encarnacion, “Transnationalization, the State and the People: The Philippine Case,” working papers of the United Nations University Asian Perspectives Project (Southeast Asia), 1984, 97.

13. *Ibid.*, 97-98.

14. *Ibid.*, 99-99.

15. *Ibid.*, 100.

resistance is the manner in which it made use of the Catholic faith to frame the issues and concerns they were fighting for.

The millenarian movements "demonstrated the extent to which the Catholic faith had become a part of Filipino consciousness while at the same time proving that Catholicism, in spite of its role as a major instrument of pacification, was also partly responsible for a 'counter-ideology' which provided the people with a framework for social use as a guide for political praxis."¹⁶

The millenarian movements lasted longer than the sporadic priest-led revolts. The alternative society they presented did not call for the return to the hierarchical past but called for a society that would end the economic abuses within the context of the Catholic faith. Millenarian movements, although they existed for long periods, were organized in isolation from one another and did not have the adequate resources to successfully overthrow Spanish rule.

Political resistance through the *principalia* class

This did not seem to be the case with the popular resistance presented by the *principalia* to Spanish rule. This class emerged as a result of the

Philippine insertion into the world market and the consequent importance of land as a commodity, leading to the rise of a local entrepreneurial class. These were descendants of the pre-Spanish native elite who opted for integration into the colonial system and the Chinese *mestizos* who inherited the merchant roles of their fathers in the marketing of export products from the countryside to the trading centers. While Filipino in racial origins, this class was the primary beneficiary of colonial rule and was, thus, intensely colonial in thinking. However, their ascendant status and the racism of Spanish feudal ideology led to their demand for greater social recognition.¹⁷

Unlike the issues raised by the priest-led revolts and the millenarian movement, the *principalia* framed their issues against the Spaniards in a different manner. That is, although they also had grievances against the abuses of the Spanish colonizer, in particular, the clergy, for this class the alternative society they envisioned was not getting rid of the colonial regime but gaining social recognition from it particularly from the friars whom they considered as the real power holders.

For the *principalia*, social recognition could also mean more political power. They supported the inclusion of natives into the religious orders to augment the manpower resources of the Catholic Church. This also became an avenue through which members of the *principalia* sought prestige as well as power.¹⁸

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*, 102.

18. Renato Constantino, "Identity and Counter-Consciousness: The Philippine Experience," in *Neocolonial Identity and Counter-Consciousness* (London: Merlin Press, 1978).

As for the abuses which the principalia denounced, these were similar to those articulated by the earlier revolts, i.e., economic in nature. The difference, however, was for the principalia, the abuses had to do with the leasehold relations between their class and the religious orders unlike the previous revolts which were against exploitative relations between the tenants and the landowners, mainly the friars.

The manner by which the principalia framed their issues may be attributed to the external environment—i.e., the rise of the middle class, also known as bourgeoisie class, in Europe. The middle class challenged the feudal order. As this class gained more economically they also wanted political power to safeguard their economic interests. Thus the external milieu provided the principalia the political opportunity to challenge the status quo.

The principalia also had the economic and political resources that enabled them to pursue the most organized opposition to Spanish rule, particularly against the abuses perpetuated by the *frailocracy* and the Spaniards. This was unlike the priest-led revolts and millenarian movements that did not have the adequate resources to either sustain themselves or to launch a formidable challenge to Spanish authority.

Resistance through the Propaganda Movement

The spokesmen for the principalia, also known as the entrepreneurial class, were the *ilustrados*.

Due to the reforms instituted in the educational system, the *ilustrados* were able to attain tertiary and post-tertiary education both locally and abroad. In their quest for reforms the *ilustrados* found ideological inspiration in liberal thought. They organized themselves into a movement based in Spain and unleashed unceasing criticisms against friar sovereignty in the Philippines.¹⁹

The *ilustrados* took advantage of the economic opportunity for them to study and to translate their knowledge into access to political power.

Unlike the priest-led revolts and the millenarian movements, the *ilustrados* sought to frame their movement within the context of a nation. That is, they tried to create a sense of being Filipino, that is a Filipino identity.

Again, this is similar to the thrust of the liberal democratic movement in Europe as led by the middle class whose reaction to the feudal order as propagated by the aristocracy or the monarchy was the establishment of liberal-democratic institutions as embodied in a nation-state. The aspirations of the *ilustrado*, however, fell short of the goal of the liberal-democratic revolutions in

19. David, Abinales, and Encarnacion, "Transnationalization, the State and the People," 103.

Europe, that is, to overthrow the aristocracy and to establish a liberal-democratic regime. Instead, the ilustrados centered their demand on Philippine representation in the Spanish parliament and the recognition of the Philippines as a province of the Spanish empire. They called for the establishment of institutions of basic freedom of association normally found in a republic or a democratic political system.²⁰ They articulated their demands through the Propaganda Movement.

The Philippine Revolution of 1896

Although the Propaganda Movement was a middle-class movement and consisted of the wealthy and the educated, their writings provided the guiding light for the *Kataastaasan, Kagalanggalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan* (Katipunan – The Highest and Most Honorable Society of the Sons of the Country), an underground organization consisting of members cutting across the classes in Philippine society, with a better understanding of the dynamics of colonial exploitation. The Katipunan's ultimate objectives radically differed from those of the ilustrados. While the Propaganda Movement was reformist, elite-led, and parliamentary, the Katipunan was, in its struggle for independence, revolutionary; it was mass-based and armed.²¹ "The execution of Jose Rizal, the foremost advocate of the Propaganda Movement, helped ignite the Katipunan, as his writings opened up greater awareness of the problems of Philippine society."²²

A major reason why the Katipunan, an underground association, was able to spearhead the 1896 Revolution against Spain was because of the way it framed its rationale. That is,

Its aims were clearly separatist. Its ideological framework was a reflection of the different cultural articulations in society. That is, the small yet strong liberal current resulting from the Propaganda Movement, and the nativistic elements characteristic of earlier millenarian movements, and was utopian-egalitarian as reflected in the demand for land distribution and communal ownership of the resources of society.²³

It is for this reason that the Katipunan attracted the different classes in society, including semi-proletarian leaders, like Andres Bonifacio, as well as radicalized intellectuals in Manila. As such, the Katipunan was able to tap the resources of this broad-based membership to launch a revolution against Spanish rule.

The Socialist/Communist Movements during the American Period

The gains of the Philippine Revolution of 1896 were cut short with the Americans coming into the Philippines. The Spanish colonizers sold the country to the United States under the 1898 Treaty of Paris. American rule exacerbated

20. *Ibid.*, 104

21. *Ibid.*, 104.

22. *Ibid.*, 106.

23. *Ibid.*, 106

the existing socioeconomic inequalities in Philippine society. The US failed to enforce an effective land reform program that could address the wide gap between the rich and the poor. First, the Americans inherited the problem of the friar lands because of the US-Spanish agreement to protect the property interests of the friars as stipulated by the Treaty of Paris. Under this agreement, the US bought the friar estates, paying for them largely out of money raised from the sale of Philippine government bonds. The intention was for the land to be sold to the landless peasantry. "However, many of the estates were bought by the *caciques* (wealthy landowners) and by the middle-class elements that originated during the American occupation, with the result that the peasants derived little benefit from the sale of the friar lands."²⁴

Second, their interest lay "in promoting the rapid growth of agricultural exports." Thus, American advocacy for land reform only referred to areas planted to rice and corn. American officials did not advocate land reform for coconut and sugar lands because these products were important exports to the US. It was not in their interest to disrupt their raw materials supply because of their concern over the plight of the agricultural workers in the coconut and sugar plantations.²⁵ Third, the US was politically dependent on the land-based Filipino elite to implement American interests in the country.

The landowners also benefited from the free trade relations instituted by the US government. This was not the case for the majority who lived in the countryside as tenant farmers and farm laborers. The Philippine elite would be comfortable with American colonial rule and they would become the reliable social and political base for the exercise of US influence in the country.²⁶

What further polarized the landed class from the landless in Philippine society was the American's perpetuation of an educational system which worked as a tool for pacifying the people. It also used English as the medium of instruction which succeeded in separating the Filipinos from their past as well as the educated Filipinos from the masses. This aggravated further the socioeconomic divide in Philippine society.²⁷

Because the political dispensation failed to address the popular economic grievances particularly of the masses, it was inevitable that there would be popular resistance to American colonial rule, something akin to resistance under Spain. The new dimension, however, was that such a movement was also against the Filipino elites who benefited from American colonial rule and the enemy was no longer the Spanish colonizer but the Americans.

24. US Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research.

25. Renato Constantino and Letitia R. Constantino, *The Philippines: The Continuing Past* (Quezon City: The Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978), 325.

26. Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Roskamm Shalom, eds., *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship and Resistance* (Quezon City: KEN Incorporated, 1987).

27. Daniel B. Schirmer, "The Conception and Gestation of a Neocolony," in *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship and Resistance*, ed. Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Roskamm Shalom (Quezon City: KEN Incorporated, 1987), 38-44. Previously published in *The Journal of Contemporary Asia* 5, no. 1 (1975).

Socialism as the framework for resistance

Ideologically, popular resistance was also framed differently. It did not advocate for liberal democracy but introduced socialism to the discourse for change. This was inspired by the emergence of socialism movements in Europe, which provided an alternative vision of society for laborers and peasants who could not identify with the liberal-democratic ideals of the middle class or the propertied class. The socialist ideology was initially epitomized by the emergence in 1929 of Pedro Abad Santos's Socialist Party. Ironically, Santos was a member of the elite class and his leading the Socialist Party provided the political opportunity by which the social movements could also tap members of the elite to pursue their cause. Just like the socialists in Europe, they attempted to assert their influence through the electoral system which was established in the Philippines by the Americans as part of the façade of "liberal democracy" in the country. In a country where politics is inevitably controlled by the landed class, the Socialist Party was an exception; Philippine electoral politics was dominated by two major parties, the Nacionalista Party and the Federal Party, which was later replaced by the Liberal Party.²⁸

The electoral base of the Socialist Party was in Santos's home province of Pampanga, which is known for its sugar haciendas. Thus the existence of hundreds of tenants who could identify with the Party's objectives. Based on the socialist ideology for socioeconomic redistribution of wealth, the Socialist Party's program called for the outright expropriation of all church estates and all private plantations. Because of the manner in which the issues were framed, it is understandable that the program of the Socialist Party attracted tenant farmers, farmer laborers, and urban workers. To be sure, the large landholders in the province were threatened by the Socialist Party.²⁹ And although the Socialist Party performed well during the 1940 elections, 50 percent of Santos's followers were disqualified from voting on account of literacy provisions;³⁰ thus a situation whereby the rules were used to discredit the poor.

Emergence of other socialist/communist movements

The experience of the Socialist Party in electoral politics brought about the realization that genuine "liberal democracy" cannot be attained in a country where the majority are poor but the ruling class comprises elites supported by the colonial power. This socially explosive situation provided the political opportunity for the emergence of organizations with socialist/communist ideals. These movements did not limit themselves to the electoral process. Examples of these were radical peasant organizations like the Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KPMP – Farmers Organization of the Philippines), which "highlighted the unionization of the peasantry" and were close to the radical workers' unions. The KPMP can be traced back to 1919 when tenants

28. US Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*

and agricultural workers in Central Luzon and nearby areas formed their own unions, culminating in a Tenants' Congress in Manila.³¹ Efforts of the KPMP were complemented by other trade unions like the Aguman ding Maldang Talapagobra (League of the Poor Laborers or the AMT), which launched strikes and demonstrations because of their constant defeat in the court each time they brought a case against the ruling class.³² A major issue, for example, was the demand of the peasants for a 50-50 crop sharing as opposed to a 70-30 sharing favoring the landlord. They also called for an end to usury.³³

Similar situations were found in other parts of the country. This was because "as American-sponsored colonial development consolidated its hold over the economy, increasing manufacturing, service and extractive industries, the modern Filipino proletariat emerged." As early as February 2, 1902, even before the establishment of the KPMP, the first labor federation, the Union Obrera Democratica (UOD – Union of Democratic Workers), was organized. This was formed by an ilustrado expatriate Isabelo de los Reyes who had been exposed to socialist thought in Europe.³⁴ The Union Obrera Democratica denounced American imperialism and accused the colonizers of landlordism as the primary cause of the people's continued impoverishment. Aside from the struggle for workers' rights, it also actively campaigned for immediate independence and the democratization of land ownership.³⁵ Another radical group expressing mass discontent and resistance on both labor and peasant fronts was the Congreso Obrero de Filipinas (Congress of Filipino Workers), which was founded on May 1, 1913. Instrumental in consolidating this movement was Crisanto Evangelista, an active labor leader since the early 1900s.³⁶

Another popular movement that raised the issue of American imperialism in the country was that of the Sakdalistas, founded by Benigno Ramos in 1933. Ramos was the protégé of the country's Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon. This movement was formed as an immediate result of a student walkout following the derogatory remarks of an American teacher against Filipinos. The Sakdalistas took issue with American control of the economy, the educational system and the military bases, and they aimed for total independence.³⁷ In the 1935 plebiscite for the Commonwealth Constitution, the Sakdalistas opted for a boycott, insisting that the plebiscite would further entrench the hold of Americans over the country. Their campaign was branded as seditious, their assemblies and other mass actions were disrupted, and their leaders arrested.³⁸

These movements seem to have culminated in the emergence of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), or more popularly known as the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) on November 7, 1930. "The CPP was formally organized on the Stalinist tenet that a period of political agitation should precede armed revolution. It presumably had the support of Santos and the Socialist Party." One of its leading personalities, Vicente Lava, was a member of the ilustrado class and was educated abroad with a PhD. The Party was

31. David, Abinales, and Encarnacion, "Transnationalization, the State and the People," 113.

32. Luis Tanuc, "Born of the People," in *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship and Resistance*, ed. Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Roskamm Shalom (Quezon City: KEN Incorporated, 1987), 26-51. Previously published in 1953 by International Publishers, New York.

33. *Ibid.*

34. David, Abinales, and Encarnacion, "Transnationalization, the State and the People," 114-15.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*, 115.

37. *Ibid.*, 111.

38. *Ibid.*, 111-12.

declared illegal by the Supreme Court of the Philippines on October 26, 1932, for violating the law of illegal association provision.³⁹ Among its founders were KPMP's Jacinto Manahan and Juan Feleo. In 1938, the Communist Party emerged again as the Communist Party of the Philippines, a merger of the Communist and Socialist Parties and declared its affiliation with the Communist International.⁴⁰

Thus, as in the Spanish period, the major grievances still had to do with socioeconomic inequalities and social injustice stemming from land tenure. The introduction of an export-crop economy by the US increased the number of tenants in the country. The introduction of manufacturing and service industries also brought an increase in the number of workers. Thus the broadening of this class, i.e., the rural and peasant workers, which provided the mass base for the socialist/communist movements. Externally, the impetus for organizing these movements was provided by the Communist International. Hence, if the liberal-democratic revolution inspired and motivated the principalia to demand reforms from the Spanish colonizer, the communist movement, emanating mainly from the Soviet Union and its satellites, provided the ideological rationale for the social movements in the country during this period.

The guerrilla movement and resistance to Japanese occupation

The strength of the socialist/communist movements, particularly in Central Luzon, was highlighted during the outbreak of World War II and the Japanese occupation of the country. This was dramatized in March 1942, when "left-wing labor and peasant leaders and intellectuals established the "People's Army to Fight Japan" or the Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon or Huks), which grew to a strength of some ten thousand members with a mass base many times larger."⁴¹

The Hukbalahap was initially a military force, but a civilian counterpart, the "United Front Movement" (UFM) was soon formed as the political arm of the Huks. The combined organization then consisted of military, political and "mass" sections: the military assured the force, the political provided the propaganda, and the "mass" supplied the men as well as food and money.⁴²

There is a debate whether the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) was responsible for the creation of the Huk movement or whether or not the Huks emerged independently of the PKP. What seems clear, however, is that the Huks and the PKP worked closely together. The Huks had been attempting to address the social ills confronting Philippine society even before the Japanese came. Under the guidance and protection of the Huks, for example, the Central Luzon peasants ignored prewar sharecropping arrangements with the peasants keeping the entire harvest of the ricefields, supporting the Huk forces instead of the Japanese as ordered by the landlords. The Huks also instituted rigid

39. US Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research.

40. *Ibid.*

41. Schirmer and Shalom, *The Philippines Reader*, 69-70.

42. US Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research.

price-control regulations in the towns and barrios throughout Central Luzon and were thus able to reduce profiteering to a minimum. "In all these respects, the wartime activities of the Huks did much to create a political consciousness among the peasantry."⁴³ Their political power was seen with the liberation of the country from the Japanese occupation whereby the Huks took charge of all government units in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, and parts of Tarlac, Bulacan, and Bataan.⁴⁴ The Japanese war thus provided the political opportunity to consolidate the socialist/communist movement particularly in Central Luzon under the leadership of the Huks. In terms of resources, the Huks had the manpower, i.e., a military arm and a mass base. Included in the framing process, which was dominantly socialist/communist, was anti-imperialism and nationalism. This fed into the peasant consciousness.

The Elite and American Colonial Counterforce against the Socialist/Communist Movements

The Huks, in particular, and the socialist/communist movements, in general, did not prove strong enough to counter the prevailing view that Filipinos should resist the Japanese and that independence could be gained under American tutelage.⁴⁵ This seemed to be a common fate of socialist/communist movements in countries at war and when the issue of nationalism is raised. More often than not, members of the socialist/communist movements are pressured to fight for their country lest they be called "traitors" by their own countrymen. Aggravating the predicament of these movements is their perception that wars in general only benefit the elites. This was also the fate of the Huks who found themselves fighting alongside the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) against the Japanese occupation forces. It did not help the Huks at all that the Americans were hostile toward them because of their leftist and Marxist leanings. Thus after the war in 1945, the US embarked on systematic arrest of Huk leaders. This weakened the socialist/communist movements. Liberation from Japanese rule therefore also signaled the almost complete destruction of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas.⁴⁶

Consolidating American- and elite-domination of the economy

This seemed to be a most unfortunate turn of events for the Philippine social movements, because despite the formal granting of independence by the United States in 1946, Philippine society in general continued to face the same social injustices as in the past but this time under the Filipino elites with the continuing support of the Americans. US economic dominance was reinforced in the country through the Bell Trade Act of 1946, which established a system

43. *Ibid.*

44. David Wurfel, *Philippine Politics: Development and Decay* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1960), 224.

45. David, Abinales, and Encarnacion, "Transnationalization, the State and the People," 121.

46. *Ibid.*, 24.

of preferential tariffs between the two countries. The Act generally "placed various restrictions on Philippine government control of its own economy and required the Philippines to amend their constitution to give a special position to US capital."⁴⁷ "In 1955 the Bell Trade Act was replaced with a new treaty, the Laurel-Langley Agreement. This Agreement removed some of the more blatant infringements on Philippine sovereignty and introduced a meticulous reciprocity, but in fact extended the protection accorded to US capital."⁴⁸

What was more important to the US, however, during this period, was the retention of its military bases in the country, particularly Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. In return the United States provided the Philippine elite with military aid needed to reassert its authority over the radicalized peasants of Central Luzon. This aid consisted of weaponry and a permanent group of military advisers known as the Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), where "Joint" referred only to the involvement of the various branches of the US military.⁴⁹ This was thus the context whereby popular resistance to the status quo existed, i.e., the continued political and economic domination of the US through the elites. And just like in the American colonial period, there continued a conscious effort to crush any form of opposition, particularly of the socialist/communist kind, to the status quo.

Electoral politics and the Huk movement

Despite the weakening of the Huk movement, it still provided the resistance the government had to contend with. Because they were no longer a strong force, the Huks concentrated on nonviolent political tactics immediately after the war. One major venue was electoral politics. "In July 1945, the Huks, the PKP labor arm (the Congress of Labor Organizations), and the party's peasant union helped form a new political party, the Democratic Alliance." The Alliance put up a score of candidates for Congress and decided to support Sergio Osmeña for president in his unsuccessful bid against Manuel Roxas, who was accused as a Japanese "collaborator." "Despite disapproval by the PKP secretariat, six Alliance candidates won in Central Luzon, including Luis Taruc, a prominent Huk leader, but Congress, under the influence of Roxas refused to seat them. Central Luzon peasant leaders were enraged." At about the same time there were landlords' private armies, which were retaliating against tenants who had been wartime Huks.⁵⁰ Thus Philippine Congress was dominated by the wealthy whose interest was the promotion of their own economic interest. Many of them had also served the Japanese and thus were also protected from punishment for such collaboration.⁵¹ Because of this, in June 1946, the Huk leaders decided to revive their wartime organization for self-protection. They, however, rejected the goal of revolution.⁵² But in this kind of situation, the political opportunity for the Huks to achieve their goals at the legal arena in general and the electoral process in particular were closed.

47. Schirmer and Shalom, *The Philippines Reader*, 87.

48. US Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, 49. *Ibid.*

50. *Ibid.*, 224-25.

51. Schirmer and Shalom, *The Philippines Reader*, 70.

52. Wurfel, *Philippine Politics*, 225.

Government strategies to address the Huk rebellion

Despite the Huks' absence in electoral politics the elites could not ignore them. The elites knew that the issues raised by the Huks were concerns that the masses could identify with, particularly the tenants in the haciendas. The government thus embarked on a series of strategies to address the Huk rebellion, which was also a recognition of the threat the socialist/communist movement posed. Besides the offer of amnesty that did not work because it required the Huks to surrender their arms, which they refused to do, the government had a three-pronged approach. One was to crush it militarily with US support. Second was to launch an anticommunist campaign and, third, through agrarian reform. In all aspects, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), through Edward Lansdale, was crucial in launching all these. The government with US support succeeded in militarily crushing the Huk rebellion; most of its leading cadres were captured by 1956. Popular support for the movement was eroded through "democratic reforms" like "clean and honest" elections.⁵³ Moreover, with the assistance of the CIA, the government raised the "anticommunist" hysteria and framed the socialist/communist movement as a "godless" ideology, anathema to Filipino Catholicism.

The government, however, also knew that these efforts were not enough to totally obliterate the Huk movement or to prevent a similar movement from reemerging. A long-range objective, therefore, was to implement a land reform program. In this, they failed dismally. This can be seen even with the effort of Ramon Magsaysay, the first president who seriously attempted at agrarian reform. The most Magsaysay could do under a landlord-dominated Congress was to pass the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which increased the tenants' share to 70 percent of the rice and corn crop and substantially improved security of tenure. Without a total overhaul of the land tenure system, such reforms were deemed to be "merely cosmetic, their efforts ameliorative, their achievement peripheral and temporary."⁵⁴ Land reform was also pursued under the Macapagal administration, whereby "Congress only allotted less than a million pesos for the implementation of the land reform program that was estimated to cost at least Php 200 million within a year of its enactment and Php 300 million in the next three years to be successful." But even if it had been provided with all the financing it needed, the Reform Code would still have benefited only 10 percent of the Filipino tenants.⁵⁵

The failure to implement land reform perpetuated the domination of Philippine society by a small wealthy elite consisting of landholders and a few powerful industrial and commercial entrepreneurs and their lawyers. Aggravating this situation was society's traditional value system, which "stresses the primacy of the kinship group over all institutions including the state. As a result, kinship and personal connections are far more important than merit or legal niceties in

53. David, Abinales, and Encarnacion, "Transnationalization, the State and the People," 132.

54. Constantino and Constantino, *The Philippines: The Continuing Past*, 324.

55. *Ibid.*

political, social and business relations." Hence the "acceptance of nepotism and corruption as the normal road to political and personal advancement."⁵⁶ The nature of the political dispensation, therefore, did not provide the political opportunity for the socialist/communist movement to attain its goals. Although the movement was threatening enough to force the elites to come out with land reform policies, these were superficial. For the elites, they really did not have to address the socioeconomic inequalities because with American military and economic assistance, it was not possible for the socialist/communist movements to overthrow them.

The Revival of Radicalism

It did not take too long for a radical nationalist movement to rise from the ashes of the Huk movement demanding an end to neocolonialism and elite domination of Philippine society. Socioeconomic inequalities, for example, were not only rampant in the rural areas but in the labor sector as well. Despite talk of postwar economic growth, the economy had failed "to provide enough productive jobs in the face of a rapid population increase."⁵⁷ The growing ranks of the exploited lower classes thus provided the political opportunity for social movements to continue to mobilize and organize to change the status quo. The framing process took on only a slight shift. That is, socioeconomic inequalities were caused by neocolonialism instead of colonialism. The accusation of elite domination remained, and the call for nationalism to counter imperialism became more intense. There were also calls to end American domination of the economy (as characterized by parity rights) and the removal of the US military bases (regarded as undermining Philippine sovereignty).

This political dispensation gave rise to a nationalist movement whose members were not necessarily socialist or communist. These included members of the elites, such as Senator Claro M. Recto. The call for nationalism also came at the time when countries in the region were demanding the end of colonial rule and national liberation movements were on the rise against their colonizers not only in Asia but also in Latin America and Africa. The fight against neocolonialism was epitomized by the Vietnam War in the 1960s, which was opposed by majority of the American people themselves. Thus there was the presence of an external political opportunity structure which was seized upon by the nationalist movements.

Such a situation gave the PKP the political opportunity to reconsolidate, taking into consideration "the upsurge of activism on both the student and labor fronts. A reassessment of the Party line led to the conclusion that the moment was ripe for the reestablishment of legal organizations in the labor, peasant and student sectors as well as active recruitment into the Party of people who had cadre potential."⁵⁸ This effort culminated in the PKP's launching of the

56. Schirmer and Shalom, *The Philippines Reader*, 126.

57. International Labour Office, "Sharing in Development: A Programme of Employment, Equity and Growth for the Philippines" (Geneva: ILO, 1974), in *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship and Resistance*, ed. Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Roskamm Shalom, (Quezon City: KEN Incorporated, 1987), 3-13. Previously published in 1953 by International Publishers, New York.

58. David, Abinales, and Encarnacion, "Transnationalization, the State and the People," 134.

Kabataan Makabayan (KM – Youth for Nationalism) in 1964. This signaled the attempt of the PKP leadership “to revive itself through fresh recruits from the students who had developed their ideology underpinning their autonomy from the Party. The PKP thought that these recruits would direct the burgeoning youth protests and do this with the proper perspective.”⁵⁹ The KM not only expanded in schools but went beyond the boundaries of universities by setting up chapters in communities and later taking the initiative to link up with workers and peasants. This expansion was pushed along by mass activities that drew public attention and established the student front as a vital sector to contend with.⁶⁰ Such a situation was made possible by the growth in the student population in the Philippines, particularly those who were entering university, i.e., fifteen- to twenty-one-year olds. The socialist/communist movement seized the potential of the studentry into their cause.

KM’s prominence, militance, and growing thrust toward the path of armed struggle, however, stood in stark opposition to the low-profile, relative conservatism and the parliamentary thrust of the old leadership of the PKP. Internal conflict started to surface ultimately ending in the expulsion of the KM cadres from the PKP. The young radicals, however, decided to fight back by forming a new party on December 26, 1964, which adopted the line of “Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought” to distinguish it from the old party.⁶¹ Calling themselves the new Communist Party of the Philippines under the leadership of Jose Ma. Sison, whose *nom de guerre* was “Amado Guerrero,” they linked up with Bernabe “Commander Dante” Buscayno, head of the New People’s Army (NPA).⁶² Unlike the PKP, therefore, the rationale of the new CPP was framed within the goals and strategies of the Chinese communist movement and not the Soviet Union’s brand of communism. And for the new CPP, there was the political opportunity to attain its goals through an armed revolution as opposed to the legal means sought by the PKP.

“Both in the internal organization and in the ability to generate mass support, the CPP was far superior to the PKP. In the urban areas, the Kabataan Makabayan functioned as a propaganda movement for the national democratic cultural revolution which drew in a variety of classes and sectors. In the countryside, guerrilla groups acted both as political and military units in order to gain a foothold among the local population.”⁶³ Since it was the armed struggle that was primary, the urban centers functioned as a recruiting ground for new members that could be sent to the communities and factories, but more importantly, that could be doing guerrilla work in the countryside.⁶⁴ The new CPP thus had more resources, both labor and economic, to mobilize than the PKP did.

As the CPP steadily expanded, especially through student organizations like the KM, the entire political milieu was infected with greater involvement. Other popular movements developed in the 1970s, the largest of which were

59. *Ibid.*, 135.

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*, 136

62. Wurtel, *Filipino Politics*, 226.

63. David, Abinales, and Encarnacion, “Transnationalization, the State and the People,” 138.

64. *Ibid.*

Christian reformist and moderate groups, which like the CPP, were student-led. The PKP attempted to match the KM through the Malayang Pagkakaisang Kabataan Pilipino (MPKP – Youth United for a Free Filipino) but was unable to overtake the lead role of the KM.⁶⁵ “The moderate groups, however, also expanded advocating a moderate line of resistance against the Marcos government through a Gandhian-type opposition.”⁶⁶ Sectarian schools also joined in following a “different pattern of politicalization. That is, student activism took the form of criticisms of the church policies which were insensitive to the plight of the poor peasants particularly in Bicol, Negros and Cavite. Vatican II reforms became the focal point for the questioning of the orientation of the church.”⁶⁷ Furthermore, “what came to be regarded as reform movements in schools revolved around the issues of lowering of tuition fee increases, improvement of educational facilities, reactions against terror teachers and the like.”⁶⁸ A new dimension was, therefore, raised with regard to the framing process. That is, the issue of social injustice was couched within in the context of Christian values.

But the issues that caught the most attention were those framed within the anti-imperialist and nationalist context. “The protest, which was predominantly student-led, was a call for nationalism. Thus, in spite of their Maoist rhetoric, they infused a concept of a nation that had been buried under the barrage of American propaganda for many years. Popular interest in Filipino culture was revived.”⁶⁹ “The period from 1970 to 1972, popularly referred to by the movement as the First Quarter Storm, was an unprecedented explosion of proportions which greatly influenced popular thinking on pressing issues and propelling nationalism as a concept to be valued.”⁷⁰

Conclusion

The ability of the social movements to take advantage of the political opportunity structures as can be gleaned through the various time frames of the pre-Martial Law period, i.e., the Spanish and American colonial periods, the Japanese occupation and the Commonwealth period provided the impetus for the democratization process, which was very much anchored in answering the problems of poverty and socioeconomic inequality. During the Spanish colonial period, for example, social movements emerged because of socioeconomic inequalities and social injustice. At the time, political resistance against the existing order was expressed through the priest-led revolts and the millenarian movements. Their concerns were framed within the context of their economic rights and for the former, the return to communal autonomy. The rise of the principalia class brought about a new dimension to popular resistance against Spanish rule which was political in nature. That is, the principalia, already having economic power, wanted political power through reforms. The principles

65. *Ibid.*, 140.

66. *Ibid.*

67. Patronilo Bn. Daroy, “On the Eve of the Dictatorship and Revolution,” in *Javala-De Dios, Aurora, Patronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power* (Metro Manila: Conspicua, 1988), 6.

68. *Ibid.*

69. *Ibid.*, 141.

70. *Ibid.*

of liberal democracy, the ideology of the middle class, framed their issues against Spanish rule. Externally, their movement was given impetus by the bourgeois revolutions in Europe as epitomized by the French Revolution. The Revolution of 1869 as led by the Katipunan saw the merging of the principalia class and the masses, as represented mainly by the tenant farmers and the working class, which were brought together by the desire for Philippine independence. What made this movement formidable was the joining together of the economic resources of the principalia and the mass base provided by the lower class.

In the American period, the continued repression of the peasants and the rural and urban workers gave impetus to the rise of socialist/communist movements. The issues were the same, i.e., the fight for socioeconomic equality, but the goal was not a liberal democratic regime but a socialist society. The concerns were also framed within a broader context of the fight against colonialism and elite domination. There was, however, a sprinkling of members of the elites who themselves founded or headed the socialist/communist movements. Educated locally and abroad, they generally provided the intellectual leadership of the movement. These movements were also given impetus by the external environment with the emergence of socialist movements under the tutelage of the Soviet Union. Strategy-wise, the socialist/communist movements engaged in electoral politics but this was to no avail as the elites dominated this arena of political power. The only recourse it seemed then was through an armed revolution.

The Japanese occupation gave the socialist/communist movements, particularly, the Huk movement, an opportunity to consolidate their forces although there was need to frame their goals temporarily in a different manner, that is, liberation from the Japanese can be attained with the support of the Americans. Despite this, the Huks pursued strategies aimed at improving the well-being of the peasantry. The end of the Japanese occupation, however, brought about the realization that the socialist/communist movements were no match to American military, political, and economic might. With the help of the Philippine elite, the US not only succeeded in crushing the Huk movement but went on to consolidate its hold on the Philippine economy and establish its military presence in the region through the American bases in the country. Despite their weakening, the socialist/communist movements continued to threaten the status quo, forcing the Philippine government with US assistance to pursue land reform programs to address the socioeconomic source of the peasants' grievances. The absence of political will rendered the effort futile.

The failure to address the socioeconomic structures that continued to breed injustice in society during the postcolonial period would witness the upsurge of the nationalist movement in the 1960s, led mainly by the socialist/communist

movements, against American and elite domination of the economy. Framing the issues in the context of the fight against neocolonialism and imperialism, the social movements rallied the burgeoning studentry to their cause. The movement was given impetus by the external environment that witnessed the emergence of national liberation movements fighting for the end of colonialism and the establishment of communism as an alternative to capitalism with the rise of China as a communist power in Asia. The students did not limit themselves to their schools but went to the surrounding cities and the countryside to organize the workers and the peasants. Their radicalization was epitomized by the emergence of the new Communist Party of the Philippines, the leadership of which followed the Chinese model. Despite the differences, what brought all the radical forces together, including the reformist movements, was nationalism, that is, the need to assert the Filipino identity which could only be attained by linking up with the basic masses—the peasants, the workers and the urban poor—in effecting social transformation.⁷¹

Guide Questions

1. Define social movements. Does this definition apply to the nature of political resistance during the pre-Martial Law period?
2. How did the social movements during the pre-Martial Law period frame their issues and concerns?
3. What strategies did the social movements use to pursue their struggle for democratization and development?
4. What were the political-opportunity structures available that allowed the social movements to pursue their goals and objectives? What factors facilitated and hindered this endeavor?

Glossary

Collective-action frames – used by social-movement participants to understand their issues and concerns and to mobilize potential members. These frames may either evolve and translate to collective action or fail to do so.⁷²

Communist Party of the Philippines – established on December 26, 1964, by members of the Kabataan Makabayan, this movement distinguished itself from the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) by espousing the line of “Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.” It sought to attain its goals through the armed revolution as opposed to the legal means sought by the PKP.

71. *Ibid.*

72. Dorothea Hilhorst, *The Real World of the NGOs: Discourse, Diversity, Development* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003).

Hukbalahap Movement – Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon or Huks for short or the “People’s Army to Fight Japan” Movement; a left-wing guerrilla movement led by labor and peasant leaders and intellectuals who fought the Japanese alongside the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.

Kabataang Makabayan (KM) or Youth for Nationalism – radical student movement which emerged in the 1960s under the tutelage of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas. KM established the student front as a vital sector to contend with.

Kataas-taasan Kagalanggalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan⁷³ or Katipunan – an underground organization led by members of the semiproletarian class and the intellectuals. Its membership cut across the classes in Philippine society and led the Philippine Revolution of 1896 against Spain. The other uses of the acronym of Katipunan are: Kamahalmahala’t Kagalanggalang na Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan⁷⁴ (Most Exalted and Most Respected Society of the Sons of the People) and Kamahalmahalan at Kataastaasang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan⁷⁵ (Most Beloved and Highest Respected Society of the Sons of the People).

Millenarian movements – social movements that attempted to address the economic problems encountered by the people during the Spanish period, e.g., land expropriation, by framing it within the context of the Catholic religion.

Political-opportunity structures framework – the political opportunity structures (POS) framework calls attention to what is considered a crucial dimension of the resources available for social movements to mobilize. In particular, it looks at how a specific political environment may determine the course of a particular social movement.

Principalia class – descendants of the pre-Spanish native elite who opted for integration into the colonial system and the Chinese mestizos who inherited the merchant roles of their fathers in the marketing of export products from the countryside to the trading centers.

Propaganda Movement – the movement led by the ilustrados, the educated members of the principalia class, which sought formal political representation in government during the Spanish colonial period.

The Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) or the Communist Party of the Philippines – communist movement formally organized on November 7, 1930. Its ideological leanings followed those of the Soviet Union. It believed in the Stalinist tenet that a period of political agitation should precede armed revolution.

The Sakdalistas – a popular movement against American imperialism in the 1930s, which demanded the end to American control of the economy,

73. Used in Reynaldo G. Iloilo, *Passion at Rabolusyon: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1997).

74. Used in Onofre D. Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation*, volume 2 (Quezon City: AKLAKI Foundation, Inc., 1989).

75. Used in Rosario Mendoza Cortes, Celestina Puyal Boncan, and Ricardo Trota Jose, *The Filipino Saga: History as Social Change* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 2000), 134, citing Santiago Alvarez’s *The Katipunan and the Revolution: Memoirs of a General* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1992), 4.

reform of the educational system, the removal of the military bases and total independence for the Philippines.

Social movements – social movements are sustained and purposeful collective mobilized by an identifiable, self-organized group in confrontation with specific power structures and in pursuit of socioeconomic and political change.⁷⁶

Socialist Party of the Philippines – founded in 1929 by Pedro Abad Santos, it marked the emergence of socialism as a framework for resistance against the feudal order and as an alternative vision of society for the landless in the Philippines, particularly the tenants of the sugar haciendas in Central Luzon.

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76. Alejandro Colas, *International Civil Society* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2002), 67.

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Philippine Social Movements during Martial Law

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem

Kung hindi tayo kikilos, sino ang kikilos?

Kung hindi tayo kikibo, sino ang kikibo?

Kung hindi ngayon, kailan pa?

(If we do not stand up and fight, who will?

If we do not speak up, who will?

If not now, when?)

– Abraham “Ditto” Sarmiento III

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Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, the student should be able to:

1. Discuss the reasons for the perpetuation of social movements during Martial Law within the context of the democratization and development process in the Philippines.
2. Examine the goals and objectives of social movements during Martial Law.
3. Elucidate the strategies used by the social movements to achieve their goals and objectives.
4. Analyze the factors that facilitated or hindered the achievement of their goals and objectives.

Introduction

The political upheaval created by the radical movement would be used as an excuse by President Ferdinand Marcos to declare martial law on September 21, 1971, putting a temporary stop to the burgeoning student

1. Vicente G. Tirol, “The Press during Martial Law,” in *Seven in the Eye of History*, ed. David Maramba Asuncion (Manila: Anvil Press, 2000), 43-81.

activism. Marcos declared that there was a "conspiracy" between the Left and the oligarchs to destabilize the country; he promised that martial law would bring about peace, order and stability to an otherwise tumultuous situation. This appealed to the Filipino middle class who feared the specter of communism, which they perceived was raised by the radical movements. Marcos also appropriated "some of the criticisms propagated by the First Quarter Storm (FQS), which had started to take root in the consciousness of the people." One major issue was the perceived deterioration of state institutions into private enclaves of the contending elite political factions. This led to issues like "pork barrel," which was believed to have hindered the state from fulfilling its responsibility to the people. By centralizing proceeds that served to protect these elite enclaves, Marcos promised "to deliver the goods" and this was popularly received.² However, Marcos's failure to fulfill his promises witnessed the growth of social movements in the Philippines, foremost of which was the communist insurgency in the country. This has led some to say that Marcos was the best recruiter of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

Arresting the Social Movements through Military and Political Means

Marcos's strategies to crush any opposition to his rule, particularly from the social movements, were reminiscent of those used during the pre-Martial Law period, i.e., these were military and political in nature. Hardest hit were the mass organizations of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), known as the national democratic (ND) movement as well as anti-Marcos politicians who were previously protected either by their stature or by their respective private armies that had been dismantled by Marcos.³ The social movements during this period remained weak. The CPP was only at the guerrilla-building stage in the countryside and its underground structure in the cities was unstable due to the near-decimation of its forces among the students and the working class.⁴ The Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) entered into a "national unity agreement" with Marcos in October 1974 in which the PKP supported various New Society programs of Marcos such as land reform, the restructuring of trade unions, and the development of diplomatic ties with socialist countries (especially the Soviet Union). In return, Marcos released PKP political prisoners and proclaimed amnesty for party members and professed to lift the ban on its mass organizations.⁵

Marcos launched a military offensive against the private armies of the bourgeois opposition, which crippled their bases of support. Their followers, reared in personalized and patronage-type politics, were ineffective without their leader.⁶ As martial law reigned, Marcos "unleashed one of the bloodiest

2. Karina Constantino David, P. N. Abinales, and Teresa Encarnacion, "Transitionization, the State and the People: The Philippine Case" (working papers of the United Nations University Asian Perspectives Project [Southeast Asia], 1984), 144.

3. *Ibid.*, 145.

4. *Ibid.*

5. David Wurtel, *Philippine Politics: Development and Decay* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), 230.

6. *Ibid.*, 146.

eras in Philippine history. Salvaging, 'hamletting' and torture became bywords that characterized the reign of terror under the regime. For the first time, the country acquired the dubious distinction of being one of the most notorious violators of human rights.⁷ "By 1977, some 70,000 Filipinos had been imprisoned for their political actions and beliefs at one time or another after martial law was declared and more arrests continued."⁸ The suppression of civil and political rights became total with the closure of media outlets and the arrest of journalists upon the declaration of martial law. What emerged was an official media that had no credibility at all. Thus there seemed to be no political opportunity to challenge martial law during its initial years.

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

The only signs of strong resistance to the regime came from the unified Muslim groups who agreed to form a broad antiregime alliance called the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1974. By portraying its resistance as both a political and a religious one, the MNLF generated massive support from the Arab states who were suspicious of the regime's sentiment toward the national minorities following a series of punitive campaigns against the Muslims on the eve of Martial Law.⁹ Just like their Christian counterparts who were not members of the elites, the Muslims were victims of landgrabbing by Christian settlers in the area who manipulated the legal system to evict the Moro farmers and their families from land they had occupied for generations.¹⁰

The emergence of the MNLF introduced a new dimension of the framing process of social movements in the Philippines. That is, the issue of ethnicity and religion emerged as basis for mobilization.

The external environment in the 1970s also provided the impetus for the emergence of the MNLF and the emphasis on ethnicity and religion. This was seen in the support given to the MNLF by the Islamic countries which organized themselves into the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The OIC was a dominant force in the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC). In the early 1970s, OPEC ended the oil monopoly of the Western multinational corporations in their respective countries and took control of the oil industry. This vastly increased the economic wealth of these member-countries, which they wanted to translate to political power. For the Islamic countries, one way of doing this was by ending the repression of their Muslim brethren all over the world—i.e., by assisting them. The external environment thus provided the political opportunity for the Muslims in the Philippines to receive economic and military assistance from the Islamic members of the OPEC to fight any form

7. Rigoberto T. Tiglao, "The Consolidation of the Dictatorship," in *Javate-De Dios, Aurora, Patronio Bn. Daroy, and Loma Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People's Power* (Metro Manila: Conspicetus, 1988), 56.

8. Amnesty International (USA), *Human Rights Violations in the Philippines* (New York, July 22, 1974), in *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship and Resistance*, ed. Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Roskamm Shalom (Quezon City: KEN Incorporated, 1987), 3.

9. David, Abinales, and Encarnacion, "Transnationalization, the State and the People," 147.

10. Wurfel, *Filipino Politics*, 155.

of repression. This was reminiscent of the support given by the Soviet Union to the PKP and China to the CPP during the earlier stages of these movements, which the Marcos government checked by establishing diplomatic ties with these two socialist countries in the mid-1970s. The MNLF forces, however, despite external support, were no match to the government's military might. By 1977 its forces were badly decimated; it also experienced defection from its own ranks. The Marcos government responded by cultivating good relations with the OIC, particularly with Libya, which was known for supporting the Muslim secessionist movement in the south. In 1978 the MNLF was forced to adhere to the Tripoli Agreement, which was agreed upon by the Philippine and Libyan governments.¹¹

The Perpetuation of Underdevelopment

Marcos knew that for martial law to be accepted, he had to couple political and military repression with economic reforms. Thus like his predecessors he implemented agrarian reform in the country as an antidote to social unrest. Declaring that the success of his martial law regime, also known as the "New Society," lies in the genuine implementation of land reform, he called for the implementation of land reform "to emancipate the Filipino farmers from bondage to the soil."¹² His land reform program, which was designed with US government advice, was complemented by his government's Masagana 99 (M99) loan program. The M99 loan program and the land reform program were considered the twin foundations of the rural development strategy introduced by Marcos.

M99 was designed to increase total rice production through the use of green-revolution technology: chemical fertilizers, insecticides, mechanized irrigation, and new, high-yield varieties of rice. It was part of an effort to modernize Philippine agriculture along capitalist lines by inducing farmers to grow crops for sale and not just for subsistence.¹³

Farmers were also forced to join cooperatives under the Samahang Nayon (SN) program in order to qualify for the land reform program. Marcos's vision was one in which the cooperative would replace the landlord.

Why agrarian reform failed

Marcos's agrarian reform program failed because of the following: First, the agrarian reform program was limited to rice and corn lands, leaving the majority of the agricultural lands, e.g., the large sugar, coconut and banana estates, outside of the scope of the program. Thus it failed to bring about any significant redistribution of land or income and even the urban population remained totally unaffected.¹⁴ Second, "only 396,000 of the estimated seven million Filipino tenant farmers were eligible to become landowners under the program. After ten years

11. David, Abinales, and Encarnacion, "Transnationalization, the State and the People," 147.

12. Kathy McAfee, "The Philippines: A Harvest of Anger," in *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship and Resistance* (Previously published in *Facts for Action*, Oxfam America Educational Publication, #15, Boston, October 1985).

13. *Ibid.*

14. Gerald C. Hickey and John L. Wilkinson, "Agrarian Reform in the Philippines," report of a seminar, December 16-17, 1977, at the Rand Corporation, Washington D.C., P-6194; Sania Monica, California, August, 1978, in *The Philippines Reader*, 3-15.

of land reform, fewer than one percent of the eligible farmers had actually obtained titles to the land they were tilling.¹⁵ A reason for this is that a large number of peasants had been reluctant to participate in the program because they feared the administrative responsibilities and financial burden they would shoulder once they became amortizing tenants. Given their poverty situation and unpredictable source of income, i.e., rice production, they were not assured of the income that would allow them to pay their land amortization. This was validated with the inability of peasants who were land-reform beneficiaries to meet their amortization payments.¹⁶ Third, the pace of the agrarian reform program was slowed down by a great number of small landlords who opposed it. Marcos had failed to appreciate the fact that he would be dealing not with a large group of landowners but a sizable number of small landlords. He did not have the political will to go against this group. For one thing, he needed them, as his local leaders, to act as intermediaries in the patrimonial system he established.¹⁷

By 1977, the failure of the agrarian reform program was evident in the lives of landless farm laborers who experienced a 30 percent decline in relative wages in the past twenty-five years. At the same time, the rural population was growing at the rate of 2 to 2.5 percent annually. This meant that, since the agrarian reform began, an estimated one million new families have sprung in the rural areas.¹⁸ For the M99 program, government surveys revealed that 69 percent of all Filipino children were underweight for their age because they did not get enough to eat. The impoverishment of rice farmers throughout the Marcos years also resulted in worsening income inequality.¹⁹ Ironically, the beneficiaries of the Marcos government's land and farm policies were the agribusiness and forestry corporations that expanded rapidly in the 1970s. Entire villages were uprooted to make way for logging concessions, cattle ranches and the plantation of bananas, pineapple, sugarcane, and rubber and palm oil trees. By 1980, an estimated 45 percent of the country's cultivated land was being used for these and other export crops.²⁰

The repression of the labor sector. The failure of the agrarian reform program left the control of the wealth in the Philippines highly concentrated in a few elites, particularly the Filipino capitalists engaged in industrial activities. These capitalists were able to link economic and political power, which made them attractive to transnational corporations (TNCs) who they teamed up with in joint ventures. As a result, Filipino capitalists reaped monopoly profits.²¹ Moreover, as part of the policy to attract TNCs, in particular, and foreign capital, in general, government banned industrial strikes under General Order 5. Leaders of the militant unions were subject to incessant harassment. This situation coupled with the lack of employment kept wages down.²² The sector of the working class which was greatly exploited was the female sector particularly in the garment and electronic sectors, which TNCs heavily invested in. The female

15. McAtee, "The Philippines: A Harvest of Anger."

16. *Ibid.*

17. Wurzel, *Filipino Politics*, 176.

18. McAtee, "The Philippines: A Harvest of Anger."

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*

21. Charles W. Lindsey, "In Search of Dynamism: Foreign Investment in the Philippines under Martial Law," in *The Philippines Reader*, previously published in *Pacific Affairs* 56 (Fall, 1983).

22. Francisco Nemenzo, "From Autocracy to Elite Democracy," in *Javate-De Dios, Aurora, Patronio Bn. Daroy, and Loma Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution*, 221-68.

workers helped to depress wage levels in the Philippines as well as in the rest of the world. This was because as competitors for jobs, they swelled the labor force, and "because there are more potential workers to choose from, the TNCs can offer to pay less." Among the complaints of women workers were the imposition of heavy workloads in terms of quotas, intolerable heat in garment factories and extreme coldness in electronic firms. Most female workers were also hired on a temporary basis.²³

The emergence of crony capitalism. Another major reason for the worsening situation of the country was the rise of crony capitalism, that is, the centralization of corruption in the hands of Marcos, his relatives and close friends. An example of this was seen in the exemption of coconut and sugar lands from agrarian reform and the entrusting of these two important sectors to Marcos cronies Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. and Roberto S. Benedicto, respectively. This was viewed as "a simple reaffirmation of feudal landlordism." Furthermore, the "agricultural monopolies also pressed down the real income of farm workers and small peasants..." leading to rural underemployment and increase in poverty.²⁴

The debt trap. Because of unbridled corruption by Marcos and his cronies, and because of the failure of the government's technocrats to prescribe the economic policies needed to address underdevelopment, the country became deeply enmeshed in a debt trap far worse than any other country in Southeast Asia.

Blame was also placed on the regime's reliance on foreign loans for economic expansion, which was "1) designed to free Marcos from the clutches of the oligarchy by assuring disproportionate resources for his friends, who were more interested in quick profit than in stable investments; 2) a result of the value orientation of the technocrats who made policy and were respected in international bank circles; and 3) by the early 1980s, a necessity because of the vast hemorrhaging of domestic capital, a flight to the security of foreign shores first indulged by Marcos' foes and later by his cronies which is inadequately quantifiable but generally known to be of major proportion."²⁵

Redefining the Democratic Struggle

The inability of the martial law regime to deliver on the economic goods and the increase in the military repression and curtailment of civil and political rights provided the opportunity for the social movements not only to consolidate themselves but also to attract more members. The manner in which they framed the opposition was within the context of democracy and the strategies were either through violence, i.e. armed struggle, or nonviolent means through the new politics. These were perceived as not necessarily mutually exclusive.

23. Sister Mary Soledad Perpinan, RGS, "Women and Transnational Corporations: The Philippine Experience," in *The Philippines Reader*, 162-72. Previously published in *Access to Justice*, ed. Harry M. Scoble and Laurie S. Wiseberg (London: Zed Books, 1985).

24. De Dios, 132.

25. Wurfel, *Filipino Politics*, 337.

The armed struggle as the continuing framework for popular resistance

The CPP continued to follow the “Marxist-Leninist-Maoist” ideological line, putting a premium on armed struggle in the countryside.

The repressiveness of the martial law regime, which did not provide the political opportunity to resort to legal means to attain change, also strengthened the CPP’s resolve that the armed struggle was the only framework for overthrowing the current regime. Thus a very important component of the armed struggle was to build up the New People’s Army (NPA), and the CPP did this by having the NPA activate its “propaganda” and “education” teams and minimize its losses by avoiding direct armed confrontation with the military.²⁶

The failure of the martial law regime to fulfill its development promises also gave the CPP-NPA the opportunity to propagate the armed struggle. The peasant sector, given its dismal state, found this option highly attractive. This was seen in the emergence of thirty-three provincial peasant associations and hundreds of local ones. In June 1985 a National Peasant Union, the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas or KMP, was founded to take the place of the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF). The FFF, a nationwide peasant organization established in the 1950s and which gained prominence in the 1960s, was crushed by the martial law regime in the early 1970s. Among the activities these peasant and farmworker organizations pursued was the conduct of training courses for farmers, publication of journals, and holding fora and demonstrations for economic reform and relief from hunger.²⁷

The increasing militarization in the country also provided the CPP-NPA the political opportunity to recruit for the underground movement. This was because although freedom was granted by the government during the day, it was often denied by night. The number of death-squad assassinations of peasants and labor activists was on the rise. Even elected officials who showed sympathy for the peasant movements were “salvaged.” Because of this, many of the movement’s middle-class supporters went into hiding or exile for fear of their lives.

The diminishing space for legal reforms compelled a number of legal opposition groups to go underground as the peasant struggle for economic survival was reduced to a military question.²⁸ Thus, by the 1980s, the Communist-led NPA grew from a minor presence in the 1970s to around over 30,000 armed regular and irregular guerrillas. (Regulars are full-time members of mobile guerrilla units. Irregulars are part-time fighters who stay close to their home villages).²⁹

The emergence of revolutionary social movements

The CPP was not the only one that viewed armed struggle as the way by which to frame the mode of resistance. There were also other revolutionary

26. David, Abinales, and Encarnacion, “Transnationalization, the State and the People,” 149.

27. McAtee, “The Philippines: A Harvest of Anger.”

28. *Ibid.*

29. Committee Print, “The Philippines: A Situation Report,” staff report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, US Senate, November 1, 1985. In *The Philippines Reader*, 1, 4, 5, 7, 8.

groups such as the social democrats who were involved in setting up underground structures and an army. Their difference with the CPP was that they did not frame their issues based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology. They were instead guided by Christian principles. The precursors of the social democrats were the social movements that were guided by the social consciousness emanating from the Catholic clergy and the laity, and which sought an alternative to the communist-led peasant movements. An example of this was the FFF, led by Jeremias Montemayor, a former dean of the College of Law, Ateneo de Manila, a Jesuit-run school for the elites.³⁰

The FFF also had a youth arm, the Khi Rho Movement, which was "composed of seminarians and priests in cooperation with students from religious-owned elite private schools such as the Ateneo University, San Beda, La Salle and Holy Spirit who were particularly active in pressuring the church for reforms through pickets and marathon demonstrations."³¹ The social democrats, however, were not successful in putting up an armed revolutionary movement because of "the factional strife within the organization over alliances and cooperation with other groups, especially the CPP. This became an obstacle to their effective formation. They had come close to announcing the founding of an army but this armed group [never approximated] the political and military strength of the NPA."³² Another revolutionary group that emerged in the mid-1970s was a breakaway faction of the CPP. Called the People's Liberation Movement (PLM), it was critical of what it believed were ideological and political inefficiencies of the CPP. The PLM framed its struggle in the urban areas and its military strategy was to assassinate members of the local police as well as confiscating their firearms. This led to popular resentment rather than support.³³

Linking the indigenous peoples to the armed struggle

The repressiveness of the martial law regime and its inability to deliver on its economic promises to the communities also provided the revolutionary movement the opportunity to recruit from the indigenous peoples (IPs). The IPs, numbering around four million, are neither Christians nor Muslims and are also referred to as "tribal Filipinos" or "cultural minorities." "Of the many ethnolinguistic groups, the largest is the Igorot of Northern Luzon, who number about half a million. These uplanders have been largely ignored in the political and social life of the country."³⁴ Despite being marginalized from the mainstream of society, these IPs' domains have been encroached upon by the Christian majority for many decades, not unlike the problem encountered by the Muslims in the south with the Christian settlers there. Furthermore, large tracts of what were once the ancestral lands of the Negritos had been appropriated for the US military bases.³⁵

Under the martial law regime, the plight of the IPs worsened as the government also began to encroach on their lands. This came as a result of the

30. Wurfel, *Filipino Politics*, 65.
31. Patronio Bn. Daroy, "On the Eve of the Dictatorship and Revolution," in *Javate-De Dios, Aurora, Patronio Bn. Daroy, and Loma Kalaw-Tiro*, 3.

32. David, Abinales, and Encarnacion, "Transnationalization, the State and the People," 152.

33. *Ibid.*

34. *The Philippines Reader*, 199.

35. *Ibid.*

martial law regime's "ushering in a new era of foreign-dominated and export-oriented development." Since tribal Filipinos occupied areas rich with natural resources, they were besieged by a growing number of corporations engaged in mining, logging, agribusiness and other export industries. To support these industries, the government rushed the construction of dams and other infrastructure projects in ancestral areas. The military, on the other hand, relocated the tribal Filipinos from the affected areas, and moved to divide communities against one another, thereby keeping them from joining a growing national resistance.³⁶

A celebrated case of popular uprising by the IPs was the Kalinga resistance to the Chico River Dam project, which was funded by a World Bank loan. "This project sought to construct four dams on the Chico River for electrification and irrigation without prior consultation with the local population. One of the dams would encroach on the ancestral lands of a tribal community, the Kalinga, which resisted the construction. In the end, owing to stiff resistance, the construction of the dam was cancelled but Macli-ing Dulag, the Kalinga chieftain who had led the opposition, was shot and killed in his home on April 24, 1980."³⁷ Situations like this provide the political opportunity for the CPP-NPA to recruit from the IPs. A reason for this is that the struggle of the IPs are also framed within the context of "economic exploitation" and "political repression," issues the CPP-NPA were also fighting against. Also, unlike the MNLF, the IPs did not have an external force, like the OIC, to give them assistance. Thus the CPP-NPA helped them fight the martial law regime.

Unlike the MNLF liberation movement, the issues for the IPs were not framed by the CPP-NPA within the context of the assertion of one's "identity and ethnicity." Primacy was given to the national democratic revolution with emphasis on the class issue.

Alternative framing processes for the democratic struggle

Although the CPP-NPA framed the democratic struggle within the context of an armed revolution and overthrow of government, there was also a conscious effort to also recruit victims of the martial law regime who may be opposed to the Marcos government's military and economic repression but were not open to armed struggle, much more a socialist/communist society as an alternative. "United front" politics as a strategy enabled the CPP to take advantage of the political opportunity presented by other emerging opposition groups; the Party set up the National Democratic Front (NDF) to act as the umbrella organization for a broad united action against the martial law regime. The united-front strategy was also the Party's way of drawing middle-class support to the movement.

36. Sally Swenson, "The Philippines: Background Documents Prepared for the Conference on Native Resource Control and the Multinational Corporate Challenge: Aboriginal Rights in International Perspective" (Boston, MA: Anthropology Resource Center, 1982), in *The Philippines Reader*, 36-38.

37. Emmanuel De Dios, "The Erosion of the Dictatorship," in *Javate-De Dios, Aurora, Patroño Bn. Daryo, and Loma Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution*, 125.

This umbrella organization, however, was organized generally for the CPP, leading to the refusal of some organizations to join.³⁸ Those groups also refused to join because of the way the CPP framed its position in the social movements, i.e., it was the vanguard party. Other groups questioned this position; although they believed that the CPP may be best equipped militarily, its ideological leadership, particularly its Maoism, was seriously challenged.³⁹ As for the middle class, a number of them did not agree with the strategy of violence, i.e., the armed struggle of the CPP, to attain fundamental socioeconomic change in society.⁴⁰

Framing the democratic struggle through "new politics"

Social movements were also aware of the challenge posed by the opposition to the Marcos regime, which consisted of "the old disenfranchised politicians who retained their party affiliation despite the loss of these parties' organizational bases, members of the Church hierarchy and, businessmen and executives who were increasingly getting disgruntled with Marcos."⁴¹ They framed their struggle within the context of restoring the old political order. Certainly the social movements did not want the old order, which was characterized by elite domination of politics. Instead, they framed their struggle under a new type of political organization that stressed grassroots organizations and the building of real people power at the community level. Calling it "new politics," one of its defining points was that it did not center on personalities but rather on principles.⁴² Its explanation of the martial law society also "[goes] as deep ... tracing it to the structural roots of the social order. These groups are mostly based among marginalized classes of society."⁴³ These groups agreed with the CPP ideology insofar as they were also anti-imperialist and pro-democratization. Advocates also believed, like the CPP, that political change could not be achieved through piecemeal reforms but required structural changes in society. Like the CPP, their strategy also included educating and politicizing the citizenry with regard to issues against the dictatorship. A difference, however, lay in the manner in which "new politics" framed its issues vis-à-vis the CPP's, i.e., it did not put primacy on the armed struggle to attain political change.

Framing the democratic struggle through the anti-dictatorship movement

"United front" politics and "new politics" found further expression in a broader framework of the anti-dictatorship or anti-martial law movement.

38. *Ibid.*

39. *Ibid.*, 150.

40. Wurfel, *Filipino Politics*,

231.

41. De Dios, "The Erosion of the Dictatorship," 153.

42. *Ibid.*, 154.

43. *Ibid.*, 153-54.

The problem, then, was not just Marcos, the person, but the political dispensation, i.e., martial law or dictatorship. What these groups called for was a restoration of democracy, and in particular, civil and political rights. The

expression of this was found in the emergence of nationalist coalitions composed mainly of progressive elements from the studentry, the workers, peasants, professionals, and anti-Marcos politicians and businessmen.

These included civil libertarians and nationalists like Senator Jose W. Diokno and Senator Lorenzo Tañada. The unifying factor that brought these diverse groups together was the common concern against the imposition of martial law.⁴⁴ The nationalists looked upon the support of the US for the Marcos dictatorship as anathema to democratic principles. Thus, they brought forth another issue into the framing process, i.e., the role of the United States in supporting the authoritarian regime through military and economic assistance and turning a blind eye on the human-rights abuses and corruption. These were all in exchange for the use of the Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base and other military facilities in the country. The middle class who joined the anti-dictatorship movement identified with the way the movement denounced crony capitalism and other forms of corruption in the Marcos government. This led to the complete loss of the Philippine elite's support for the martial law regime.⁴⁵

An active participant in the anti-dictatorship movement was the Church, which was significant in a country where 80 percent of the people are Catholics. The Church's vast organizational network could reach the remotest barrio through the power of the pulpit, thus inevitably exerting a pervasive influence in the lives of the Filipinos.⁴⁶

The Church, however, was not a monolithic entity. For the church hierarchy, as represented by the former Archbishop of Manila Cardinal Jaime Sin, its reaction to the declaration of martial law was one of "critical collaboration." On the other hand, militant priests, nuns and lay church workers who had been working with the poor and oppressed were uncompromising in their condemnation of the immorality of martial law and its effects.⁴⁷ These groups include the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP), which worked closely with the workers and peasants in their struggle. The AMRSP was instrumental in the creation of the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFD), which was principally responsible for the documentation and dissemination of mounting human-rights abuses as well as working for the support of political detainees and their families. It also worked closely with the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), an organization of lawyers headed by former Senator Jose W. Diokno who defended political detainees pro bono.⁴⁸ A dominant expression of the Church in the rural areas was the Basic Christian Communities (BCC). The BCCs did not only bring a new awareness of the faith to the peasantry "but related that faith to everyday problems, among them

44. Daroy, "On the Eve of the Dictatorship and Revolution," 8.

45. Tiglao, "The Consolidation of the Dictatorship," 41.

46. *Ibid.*, 58-59.

47. *Ibid.*, 59.

48. *Ibid.*, 60.

illegal expropriation by multinational corporations of their land, midnight raids (sometimes with rape and pillage) by the military, and even evacuation from 'free fire zones'. Discussions within these communities, as facilitated within the BCCs, also encouraged the villagers to demand redress of grievances.⁴⁹ Within the CPP, there emerged the Christians for National Liberation (CNL), which sought the revolutionary path for change emphasizing Christian values. Thus, despite these different strategies for members of the Church, a unifying factor was the way they framed their concerns, i.e., the abuses and exploitation of the martial law regime defied the very grain of Christian values and practice.

The Aquino assassination and "The Marcos Resign Movement"

The anti-dictatorship movement gained further impetus with the assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino on August 21, 1983. Aquino was the most prominent leader of the opposition and was killed while in military custody. His assassination brought millions to demonstrate in the streets. It was also the event which moved the middle class to action and join the fight against the dictatorship.⁵⁰ All protest organizations rallied around a single call for the resignation of Marcos. Existing organizations, foremost of which were the CPP and the social democrats, benefited from the protest movements "in terms of recruitment, organizational consolidation and even expansion into sectors hitherto outside their influence."⁵¹

Other prominent players in the "Marcos Resign Movement" were the elite's opposition party organizations as well as former Marcos politicians who defected "to the other side" upon sensing the regime's impending downfall. The protest movement witnessed the emergence of new groups that were essentially independent of the Left, the social democrats and the elite opposition. "The formation of such groups may be argued as the concrete realization following the 'new politics' mentioned above. These groups were diverse. They ranged from residential associations, medical organizations, and business groups whose basis for protest ranged from the Aquino killing and one-man rule, to the more ideological sophisticated ideas which linked the protest movement to the overall struggle for national sovereignty and democratization."⁵² Members of these movement became known as cause-oriented groups. The massive protest movements also "revived theorizing on the possibility of social transformation through an urban-based civil disobedience movement, something that had never been thoroughly articulated in the past. As a result, a plethora of modes of protest developed. Among such new methods were confetti rallies, jogging, and children's marches."⁵³

One coalition that epitomized the coming together of the "Marcos Resign Movement" was the Justice for Aquino, Justice for All (JAJA), which engaged in mass actions and peaceful protests. The methods they chose were outside the electoral arena and veered away from the traditional methods of changing

49. Wurfel, *Filipino Politics*, 262.

50. Ma. Serena M. Diokno, "Unity and Struggle," in *Javate-De Dios, Aurora, Petronio Ben. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, Dictatorship and Revolution*, 132-75.

51. David, Abinales, and Encarnacion, "Transnationalization, the State and the People," 155-56.

52. *Ibid.*, 158.

53. *Ibid.*

regimes.⁵⁴ The moderate opposition in the “Marcos Resign Movement” found expression in the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), an alliance of several opposition groups. At the other end of the spectrum was the radical opposition as represented by the CPP. Among the united front organizations that emerged in 1983 was the Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (NAJFD). The NAJFD looked favorably on the National Democratic Front’s (NDF) initiative for a united front because it was “impressed by the Left’s ability to mobilize a mass following and discouraged by the chances for reform entirely through the parliamentary process.”⁵⁵ Instances of crude military repression of peaceful demonstrations deepened that discouragement. Another coalition that sought the possibility of unifying the various opposition elements against Marcos was the KOMPIL Congress (Kongreso ng Mamayang Pilipino – Congress of the Filipino People) in 1984.⁵⁶ Sectoral groups also emerged while existing ones grew in strength with the assassination of Aquino. An example of the former was the Women for the Ouster of Marcos and Boycott (WOMB) and an example of the latter was the General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA) founded in March 1984.⁵⁷ GABRIELA is closely associated with the CPP.

The CPP’s New People’s Army, in the two years following the Aquino assassination, expanded so rapidly that it posed a credible threat to the survival of the Philippine government. From a total force of a few thousand armed guerrillas in 1980, the NPA grew to about over 15,000 regulars and a somewhat larger number of part-time irregulars. These forces were also fighting on as many as sixty fronts around the country.⁵⁸

Electoral politics as a political opportunity for change

The debate as to the utility of electoral politics to attain change raged within the anti-dictatorship movement. Marcos was quick to note this: he did not hesitate to dangle elections, which he saw as an alternative to the call for his ouster or an armed revolution to overthrow him. Thus, the opposition was split when he called for elections to the 1984 Interim Batasang Pambansa or IBP⁵⁹ (Philippine legislature) elections. This was acceptable to the traditional politicians, who viewed elections as the way to end martial law and return to traditional politics as couched in liberal democratic terms, i.e., political parties and electoral votes. Those who were against the armed struggle but did not favor the socialist/communist alternative the CPP was offering, did not believe in elections at this time. First, they argued, the elections were being conducted under a martial law regime whereby Marcos had the power to dissolve the IBP. Second, Marcos also had the power to appoint his people to a substantial number of seats in parliament. Third, Marcos still held on to repressive martial law powers that allowed him to arrest anyone for no reason at all. As for the CPP, electoral politics was

54. Diokno, “Unity and Struggle,” 148.

55. Wurfel, *Filipino Politics*, 281.

56. *Ibid.*

57. GABRIELA was named after Gabriela Silang, a Filipino general in the revolution against Spanish colonialism in the Philippines.

58. Committee Print, “The Philippines: A Situation Report.”

59. This was called Interim Batasang Pambansa to pave the way for the transition from a presidential-parliamentary system, patterned after the French government, to a parliamentary system.

never in its strategy for change, armed struggle being the top priority. Thus members of the anti-dictatorship movement who did not see the viability of electoral politics to bring about democracy, called for a boycott of the elections.

A number of opposition members won during the IBP elections signaling the Filipino people's growing disenchantment with the Marcos government. But their victory did little to end the massive demonstrations against the dictatorship. At this point, the United States was beginning to show its support for the segment of the anti-dictatorship movement that was framing the issue not within the context of an armed struggle and the establishment of a socialist/communist society but through electoral politics and the reestablishment of liberal democracy in the country. The strategy was to pressure Marcos to call for presidential snap elections to establish his legitimacy and credibility. Marcos succumbed to this pressure and the opposition put up Mrs. Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, the widow of the martyred Senator Aquino, as the candidate.

In the anti-dictatorship movement, the traditional politicians had no problems with participating in the presidential snap elections as electoral politics has always been their arena of struggle. Other members of the anti-dictatorship movement who boycotted the 1984 IBP elections saw that the presidential elections was different from the previous electoral exercise in that the one elected president would have all the powers of the dictator. Thus if Mrs. Aquino won, she could put an end to martial law and all its repressive decrees, hence they opted to participate in the elections. There were also those in the CPP who wanted to participate in the elections but the party leadership vetoed this. The CPP's official line was to boycott the elections. The party leadership argued that it did not matter whoever won because the Philippines would still have an "elite democracy," noting that Mrs. Aquino herself came from a landed family in the Philippines. The Cojuangcos, Mrs. Aquino's family, own a hacienda in Tarlac and so does her husband's family. The CPP leadership believed that the snap presidential elections would not bring about the socioeconomic structural change which they sought, the only change being in the political leadership. Furthermore, "elite democracy" for the CPP leadership was still a far cry from the socialist/communist society they had envisioned for the Philippines. Strategy-wise, this faction of the CPP remained committed to armed struggle as the means to attain change and the belief that the revolution should begin in the countryside and not in the cities. The vast majority of Filipinos opted to participate in the snap presidential elections. The end of the martial law regime, however, did not come about with the presidential elections but with a popular uprising fueled by the perception that Marcos cheated the opposition in the elections. This brought about a massive outpouring of people in the streets culminating in what became popularly known as the People Power Revolution of February

1986. By then, the United States, despite the reluctance of then-President Ronald Reagan who was a good friend of Marcos, had already shifted its support to the opposition.

Conclusion

During Martial Law, therefore, one witnessed the continuity as well as change in the nature of the social movements in the manner in which they framed their issues as well as the strategies they used. The socialist/communist movements remained dominant. These movements continued to frame their issues and concerns within the context of socioeconomic inequalities and social injustice. A difference was that it was the new CPP, carrying the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist line, which was dominant during Martial Law. The PKP was no longer a force to contend with as well as the Huk guerrillas. To counteract the issues raised by the CPP, Marcos framed the rationale of the martial law regime as anticommunist. This appealed mainly to middle-class Filipinos as it was during the pre-Martial Law period. The martial law regime also promised to deliver the economic goods through an authoritarian government that remained mainly capitalist. Just like in the pre-Martial Law period, the Marcos government made use of political repression and military means to quell the communist insurgency. The difference, however, was that Marcos also deployed these strategies to silence members of the elite that he considered his opponents. He framed his justification for this by stating that these elites, e.g., the Aquino family, were the oligarchs who were dominating the Philippine political and economic power and were in alliance with the communists. This was a different scenario during the pre-Martial Law period whereby the elites were viewed as a monolithic force supported by the United States, and together they created a formidable obstacle to the social movements fighting for socioeconomic inequalities. Although there were elite members in the socialist/communist movements during the pre-Martial Law period, they were more the exception than the rule. Another difference is that the United States during Martial Law went out to fully support Marcos against any kind of opposition, whether from the communist insurgency or the elites, i.e., the "oligarchy."

It was also during Martial Law when the issues of ethnicity and identity entered into the framing process of the social movements, as in the case of the MNLF and the Cordillera people. The MNLF, unlike the Cordillera communities, however, had external support from the OIC members. This gave the MNLF as a liberation movement more clout to fight the Marcos government. This clout, however, was greatly undermined by Marcos through the use of diplomacy, economic assistance for the Muslim areas and military means. Because support

was also given by the Islamic countries to the MNLF, the issue of socioeconomic justice was framed together with the need to respect their right to their ethnic identity. This was different in the case of the Cordillera peoples since they relied greatly on the NPA, the members of which were ethnically varied, to militarily resist the encroachment of the government and TNCs into their ancestral lands. Their issue was framed in terms of their socioeconomic rights to their land in particular, and in terms of the national democratic struggle in general. Thus the issues of ethnicity and identity were secondary to the class issue.

Just as in the pre-Martial Law period, the inability of the government to deliver on its economic promises, particularly through the implementation of a genuine agrarian reform program, gave further impetus for the growth of social movements, particularly the CPP-NPA. Other factors that closed political opportunities to engage in the legal struggle instead of the popular struggle was the military repression unseen before in Philippine history, the chronic corruption of the Marcos government epitomized by crony capitalism, wrong economic policies that led the country into a debt trap, and the continuing US military and economic support for the authoritarian regime in exchange for the establishment of US military facilities in the country. It was thus not surprising that the armed struggle would continue to be a dominant framework for popular resistance as during the pre-Martial Law period, which also witnessed the emergence of other revolutionary social movements besides the CPP.

The change in the framing process was evident in the "united front" politics and "new politics," which was further expressed in the anti-dictatorship movement that brought together members of the landed elites, i.e., those who were jailed by Marcos, the business community dispirited by the rampant corruption, anti-communist social movements, nationalists like Diokno and Tañada, unorganized masses as well as the middle class and the CPP. Such a formation was not found before Martial Law; the repressiveness, corruption, and the inability of the martial law government to deliver the economic goods affected all classes and provided the political opportunity for such a coalition. Marcos's call for elections also provided a political opportunity for members of the social movement, particularly those who were not in favor of the armed struggle and a socialist/communist society alternative, to bring about change. This occasion also provided the political opportunity to educate and mobilize the citizenry to the anti-dictatorship movement. It was the 1986 snap presidential elections that proved fatal to the Marcos government as it could no longer stop the masses of people who went out to demonstrate against what they perceived was the wholesale cheating that marred the polls. With the withdrawal of US support for the Marcos government, the only option for the dictator was to flee, thus achieving the objective of the social movements to end martial law. The nature of democracy that would evolve henceforth remained a burning issue in the period after Martial Law.

Guide Questions

1. What factors led to the perpetuation of social movements during Martial Law?
2. How did the social movements at the time frame their issues and concerns?
3. What strategies did the social movements use to pursue their struggle for democratization and development?
4. What were the political opportunity structures available that allowed the social movements to pursue their goals and objectives? What factors facilitated or hindered this endeavor?

Glossary

Agrarian reform – antidote of the martial law regime to social unrest. It sought to emancipate the Filipino farmers from their bondage to the soil by distributing rice and corn lands to tenant farmers. It was a dismal failure.

Basic Christian Communities (BCCs) – a dominant expression of the Church in the rural areas. The BCCs were instrumental in bringing new awareness of the faith to the peasantry by relating this to their everyday problems, such as militarization and their exploitation by multinational corporations.

Cause-oriented groups – emerged during Martial Law as opposed to the traditional politics carried out by the political parties, i.e., politics based on patronage and corruption. For cause-oriented groups, politics should be based on issues and not personalities. Thus they were the main bearers of new politics and among the issues they dealt with were women, environment, and peace.

Crony capitalism – the centralization of corruption in the hands of Marcos's relatives and close associates.

Indigenous peoples (IPs) – neither Christians nor Muslims, the indigenous peoples are also referred to as “tribal Filipinos” or “cultural minorities.” During the martial law years, they were forcibly evicted from their ancestral lands to pave the way for development projects of the government and transnational corporations (TNCs). This led to many of them joining the New Peoples' Army (NPA).

Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) – founded by Nur Misuari, the MNLF was a liberation movement, established in 1974, which sought to end the political and economic repression of the Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu.

National democracy – as a temporal stage, national democracy was deemed by the CPP-NPA-NDF as a transition stage from a semifeudal,

semicolonial situation to a socialist construction. In this transition, the CPP-NPA-NDF saw themselves forming a united front with the national bourgeoisie and other allies. Essentially this was the stage after the semifeudal and semicolonial structure has been eliminated and socioeconomic inequalities could then be addressed, e.g., through land redistribution.

New politics – politics which stresses that power should come from the people, i.e., from grassroots organizations and at the community level. It is centered on principles rather than personalities and addresses the structural roots of social problems.

Social democracy – Social democracy, which is closely identified with the Jesuits of Ateneo de Manila, seeks for structural change in society to address poverty and socioeconomic inequalities but not through armed struggle.

United front politics – forming alliances with other members of the opposition groups for a broad united action against martial law. One of its major expressions during Martial Law was the anti-dictatorship movement.

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Philippine Social Movements after Martial Law

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem and Jorge V. Tigno

An important element of popular empowerment is the realization that democratization will not come from the state but from the people's movements which are the major catalysts for strengthening civil society.¹

From a critical theory of emancipatory politics politics is not the act of one individual but rather the mobilization of social movements that seek to overturn the system as a whole for the benefit of all.²

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, the student should be able to:

1. Discuss the nature of the social movements which persisted as well as emerged in the post-Martial Law period.
2. Examine how these social movements framed their issues and concerns.
3. Elucidate the strategies used by the social movements in achieving their goals and objectives.
4. Analyze the factors that facilitated or hindered the attainment of the objectives of these social movements.

Introduction

Social movements persisted after the end of martial law as there remained a need to address basic issues such as poverty, underdevelopment, socioeconomic inequalities and social injustice. These issues continued to be inadequately addressed or were even completely ignored by the predominant political entity, i.e., the elite-dominated state. Thus at this time social movements, as non-state initiatives, pursued the engagement, and even confrontation, of the state and its policies.

1. FOPA Cnsis of Socialism Cluster Group, "The Dual Crisis of the Philippine Progressive Movement," in *Re-examining and Renewing the Philippine Progressive Vision*, ed. John Gershman and Walden Bello (papers and proceedings of the 1993 Conference on the Forum for Philippine Alternatives [FOPA], San Francisco Bay Area, California, April 2-4, 1993), 17.

2. Bece Margushca, *Contemporary Social Movements and the Making of World Politics* (dissertation submitted for the PhD in International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, 2002), 32.

Just as in the pre-Martial Law and Martial Law periods, social movements during the post-Martial Law period—organizations, and undertakings that sought to either preserve, reform, or radically transform existing political, economic, and social institutions and processes—remained to be popular forces. They were also conceived out of a “condition of unrest, and derive their motive power, on the one hand, from dissatisfaction with the current form of life, and, on the other hand, from wishes and hopes for a new scheme or system of living.”³

The difference, however, in the post-Martial Law period is that the issues they raised were framed in the context of a period of transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The challenge, therefore, for the social movement was how to take advantage of the political opportunity structures available under a new political dispensation, taking into consideration the resources at their disposal and the manner in which to present themselves as an alternative to the people who remain marginalized by the state.

Redefining the Role of Social Movements under an “Elite Democracy”⁴

An immediate challenge for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in the advent of the Aquino administration was how to frame its issue of engagement with the popular government that has restored formal democratic institutions in the country. Although the CPP viewed the Aquino government as elitist, it also realized that going against the highly popular Aquino government would be unwise. The majority believed that the 1986 People Power Revolution was authentic in the sense that it was an extraconstitutional process whereby “the masses played the decisive role and the change of ruler opened up a vast ‘democratic space’ for the continuing of struggles for fundamental changes in society.”⁵ In terms of political opportunity structures, Philippine redemocratization witnessed the vast expansion of many groups aligned with the Left. Differences among them increased as “new ideologies emerged, new priorities arose and new political tactics were developed.” The “Left” thus came to refer to a broad and varied spectrum of factions from progressive pro-Aquino groups to the communist National Democratic Front (NDF).⁶ This amalgamation of leftist forces that were not part of the CPP-NPA-NDF came to be referred to as the “independent left.” Its members went “beyond the middle-class activists who work with the national democrats and the leftists in the mainstream reform parties.” These included “social democrats and democratic socialists, environmentalists, left-leaning nationalists and religious activists.” Although the independent left was primarily middle class, it also included some labor leaders.⁷

Among the national democrats (NDs or natdems), there emerged the popular democrats (popdems) whose main concern was to work for a broad left front.

3. Herbert Blumer, “Collective Behavior,” in *An Outline of the Principles of Sociology*, ed. Robert E. Park (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1939), 199. <http://wombist.binghamton.edu/socm/definitions.htm>.

4. This section is based on Teresa S. Encarnacion, “Non-Governmental Organization Approaches to Cooperative Development: Two Case Studies on the Philippine Experiences” (PhD dissertation, Department of Politics and Public Administration, The University of Hong Kong, unpublished, August 1997).

5. Francisco Nemenzo, “Perspectives on the Crisis of the Movement: Philippine Crisis Left and Right,” in *Re-examining and Renewing the Philippine Progressive Vision*, ed. John Gershan and Walden Bello (Papers and proceedings of the 1993 Conference on the Forum for Philippine Alternatives [FOPA], San Francisco Bay Area, California, April 2-4, 1993), 28.

6. David Timberman, *A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Manila: The Bookmark Inc., 1991), 310.

7. James B. Goodno, *The Philippines: Land of Broken Promises* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd. 1991), 170.

This was the only way the popdems believed that traditional elite democracy could be replaced with “popular democracy,” i.e., the people’s exercise of direct participation in government so as to be able to exert a certain amount of power.⁸ The popdems were highly critical of the national democrats’ “sectarian” approach to coalition building, i.e., its tendency to insist on the national democratic line—the primacy of the armed struggle and to dominate in legal democratic alliances.⁹ According to Horacio “Boy” Morales, who was one of its leaders, such a coalition was needed because the popdems believed that “no single organization could win power legally and govern effectively alone and for itself.” Thus the need to rally all “contending political groups, parties and organizations to participate in the political system and to help resolve urgent national, social and territorial issues.”¹⁰

The popular democrats were generally wary of the Aquino government and opted for “critical collaboration.” In this sense, the popdems shared the view of the national democrats of the new leadership as an unstable coalition of “liberals” and “fascists” and adopted a policy of “vigilant and “principled support” of the new government being able to politically dominate the rightists.¹¹ The Philippine Left as a whole, however, welcomed the formation of the Aquino “rainbow” cabinet which consisted of members from the various ideological forces in society. They viewed this as a positive step in the abolition of Marcos’s repressive decrees, the restoration of democratic institutions, and the inclusion in the constitution of articles on social justice and human rights.

Electoral politics as the arena of struggle

In a time of democracy, the Left once again looked at elections as a political opportunity by which power could be attained. They joined the electoral bandwagon, something other social movements had tried to engage in even before Martial Law. The Left participated for the first time since 1946 in the May 1987 congressional elections. The Alliance for New Politics (ANP) was formed as an umbrella organization for the Partido ng Bayan (PnB), which was created by the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan or Bayan¹² in late August 1986 specifically for the 1987 elections. The popular democrats through the Volunteers for Popular Democracy (VPD), joined Bayan in this endeavor. Former New People’s Army (NPA) Commander Bernabe “Dante” Buscayno and former NDF leader Morales were among the PnB’s prominent left candidates.¹³ The PnB presented itself as different from the traditional political parties by framing its issues within nationalist and democratic politics. It advocated the practice of “new politics,” as espoused during Martial Law. In the economic sphere, the PnB framed its issues within class politics: it called for general and comprehensive agrarian reform and workers’ rights. These have been concerns of social movements since pre-Martial Law days.

8. Timberman, *A Changeless Land*, 310-12.

9. *Praktika*, “When a Zigzag Turn Is Shorter than a Straight Route,” May 14, 1986.

10. Cesar Cala and Jo Dongail, *Call for People’s Development by Horacio “Boy” Morales Jr. Selected Speeches from 1986-1989* (Quezon City: National Council of Churches in the Philippines, 1990), 4.

11. Timberman, *A Changeless Land*, 313.

12. BAYAN was formed in May 1984 in an attempt to form a united front coalition of anti-Marcos groups. This united front initially included various ideological forces ranging from members of the national democratic front (NDF) movement to conservative Makati businessmen. Because of accusations that the national democrats wanted only to dominate BAYAN, non-NDF groups decided to abandon the organization.

13. Timberman, *A Changeless Land*, 207.

Unlike the traditional political parties, which draw their strength from the political and economic elite and their ward leaders, the PnB relied on members of the cause-oriented groups and community organizations that have brought together people on the basis of issues. The members are generally workers, peasants, the urban poor, and middle-class professionals.¹⁴

From the Left's viewpoint, elections provide the arena of struggle between popular democracy and elite democracy. The former's very essence is that of people power, which some define as the "direct action by a militant citizenry as distinguished from passive reliance on elected representatives." It is, therefore, "a mode of popular intervention in the political process which goes beyond suffrage."¹⁵

As pointed out, "it is a living principle to govern the relations of citizens and government."¹⁶ Elections, therefore, were framed not as an end in themselves, but only one of the vehicles for strengthening people empowerment.

Peace talks and national reconciliation

The Left also viewed the Aquino government's reconciliation program as a political opportunity to pursue the democratization process. After the release of a number of its leaders such as Buscayno and CPP founder and leader Jose Ma. Sison, the NDF opened itself to a dialogue with the Aquino government and a possible cease-fire with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the NPA. On November 27, 1986, the government and the NDF representative signed a sixty-day cease-fire with peace talks to begin on December 8, 1986.¹⁷ The CPP was aware of the scheme of Aquino's military strategists, i.e., a cease-fire would give the AFP the opportunity to regroup.

At the same time, however, the Party also felt that it could not spurn Aquino's offer of reconciliation particularly since it also wanted to take advantage of the "democratic space" in Philippine politics. Moreover, peace talks, the CPP believed, would help "legitimize" the Party and provide the opportunity by which it could explain to the Filipino people what the communist movement was all about.¹⁸

Problems Confronting the Social Movements after Martial Law¹⁹

Two years after the February 1986 uprising, the "democratic space" which the Filipino people enjoyed began to shrink. The elite continued to dominate politics. As the socialist group Bukluran sa Ikaunlad ng Isip at Gawa or BISIG pointed out, although the replacement of Marcos by Aquino was most welcome,

14. Wilfrido Villecorta, "Ideological Orientation of Political Forces in the Aquino Era," in *Economy and Politics in the Philippines Under Corazon Aquino*, ed. Bernhard Dahm (Hamburg: Mitteilungen Des Instituts Fur Asienkunde, 1991), 171.

15. Nemenzo, "Perspectives on the Crisis of the Movement," 3.

16. *Ibid.*
17. James Putzel, *A Capivie Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1982), 221.

18. Timberman, *A Changeless Land*, 294.

19. This section of the chapter is based on Teresa S. Encarnacion, "Non-Governmental Organization Approaches to Cooperative Development: Two Case Studies on the Philippine Experiences" (PhD dissertation, Department of Politics and Public Administration, The University of Hong Kong, August 1997).

the change in government was merely one from a "bourgeois dictatorship" to a "bourgeois democracy."²⁰ The radicals in government were slowly being replaced by more conservative elements as a result of pressure from the military, which had gained leverage vis-à-vis Aquino after it successfully crushed a series of coup d'etats. As for progressive elements like the social democrats who remained in power, a number of them were confronted with the dilemma of serving two masters, i.e., the government and themselves.²¹ Social movements also failed to make inroads in electoral politics. Being new in the game, the Left failed to dent the 1987 electoral process. None of the Alliance of New Politics, the popular movement supporting the Partido ng Bayan, made it to the Senate, and only two out of the seventy-one House candidates won.²²

Peace talks with the leftist rebels also collapsed. This is because the Left also had to contend with a military machinery that pressured the Aquino government to forcefully carry out an anti-insurgency campaign. The AFP under Gen. Fidel Ramos had never been comfortable with the government's peace talks with the communists and instead pushed for a strategic counterinsurgency plan called "Mamamayan" (People), which combined the goals of national reconciliation with security and development.²³ Aquino did not need much persuasion. She supported the emergence of paramilitary formations, i.e., anti-communist vigilante groups as well as death squads in early 1986. One of the more infamous ones was the *Alsa Masa* (Masses Arise), which arbitrarily killed suspected communists or NPA members in 1987.²⁴ These events further doomed the peace talks. Given the ideological gap between the military and the communists, neither side was prepared to make any compromises that might weaken their respective military positions. The government was adamant that issues were to be negotiated within the Constitution's legal and political framework and only then could issues such as amnesty, rehabilitation, legalization of underground organizations and the surrender of arms be discussed.²⁵

Of course there was also the government's failure to implement genuine agrarian reform. A major cause of this was the continuing elite domination of the Philippine economy; thus powerful landlords prevented the enactment of an agrarian reform law. Although the Aquino government passed the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or Republic Act (RA) 6657, majority of the peasant organizations rejected this. To say that the Aquino government's failure to institute a genuine agrarian reform program was a disappointment is an understatement. This is because during Aquino's electoral campaign and after coming to power, she emphasized that the redistribution of agricultural land was to be the cornerstone of her administration's economic policy. Her failure to keep her promise could only be explained by the domination of her cabinet, as well as Congress, by policy makers who came from the conservative big-business class, political clans and landowning elite. Thus even after the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, 20 percent of the total population continued

20. Timberman, *A Changeless Land*, 313.

21. Goodno, *The Philippines: Land of Broken Promises*, 175.

22. David Wurtzel, *Philippine Politics: Development and Decay* (USA: Cornell University Press, 1988).

23. Putzel, *A Captive Land*, 219.

24. Martin Wright, *Revolution in the Philippines? Keating's Special Report* (United Kingdom: Longman Group, UK Ltd., 1988), 61.

25. Jose Ma. Sison, "Open Forum on 'Talk of Jose Ma. Sison on 'Semi-feudalism' in the Philippines: Myth or Reality?'" in Romulo A. Sandoval, *Prospects of Agrarian Reform under the New Order* (Quezon City: NCCP-URM and REAPS, 1986).

to own 80 percent of the country's agricultural lands.²⁶ What sealed the doom of the peace talks was when peasants and their urban supporters were brutally fired upon while staging a demonstration in front of Malacañang on January 22, 1988. Known as the Mendiola Massacre, thirteen protesters were killed and many more were injured. The massacre outraged members of the cause-oriented groups, many of whom supported Aquino, and led to a number of them resigning from their government positions.²⁷

The Debate Within the Left: What Strategies to Take²⁸

The lack of political opportunities to make radical political and economic inroads in the democratization and development processes led to a series of debates within the CPP. A controversial issue in the Party discourse was whether the CPP should focus on the armed struggle, with emphasis on the New People's Army leading a people's protracted war, or concentrate on the legal or extralegal struggle which focused on the National Democratic Front's united front policy. The CPP's July 1986 official publication, *Ang Bayan*, stated that "the unarmed means of struggle... assume[s] greater importance, although members were reminded that the armed struggle remains central."²⁹ The popular democrats, however, did not agree with this and found allies with a faction of the Party known as the "insurrectionists" who also saw the strategic value of united front and the shifting of the struggle from the rural to the urban area. Thus, they both questioned the national democratic approach to winning the war. However, the "insurrectionists" still saw the armed struggle as an important mechanism for attaining victory. Urban partisan warfare would entail legal action such as *Welgang Bayan* (nation's strike). These two strategies, together with its warfare tactic of "moving away from small guerrilla units and forming companies" as the focal point of the armed struggle, made up what was viewed as the "fast-track" approach to winning the war. The popular democrats, however, did not see themselves as engaging in underground activities and remained basically above ground, i.e., legal.³⁰

Creating a broad coalition front through the legal Left

The popular democrats argued in particular for the need to take advantage of the current political dispensation to expand the "democratic space" which people earned after the 1986 People Power Revolution. But the CPP hardliners questioned the tangibility of the "democratic space." Leto Villar of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (May 1 Movement), a radical worker's union, pointed out that it was difficult to argue that a "democratic space" in fact existed when harassment in picket lines and killings continued.³¹ The popular democrats disputed this, saying this was precisely why the armed struggle should not be pursued. A call to

26. Manuel Almojela, "Tripartism in Agrarian Reform: The INPARAD Experience," *Development NGO Journal* 1, no. 1 (Third Quarter 1992): 41.

27. Putzel, *A Captive Land*, 221.

28. This section is based on Teresa S. Encarnacion, "Non-Governmental Organization Approaches to Cooperative Development: Two Case Studies on the Philippine Experiences" (PhD dissertation, Department of Politics and Public Administration, The University of Hong Kong, August 1997).

29. Richard J. Kessler, *Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 94.

30. Joel Rocamora, *Breaking Through: The Struggle within the Communist Party of the Philippines* (Metro Manila: Anvil Publishing Inc., 1994).

31. Goodno, *The Philippines: Land of Broken Promises*, 154.

arms, they pointed out, would definitely wipe out whatever “democratic space” was left. Instead, there was a need to fight for democracy and one way to do this was by continuing to nurture the broad coalition that grew rapidly after the Aquino assassination. The legal struggle, this faction argued, would help harness the middle-class Filipinos who play a crucial role in both spreading and opposing revolutionary ideas. This class includes professionals such as media practitioners, academics, government bureaucrats and community organizers. Thus the need for multitenancy alliances rather than limiting this effort to a class-based one and accepting the national democratic program.

Creating a broad coalition front based on issues was also perceived as an easier way to gain support from the people. A popular concern, for example an oil price hike, directly affects the masses, making it more convenient for organizing and raising their consciousness. Better that, they argued, than introducing the people directly to the politics of national democracy or socialism which is more difficult to comprehend.³² Another argument for a broad coalition is to enable the CPP to integrate the emergence of various cause-oriented groups espousing the “new politics” issues, e.g., women, environment and peace. These are concerns that go beyond class barriers. A dilemma, however, in the Party was the implication of confronting these “new politics” interests and transforming them into assets for the armed revolution.³³ The “Save the Earth” movement, for example, contradicts the NPA practice of exacting revolutionary tax from illegal loggers.

Theoretically, the CPP hardliners have difficulty in integrating these issues because they imply pluralism, resistance to centralized direction, and distrust of a totalizing ideology. These concerns go against CPP-NDF practice. Moreover, “new politics” does not speak of seizure of state power but “a transformation of the political arena of elite democracy to mass, popular democracy.”³⁴ Another problem with “new politics” is its difficulty in making great strides, particularly in the arena of electoral politics.

Like the national democratic movement, some believe that Marxism, too, seems to be heading toward its own crisis.³⁵ The movement’s focus mainly on an organized political force to win state power as emphasized by Leninism in its “war of movement” in a concrete conjuncture is heavily criticized by those who agree more with the alternative presented by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci, who recognized “the crucial importance of such transformative moments” and argued for a “war of position” that “spans successive conjunctures, shifting the balance of forces through interventions at various sites, particularly within civil society....”³⁶

In the Philippine popular movement, the Gramscian position allows for what Morales defines as popular empowerment, i.e., the “transfer of economic and social power from one center to another and/or to create new centers of socioeconomic powers complementary to or in competition with the traditional centers.”³⁷

32. Goodno, *The Philippines: Land of Broken Promises*, 155.

33. P. N. Abinales, “Considerations on Filipino Marxism: A Response to ‘Questioning Marx, Critiquing Marx’,” *Kasarinlan: A Philippine Quarterly of Third World Studies* 9, no. 1 (3rd Quarter 1993): 4.

34. *Ibid.*

35. FOPA Crisis of Socialism Cluster Group, “The Dual Crisis of the Philippine Progressive Movement,” 11.

36. J.V. Femia, *Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness and the Revolutionary Process* (London: Clarendon Press, 1981), 53. In William K. Carroll and R.S. Rattner, “Between Leninism and Radical Pluralism: Gramscian Reflections on Counter-Hegemony and the New Social Movements,” *Critical Sociology* 20, no. 2 (1994): 10.

37. Cala and Dongal, *Call for People’s Development*, 42.

Spearheading this new movement were the popular forces that have emerged during the post-Aquino assassination and had prevailed in the advent of the new administration. Distinctly present were urban-based and middle-class participants allying together with the traditional movements represented by peasants, workers, and the urban poor. They were involved in issues such as human rights, development and environment, which are no longer treated as class issues but concerns affecting every citizen demanding a more equitable and sustainable society.³⁸

It is within this context that social movements help promote an alternative framework of development concerning the conduct of a set of less conventional development practices, approaches, and lifestyles.

The decline of the CPP-NPA-NDF

These political changes deepened the CPP debates on the role of development work, particularly that carried by NGOs associated with the NDF movement. For a long time, development work had always been viewed as secondary to the armed struggle. It was even alleged that the NDF had created front organizations merely to harness funding from abroad. However, there were those who believed that the socioeconomic projects these organizations were setting up and implementing played a crucial role in the movement. More important, they also believed that economic assistance should be channeled to these livelihood schemes rather than be used for buying arms. This position, however, was not supported by the official policy of the NDF.

The democratization process provided a political opportunity, i.e., through development work, to bring about change. This political opportunity was further enhanced as the armed struggle became less tenable as the main venue for attaining change because of the gradual eradication of the CPP mass base in the mid-1980s.³⁹ The effectiveness of the AFP in neutralizing the NPA diminished the power of the armed struggle. This was evident in the following situations: One was the AFP's capture of arms during its encounters with the NPA. This, together with the relatively low-powered arms of the NPA, clipped the communist insurgency's strength.⁴⁰ Another was that after four years post-EDSA 1, the NPA was reported to have lost about 40 percent of their territory. An NPA general commander attributed this to the new AFP tactic of saturating the guerrilla front with large numbers of troops and suffocating the mass base by staying there for extended periods of time.⁴¹

Another political opportunity structure that paved the way for other strategies than the armed struggle during this period was that the NPA support from its network of solidarity groups in North America and Western Europe had been limited to propaganda and symbolic material support.⁴² Support from this group further declined with the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Also, the existence of "war weariness"

38. Isaganí Serrano, "Some Notes on Popular Democracy," *Conjuncture* 6, no. 2 (February-March 1993): 15.

39. Timberman, *A Changeless Land*, 289.

40. *Ibid.*, 303.

41. *Ibid.*

42. Rolf Hanisch, "The New People's Army," in *Economy and Politics in the Philippines under Corason Aquino*, 254.

that had set in the peasant base opened up other political opportunity structures outside of the armed struggle. These opportunities, which gave impetus to other alternative strategies, allowed members of social movements outside of the CPP-NPA-NDF to frame their struggle in terms of radical change through development work as well as advocacy.

Political opportunity structures outside of the armed struggle also opened up because of the decline of the NDF. This could be attributed to the following factors: First, in 1989, the Party's united front coalition that was still struggling to consolidate its forces had been losing ground since the 1986 People Power Revolution. Second, the legal movement lost prominent businessmen and professionals to the Aquino government or had been disillusioned with the NDF. Third was the capture of ranking members and staff of the CPP's United Front Commission, which crippled urban protest in 1988. Fourth, the student movement, which the Party had spearheaded during the Marcos regime, also experienced a decline.⁴³ Fifth, bloody internal purges occurred in Mindanao and Southern Tagalog as a result of the paranoia of "deep penetration agents" (DPAs), i.e., government agents who have infiltrated the CPP-NPA-NDF. This had claimed at least 700 lives, thus further weakening the movement. This also led to the demoralization of the cadres and erosion of the mass base, resulting in more effective government penetration of NDF-influenced areas in both the countryside and the cities.⁴⁴ Sixth, the debate within the CPP on "democratic centralism," which stresses the supremacy of the Party, further debilitated the NDF. All "mass organizations," for example, were looked upon as "mechanisms for transmitting the Party's messages to the people."⁴⁵ What was lacking for some Party members, therefore, was a genuine assessment of Party policies. A number of Party members blamed the leadership for not encouraging any form of debate from within, further intensifying the chaos the movement was undergoing.⁴⁶

The ultimate political opportunity that would further give impetus to the exploration of other venues for change apart from the armed struggle was the split in the CPP. This was announced on December 10, 1992, when a newspaper bannered the headline "CPP Split Confirmed."

Their ranks ultimately split in 1993 between the "reaffirmists" (RAs) and the "rejectionists" (RJs), i.e., those who support and disagree with Armando Liwanag's assessment of the last fourteen years of the national democratic movement as embodied in "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors." Armando Liwanag was alleged to be CPP leader Jose Ma. Sison. The document attempts to limit the debate to the movement's loyalty to or betrayal of the strategy of "protracted people's war."⁴⁷

43. Gregg R. Jones, *Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement* (USA: Westview Press, 1989), 300.

44. FOPA Crisis of Socialism Cluster Group, "The Dual Crisis of the Philippine Progressive Movement," 15.

45. Putzel, *A Captive Land*, 390.

46. *Ibid.*

47. FOPA Crisis of Socialism Cluster Group, "The Dual Crisis of the Philippine Progressive Movement," 12.

All was not black or white, however, for some members. There were still groups within the CPP, which although they basically agreed with the “Reaffirmists,” could not wholeheartedly endorse Liwanag’s view because the process of getting it approved was too divisive. On the other hand, there were those who disagreed with the “reaffirm” principle but believed that both sides should try to work out their differences preferably through a meeting of the Party’s Central Committee.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the Party split had led to the loss of substantial number of its membership and organizational capability, as well as the CPP’s ideological and political hegemony over the national democratic movement. Consequently, “the whole Philippine progressive movement entered a period of intense and rapid organizational and ideological change.”⁴⁹

“Let a Hundred Visions and Strategies Bloom”

Despite the decline of the CPP-NPA-NDF, there was never any doubt for the social movements that confronting poverty and socioeconomic inequalities remain to be the most formidable challenge. The difference now was the manner in which this would be framed and to determine appropriate strategies, taking into consideration the social movements’ resources and political opportunities that are available internally and externally.

Development work through NGOs and POs

One of the more popular avenues for change which the social movements pursued was development work through NGOs or POs. The latter are NGOs whose members and constituents are also its beneficiaries. This was quite understandable as these NGOs/POs provided leftist activists the opportunity to continue “serving the masses” through the implementation of economic projects particularly in the countryside. This was most welcome especially for war-weary NPA communities, who wanted to focus on improving their economic conditions. Development work through NGOs provided a venue for harnessing what the Left perceived as the “middle forces” that fought the Marcos dictatorship. It also allowed the integration of “new politics” issues such as environment and gender, which appealed to the middle class. Thus a broad coalition alliance was made possible through NGO development work. All these led to an NGO renaissance in the post-Marcos period.⁵⁰

The situation in the Philippines was also reflected throughout the Asian region, whereby the political internal and external environments provided the emergence of thousands of these NGOs to operate and thrive in transforming production and social relations at the grassroots levels. Korten conceives of four phases that NGOs have evolved into. These are: Phase 1 – relief, rehabilitation, and welfare concerns in which NGOs deliver basic social services

48. “To reaffirm or to resist,” *Conjuncture* 5, no. 2 (February-March 1993).

49. Rocamora, *Breaking Through*, 9.

50. Encarnacion, “Non-Governmental Organization Approaches to Cooperative Development,” 15.

during periods of acute shortages such as droughts, calamities, and war; Phase 2 – community development activities where NGOs function as mobilizers of popular and governmental support in response to local or community-based needs and concerns; Phase 3 – undertakings for sustainable development where the focus of the NGOs shifts from local to national concerns; and Phase 4 – the establishment of genuine people's movements in which NGOs function as activists and educators seeking to synergize and energize different networks toward both national and global social development goals.⁵¹

One of the biggest development NGOs that emerged during the postmartial law period was the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), which was revived by popdem leader Morales who gave the NGO a more progressive thrust. The PRRM provides for education and resources in its aim to strengthen "civil society." Together with its socioeconomic projects, PRRM tries to initiate coalitions as well as councils where organizations and the movement can come together.⁵² The social democrats also resorted to the establishment of development NGOs. Among the NGOs they set up was the Agency for Community Education and Services or ACES, which focuses on rural development work in Nueva Ecija. Their family and school ties and access to the Aquino government enabled the social democrats to avail themselves of funds for development projects in the post-Marcos era.

The NGOs, however, confronted a number of problems. One was their dependence on development assistance from industrialized countries, which had resulted in some of them losing their autonomy. Another had to do with the efficacy of NGOs, i.e., some of them tended to become bureaucratic and "in some ways... mirror the oppressive relations in society they have been striving all these years to change."⁵³ Rivalries between organizations as well as the needless duplication of activities and initiatives also hindered the progress of social development organizations in the country. A few NGO personalities behaved like politicians and bureaucrats. There had been a spate of spurious NGOs that merely took advantage of available (foreign as well as government) funding sources.⁵⁴ The NGOs' agenda could also run in conflict with one another. For example, NGOs catering to peasant movements typically addressed the issue of farmer landlessness through individual or private land ownership. However, increased individual land ownership could spawn other land development issues such as the use of fertilizers, and land conversion for commercial purposes, among others, which could in turn create environmental concerns that impact on the rest of the other sectors of society.

These impediments, notwithstanding, NGOs play a pivotal role in a society, especially when the state by itself is incapable of addressing the challenges of underdevelopment. The NGOs' "social capital" of networks of movements, particularly their links to the well-organized leftist movement in the country, had been an advantage the state could not ignore in the transition from

51. David Korten, *Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and Global Agenda* (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1989).

52. Olie Tornquist, "Democratic 'Empowerment' and Democratization of Politics: Radical Popular Movements and the May 1992 Elections," *Kasarian: A Philippine Quarterly of Third World Studies* 8, no. 3 (1993): 42.

53. Isagani Serrano, *Civil Society in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington, D.C.: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, 1994), 101.

54. See Korten, David, *Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and Global Agenda* (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1989).

authoritarianism to democracy. Thus the 1980s in the Philippines was viewed as the decade of development NGOs. The 1990s, on the other hand, would see the growth of the cooperative movement as a vehicle for social movements to carry out development work. The Philippines continues to have one of the most vibrant NGO communities in the region.

Advocacy work through NGOs

Most of the NGOs frame their engagement in socioeconomic activities not as an end in itself but as emanating from a political vision, i.e., their activities are seen as a step toward the economic emancipation of Philippine society's marginalized sectors. Thus it is not rare for these NGOs to also engage in advocacy work because of the continued existence of societal structures that prevent the attainment of the people's economic advancement. These adverse forces, they contend, will have to be confronted in a political manner. Their advocacy work is framed in terms of various issues: environmental protection, gender awareness and promotion, human-rights protection, and economic reforms, among others. There are also organizations that call for good governance, transparency in public policy making, and accountability of public officials, including those organizations campaigning for genuine political and electoral reforms such as the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) and the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC). Because the concerns they focus on are not necessarily class-based issues, these are referred to as new social movements that emphasize consciousness, culture, and identity in the formation of the collective will.

The political opportunity for advocacy work was also given impetus by the enlargement of the political space not only informally, but also formally, such as through the 1987 Constitution, which included the principle that the "State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation." Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution also defines the role and rights of people's organizations. The framers of this constitution perceived people's organizations as being the enabler of people "to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means." Given that role, Section 16 of Article 13 of the constitution stipulates that "the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms."⁵⁵ These constitutional provisions were complemented by other legal instruments such as Republic Act 7160, more popularly known as the 1991 Local Government Code, which formalized the participation of NGOs in local governance.

55. Joel F. Ariate Jr., "Protests and Perceived Threats in the Hog Industry," in *People, Politics, and Profit: State-Civil Society Relations in the Context of Globalization*, ed. Ma. Glenda Lopez Wui and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem (Q.C.: Third World Studies Center, 2006), 91.

Other areas of social movements' engagement of the state

The other areas whereby social movements have explored political opportunity structures by which to engage the state are the following: One is through electoral politics, which they have pursued since 1986. This was given impetus by the party-list system as embodied in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which allotted the maximum of three seats in the House of Representatives to marginalized sectors who are able to gain at least 6 percent of votes cast for the party-list parties. A major beneficiary of this is Bayan Muna, a party closely associated with the CPP-NPA-NDF. Other leftist parties that won congressional seats through the party-list system were AKBAYAN and SANLAKAS. Some of the members of these two parties were formerly affiliated with the CPP-NPA-NDF. Non-leftist groups also emerged, espousing sectoral issues.

Another is through their acceptance of government positions in the Cabinet. This was demonstrated by Horacio Morales, who was the agrarian reform secretary in the Estrada administration, and Rigoberto Tiglao, who was appointed head of the Arroyo administration's Presidential Management Staff (PMS). Tiglao was previously President Arroyo's chief of staff. Such developments, however, deplete the stock of key players in the movement.

A third way is through extraconstitutional means, which had also been resorted to as a venue for change by social movements. This was, for example, seen in the 1992 demonstrations against the Ramos administration's call for charter change, which the public perceived as a means of extending his term, thus bringing back memories of authoritarianism. These protest actions had been the biggest since the 1986 People Power Revolution. Another major event was the ouster of President Estrada in a People Power 2 uprising. Social movements had been in the forefront of these two events. Social movements have recently also been calling for the resignation of President Arroyo in light of the *jueteng* gambling scandal involving her immediate family and the divulgence of wire-tapped phone calls to a Commission of Elections (COMELEC) commissioner that had made her suspect of cheating in the 2004 presidential elections.

Social movements have also taken advantage of the emerging trends in information and communication technology. The availability and popularity of communications systems and devices have given more people the opportunity to communicate effectively and have enhanced the collective undertakings of social movements. The Internet (as signified by the way E-lagda had been influential in the oust-Estrada campaign) and the ubiquitous mobile phone can be some of the means to eventually bring about greater democratic participation, public accountability, and good governance. Lopez (2001) observed that:

One cell-phone service provider had to station a mobile antenna to handle the large volume of “text” messages during the four days of protest. More than ninety million messages were processed, twice the daily average which is already the highest in the world. People Power 2 might just have been the first people’s revolution that overturned a government with the help of the latest telecom technology.⁵⁶

Amidst these new visions and strategies, what lingers in the forefront is the struggle against poverty and socioeconomic inequalities. The constant reminder for this is the persistence of the communist insurgency and the armed struggle, particularly in the countryside. Thus the push for a genuine agrarian reform program continues, and the calls by civil society as well as by both the government and the CPP-NPA-NDF for peace talks have persisted through the past decades. There is also the equally urgent need to address ethnic conflict. Social movements have been successful in the enactment of the Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA) as well as the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Although there have been shortcomings in their implementation, one cannot deny that gains have also been attained. Social movements view such increments as a step toward the vision of the rights of a people to self-determination, which is a crucial dimension to genuine democracy and development.

Conclusion

In the post-Martial Law period, social movements persisted because of the problems the State has failed to address. This can explain the continuing communist insurgency, which had been a pre-Martial Law phenomenon. The CPP-NPA-NDF persists to frame the issues based on class and the strategy is through a national democratic revolution, i.e., the armed struggle that will radically transform society.

It is in this regard that the CPP-NPA-NDF continues to be part of social movements that are influenced by the notion of revolution. Collective engagements sweeping away and displacing established social and political institutions and conventions have always been a crucial aspect of the politics of these social movements.

As in the Martial Law period, the CPP-NPA-NDF continues to be dependent on an alliance of peasants, workers, indigenous peoples, youth, women, and other marginalized groups in the main pursuit of wresting power from traditional elites.

The democratization process following Martial Law has also provided the political opportunity to bring forth other visions and strategies by which to

56. Oscar Lopez, “Remarks” (Carlyle Asia 2001 Advisory Board Meeting, Industry and Country Investment-Telcommunications & Media, Island Shangri-la Hotel, Hong Kong, May 28, 2001, <http://www.benpres-holdings.com/transcripts/omi-052801-carlyle.shtml>).

address the problems of poverty and socioeconomic inequalities as well as other issues that are not class-based, e.g., women, peace and human rights. The political opportunity structures for considering strategies outside of the armed struggle were brought on by the following factors: First, the weakening of the CPP-NPA-NDF as brought about by the military supremacy of the AFP over the NPA; second, the effective tactical maneuvers by the AFP in NPA areas; third, the weakening of the NDF because a substantial number of its middle-class members went to NGO work or government positions; and fourth, the military capture of ranking members in the CPP. Problems within the CPP also weakened the movement. These included internal debates within the Party, e.g., the questioning of democratic centralism and the existence of deep penetration agents which decimated the ranks of the CPP.

The social movements that spawned after Martial Law also provided venues by which the power of the state can be challenged, whether formally or informally, although not all of them may engage or confront the state. What is clear to the social movements is that their target-beneficiaries and stakeholders are the vulnerable groups, e.g., workers, peasants and women. Hence they consider alternative expressions of political power. These new social movements advocate reform and not revolution; small wonder that these movements have become part of the mainstream. They had framed the issues no longer in the context of colonialism or an authoritarian regime but in a period of transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

The framing of concerns continued to take into consideration "class politics" while others took on the issues of "new politics" that emerged during Martial Law, with emphasis on non-class-based issues, e.g., environment, women, peace and human rights concerns. Issues were also framed within the context of people empowerment, i.e., enhancing the power of people to intervene in decisions or situations affecting their lives.

The political opportunity structures and the framing of the issues also determined the various strategies the social movements pursued after Martial Law. The strategies have basically been nonstate initiatives that engage or confront the state. These included the establishment of a broad leftist front, the unifying factor of which was to push for further democratization, i.e., popular democracy, as opposed to elite democracy. Such strategies generally did not consider the armed struggle as the primary means of attaining change. Some viewed development and advocacy work, for example, as the major strategies in pushing for the democratization process. The establishment of a broad democratic front was also a strategy to attract the middle class into the social movements. Thus the issues need not be class-based but could also be issues that cut across classes, like environment and gender. The electoral process was also viewed as a strategy for the social movements to intervene in government decision making. With regard to the electoral process, the constituencies came mainly from the

grassroots. As for the use of violence, a sector of the social movements believed in urban partisan warfare, but legal and extralegal means, e.g., the *Welgang Bayan* was preferred to armed struggle.

The challenges to social movements and the latter's *raison d'être* continue to be defined by socioeconomic inequalities and poverty. The state has failed to confront these as seen in its refusal to implement a genuine agrarian reform program, and harassment of picket lines and killings of workers fighting for better wages and work conditions. Peace talks have also failed, and this has been blamed on various complex reasons. Difficulty in making inroads in electoral politics as well as confronting traditional politics continue to hamper the quest for democratization and development. Nevertheless, these hindrances have not dampened the social movements' struggle for the establishment of a society founded on social justice and equality.

■ Guide Questions

1. What issues and concerns did social movements advocate in the years after Martial Law?
2. How did social movements frame their issues and concerns?
3. What strategies did they utilize in addressing these issues and concerns?
4. What factors facilitated or hindered their efforts to confront these issues and concerns?

Glossary

Deep penetration agents (DPAs) – government agents who have infiltrated the CPP-NPA-NDF. Their operations have claimed at least 700 lives, thus weakening the movement. This led to the demoralization of the cadres and erosion of the mass base, resulting in more effective government penetration of NDF-influenced areas in both the countryside and the cities.⁵⁷

Democratic centralism – in the Philippine context, “democratic centralism” stresses the supremacy of the Communist Party of the Philippines. All “mass organizations,” for example, are looked upon as “mechanisms for transmitting the Party’s messages for the people.”⁵⁸

Nongovernment organizations (NGOs) – the Philippine National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) describes NGOs as “private, nonprofit volunteer organizations that are committed to the task of what is broadly termed “development.” This is to differentiate it from its generic meaning,

57. Putzel, *A Captive Land*, 380.

58. FOPA Crisis of Socialism Cluster Group, “The Dual Crisis of the Philippine Progressive Movement,” 15.

i.e., NGOs refer to all organized formations outside the government, which, therefore, includes rotary clubs, business groups, girl and boy scout groups, etc.

People's organizations (POs) – NGOs whose members and constituents are also its beneficiaries. Like NGOs in general, POs are explicitly political organizations whose development work is contextualized within a critique of existing economic structures and government economic policies.⁵⁹ These organizations, however, do not limit themselves to theory but have also initiated new and innovative schemes at the grassroots level where government programs have failed.

Popular democracy – the very essence of popular democracy is people power, which is defined as “the direct action by a militant citizenry as distinguished from passive reliance on elected representatives.” It is, therefore, a “mode of popular intervention in the political process which goes beyond suffrage.” As pointed out, “it is a living principle to govern the relations of citizens and government.”⁶⁰

The “independent Left” – the amalgamation of Left forces that are not part of the CPP-NPA-NDF has come to be referred to as the “independent Left.” Its members “go beyond the middle-class activists who work with the national democrats and the leftists in the mainstream reform parties.” These include “social democrats and democratic socialists, environmentalists, left-leaning nationalists and religious activists.” Although the independent Left is primarily middle class, it also includes some labor leaders.⁶¹

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Religion, Church, and Politics in the Philippines

Ma. Lourdes G. Genato Rebullida

We see that the role of the Church in the Philippines today is to intensify every effort to awaken the consciousness of all our people to a full realization of their dignity and equality as persons.

– Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP), 1971

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, the student should be able to:

1. Identify the churches as religious groups that have been actively involved in Philippine politics.
2. Describe the political behavior of churches in the processes of political change, democracy, and development in the Philippine context.
3. Analyze the social, economic, political factors that moved religious organizations and different churches to participate in regime change, elections, and programs for people development.
4. Explain the role of religion as a belief system, religious organizations and the church as a social institution in Philippine democracy and development.

Introduction

Religion and church are formidable sociocultural and political forces in Philippine society and politics with a history of influence and participation in the processes of state formation, democracy, and development in the country. As belief systems, the religions of Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism have shaped Philippine culture and the personal lives of their believers. Their respective churches, religious groups and religious movements, into which the believers have been organized, assumed political significance as their numbers, leadership, resources, and political orientations affected political processes in different ways and at certain points in Philippine history.

The political salience of the phenomena and concepts of religion, church, religious groups, and religious movements in the Philippine setting are discussed in this chapter. The first part of the chapter presents the nuances of the concepts religion and church, religious groups and movements, and the theoretical perspectives. The second part presents the historical context and locates the specific religions, churches, religious groups and religious movements in the Philippines. The third section examines the dynamics of political engagement between church and state. The last section explores current issues on religion as a factor in Philippine politics and church-state relations.

Brief Historical Background

Islam, known to be the religion in the Philippines even before the Spanish and American colonization, remains dominant in the southern part of the Philippines among Muslim Filipinos. The Catholic religion and the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines (RCCP) trace their roots to Spanish colonization of the Philippines in 1521 and consistently claim the largest membership of Philippine population then and now. The various streams of the Protestant religion and respective churches came into the Philippines at the onset of American colonization in the 1900s.

Other religions and respective churches are not as large in the number of adherents but some of these had become politically significant, particularly those founded by Filipinos. The Philippine Independent Church (Iglesia Filipina Independiente) is remembered for its historic role in the latter part of the Philippine Revolution and in the upsurge of nationalism at the time.¹

Religion and Church: The Political Force of Beliefs and Organizational Resources

Conceptual nuances

Religion and church are interrelated concepts since both are viewed as elements of culture and institutions of society as explained in sociology, anthropology, philosophy and psychology. But the distinctions and nuances must necessarily be understood to appropriately analyze their power in Philippine politics.

Religion is generally viewed as the system of beliefs and practices; it is commonly called faith. In the literature across the decades, religion has consistently been

1. Teodoro Agoncillo and Oscar Alfonso, *Short History of the Filipino People* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1968), 279, 282.

referred to as a system of beliefs, principles, doctrines, symbols, including rituals, and practices, norms, values, and moral prescriptions, and pertaining to man's relationship with a supernatural being, a creator, or some power beyond.² At the levels of the individual and personal, the social and collective, religion has been examined as an expression of what can be considered as spiritual, holy, sacred, pertaining to faith in supernatural reality, and as answers to questions about the meaning of life.³ Religion permeates the people's way of life as it is associated with the meaning and value that people give to economic goods, labor, wealth, social class, marriage customs, political authority, and many other aspects of life in society.⁴ The system of beliefs and practices are written in some form of document or book (such as the Bible, the Qur'an, the books of the Philippine Independent Church, the Iglesia ni Cristo) and traced to a source, to a person considered to be the founder, to the main teacher.

On the other hand, the concept "church" has many meanings. Essentially, it is the community of persons, the believers and adherents of a specific religion, and the organization they have formed among themselves, which includes the leaders and members, their structure, and system of operations.⁵ Hence, it has the character of a human institution or organization; and the spiritual mystery of relationships between man and God and among believers. The term church also denotes the physical edifice or place where the believers hold their religious activities.⁶ At the societal level, church is considered a social structure and a social institution, as patterns of interaction occur persistently, becoming part of the way people live and organize themselves.

Related terms denote the religious character of the group—hence, religious group, religious community, religious organization, church-based group, religious movements. Johnstone asserts that religion, besides being an individual matter, is a group phenomena such that six characteristics can be applied when identifying a religious group: 1) at least two or more people who have established certain patterns of interaction; 2) with common goals; 3) shared norms; 4) a role for every member, or set of functions, a division of labor; 5) a status system or hierarchy with different levels of power, authority, prestige and its corresponding roles and engagements; and 6) the members' sense of identification with the group.⁷ But the notion of religious movement carries the peculiar attributes of a social movement, such as mass mobilization and intensity of cause,⁸ and collective activities to set up a new order of life, usually in response to the harsh realities of life.⁹ Religious movements have been known to direct its force upon political causes such as revolution, independence, secularization, modernization, and recently toward re-sacralization of modern and secular institutions. In religious resurgence and fundamentalist movements, new meanings are given to traditional religion, hence religion is said to be reinvigorated, purified. This reshapes personal and social behavior along religious tenets and stimulates an upsurge in commitment and practice among believers.¹⁰

2. Glenn Vernon, *Sociology of Religion* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962).

Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*, 5th edition, fully revised and updated (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 91, citing W. Comstock et al., *Religion and Man: An Introduction*, 1971.

Ronald L. Johnstone, *Religion in Society: A Sociology of Religion*, 5th edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997), 10-12.

3. Hague and Harrop, *Comparative Government*, 91, citing W. Comstock et al., *Religion and Man*, 1971.

4. Vernon, *Sociology of Religion*, 55.

Thomas O'Lea, *The Sociology of Religion* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1960).

5. Ma Lourdes Ganato, "Perceptions of the Religious Esteem of Development Goals of the Government: 1967-1977," (MA thesis, University of the Philippines, 1976), 30-34.

Ma Lourdes Ganato-Rebulida, "Church Development Perspective: Policy Formulation and Implementation," (PhD dissertation, University of the Philippines, 1990), 50-51.

Ma Lourdes Ganato-Rebulida, "Reconceptualizing Development: The View from Philippine Churches," *Philippine Political Science Journal* 33, no. 36 (June 1991-December 1992): 49-62.

6. Ma Lourdes Ganato-Rebulida, "Church Development Perspective: Policy Formulation and Implementation," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* 35, no. 1 (January 1991): 52.

7. Johnstone, *Religion in Society*, 7-9.

8. George Andrew Kouvetaris, *Political Sociology: Structure and Process* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1997), 200-214.

9. Grace Jarnon, "The El Shaddai Prayer Movement: Political Socialization in a Religious Context," *Philippine Political Science Journal* 20, no. 43 (1999): 81.

10. James, "The El Shaddai," 85-86, citing Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 94-96.

Strategic functions in political socialization and political culture

The political salience of religious beliefs, values, and practices is observed in its role in shaping political culture, in political socialization and in political mobilization. In their classic work, *The Civic Culture* (1963), Almond and Verba point out that the people's orientations to political symbols, structures, and processes, their preferences and actions, are shaped by their values and beliefs.¹¹ Theories on political culture emphasize the effects of the people's culture—the sum total of their way of life, or aspects thereof—upon their perceptions and actions toward the state and government, political leaders and political processes, and whatever type of political system, be that democratic or authoritarian. Religion is a most important component of political culture tracing the evidence from ancient civilization, such as in China and the Middle East, and even in medieval Europe where political rulers anchored their authority on religious claims. For instance, the Qur'an served as the Muslims' basis for an Islamic state; the Scriptures as basis for the claims raised by Christian church leaders and monarchs during Europe's medieval period to establish the domains of the church and state.¹² Many other country-specific studies attest to the effects of the people's beliefs and values, including those that are religious, upon political structures and processes. Hence, religion can be considered as an important political resource, since religious qualities that motivate people can be channeled to political action.¹³

In shaping political culture, the process of political socialization provides the interactive channels by which society inculcates its values and ways of life upon its members; and the ways members learn the political culture of their society.¹⁴ Pertinent to religion, political socialization involves a process of transferring, learning, and acquiring religious beliefs and its political attribution that occurs along every person's life cycle, from infancy to adulthood,¹⁵ and collectively passed on from one generation to the next. Churches and religious groups were found to be politically important as instruments or agents of political socialization, as they infuse religious beliefs and values that affect individuals and groups on a daily basis in various aspects of life—economic, social, religious¹⁶—including political action such as in voting and expressions of public opinion. When political issues are couched in religious terms, believers can be motivated toward certain forms of commitment and action.¹⁷

Political behavior in a pluralist democracy

In a modern, secular, and democratic state, specifically the type of pluralist democracy that encourages political participation of many groups, the churches and religious groups find latitude for political involvement under the principle of separation of church and state. As one of the many contending groups, churches and religious groups can participate in the democratic hallmarks

11. Gabriel Almond and Verba Sidney, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963).

12. Hague and Harrop, *Comparative Government*, 91-92.

13. Jamon, "The El Shaddai," 84-85, citing Kenneth Wald, *Religion and Politics in the US* (New York: St. Martin, 1987), 29-30.

14. Austin Ranney, *Governing: An Introduction to Political Science*, 7th edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996), 58.

15. Hague and Harrop, *Comparative Government*, 88-89.

16. Jamon, "The El Shaddai," 84-84, citing Louis Luzbetak, *The Church and Culture: An Applied Anthropology for the Religious Worker* (Illinois: Divine World Publications, 1983), 6.

17. Genalo, "Perceptions of the Religious Elites," 10, 36, citing Robert Bellah, *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia* (New York: Free Press, 1965), 5, 32-36.

Jamon, "The El Shaddai," 84-85, citing Wald, *Religion and Politics*, 29-30.

of elections, interest group formation and interest articulation, and policy making.

Weber drew attention to religion by examining the influence of the Protestant ethic on the growth of capitalism.¹⁸ Studies have since examined the political impact of religions, churches, religious groups and movements, particularly in postcolonial Asia, Africa, Latin America, as these relate to ideology, elections, political parties, independence movements, revolutions, regime change, modernization, and socio economic-political development.¹⁹ In recent years, there has been attention on Islamic religious fundamentalism and resurgence in many parts of the world—in the Middle East where Islam predominates, and in some Southeast Asian states, including the southern parts of the Philippines, bringing into question the compatibility of Islam with democracy and globalization.²⁰

In the case of the Philippines, these concepts and assertions find empirical validity. The political currency and social roles of religion, churches, and religious groups can be situated in the Philippines' colonial history and postcolonial politics of nation building, democracy, and development.

Political salience in the Philippines

The impact of religion and the political behavior of religious groups can be observed in the political socialization and the political culture of Philippine society, in the occurrence of revolution and regime change, in democratic processes—particularly in elections and policy formulation, in various aspects of development, and recently, in civil society's interaction with the state.

The politically relevant religions in the Philippines are Islam, Roman Catholicism, and Protestantism. Since the 1950s, the religious beliefs of the Iglesia ni Cristo and of many religious movements have also exerted their political influence.

Of the churches, the Catholic Church has figured prominently in the Spanish colonization of the Philippines and was the subject of the Philippine Revolution against Spain in the 1890s. Since the Philippines' self-rule in 1946 and under the constitutional provision of separation of church and state, the Catholic Church and other churches found new arenas for political involvement, such as in elections, policy making, and interest articulation.²¹ The Catholic Church and Protestant member-churches of the National Council of Churches of the Philippines (NCCP) have been institutionally engaged in social, political, and economic development.²² The Catholic Church has been known for its influence over its large membership during elections. During the Marcos regime (1965-1986), the Catholic Church and some Protestant churches were immersed in the politics of church and state conflict, ideology, and regime change.²³ In the processes that culminated in the so-called 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, the Catholic Church and various Protestant churches took activist positions that helped topple President Ferdinand Marcos. At the 2001 EDSA 2 event that caused President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to step down from office, the Catholic Church and, in a less visible but significant way the

18. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London: Unwin University Books, 1930).

19. Robert Bellah, *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia* (New York: Free Press, 1965), 32-36.

Donald Smith, *Religion, Politics, and Social Change in the Third World* (New York: Free Press, 1971).

Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

Daniel Levine, ed., *Churches and Politics in Latin America* (California: Sage Publications, Inc., 1980).

20. Carmen Abubakar, "Is Islam Compatible with Democracy?" *Kasarinian: A Philippine Quarterly of Third World Studies* 12, no. 1 (1996): 25-44.

Colin Rubenstein, "The Role of Islam in Contemporary South East Asian Politics," <http://www.jpss.org/jp436.htm>.

21. Bernardita Panganiban, "The Role of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippine Politics" (MA thesis, University of the Philippines, 1963), 161-82, 92-97.

Miguel A. Bernad, *The Christianization of the Philippines: Problems and Perspectives* (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1972), 209-73.

John N. Schumacher, S.J., "Church and State in Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in *De la Costa, H. and J. Schumacher, Church and State: The Philippine Experience*, *Loyola Papers 2* (Manila: The Loyola School of Theology, Ateneo de Manila University), 30-32.

22. Wilfredo Fabros, *The Church and its Social Involvement in the Philippines: 1930-1972* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1988), 16-27, 105, 60-65, 77-81.

Ma. Lourdes Ganato, "Perceptions of the Religious Elites of the Development Goals of Government 1974-77" (MA thesis, University of the Philippines, College of Arts and Sciences, 1976), 180-255, 256-80.

Ma. Lourdes Ganato-Rebulida, "Church Development Perspective: Policy Formulation and Implementation" (PhD dissertation, University of the Philippines College of Public Administration, 1990), 171-270, 342-512.

23. Mario Belasco and Rolando Yu, *Church-State Relations* (Manila: St. Scholastica's College, 1981), 57-150.

Ma. Lourdes Ganato-Rebulida, "Religion and Ideology in Public Administration: The Role of the Churches in the Philippines," *Tupon* 12, no. 1 (1992): 7-36.

Protestant churches, took a politically vital role in political mobilization and regime change.

The Muslim or Islamic groups are crucial in the issues of constitutionalism, political and national integration, considering their years of resistance and separatist struggles against the Philippine state.²⁴ The state and Muslim groups are currently engaged in peace processes, decentralization and regional autonomy in Mindanao.

In elections, the Iglesia ni Cristo has long been associated with bloc voting.²⁵ In recent years, other religious organizations and movements, particularly the El Shaddai and Jesus Is Lord Fellowship, gained political value with their resources and capacities for political socialization, political mobilization, and electoral participation.²⁶

Church and State Relations in Historical Perspective

The strategic turning points and crucial roles of churches or religious groups, as well as the significance of religion as a factor in political processes can best be explained in its historical contexts. The discernible time periods in which to locate the churches in relation to political issues and processes are the following: 1) pre-Hispanic period of Islamic stronghold in the Philippines; 2) Spanish colonization and unity of church and state beginning 1521, then the 1896 Philippine Revolution, 1898 Malolos Congress and Malolos Constitution; 3) American colonization in the 1900s till 1946; 4) Philippine self-rule since 1946 till the start of the Marcos regime under martial law in 1972; 5) the Marcos regime from 1972 to its downfall in 1986; 6) the February 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution and thereafter, the redemocratization process under the presidential terms of Corazon C. Aquino, Fidel V. Ramos, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Given this historical framework, this section presents the place of Islam and Islamic resurgence in the context of the Muslim struggles for secession, the issue of autonomy, and the current peace processes; and the political involvement of the Catholic Church, Protestant churches, and other types of churches and religious groups in the Philippines.

Islam and Islamic resurgence: Issue of autonomy and peace processes

Islam had come to the Philippines through Arab merchants and Islamic missionaries as it spread to Southeast Asia sometime in the thirteenth century (1210), to the Sulu Archipelago, Mindanao, the Visayas, and Luzon.²⁷ Prior to Spain's colonization of the Philippines, Islam had established a foothold in many parts of the country, thus marking the cultural and political identity of the Muslims. By many accounts,²⁸ the ethnic communities, kinship system, the political units called *balangay* or *barangay*, made up the basic sociopolitical organization in the Philippine islands at the threshold of Spanish conquest.

24. Jamal Kamlian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines: A Discourse in Self-Determination, Political Autonomy and Conflict Resolution," www.law.emory.edu/HR.

Thomas Michael Wallis, "The Bases of the Moro Problem," MA thesis, The American University, 1968 (Michigan: UMI Dissertation Information Service, 1990).

Santanna T. Rasaf, "The Legacy of Islam in the Philippines," *Sister of Peace Ceremony, Women Breaking Barriers for Peace Conference*, Manila Hotel, February 12, 1999. http://www.wponline.org/vil/Articles/politics/legacy_of_islam_in_the_philippines.htm.

Samuel Tan, *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle* (Quezon City: UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 2000).

Samuel Tan, "The Bangsamoro Struggle," <http://www.up.edu.ph/lorum/2000/06/mayjun/bangsamoro.htm>.

25. Genato, "Perceptions," 45-46, citing Julia Reyes-Sta. Romana, "The Iglesia ni Cristo: A Study," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 14, no. 3 (July 1953): 329-43.

Genato, "Perceptions," 45, citing Hirofumi Ando, "The Altar and the Ballot Box: The Iglesia ni Cristo in the 1954 Philippine Elections," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* 2, no. 4 (October 1966): 356-66.

Agoncillo and Altonso, *Short History*, 279, 292.

Bonifacio Salamanca, *The Filipino Reaction to American Rule 1901-1913* (Shrewsbury, 1968), 217, 96-107, 110, 46-51.

26. Grace Gorospe-Jamon, "The El Shaddai Prayer Movement: Political Socialization in a Religious Context," *Philippine Political Science Journal* 20, no. 43 (1999): 83-126.

27. John Garshman, "Foreign Policy in Focus: Moro in the Philippines," http://ipip.org/selfdetermination/conflicts/philippines_body.html, 1.

28. Oscar L. Evangelista, *Building the National Community: Problems and Prospects, and Other Historical Essays* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 2002).

Gersman, "Foreign Policy."

Samuel Tan explains that the term "Moro" was used by Western sources to refer to the culture; "Mohammedan," related to the founder of Islam; "Muslim," to believers of Islam.²⁹ In southern Philippines, the Muslims successfully resisted foreign colonization not only by Spain but also by the United States, compared to Luzon and Visayas that came under colonial rule. The Moros or the Muslims, as referred to by the Spaniards (after the Moors), resisted colonial rule by Spain and the United States and kept Islam against the Roman Catholic and Christian religions; hence the Islamic political and religious system remained dominant in southern Philippines.

During the Philippine Commonwealth period, President Manuel Quezon worked at the inclusion of Muslim Mindanao and promised participation in government, which dispelled the Muslim opposition as expressed in their Dansalan Manifesto.³⁰ Mindanao was incorporated in the Republic of the Philippines in 1946 at the close of American colonial rule.

Since the formation of the Philippine Republic and independence from American colonial rule in 1946, the Muslims have faced the dilemma of integration or secession from the entire country and posed a continual threat to the Philippine state. According to Tan, the integrationist view prevailed from 1946 to 1968, the secessionist view from 1968 to 1987, and from 1987 to the present, the separatist alternative.³¹ Tan further clarifies that "separatism" was used by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the view that the Bangsamoro nation was not part of the Philippines, while "secessionism" has been used generally by the government and Muslims who consider themselves Filipinos; and "struggle" refers to the Bangsamoro conflict.³²

In 1968 the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) was organized, calling for the secession of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan from the Philippine Republic and declaring a holy war.³³ These Muslim groups raised arms against the Philippine state anchored on the Muslims' discontent and grievances over many state policies that, in their perceptions, disregarded their cultural identity, marginalized them vis-à-vis the Christians, and caused deterioration in the socioeconomic and political conditions of their lives. In 1969 the MNLF was organized and eventually responded to the government's offer of autonomy for Muslim Mindanao within the framework of the Philippine unitary state and the 1987 Philippine Constitution. However, the Moro Islamic Liberation Movement, a group that broke off from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1983, and the MNLF Reformists continued to challenge the state and represent the struggle of the Muslims for the cause of an independent Moro nation. Another group set up in the mid-1980s, the Abu Sayyaf, aimed to propagate Islam through jihad and has engaged in terrorist attacks in recent years.³⁴

The contemporary Islamic resurgence in the Philippines is anchored on the religion of Islam, which emphasizes commitment to Allah and to no other authority; and, on the view that Islam provides the remedy to all of humankind's problems. The resurgence is considered "not only an attempt but a constant striving for the creation of an Islamic society," for the uplift of the Muslims from their much

29. Tan, *Internationalization*.

30. Hashim Abubakar and Farishta Abubakar-Guabral, "Are Muslims the Weakest Link?" http://www.cyberdaryo.com/opinion/op2002_0117_01.htm.

Kamilian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines," 3.

31. Tan, *Internationalization*, 39.

32. Tan, *Internationalization*, 41.

44. Kamilian, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines," 5.

34. Gershman, "Foreign Policy."

diminished socioeconomic and political conditions, and for the revival of the lost glory of the Muslims.³⁵

In response, the government entered into what is now called the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, also signed into law as Presidential Decree (PD) 1083—the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, and incorporated in the 1987 Constitution (Article 10), stipulating the creation of an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The factors for the Mindanao problem are multidimensional (land disputes and economic disparities vis-à-vis Christians, among others). It has also been said that the resistance against the state is anything but a holy war or a religious war. However, the religious factor derives from the nature of Islam as a way of life and from which the adherents derive their social and cultural identity. The term “Moro” (as they were called by the Spaniards) had been replaced by the term “Muslim” sometime in 1946. The term Bangsamoro has been used in recent years (around 1989) to capture both the historical and contemporary identity of the people, that is, *bangsa*, the local term of Muslim cultural groups for “one race”; and “Moro,” the Spanish term for believers in Islam.³⁶ The issues persist to this day even after the creation of ARMM.

Spanish colonization, Roman Catholicism, and the unity of church and state

Spain colonized Luzon and Visayas for more than 300 years, from 1521 to 1898, by the joint efforts of Spanish government officials and four friar orders, under the principle of unity of church and state.³⁷ The Augustinians, Dominicans, Franciscans, Recollects and, later, the Jesuits accomplished the spread of the Roman Catholic religion and the institutionalization of the Roman Catholic Church in different parts of Luzon and Visayas. American protestant missionaries posted themselves in different areas of the Philippines by the different denominations—the Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, United Brethren, Disciples of Christ, Episcopal Church, Congregationalist, Seventh-Day Adventist.³⁸ This lengthy phase in Philippine history laid down many issues in Philippine society, culture and development, specifically in terms of class structure, land ownership and tenure system, education, language, political economy and distributive justice, and church-state relations.

The Spanish friar lands became a sensitive socioeconomic-political issue in the Philippines even after the end of the Spanish colonial regime. The friar estates and the hacienda system therein extended to many areas in Bulacan, Laguna, Batangas and Cavite³⁹ and constituted the wealth of the Catholic Church, giving cause for the public to criticize the church in subsequent decades. The hacienda system created a social class structure and a system of sharing between landowner and tenant who rented the land, and between the tenant and sharecroppers. The sale of friar lands to the government during the American regime did not alter the inequitable economic and political relationship inherited from the hacienda system that fostered social unrest and attracted agrarian communities to communism in the 1950s.⁴⁰

35. Hamid Aminuddin Barra, “Islamic Resurgence in the Philippines,” *Mindanao Islamic Journal* 2, no. 1 (January-December 1989): 104, 12-113.

36. Tan, “The Bangsamoro Struggle.”

37. Pedro S. De Achutequi and Miguel Bernard, *Documents Relative to the Religious Revolution in the Philippines* (Quezon City: Anasao de Manila University Press, 1972); Schumacher, “Church and State.”

38. Salamanca, *The Filipino Reaction* 217, 96-107, 110, 46-51.

39. Ganato, “Perceptions of the Religious Elites,” 64-65.

Pablo Fernandez, O.P., *History of the Church in the Philippines 1521-1898* (Manila: National Book Store, 1979), 347-49.

40. Ganato, “Perceptions of the Religious Elites,” 67, citing Tugoy, Arthur, and R. Toliver. *Seeing the Church in the Philippines* (Manila: OMF Publishers, 1972), 17, 26-28, 40-43.

Rodrigo Tano, *Theology in the Philippine Setting* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1981), 85-131.

Biasoco and Yu, *Church-State Relations*, 57-96.

39. Ganato-Rebulida, “Church Development Perspective,” 114, citing Dennis Morrow Roth, *The Friar Estates of the Philippines* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977), 1-2, 40-47, 120-32.

40. Ganato-Rebulida, “Church Development Perspective,” 116-17, citing Eduardo Lachica, *Huk: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt* (Manila: Solidarity Publishing House, 1971), 59-60, 62-89.

1896 Philippine Revolution: Creating the secular state

The combined abuses of the Spanish friars and colonial government officials fueled the Philippine Revolution against Spain in 1896. Against the backdrop of Philippine nationalism, the martyrdom of three Filipino priests Gomez, Burgos, and Zamora, initially sparked the issue of secularization and Filipinization of Catholic Church parishes.⁴¹ In the fervor of nationalism, Isabelo de los Reyes and Gregorio Aglipay argued for a Filipino national church, independent of the Catholic Church in Rome. This led to the birth of the Philippine Independent Church during the later part of the 1896 Philippine Revolution, with Aglipay as its first head, hence the Philippine Independent Church is also known as the Aglipayan Church.

Furthermore, religious experiences helped in the political socialization of the masses toward peasant brotherhoods and uprising. Folk Christianity evolved from the integration of Catholicism introduced by the Spanish colonizers and the native religious beliefs. The so-called *Pasyon* (*Pasyon Pilapil*)—the manuscript on the life of Jesus Christ read during the Holy Week Catholic church ritual, was instrumental in drawing the parallelisms of the sufferings of Christ with the oppressed conditions of the Filipinos under the Spanish colonial regime.⁴² Peasant revolts against the Spanish authorities were imbued with religious fervor, in the rituals of the groups on piety and charity, their message of redemption, particularly derived from their background of membership in religious confraternities.⁴³

In the 1898 Malolos Congress, the delegates debated on the principle of unity of church and state versus the principle of separation of church and state in crafting the 1898 Malolos Constitution.⁴⁴ Taking the position in favor of separation of church and state, the Filipino delegates to the Malolos Congress gave the Philippines its first constitutional experience with a modern, secular and democratic state as stipulated in the Malolos Constitution.⁴⁵ In historical accounts, the revolutionary government, known to be the First Philippine Republic, under the presidency of General Emilio Aguinaldo and with Apolinario Mabini in the cabinet, did not pursue the separation of church and state due to the exigencies of the revolution against Spain, while the Philippine Independent Church supported the revolution against Spain.

At the close of the Philippine Revolution and turnover to American colonization of the Philippines in 1898, the American priests replaced the Spanish friars.⁴⁶ Despite the Philippine Revolution directed at both the Spanish colonial government and the Catholic Church, the majority of the Filipinos remained Roman Catholic in their professed religion (83 percent in different periods of population census) and the Roman Catholic Church maintained its institutional status in Philippine society.

American colonization, multiplicity of churches, and tutelage in democracy

Protestantism and various Protestant denominations entered the Philippines as American colonization commenced and missionaries apportioned the areas in the

41. Schumacher, "Church and State," 30-32, 89.

Agoncillo and Alfonso, *Short History*, 278, 292.

De Achutegui and Bernard, *Documents Relative to the Religious Revolution*.

Salamanca, *The Filipino Reaction*, 107-11.

42. Reynaldo C. Ite, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1989), 11-18.

43. Ite, 29-31.

44. Cesar Adib Majul, *The Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Philippine Revolution* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1996), 103-76.

45. Majul, *The Political and Constitutional Ideas*, 153-76.

Ma. Lourdes G. Rebulida, "Social Change and the Malolos Congress" (paper presented at the International Congress on The Malolos Republic and Asian Democracy, Manila Hotel, January 19-20, 1999).

46. Genato-Rebulida, "Church Development Perspective," 110, citing Salamanca, *The Filipino Reaction*.

Philippines for their respective work of evangelism. The multiplicity of American Protestant groups gave credence to American political ideas of democracy, participation, pluralism, right to religious freedom, and separation of church and state. In time the Filipinos organized their own Protestant churches or broke off from the American churches to form their own independent Filipino churches.⁴⁷

Under American rule, the Catholic Church adjusted to the tutelage of pluralistic and representative democracy. Priests and church members initially saw action in the elections for the Philippine Assembly in 1907.⁴⁸ Thus began the tradition of powerful bloc voting among the Catholics, guided and exhorted by the church hierarchy.

Meanwhile, a Filipino named Felix Manalo founded the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) in 1914 on the basis of some spiritual experience, though he had been a Protestant, moving as member of one Protestant church to another. Since then, the INC has grown to become a powerful voting bloc and very much sought after by politicians in need of endorsement from the leaders and voting support from the members. It is well known that members of this church vote as a bloc based on a teaching that they agree, be united and of one mind, same judgment, without dissension among them.⁴⁹

The churches and Philippine democracy

Separation of church and state

The relationship between church and state became one of the major issues in the 1896 Philippine Revolution and in the debates of the 1898 Malolos Congress in crafting the Malolos Constitution. The friar congregations' control of education, ownership of vast tracts of land, and the hacienda system (land tenure, rent, taxation, and sharing of produce) turned out to be the major sources of Filipino antagonism against the Catholic Church in the Philippines.⁵⁰ The Malolos Congress decided in favor of the separation of church and state in writing the 1898 Malolos Constitution. Subsequently, the Philippine Constitutions of 1935, 1972, and 1987 affirmed the principle of separation of church and state in establishing the Philippines as a secular and democratic state.⁵¹ Hence the church is a social institution expressed organizationally by many different churches with no direct powers of control over the state and government. In the framework of democracy and pluralism, these churches exercise rights derived from the Philippine constitution to function as organizations and groups, and to participate in the processes of elections, interest articulation, legislation and policy formulation.

Pluralist democracy and political participation in electoral politics

Since Philippine independence from American colonial rule in 1946, the Roman Catholic Church and the Iglesia ni Cristo established their political significance by their influence on voters during elections and on public opinion by their institutional position statements, pastoral letters, and their leaders' articulation of personal

47. Genato-Rebulida, "Church Development Perspective," 111-12, citing Salamanca, *The Filipino Reaction*.

48. Genato-Rebulida, "Church Development Perspective," 118.

49. Genato-Rebulida, "Church Development Perspective," 99, citing Hirofumi Ando, "The Altar and the Ballot Box: The Iglesia ni Cristo in the 1954 Philippine Elections," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* 2, no. 4 (October 1966).

50. E. Arsenio Manuel, *Felipe Calderon: A Biographical Portrait* (Manila: Bookman, 1954), 19.

51. Jemon, "Church and State Relations," 4.

Ma. Lourdes Genato-Rebulida, "Social Change and the Malolos Congress" (paper presented at the International Congress on The Malolos Republic and Asian Democracy, Manila Hotel, January 19-20, 1999), 1-3.

insights.⁵² In the early years, the Roman Catholic Church also engaged in policy advocacy to influence legislators, such as their opposition in the 1950s to the compulsory reading of Jose Rizal's novels in educational institutions as these were harmful to Catholicism.⁵³

Until today, both the Catholic Church and the INC have sustained the same pattern of electoral influence by their support for political candidates at different periods of national and local elections. Jaime Cardinal Sin had been a politically influential leader of the Catholic Church.

A brief episode in May 1967 called attention to the presence in Philippine society of a religious-political group with so-called nativistic, messianic and millenarian characteristics. The Lapiang Malaya, or Freedom Party, was an organization with symbols, uniforms, and titles similar to those of the Katipunan—the Filipino revolutionary movement against Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines.⁵⁴ The group held on to ancient beliefs, magical objects (*anting-anting*), and religious experiences. The leader, Valentin Santos, had presented himself as a presidential candidate in 1957. He challenged President Marcos to resign and staged an uprising on May 1967. The members met death as they used bolos to face the armed government troops.

In the 1980s, new Christian churches, religious groups, and religious movements were organized along the lines of the spiritual charismatic renewal. They have gained political influence by their cohesion and numbers such that political candidates have sought their electoral support. The El Shaddai group of Bro. Mike Velarde provided the platform for political leaders and candidates in the national elections (1992, 1998, and 2005) and echoed political values based on the Christian faith.⁵⁵ In the 2004 elections, various faith-related groups supported the presidential bid of Bro. Eddie Villanueva, a well-known leader of a Christian group, the Jesus Is Lord Fellowship.

Political activism and regime change

In the 1970s, the political activism among students and other cause-oriented groups stirred the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant churches to examine their institutional roles in Philippine society.⁵⁶ Also, the theology of liberation from Latin America and ideologies espoused by reformist and radical groups in the Philippines influenced sectors within the churches.⁵⁷

Recognizing the need for social relevance, these institutional churches engaged in transforming their orientations toward society, politics, government, development and change. The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) made the official pronouncements for the Catholic Church, while the National Council for Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) and the Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches (PCEC) represented their respective Protestant member-churches.

Initially, the churches' key leaders (Rufino Cardinal Santos, Archbishop Teopisto Alberto) and official decision-making structures articulated support for the government under President Marcos, including support for Marcos's declaration of

52. Panganiban, "The Role of the Roman Catholic Church," 161-62, 92-97.

Genato, "Perceptions of the Religious Elites," 45-46, citing Rayto-Sta. Romana, *The Iglesia ni Kristo*, 329-43.

Genato, "Perceptions of the Religious Elites," 45, citing Ando, *The Altar and the Ballot Box*, 356-66.

53. Panganiban, "The Role of the Roman Catholic Church."

54. *Ibid.*, 1-3.

55. Jaron, "The El Shaddai," 56. Solano and Yu, *Church-State Relations*.

Robert Youngblood, *Marcos Against the Church: Economic Development and Political Repression in the Philippines* (London: Cornell University Press, 1990).

Genato, "Perceptions of the Religious Elites."

Genato-Rebullida, "Church Development Perspective."

57. Tano, *Theology*.

martial law and the New Society in 1972, expecting benefits to the country.⁵⁸ However, the Marcos regime's authoritarianism, repression, and questionable development policies spurred church activists to take more radical approaches to politics and development and to openly contest the regime. Early enough, the church decried the Marcos regime's harassment of church activist nuns, priest, pastors, and workers engaged in social action and development programs, and military raids on church offices.⁵⁹

Conflicts seriously ensued between church and state from 1972 to 1986, heightening the churches' politicization. Church-related groups engaged in various forms of activism included the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP); the NCCP; the radical evangelical wing represented by the Institute for Studies in Asian Church and Culture and their political coalition, *Konsensiya ng Febrero Siete* (KONFES), among protestants; the CBCP; the National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA); the Ecumenical Center for Development (ECD); and many other activist pressure groups composed of nuns, priests, seminarians, and other church members.⁶⁰ Church people stood at the frontline of regime change in the events surrounding the February 1986 presidential snap elections called for by President Marcos and the defection of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, culminating in the historic 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution. Religious symbols dominated the EDSA 1 event and Jaime Cardinal Sin stood out among the church leaders as the key force in summoning the populace to participate. Hence the activist churches played a historic part in removing Marcos from power and installing Corazon Aquino as Philippine president.

In January 2001 the Catholic Church would repeat the exercise of political influence in regime change as it helped mobilize people power that brought down President Estrada from the presidency and catapulted Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the presidency. At this event referred to as EDSA 2, Cardinal Sin again played an influential role.

Development, redemocratization and governance

From the 1970s to the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution and in the post-EDSA 1 years, the Catholic Church and the Protestant member-churches of the NCCP as well as committed elements among evangelicals evolved their own development perspectives that they claim to be liberation-oriented and holistic in its political, economic, cultural aspects.⁶¹ The 1970s turned out to be a crucial era that marked the turning point for major churches as their hierarchies decided to engage in development work, which formed part of their political activism. The churches engaged in their own development programs and projects to address problems of social injustice and oppression and to help the people achieve their human potential. Departing from traditional social action and dole-out approaches, the involved churches and church-related groups worked in urban and rural areas, in community organizing and empowerment of peasants, laborers, fisherfolk, and

58. Youngblood, *Marcos Against the Church*, 172-73.

Genato, "Perceptions of the Religious Elites," 109-12.

59. Youngblood, *Marcos Against the Church*, 174-77.

60. Genato-Rebutida, "Religion and Ideology."

Youngblood, *Marcos Against the Church*, 174-203.

61. Genato-Rebutida, "Church Development Perspective," 170-269.

Ma. Lourdes Genato-Rebutida, "Reconceptualizing Development: The View from Philippine Churches." *Philippine Political Science Journal*/33-36 (June 1991-December 1992): 44-64.

Youngblood, *Marcos Against the Church*.

urban-poor communities. They established Basic Ecclesial Christian Communities; mobilized community-based programs for health, livelihood, environment, and other concerns; and advocated policies on various issues of political and economic reform (as reported by the CBCP, NASSA, NCCP, and ECD).

These engagements facilitated the politicization of church members, such that some were perceived to have become communists because of their affiliation with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Some were labeled progressive, moderates, and conservatives, given their ideological and political leanings.⁶²

Development work immersed the church people in the process of political socialization that helped pave the way for their participation in the events surrounding the EDSA 1 People Power Revolution. This also established the linkages between church and civil society, and the collaborative struggles of civil society and the church against the state under the Marcos rule.⁶³

Post-EDSA 1 and under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the Catholic Church and the Protestant NCCP member-churches sustained their development work as they moved into new and relevant arenas in collaboration with civil society nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and people's organizations (POs). The democratic space under the Aquino presidency and the governance framework as derived from the 1987 Constitution enabled the civil society groups, business groups, and the churches to participate in development and democratic processes. Church and state relationships entered a new phase as activist churches pursued policy advocacy and participated in policy-formulation processes in collaboration with civil-society NGOs and POs.

In the current stage of Philippine democracy, the church as a social institution, and the different churches in their organizational contexts, find space for political involvement as the state's governance framework engaged participation of the various sectors in Philippine society. The 1987 Philippine Constitution has expanded the latitude for the democratic processes of participation of civil society and other sectors in development, decentralization, legislation and policy formulation. In the prevailing political context, the different churches, religious groups and religious movements have ample space for different forms of political and social involvement.

Modes of Political Engagement in Democratization Processes

The force of religion in Philippine society derives from the elements of faith, beliefs, values, and norms inculcated in the people—the believers and adherents. The factors of beliefs, organizational structure, leadership, political socialization processes, size and cohesion of membership, resources and strategies account for the political value and salience of churches, religious groups, and religious movements in the Philippines. This section presents these variables and the modes of engagement of the more politically involved groups.

62. Youngblood, *Marcos Against the Church*, 176-77.

63. Allan Alegre, *Trends and Traditions, Challenges and Choices: A Strategic Study of Philippine NGOs* (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs Philippines-Canada Human Resource Development Program, 1996).

Church resources

Religious multiplicity or pluralism denotes the freedom to form associations under the democratic framework of the Philippine Constitution, such that many different churches were established in the Philippines. The Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines (RCCP) is often referred to as "the church," considering that majority of Filipinos claim to be members and profess the Catholic religion. In the 1960s, Roman Catholic Church members constituted 84.0 percent of the population; the Aglipayan or Philippine Independent Church at 5.2 percent; Protestant churches of various denominations comprised 2.9 percent; INC, 1.0 percent; Muslims, 4.9 percent; and others 2.0 percent.⁶⁴ By 1991, the Social Weather Stations (SWS) survey showed almost the same figures: Catholics, 84.0 percent of the Philippine population; Aglipayans declined in membership to 4.0 percent while the INC increased to 3.0 percent; the Protestants of different denominations remained the same at 3.0 percent; while the Muslims reportedly constituted 1.0 percent, much lower than earlier figures.⁶⁵ In 1990, population census registered 85.0 percent Catholics, with other Christian denominations at 8.7 percent; Muslims at 4.6 percent; indigenous groups with religious traditions, 1.2 percent; atheists and persons with no religious preference, 3.0 percent.⁶⁶ The 2000 Population Census data also showed Catholics comprised 85.0 percent of the population.

The Catholic Church's social and political power derives mainly from its vast membership, the ownership and management of educational institutions and other engagements such as media, and financial resources. The membership is distributed in 2,983 parishes comprising eighty-six dioceses in the different parts of the country; the hierarchy of leadership consists of 110 archbishops and bishops, and 7,406 priests; also religious orders, comprising 250 brothers, 3,970 seminarians, and 9,873 sisters.⁶⁷

The Social Weather Stations' surveys, periodically conducted (1985, 1986, 1989, 1990), indicated that the Catholic Church remained the most trusted social institution, and that the people continued to pursue religious practices, making the church an influential social institution.⁶⁸ The political power of the Catholic Church stems from its capacity to influence and mobilize its vast membership toward political ends, mainly during elections to support and ensure victory of political candidates; and, in policy formulation, to support or oppose legislation and executive policies. Observers have said that the Catholic Church's moral ascendancy derives from the vacuum in political leadership and the lack of a reliable and credible institution that can challenge the forces of traditional politics.⁶⁹

In the '70s to the present, new churches and organizations emerged with different orientations from those of the mainline churches. These have been referred to as the "born-again" Christian churches, "charismatic" churches, and related organizations. Among these are the El Shaddai and the Jesus Is Lord Fellowship, which began to figure prominently in electoral politics as their membership provided support to candidates in the national elections (El Shaddai supported presidential

64. Genalo, "Perceptions of the Religious Elites," 74, citing Tugay and Toliver, *Seeing the Church*, 14.

65. Jimon, "Church and State Relations," 8.

66. US Department of State, "International Religious Freedom Report," <http://www.state.gov/g/dwr/rs/rls/2004/35425.htm>.

67. Jimon, "Church and State Relations," 11; <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protestant>; <http://www.nationmaster.com/country/rp/region480>.

68. *Ibid.*, 10.

69. *Ibid.*, 10-11.

candidate Joseph Estrada in 1998, and Jesus Is Lord Fellowship supported presidential candidate Eddie Villanueva).

**The El Shaddai Prayer Movement:
Political Socialization by a New Religious Movement**

In a pioneering study, Jamon (1999) analyzed the increasing significance of new religious movements through the case of the El Shaddai Prayer Movement in the 1992 and 1998 elections.⁷⁰

The El Shaddai's membership has reached 1.5 million, organized in 1,300 Philippine chapters (1995) and sixty-one accredited international chapters organized in twenty-five countries from 1988-1995.⁷¹ Reaching down to the grassroots, the El Shaddai connects with the local Catholic Church parish, with the local parish priest serving as spiritual director. At the same time, numerous nonparish-based communities or prayer groups exist in offices, factories, and other establishments. The movement's cohesion has been made possible by the work of various structures, such as the coordinating secretariat, executive coordinating council, national diocesan outreach coordinators for rallies and core groups, local chapters, and prayer groups.⁷² The El Shaddai maintains radio and television stations reaching out to different parts of the country for disseminating religious, organizational, socioeconomic, and political messages. Such media resources present El Shaddai's actual and potential power as agents of political socialization and mobilization.

Jamon's study highlighted the movement's role in the 1992 and 1998 elections when its leader, Mike Velarde, invited presidential candidates to an overnight prayer rally with the usual attendance of some 1.5 million members, whose votes could count in anyone's favor. When Joseph Estrada became president in 1998, he chose Velarde as his spiritual adviser. Furthermore, in policy issues, the leader's endorsement and the group's support have also been sought after, such as in the 1995 issue on charter change, which was opposed by former President Corazon Aquino and Cardinal Sin of the Catholic Church.⁷³

In examining the El Shaddai prayer movement's political salience, Jamon asserted that this case validated the theories and psychological findings on social movements. In its historical evolution, El Shaddai's growth in membership has been facilitated by the leader's personal transformation and teachings that respond to the members' need for personal integration amidst harsh conditions of the times. Starting with a radio program and the

70. Jamon, "The El Shaddai," 86-89.

71. *Ibid.*, 94-95.

72. *Ibid.*, 95.

73. *Ibid.*, 90.

acquisition of a radio station, Mike Velarde's following grew to be the El Shaddai Prayer Movement with nationwide and international chapters. The organization developed into well-defined ministries and a network reaching down to the grassroots through the Catholic Church parish-based local chapters and nonparish-based communities or prayer groups in private offices, establishments and elsewhere.⁷⁴

The movement's media ministry—radio and television, serves as a potent mechanism for organizational cohesion, political socialization and mobilization through dissemination of teachings and various information on organizational activities, social and political issues, even on livelihood and business.⁷⁵ The programs and messages on radio and television helped create a sense of "community" and belonging, with common orientations toward social and political issues. Jamon's in-depth analysis sheds light on the nuances of the El Shaddai's activities: prayer rallies, prayer vigils, community meetings, and anniversary celebrations, attended by its formidable membership, as well as invited political leaders and those seeking support.⁷⁶ The teachings and religious beliefs, outreach activities, and social services carry messages for personal uplift and personal integration of the spiritual with political values and social commitment (by way of assistance to typhoon victims, overseas contract workers, etc). Furthermore, Velarde's personality—his charismatic leadership and style, according to Jamon—is an intriguing factor in the movement's growth and political influence.

Church activism and civil society engagement for development and democracy

For many decades until the '70s, the Catholic Church engaged itself in social action as a way to help resolve social and economic problems, which included livelihood projects and cooperatives, among others.⁷⁷ By the mid-'70s, the Catholic Church and Protestant member-churches of the National Council of Churches in the Philippines opted to shift to a "preferential option for the poor," to engage in development work for justice and equity, and to contest the state and government, under President Ferdinand Marcos on issues of social justice and development. This was in response to criticisms from student activists and left-leaning groups that the institutional church participated in perpetuating unjust social structures in Philippine society. The discourses of their theologians facilitated the political socialization within the involved churches. Latin America's theology of liberation and Marxist social analysis exerted influence on the thinking within these churches.⁷⁸ The turnaround from an orientation of dole-outs and initial support to Marcos's martial law and New Society to church political activism and development

74. Jamon, "The El Shaddai," 94-95.

75. *Ibid.*, 95-100.

76. *Ibid.*, 104-5.

77. Fabros, *The Church and Its Social Involvement*.

78. Tano, *Theology in the Philippine Setting*.

engagement proceeded from the churches' institutional decision-making processes. In pastoral letters and other pronouncements, the Catholic Church and involved Protestant churches acknowledged their institutional role in perpetuating the ills of Philippine society and declared their shift to the prophetic role of exposing injustice and oppression by taking a preferential option for the poor.⁷⁹

Rationalizing their stance as consistent with their belief system and anchored on Christ's teachings in the Bible, these churches worked at the grassroots for the human development of poor and marginalized sectors in Philippine society. The Catholic Church also weighed the options of critical collaboration or direct confrontation with the state in the Marcos regime from 1972 to its downfall in 1986.⁸⁰ Policy declarations at the highest decision-making level on the issues of political, economic, and sociocultural development stirred the internal transformations of structures and programs of both the Catholic Church and the Protestant churches—particularly those affiliated with the National Council of Churches in the Philippines.⁸¹ Generally, the involved churches pursued a paradigm shift in their political activism toward the state and their work of community organizing and people empowerment to effect development, democracy, and social change.

Discourses and policy statements defined development to be a holistic, multidimensional, liberational, and transformative process.⁸² Development was perceived to be a condition in which the people have been liberated from injustice and oppression, and are thus able to develop their full human potential where peace prevails.

In its political dimension, development involves democracy, which in turn consists of people participation, human rights, clean elections, political legitimacy, political accountability, sectoral representation, sovereignty of the state, and separation of church and state. The struggle to effect these political values brought these churches into conflict with the state, leading to the churches' downright denunciation of Marcos's victory in the February 1986 presidential snap elections, and culminating in their involvement in the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution.⁸³

In the socioeconomic-cultural aspects of development, the churches were engaged in community organizing among the poor and marginalized sectors of the population, where the people reflect on social problems and their corresponding actions enlightened by their understanding of their scriptural beliefs. For respective socioeconomic programs, the churches deviated from the traditional dole-out and social action approaches and shifted to community organizing and empowerment of the people for participatory action and collective mutual help in various areas of human need—such as health, livelihood, employment, environment, sustainable development, economic reform, poverty alleviation, socioeconomic welfare, wages, human rights, values formation, and empowerment. The beneficiaries or partners were marginalized ethnic groups, rural peasants, and urban workers.

The churches' vigorous policy advocacies for development went beyond the Marcos regime to the presidential terms of Corazon Aquino, Fidel Ramos, Joseph

79. Genato-Rebulida, "Church Development Perspective," 202-12 (see discussions based on the NCCP Consultations on Development 1974, 1975; also the CBCP Pastoral letters issued in the period 1974-1976).

80. Youngblood, *Marcos Against the Church*.

81. Genato-Rebulida, "Church Development Perspective."

82. Genato-Rebulida, "Church Development Perspective," citing CBCP pastoral letters and NCCP pronouncements (1974-1986).

Alegre, *Trends and Traditions*.

87.

Genato-Rebulida, "Church Development Perspective."

83. Youngblood, *Marcos Against the Church*.

Estrada, and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Their policy advocacies were directed at various development and policy issues, e.g., population policy, reproductive rights, relations with the US, military and civil relations, human rights, ecology and environment, justice and peace building, electoral reform, land and housing reform, among others.⁸⁴

In the process, the involved churches became part of the civil-society movement in the Philippines by their support for NGOs and POs, and by their policy advocacy together with civil-society groups.⁸⁵ The involved churches established their organizations that can be considered as NGOs, thereby contributing to the formation of civil society. These church-based or church-supported civil-society organizations were distinct from other civil-society NGOs and POs by virtue of their religious beliefs, values derived from their faith, and by their church membership or affiliation. For instance, basic ecclesial community building (Basic Christian/Ecclesial Communities) emphasized Christian spiritual formation. On the other hand, like other civil-society groups, the churches and church-based organizations were engaged in conscientization or raising of social awareness, community organizing for empowerment of grassroot communities, and community mobilization to exert pressure on the policy-making structures of government. Also, church-based development programs and church-affiliated organizations received funding for their development programs from international church-affiliated organizations. Church-related organizations included the Catholic Church affiliated National Secretariat for Social Action, the Protestant group National Council of Churches of the Philippines and the Ecumenical Center for Development of the NCCP.

By formulating a development framework, the involved churches rationalized and operationalized their participation in politics, regime change, redemocratization, and development. These churches were linked to the civil-society movement and turned out to be powerful forces in political socialization and political mobilization that proved effective in bringing about regime change, such as in the events of the February 1986 snap elections to the February 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution that toppled Marcos, and even in the 2001 EDSA 2 event that brought down Estrada.

Electoral participation, interest articulation, and policy advocacy

The force of religion and church influence continue to take place in elections and in the processes of interest articulation and policy advocacy. In the electoral processes from 1946 until the 2004 elections, especially during national elections, the churches have been observed to continue setting voting guidelines for its members. The Iglesia ni Cristo has always been a powerful voting bloc, from its track record in the early years of the post-World War II Philippine Republic, on account of its religious values and emphasis on unity and agreement among its members⁸⁶ to the 2004 elections when the media reported political candidates

84. Alegre, *Trends and Traditions*, 57.

Genato-Rebullida, "Church Development Perspective."

85. Alegre, *Trends and Traditions*, 56.

86. Hirofumi Ando, "The Altar and the Ballot Box: The Iglesia ni Cristo in the 1954 Philippine Elections," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* 2, no. 4 (October 1956).

seeking an audience with the INC leader. On the other hand, the Catholic Church persisted in issuing pastoral letters to remind its members of the desired qualities of candidates, with Cardinal Sin as keenly sought after by political candidates for his endorsement. In post-EDSA 1 elections, the Catholic Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (CPPCRV) and VOTECARE joined many other groups for electoral education, advocacy for electoral reform,⁸⁷ and vigilance in electoral processes including poll watching in electoral canvassing to ensure fair, honest, and peaceful elections.

As a general strategy, the church leaders and the organization infused religious beliefs and values on the voters to influence their choice of political candidates during elections. In the 1998 national elections, the El Shaddai group accommodated the presence of political leaders in their gatherings for them to be prayed over, and supported President Joseph Estrada. In the 2004 national elections, the presidential candidacy of a Christian group's principal spiritual leader changed the landscape of church involvement in post-EDSA electoral politics. Brother Eddie Villanueva, the spiritual leader of the Jesus Is Lord Fellowship, officially entered the presidential race upon complying with the guidelines and policies.

Teodoro Benigno of the *PhHippine Star* wrote in his column that Bro. Eddie, "of all the presidential candidates came out most sincere, the most deserving, the most articulate, the most perceptive, the most endearing."⁸⁸ Benigno also observed that Bro. Eddie drew the "biggest crowds" coming from "every sector of society" who "brought their own food, bought their yellow t-shirts, rally paraphernalia." This came as a contrast to the usual mode of political campaigns where candidates sang, danced, and reports abound of money given to voters in exchange for the votes. During the electoral campaign, Bro. Eddie and his Bangon Pilipinas called on righteous, moral and spiritual qualities of political leaders, anchored on faith in and fear of God.⁸⁹ Support came from Muslims, Catholics, born-again and charismatic Christians, and other faith groups (for example, a statement of support from Datu Fuad Kiram of the Sultanate of Sulu).⁹⁰ The media and businessmen caught his striking contrast to the other presidential candidates, stating that "Villanueva [is the] only one with guts to trim bureaucracy."⁹¹ Despite the breakthrough, Bro. Eddie lost the 2004 presidential race to Arroyo.

Islam and Islamic groups in Philippine democracy

Muslim separatist and secessionist struggles run parallel to Muslim integrationist struggles with respect to the inclusion of Muslim Mindanao areas in the Republic of the Philippines. In the Philippines, the dilemma looms over Islamic accommodation of Philippine democracy and decentralization with the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The phenomenon is also located in the larger arena of Islamic states in other parts of the world, the Middle East specifically; hence the question of Islam and democracy.⁹² Tan writes of the "internationalization of the Bangsamoro struggle" (which is also the title of his book) in the context of the

87. Alegre, *Trends and Traditions*, 97.

88. Teodoro Benigno, "Behold, the Elections! Bro. Eddie Phenomenon," *The Philippine Star*, May 12, 2004.

89. Bro. Eddie Speaks Righteous Gov't, *Inquirer*, February 19, 2004.

90. Sultan Esmail D. Kiram II, "Message of Sultan Esmail D. Kiram II" (Press conference, Bus-bus, Jolo, Sulu, April 23, 2004).

91. Nestor Mata, "The Evangelist," *Malaya*, January 11, 2004, 4.

92. Judy T. Gulane, "Businessman: Villanueva Only One with Guts to Trim Bureaucracy," *Business World Publishing Corporation*, nd, 1, 8, <http://bworld.com.ph>.

92. Abubakar, *Is Islam, 25-44*.

Organization of Islamic Conference, and the distinguishable stages and strategies of Muslim integration, Muslim independence movement, MNLF separatism, Muslim secessionism, and Bangsamoro struggles in historical time.⁹³

The Mindanao problem is multidimensional; it spans religious, political, cultural, ethnic, social, and economic dimensions. It carries strains of inequities in development and the burdens of armed conflict across Muslims and Christians, and between them and the state. Several attempts at peace have been made. The state responded to Muslim demands by delineating the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in 1990; the government signed the peace agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front in 1996.⁹⁴ In June 2001 the government and the MILF agreed to implement a cease-fire; and in May 2002 both parties signed an agreement of rehabilitation and development.⁹⁵

The integration of Muslims into the mainstream of the Philippine state and democracy, and the development of the people and the area, call for culturally sensitive interventions. The madrasah schools, shari'ah courts, the Muslim people's livelihood and employment, the integration of Muslims into the military and public service are among the many concerns of development and transformation for Mindanao. These pose challenges to the Philippine government and the state. Muslim religious leaders, and organizations (such as the Ulama Association), interfaith organizations (such as the InterFaith Group), and the Bishops-Ulama Conference are instrumentalities engaged in the peace processes in Mindanao.⁹⁶

Problems and Prospects

Religion has proven to be one vital element in Philippine politics along the historical timeline of nation building, state formation and constitutionalism, and the functioning of the democratic ideology of the political system. As a system of beliefs, it provided the frame of reference for the political behavior of those who believe and, comparatively, of those who do not believe or simply pay lip service to its norms and values.

Majority of the Filipinos have remained faithful to the Roman Catholic religion or Catholicism despite the revolution of 1896 waged against the oppressive colonial rule of the Spanish officialdom and the friar religious orders of the Catholic Church, from 1521 to 1898.

Under the framework of the separation of powers of church and state through the Philippine Constitutions of 1935, 1971, and 1987 with the new governance framework for state and civil society relations, evidence is strong that the Catholic Church has sustained political dominance in the many facets of democracy in the Philippines. In elections, regime change, interest articulation and policy formulation, development management, and generally in political socialization, this church has used its vast and nationwide instrumentalities of schools and media channels, and

93. Tan, "The Bangsamoro Struggles," 41-50.

94. US Department of State, "International Religious Freedom Report."

Tan, "The Bangsamoro Struggles," 209-44.

95. US Department of State, "International Religious Freedom Report."

96. *Ibid.*

linkages with civil-society groups. The political significance of the Catholic Church grew stronger as it spawned its own civil-society organizations, referring to these as church-based, or church-sponsored, or church-supported NGOs and POs.

While constituting a minority of the population, the politically mainline Protestant denominations and the radical wing of the evangelical churches as well as recently organized charismatic, born-again Christian churches have exhibited cohesion and strong moral persuasive capacities over their members that made them valuable to political candidates during elections. Despite electoral defeat in the 2004 presidential elections, Bro. Eddie Villanueva called attention to the application of Christian spiritual values and norms in politics and public service. Such are perceived compatible with the philosophical, ethical, and normative ideals expected of political leaders and the government, but only paid lip service to or even totally ignored by unscrupulous power-oriented politicians.

The electoral encounters between churches and political candidates will persist for various reasons. On the one hand, churches will remain interested in ensuring the application of their beliefs, norms, values, and ethics in politics. On the other, it may also be said that churches are interested in organizational, societal, and political power. Evidence also shows that such power and influence are applied by the churches, and religious organizations in policy advocacy, in pursuing both the organizational interests of the church and its members, and in ministering to the poor and the disadvantaged in society.

Aware of their institutional strength, the politically engaged churches have used this strategically in their involvement in many aspects of development. Hence, these churches, religious organizations, and religious movements establish their sustained presence and visibility even between elections through their development work. Their development concerns keep them in touch with their members and other population groups and people's real needs. In this sense, the political significance of the churches, religious organizations, and religious movements lies in their capacity to mobilize their institutional resources and activate alternative NGO service delivery systems to meet various types of human needs. Their concerns run through the same concerns of government and even beyond—such as housing, land, livelihood, health, environment, justice, and people. People empowerment has become one hallmark of activist and development-oriented churches. Other churches that are focused more on spiritual and individual needs assume social and political significance when they function as venues for values formation, political socialization, and political culture formation.

Islam and Islamic religious organizations are strategically vital in light of the peace processes, socioeconomic development in Muslim Mindanao, political stability of the state, and democratic processes. As experts have pointed out, the reinterpretation of Islam and the Islamic state in light of its compatibility with democracy is done not only in Mindanao but in other Muslim areas of the world. The Muslim ulamas or spiritual leaders and Muslim social structures and institutions

such as the madrasah schools and the sharia courts are vital instrumentalities for political socialization of the Muslims or Bangsamoro into the mainstream of the Philippine state and democracy.

■ Guide Questions

1. What are the meanings given to the concepts religion, church, political culture, and political socialization?
2. What have been the effects of Spanish and American colonization of the Philippines in the introduction of religion and formation of religious organizations and churches? What have been the consequences on the processes of nation and state formation in the Philippines?
3. Given the elections in the Philippines, how did the factors of religion and church affiliation affect voter and candidate behavior?
4. Which of the different churches in the Philippines have played an active part in Philippine politics, particularly in regime change and democratization? Describe how and cite the reasons for their involvement.
5. In what ways have religious organizations and churches been involved in different aspects of development in the Philippines?
6. How do we assess the relationship of church and state in the Philippines?

■ Glossary

Bangsamoro – literally, Moro Nation, the imagined community of Muslim Filipinos and their symbol of nationhood in Mindanao.

Church – the community of persons, the believers and adherents of a specific religion.

Church activism – the internalization of unconventional functions and roles of churches that include those that are political in nature.

Church-state conflict – the friction between civil and ecclesiastical institutions in the proper dispensation of their functions and responsibilities.

Democracy – rule of the people; implies popular participation and governance in the public interest.

Islamic resurgence – the revival of interest and adherence to Islam and its precepts in Mindanao.

Political culture – a pattern of sociopsychological orientations toward political objects; a people's political attitudes, beliefs, symbols, and values.

Political mobilization – the act of assembling and organizing resources to support political objectives.

- Political socialization** – process and interactive channels by which society inculcates its values and ways of life upon its members; and ways the members learn the political culture of their society.
- Religion** – a system of beliefs, principles, doctrines, symbols, rituals, practices, norms, values, and moral prescriptions pertaining to one's relationship with a supernatural being, to a creator, or some greater power.
- Religious organizations** – mechanisms for collective action created by churches that include the leaders and members, their structure, and system of operations.

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Islamic Nationalism and Philippine Politics

Julkipli M. Wadi

The Muslim community in the Philippines has an important function to play. It is a witness to how much a people [are] willing to fight and sacrifice for centuries and suffer for the sake of freedom from foreign conquerors and as such is therefore a model for valor and patriotism for other Filipinos.

– Dr. Cesar Adib Majul, 1972

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, the student should be able to:

1. Explain the various theoretical perspectives on nationalism.
2. Describe the emergence of Moro identity formation in the context of the Moro struggle and criticisms on Moro nationalism.
3. Examine how the notion Moro nationalism shapes the continuing conflict in Mindanao.
4. Assess the implication of the growth of Islamic identity building on nation building.

Introduction

The continuing conflict in Mindanao and the inability of the protagonists to resolve the Moro struggle for self-determination elicit deeper examination of Filipino nationalism and its elements, including the contrasting identity formations in southern Philippines. It comes at a time when the traditional idea of nationalism is rapidly changing while other forms of social construction like ethnicity, culture, and religion have increasingly played a part in the issue of national identity and nationhood. Representing a new configuration of Moro struggle that amalgamated with a certain interpretation of Islam, a phenomenon of what may be called Islamic nationalism challenges the traditional assumptions of Philippine identity formation while posing unmitigated pressures on the government. It also triggers a new dimension in looking at the traditional mold of the Moro struggle and provokes new thoughts in the discourse of identity politics and nation building.

The birth of Islamic nationalism in the Philippines is part of the whole historical development of the Moros, a group of Muslims in the south that have been influenced by Islam for several centuries, as they try to adjust to the challenge of modernity and nation-states. That new outlook took its initial shape in their struggle against colonialism, which eventually transformed into an inchoate demand for sovereignty, including political tutelage under the United States before America's withdrawal from the Philippines in 1946. When the US instead dissolved Moro sovereignty and transferred political control into the helm of early Filipino nationalists, the modern idea of Moro nation (*Bangsamoro*) grew. It subsequently translated in the awakening of political consciousness and reformulation of their historic identity and the launching of protracted war of secession and self-determination. Consequently, the failure to resolve the "Mindanao conflict" led to the emergence of a new form of Moro nationalism whose objective is not only a demand for separate *bangsa* but an assertion for a separate and independent government and homeland animated by political ideals of Islam and *sharia* (Islamic law). All of these make the politics of identity formation in the Philippines diverse and complex.

This chapter examines Islamic nationalism in the context of the Moro struggle and its impact in the Philippines. It analyzes the category, strand, and dynamics of Moro nationalism. It also underscores the theoretical perspectives of Islam, nation-states and nationalism, and the major frameworks of Moro nationalism. It analyzes Moro identity formation and other contesting forms of nationalism and its critiques.

Traditionally, **nationalism** is defined as a "state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation-state."¹

Nationalism, Nation-States, and Islam

The definition of what constitutes a nation and its ramifications is taken as the exclusive domain of state. This perspective on nationalism gives premium to the view of the state as an autonomous entity distinct from society and its attendant position as reservoir of power, control, and authority; the state is thus empowered to define the thrust of governance and the interest of the nation.² This view, however, is countered by the fact that power relation is complex and permeates beyond state to society, the latter being the broader field where the locus of power actually resides.³ The idea of nation and the forging of a sense of nationalism cannot, therefore, be made the sole monopoly of the state but can also be appropriated by other critical sectors of society.

1. Von Nostrand Reinhold, "Nationalism: Its Meaning and History," in Ziauddin Sardar, *The Future of Muslim Civilization* (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications [M] Sdn Bhd, 1988), 74.

2. Max Weber, "Ethnic Groups," in *Economy and Society*, vol. 1, ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 64.

3. Michael Foucault, "Truth and Power," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), 64.

This latter perspective opens a space to views of nationalism outside of, and even contradictory to, the state. The rationale of understanding nationalism using an interdisciplinary perspective is due to the fact that in the Muslim world, for instance, nationalism is viewed in many ways. Recently, these perspectives have triggered new debate particularly with respect to the Moro struggle. There are those who claim that nationalism is compatible with Islam while others dismiss it for the reason that nationalism is parochial while Islam is universal. Others remain equivocal with the concept while the rest maintain that the phenomenon of nationalism in the Muslim world does not totally emanate from Islam but from other social, ideological, and ethnic constructs.

With the independence of many Muslim countries and their subsequent participation in the community of nations, many studies explain the relation between Islam and the nation-state system.⁴ James Piscatori's *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (1986) discusses the nature of relation between Islam and nation-states and categorizes the relation and the degree of acceptability of nation-states system among Muslims into two quasi-ideological divides: the conformists and the nonconformists.⁵ Conformists believe that Islam accommodates with nation-states and that Islam recognizes and promotes nationalism. Conformists anchor their argument on the primary source of Islamic law (i.e., Qur'an) when it declares:

O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full Knowledge and is well-acquainted (with all things).⁶

This Qur'anic provision illustrates that the formation of nation is a natural process and therefore to struggle for nationhood is a legitimate cause provided that it is used toward human and international understanding. Moreover, the Qur'anic term *lita'arafu* (that ye may know each other) connotes territorial pluralism and legitimacy of any polity and other forms of human association, however diverse they may be (e.g., state, nation, tribe). It is agreed that today's nation-states are realities in modern international affairs; therefore, Islam as a system of thought must inevitably recognize this fact. Today's Muslim countries and their participation in world affairs are clear and irrefutable proof of the harmony of the Muslim world and the community of nations. Majid Khadduri, a known specialist of international law, remarked that the birth of Muslim states and their entry into the United Nations is one of the significant international phenomena of the twentieth century. "The various nations professing this religion [Islam] today," he wrote, "are participating in promoting stable world order and international cooperation."⁷

4. For literatures on Islam and nation-state system, see, Muhammad Hamidullah, *Muslim Conduct of State* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1953); Majid Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1966); Mohammad Taha al-Ghunaimi, *The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968); AbdullHamid Abu Sulayman, *The Islamic Theory of International Relation: New Direction for Islamic Methodology and Thought* (Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1987); and Kalim Siddique, *Stages of Islamic Revolution* (London: The Open Press, 1996).

5. James Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (Cambridge: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1986), 40.

6. Qur'an, 49: 13.

7. Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (London: The John Hopkins Press, 1955), vi.

On the contrary, nonconformists do not agree on the idea of, and political arrangement provided by, nation-states, including the conventional idea of nationalism. It is argued that nationalism is foreign to Islam. Thus the term "Islamic nationalism" is a contradiction in terms because Islam as a supra system of ideals envisions a universal order while nationalism as a political construct is concerned with a limited order. It is contended that Islam, as a normative system, ought to govern the way of life of people regardless of their nationality, geography, ethnicity, language, ideals, and ideology. Views of nonconformists are generally patterned after the thought of international Islamic revivalists like Abu ala Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Abd al aziz Ibn Baz, Ayatullah Khumaini, Ishmael Faruqi, and Kalim Siddique.

For instance, Mawdudi, a known scholar in India and an influential ideologue of Islamic movements, noted that nationalism is alien (*bid'a*) in Islam. It is a creation of Western civilization that takes nation-state, not God, as divine.⁸ Nonconformists further argue that the nation-state is a "prison" for Islam and that nationalism is a form of neocolonialism.⁹ By reifying national interest, the nation-state is compelled to disregard morality and justice¹⁰ with the adage "my country right or wrong." They contend that the West's record in world-order affairs is little more than convention and force.¹¹ On the contrary, Islam has been consistent in its view that the *millat* or religious society must be the basic identity framework [sic] of world order as the "Islamic world order has been composed of the Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, Sabaeen, Hindu and Buddhist religious communities."¹² "The reasoning of Islam," according to Faruqi, "is founded on the repudiation of tribalism and nationalism; for it regards ethnocentrism, as evil and unbecoming of humans whom God created equally and whom He endowed with His spirit."¹³

The quasi-ideological divide of Islam and nation-states partly explains the internal friction in the Muslim world. There are no Muslim countries today not opposed, if not totally plagued, by ramparts advanced by Islamic movements, which appear in many forms and orientations. Indeed, the Muslim world has never been a monolith. The political bivalence (or multivalence) of Islam has been in existence since the days of old (e.g., Ali-Muawiyah claim of political succession, Ummayyad-Abbasid rivalry, Arab-Ottoman "détente," Sunni-Shia schism). In the early twentieth century, the Muslim world, particularly the Middle East, was polarized into two major camps: pan-Islam and Arab nationalism. The former envisions an international polity (*ummah*) not restricted by race, nationality, states, nation; while the latter, influenced by post-Ottoman realpolitik, tries to strengthen regional unity among Arab countries through the mechanism of nation-states. Whereas both camps detest Israel, Arab nationalists are, more often than not, willing to extend recognition, coexistence and cooperation while Islamists do not extend the same. Rather, the most extreme among them struggle for the dissolution of the State of Israel because of the general belief that it is an

8. James Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (Cambridge: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1986), 102.

9. Kalim Siddique, *Stages of Islamic Revolution* (London: The Open Press, 1996), 30.

10. Ishmael Faruqi, "Introduction," in Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman, *The Islamic Theory of International Relation: New Direction for Islamic Methodology and Thought* (Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1987), xvii.

11. *Ibid.*, xii.

12. *Ibid.*, xxv.

13. *Ibid.*

instrument of international Zionism and Western hegemony in the Middle East. Because of this polarity, Islam and its relation with nation-states are projected in "two faces: pro and anti nation-states."¹⁴ The latter is generally identified with pan-Islam.

Although pan-Islam as advanced by transnational Islamic movements has been buttressed by Arab nationalist regimes, they also challenged big powers as shown in the horrible attack of America on September 11, 2001.¹⁵ Moreover, transnational Islam has influenced many groups and organizations in other countries, including those in Southeast Asia and the Philippines. Of more than a billion Muslims in almost sixty Muslim countries only two-thirds constitute Muslim majority, while one-third are minorities making the latter vulnerable to the sway of Islamic groups. The quasi-ideological divide in Islam has definitely influenced the struggle of Muslim minorities (e.g., Moros). It is expected that the debate engaged in by the Muslim minority would take on a new form as the actors contend the issue of Islam, nation-states and nationalism including the political systems and governments that control them.

In sum, Islamic nationalism of conformist interpretation is closely aligned, albeit with some variation, with the general understanding of nationalism. It is the form of nationalism associated with the Moro struggle. In this regard, the Moro nationalist struggle and its quest for a separate *bangsa* is part of Islamic nationalism when viewed in the perspective of Islam conforming with the nation-state system.

Moro nationalism, as prominently advanced by mostly Muslim liberation movements, is generally viewed as caused by ethnic identity assertion and Islamic identity building formation in southern Philippines.

Major Frameworks of Moro Nationalism

Philippine scholarship provides, however limited, an understanding of the Moro struggle and the subsequent rise of Islamic nationalism. Views differ not only between the Philippine government and the Moro movements but also among scholars and political analysts. Moreover, the views differ not just along the conformist and nonconformist debate. Perspectives also vary along historical, ethnic and ideological lines. There are, at least, three contending but interrelated frameworks helpful in understanding the Moro struggle, its strand and dynamic, including the rise of Islamic nationalism, namely: 1) Moro nationalist history, 2) framework of ethnicity, and 3) Islamist discourse on the Moro struggle.

14. Mohammed Ayoub, *The Politics of Islamic Resurrection* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 271.

15. For discussion on the reaction of the Muslim world on 9/11 see Julkipiti M. Wadi, "Ambivalence, Ferment and Trade-off since 9/11," in *Before and After September 11, 2001*, ed. Benjamin T. Tolosa Jr. (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Asian Studies, 2004), 10-19.

Moro nationalist history is a perspective based on the idea that in the Philippines there are two historical trajectories: one in the north (Luzon and Vizayas) and the other in the south (Mindanao and Sulu). The trajectories were originally separate but were integrated arbitrarily in the American period. The first historical tract is represented by Indios (later Filipinos) and the second is by the Moros in southern Philippines. While Western influence and Judeo-Christian tradition shape the former, it is the Malay-Islamic civilization that animates the latter. This perspective argues that the Moro people was once a nation and that they had their own territory and political institution (e.g., sultanate), which was the sovereign power recognized by leading imperial powers and countries centuries before the Philippine Republic was even contemplated.¹⁶ Their being part of the Philippines is regarded as the product of a colonial maneuver whose basis is historically unfounded and legally questionable. In accordance with peoples' right to self-determination, this view pursues the line that the Moro people have the right to regain their sovereignty as a nation (*bangsa*) and their country (*bula*), and preserve and promote their religion (*agama*).

Moro nationalist history explains the Moro struggle and their quest for a separate national identity and political independence as advanced by Moro movements.

16. For a detailed list of major treaties and international agreements entered into by Sultans of Sulu and Maguindanao with foreign powers, see Michael Mastura, *Muslim Filipino Experience: A Collection of Essays* (Manila: Ministry of Muslim Affairs, 1984). See also, Jukipi Wad, "The Philippines and the Islamic World," in Aileen San Pablo-Bavera and Lydia Jose, *Philippine External Relations: A Centennial Vista* (Pasay: Foreign Service Institute, 1998), 82-87.

17. Nur Misuan, "The Rise and Fall of Moro Statehood," in *The Bangsa Moro People's Struggle for Self-Determination: Towards an Understanding of the Roots of the Moro People's Struggle*, vol. 6, no. 2 (Manila: Philippine Development Forum, 1992), 38.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Typical examples of this writing may include the work of Cesar Adib Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1999); Peter Gordon Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos 1899-1920* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1983); Saib Jubar, *A Nation under Endless Tyranny*, 2nd edition (Lahore: Islamic Research Academy, 1999).

It is the theme adopted by most Moro nationalist writings articulating the logic of Moro struggle as an "unalterable fact of history."¹⁷ Nur Misuari, for instance, believes that "this historical fact is inextricably linked to the Bangsamoro people's inherent desire to be left free and sovereign, having their own honored place in the community of nations."¹⁸ The rhetoric of Moro nationalists is typical of liberation movements worldwide as can be seen in the use of concepts like self-determination, decolonization, usurped sovereignty, and annexed or occupied territory. In an attempt to articulate the historicity of the Moros, Islam is projected to have played a significant role by providing them identity, a sense of belonging and ideology. However, the treatment of Islam is not along theological exegesis and rigid interpretation of sacred texts but through an elaborate extrapolation of epistemological, historical, and political construction of Islam, particularly its sway in Southeast Asia and its impact on Muslims in the Philippines.¹⁹ This perspective recognizes, of course, the system of nation-states and respects international law and convention.

The ethnicity framework countervails the nationalist perspective, including the Islamist discourse on Moro history and struggle. It views Moro nationalism through the prism of culture and ethnicity. Ethnicity viewed from the perspective of the state is thus the major position of the Philippine government and most

Filipino scholars and analysts. On the contrary, ethnicity viewed from below is also referred to as ethno-nationalist history. Islam understood in its nominal form is generally downplayed in the awakening of national consciousness. It does not, therefore, agree with the phenomenon of Islamic revival in southern Philippines; rather, it simply refers to it as ethnic resurgence or "ethnic affirmation."²⁰ Datuship, tribalism, "folk Islam," and other ethnic idiosyncrasies among "Muslim Filipinos" are considered more critical than Islam in forging national consciousness among Moros. Hence, the rise of Moro nationalism is simply viewed as caused by the resurgence of ethnic identity by a subgroup of people willing to define their own affairs. In this regard, Moros are labeled "Muslim Filipinos" or "Filipino Muslims." This perspective also considers the nationalist perspective of Moro history as representing a "central historical narrative." Recently, the framework of ethnicity has been promoting a tripeople perspective of Moro people composed of Christians, Muslims, and Lumad.²¹

Finally, the Islamist discourse on politics in the Moro struggle is a religious-political thought which articulates new thrust, vision, goal, and strategy of the Moro struggle for self-determination on the basis of the political ideal of Islam. As it were, the conformist and nonconformist strands reflect heavily in this discourse. For conformists with an Islamic orientation, albeit moderate, Moro history and the logic of nationalist struggle are deemed significant, but it is Islam, particularly the principles of *tauhid* (unity), *amanah* (divine trust), *khilafah* (stewardship), *shariah* (law) and *jihad* (struggle) that must be taken primary and determinant in shaping the struggle. Thus the thrust of the Moro struggle is to carve an independent Bangsamoro Homeland in order to establish an Islamic state and an independent government for the Moro people as a vehicle to implement the *shariah*. However, it tries to maintain a balance between the conformist political ideal of Islam and the current reality in Mindanao by recognizing as well the right of Christians and Lumads. It is thus open to negotiation and the peace process.²²

On the contrary, nonconformists with radical tendencies espouse an Islam that is transnational and recognizes no territorial boundaries, and the ideas of nation-state and nationalism are totally abhorred. They also consider nationalism as glorified tribalism and "a malady that inflicts the Moro Homeland."²³ Hence the Moro struggle is not simply to carve an independent "Bangsamoro Republik" or to put up an "Islamic state" on the basis of territorial or "national" objective. For radical Moro Islamists, the ultimate aim of any Muslim struggle (including the Moro struggle) must be to make the word of Allah supreme through *jihad fi sabilillah* (struggle in the cause of Allah) and to eliminate the cause of oppression and injustice. The failure of the Moro rebellion, according to this view, is due to non-application of principles of *jihad* in Moro struggle. This perspective believes that unless Moros embrace *jihad*, their struggle for freedom, justice, and independence would never be realized. In light of the Muslims'

20. Mc Keena is one of recent authors who does not agree with the general theme and historical approach adopted by Majul by alleging that it represents as "central historical narrative." However, because of the comprehensiveness of Majul's Muslims in the Philippines, his magnum opus on Philippine Islam, Moro struggle and society, Mc Keena accepts that Majul's work "is best evaluated in the context of the political environment in which it was written." Moreover, with Majul's detailed and specific treatment on Moro struggle in *Contemporary Muslim Movements in the Philippines*, Mc Keena admits that "Majul's corpus of work in general is a rich and impressive collection of carefully researched historical writings on Philippine Muslims." If Mc Keena had read the numerous unpublished articles of Majul on Islam and Muslims in the Philippines, he would have seen the depth and breadth of Majul's scholarship that no other Filipino scholars had surpassed and even equaled. Nonetheless, Mc Keena describes Majul's works as representing "Philippine Muslim nationalist history." See Thomas Mc Keena, "Appreciating Islam in the Muslim Philippines: Authority, Experience and Identity in Cotabato," in *Islam in an Era of Hybrid States: Politics and Religious Revival in Muslim Southeast Asia*, ed. Robert W. Heiner and Patricia Horvath (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 55, 67. For a broader anthropological study on the Moro struggle and politics particularly in Cotabato area, see Thomas Mc Keena, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Manila: Anvil Philippines Inc., 1998).

21. Rudy Rodil, *The Minoritization of the Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago* (Davao Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao, Inc., 1994), 33.

22. Salamat Hashim, *The Bangsamoro Mujahid: His Objectives and Responsibilities* (Mindanao: Bangsamoro Publications, 1985). See also Salamat Hashim, *Referendum: Peaceful, Civilized, Diplomatic and Democratic Means of Solving the Mindanao Conflict* (Cangay-Abubakar As-sidique: Agency for Youth Affairs-MILF, 2002). For detailed outline of Salamat's political thought, see, Aboued Sayyid Lingga, "Political Thought of Salamat Hashim" (MA thesis, University of the Philippines, 1990).

23. Abdurajak Janjalani Abubakar, "History of Harakatu fi Islamiyah," in *The Abu Sayyaf Discourse: Radical Ideas of Abdurajak Janjalani Abubakar*, trans. Juligat Wadi (research study submitted to the Mindanao Studies Program, Center for Integrative Development Studies, University of the Philippines, 1996).

worsening condition in Mindanao, nonconformists consider war (*jihad qital*) a necessity, thus the *mujahidin* (freedom fighters) who perish in war are considered martyrs. This perspective detests negotiation and peace talks.²⁴ While few Islamic militants like the Abu Sayyaf have adopted this position, the Moro struggle with a nonconformist orientation has impacted heavily on the country for the past few years.²⁵

Moro Identity and Other Contesting Identity Formations

Undeniably, whether of the conformist or the nonconformist type, Islamic nationalism, including the major frameworks and strands of the Moro struggle, does not exist in a vacuum. A dominant national identity (Filipino) and other evolving identity formations among non-Muslims and other settlers in Mindanao contest it.

Filipino as national identity by majority of the people in Mindanao is undeniably the dominant political identity formation in the area, including those in Moro areas. A wide range of government apparatuses is strongly in place while the Philippine political system—its structure, function, and process—is entrenched there. Political, economic, and military control; civil authority, electoral processes including public and private bureaucracies notwithstanding people's interest; political values; and cultural orientation are mostly identified with the state.

Another identity formation is the so-called Mindanaon. It is originally conceived as a label to surmount religious terms like Muslims and Christians, which are considered divisive and inappropriate for political and national identification among the people of Mindanao. Though it promotes a tripeople perspective, the idea of Mindanaon attempts to bring together under its umbrella the Moros, Christians, and indigenous people. It refuses to identify with the Moros because of the latter's perceived pejorative connotation and exclusive identification with Muslims. Mindanaon is very much identified with, if not totally subsumed by, Filipino as an identity formation. To say the least, unlike Filipino and Moro, Mindanaon, including the recently coined term Lumad (indigenous people), has not really been established as a separate identity formation, owing perhaps to its lack of historicity and ideology as well as the ambivalent politics of most of its proponents.²⁶

What has been problematic, of course, is the word "Moro" as an emerging identity mostly among Muslims in Mindanao, although its proponents (e.g., MNLF) do not restrict its membership to the Islamized groups but to all inhabitants in the area. The use of "Moro" as a rallying identity was of recent origin, a product of "deconstruction" by mostly non-elite Moro youth in the '60s in their attempt to advance new identity while bridging the chasm between Muslim and Christian

24. *Ibid.*, see particularly Abdurajak Abubakar's "Struggle of the Qur'an by the Ummah in the Last Era," "The Rules of Jihad," and "Jihad: The Misunderstood Doctrine," in *The Abu Sayyaf Discourse: Radical Ideas of Abdurajak Janjalani Abubakar*.

25. For historical context of political Islam in the Philippines including the rise of the Abu Sayyaf, see Julkipli Wadi, "Philippine Political Islam and the Emerging Fundamentalist Strand," *UP-CIDS Chronicle* 3, no. 1 (January–June 1988): 33–42.

26. The term Mindanaon was strongly identified with the New Mindanao Independence Movement (NMIM) of Ruben Canoy of Cagayan de Oro as a reaction to the People Power Revolution in 1986. During its height, the NMIM advocated the "Federal Republic of Mindanao." While the political luster of NMIM was short-lived, various personalities and groups however continued to push its thrust and vision in northern Mindanao and find its ways in the rhetoric of federalism. See, Ruben Canoy, *The Quest for Mindanao Independence*, revised edition (Cagayan de Oro: Mindanao Post Publishing Company, 1987), 4. According to Rudy Rodri, the formation of broader organizations of Lumads only happened in the Aquino period. See, *The Minimization of the Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago* (Davao: Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao, Inc., 1994). For extensive discussion of contesting identity formations in Mindanao, see Julkipli Wadi, "Mindanao Nationalism: Direction, Representation and Intersection" (a paper presented during the 2003 Annual National Conference of the Philippine Political Science Association, The Royal Mandaya Hotel, Davao City, October 23–25, 2003).

(Bisayah) relation. It tries to dispel the myth, bias, and other pejorative connotations that have been ascribed to the word especially during the Spanish period.

Although the US in the early twentieth century used the word "Moro" more than "Muslim," the pejorative connotation attached to "Moro" has never really changed the perception of non-Muslims especially with the war against international terrorism. Indeed, the pejorative connotations of the word "Moro" should have been dispelled. It was simply coincidental that the early Spanish conquistadores called the early inhabitants of the Philippines who resisted them "Moro"—unlike the *Pintados* of the Visayas and the *Indios* of Luzon who easily submitted to Spanish might. It was also coincidental, and much less unfortunate, that Spain, after being ruled for seven centuries by the Moors from North Africa, carried her historical baggage and unleashed her fury on the early Malay inhabitants of the archipelago who mostly happened to be Muslims. With the MNLF's struggle, "Moro" or "Bangsamoro" gained widespread legitimacy where no less than the Philippine government has recognized it, including the international community.²⁷ Many studies show the growing identification with, and preference of Muslims for, the terms "Moro" and "Bangsamoro" than "Filipino" as identity.²⁸

The use of the term *bangsa*, which means nation, connotes that the Bangsamoro as a broader polity is composed of various groups, ethnicity, tribes, religion, and so on.

Critiques of Moro Nationalism

The integration of the Moros into the main fabric of the Philippine colonial state serves as the basis of legal claim, particularly by the government. Accordingly, the Moros' notion of nationalism is a mere component of Filipino nationalism even as they are labeled under the rubric of various terms such as "pagans," "non-Christian tribe," "cultural community," "Muslim minority," "Muslim Filipinos," "Filipino Muslim," "Philippine Muslims" and so on. This argument is based on Moros' recognition of Philippine law, their participation in the political process, their representation in various branches of government, including the military and other public offices. This view promotes the argument that Moros are Filipinos and that they do not have any separate political identity.²⁹ Obviously, this view, while recognizing the feat of the Moros in their struggle against colonialism, also implies that the Moro struggle does not make any contribution to the making of the Philippines as a nation for "the Filipino nation finally came into being in 1890s."³⁰

27. See Republic Act 6734, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao." Congress of the Philippines. For amended version see, Republic Act 9054. The MNLF used "Bangsamoro people" in its representations in international organizations like the Organization of Islamic Conference and the United Nations.

28. See Philippine Majority: Minority Relations and Ethnic Attitude, Filipinas Foundation. See also Abdulsiddik A. Abbahi, "The Bangsa Moro: Their Self Image and Inter-Group Ethnic Attitudes, *Dansalan Quarterly* 4, no. 4 (July 1984). See also, Abdurahman T. Canacan, "Muslim Professionals in Metro Manila: A Study of their Identity and its Implications to National Unity" (MA thesis, University of the Philippines, 1990).

29. For discussion on how Moro traditional leaders identified with American-Filipino policy of Filipinization and played "ambivalent politics" before 1946, see, Patricio N. Abinales, "The Muslim-Filipino and the State," *Public Policy* (April/June 1998): 37-59. See also, *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), 46.

30. Jose Abueva, ed., *The Making of the Filipino Nation and Republic: From Barangays, Tribes, Sultanates, and Colony* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1998), 8.

If, thus, the notion of Filipino nation came only in late nineteenth century, how do we make sense of the centuries-old struggle of the Moros? Cesar Adib Majul, an eminent Filipino scholar, has raised the same observation:

If the Philippine Revolution is to be regarded not only as a movement of some Christian natives against Spanish rule, but of the Filipino people in their attempts at freedom, then there is no reason why the more than three hundred years of struggle of the Muslims of the South against Spain and resistance against pressure from other Western powers, cannot in the same light also be considered as part of the Filipino struggle for freedom.³¹

As if taking a cue from Majul, former UP President Jose Abueva suggested:

This is why an enlightened sense of history, an inclusive view of Philippine nationalism, nationhood, and nation building, a deep and broad concept of compensatory and redistributive justice are indispensable to the resolution of the "Moro problem," the advancement of Bangsa Moro, and the development of their homeland and all of Mindanao.³²

Yet, while there is an urgent need for "substantive realization of the Moros' vision of Bangsa Moro" it has been suggested that the process of realization should be "through the mechanisms and processes of regional autonomy within the framework of Filipino nationhood, national sovereignty, and the integrity of the Republic."³³ In this regard, Abraham Sakili, a faculty member of the University of the Philippines, commented:

The facts of Muslim history are already available in ready references, and their relevance and importance to Philippine national history cannot be subordinated anymore. Without considering the development of Philippine Muslim history as national history parallel to Christian Philippine national history, or by subordinating the glorious history of the Muslims to the Euro-Western-oriented history of the Philippines, the Muslims in the country have reasons to believe that Filipino scholarship has been instrumental in perpetuating what the MNLF regards as "Philippine colonialism" imposed on the Muslim citizens.³⁴

The opposition to the traditional approach in placating and integrating the Moros and their struggle into mainstream majority, such as what Abueva proposes, is plagued with a serious dilemma. On the one hand, Muslims cannot just accept the idea that their history and centuries of struggle would be merely subordinated to a history of other people that does not recognize their contribution in historical formation, in the first place, while continuously dominating and directing their own affairs. Muslims fear that this view would continuously make them play second fiddle in Philippine society. Moreover, the Filipino elite and oligarchy will continuously stifle the Muslims' aspirations

31. Cesar Adib Majul, "The Role of Islam in the History of the Filipino People," *Asian Studies* 4, no. 2 (August): 303-15. See also "The Moro Struggle in the Philippines," *Third World Quarterly*, April 1988, 897-922.

32. *Op. cit.*, 746.

33. *Ibid.*, 745.

34. *Ibid.*, 751.

and ideals as the former has the advantage of power, wealth, control, and influence all over the country.

On the other hand, the Filipino majority would definitely resent their history and the legacy of their Philippine Revolution tinkered with, and possibly subsumed, by another history like that of the Moros'. This point was markedly proven, for instance, by the strong reaction of Filipinos against the proposed inclusion of a ray (to acknowledge the Muslim struggle) in the Philippine flag during the centennial celebration of the Philippine Revolution in 1998. If the mere inclusion of a ray that would symbolize Muslims' role in Philippine nation building could receive such strong disapproval, how much more if Muslims asked for a bigger, if not superimposing, role in Philippine society?

The major critique of the Moro struggle against colonial powers is that it lacks the material basis for nationhood. Accordingly, the "earlier revolts in the islands that marked colonial history under Spain were local reactions to the abuses of the rulers; they were not yet assertions of nationality."³⁵ The historic "Moro war" is not considered an articulation for the creation of a new political order but more of a defense of the sultanates and their territories; it is contended that past Moro grandeur cannot be used as basis for nationhood. On the contrary, to use the material basis of nationality as the sole matrix in appraising earlier revolts in the Philippines is limited, if not erroneous. The context of colonial history in the Malay world, including Moro society, is defined by *weltanschauung*, political ethos and cultural orientation distinct from Europe, where the idea of nation-states evolved. "At bottom," Majul wrote, "the Muslim resistance against Spain in the Philippines was not an isolated or insignificant phenomenon but an essential part of the general resistance of all Muslim peoples in Malaysia (Malay world) against Western Imperialism, colonialism and Christianity." "In an important sense," he emphasized, "the sultanates were articulations of a wider social entity, the Islamic society in the Malaysian world. It is within this context that the history of the Moro Wars should be seen to be better understood and appreciated."³⁶

Kenneth Bauzon argues that long before the advent of the nation-state, the Moros in the south had been part of the ummah as a broader aggregate of their Islamic identity even as they had long striven to gain their political identity.³⁷ Thus, nationality alone cannot be used as a standard in appraising Moro history because the notion of nation-states was obviously unknown then. It was the imperial system, not nation-states, that defined the character of international order before the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the French Revolution in the eighteenth century, the two major political developments that ushered the birth of nationalism in the West. And it took two more centuries and several decades before the idea of nationalism as understood in its modern sense reached and eventually influenced colonized peoples in Asia.

35. *Ibid.*, 8.

36. Cesar Adib Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1999), 410.

37. Kenneth E. Bauzon, *Liberalism and the Quest for Islamic Identity in the Philippines* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1991), 57.

Dismissing thus the centuries-old struggle of colonized people like the Moros as irrelevant and not part or extension of their political awakening in modern times is untenable. This mode of periodizing history is exclusive, narrow, and segmented, tantamount to what Arnold Toynbee calls "egocentric illusion."³⁸ It means such a view of history is highly reductive and overly subjective. While the idea of nation was absent then, the Moros, like other people in Southeast Asia, had already evolved an indigenous notion of polity like *bangsa* and *banua*, which suggests a broader idea of political community and social aggregation. While the concept of nation was not yet around at that time, the "spirit" of nation must have already been in place. In this regard, Muslims cannot be totally faulted when they articulate a more inclusive definition of identity to embrace their history, their faith and their politics. Unlike the West where religion has been viewed as separate from society, Muslims insist that Islam has played a crucial role in shaping their community. Apart from the view that "history has been one intimately intertwined with Islam," Majul is convinced that "Islam added steel and determination to an already spirited people and gave them a more intense sense of identity with definite commitments and well laid out directions."³⁹ Such determination and steel must have served as a critical component in the Muslims' search for identity in their continuing struggles to this day.

It is time we review the idea of Filipino nationalism, its basis, utility and relevance. The rise of Moro nationalism puts into question the legitimacy and effectiveness of the traditional understanding of Philippine nationalism. Moro nationalism and struggle cannot simply be dismissed as an unreasonable challenge to the state and addressed by expedient means and narrow ends. The challenge must be viewed partly as a symptom of state failure in nation building and partly as the culmination of struggle of people whose time has come after being unjustly misunderstood for decades if not centuries. Unless this is done, we doubt the usefulness and the applicability of the traditional approach in addressing the age-old Mindanao conflict.

Guide Questions

1. Discuss the various frameworks used by Philippine scholars in explaining the Moro struggle.
2. What is Islamic nationalism and how did it come about? What were the criticisms against the Muslim nationalist history?
3. In what way does the notion of Moro nationalism impede in resolving the conflict in Mindanao?
4. How does Islamic identity formation impact on national identity formation?

38. Mean Muhammad Sharif, ed., *History of Muslim Philosophy: With Short Accounts of Other Disciplines and the Modern Renaissance in Muslim Lands*, vol. 1 (Kempton: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963), 7.

39. Cesar Adib Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines: Past, Present and Future Prospects* (Manila: Convivium, 1971), 43.

Glossary

- Bangsa** – nation, connotes that the Bangsamoro as a broader polity is composed of various groups, ethnicity, tribes, religion, and so on.
- Islamic nationalism** – a religio-political construction of Islam on nation-states, advanced by so-called Muslim conformists and opposed by nonconformists.
- Moro** – an identity formation in southern Philippines.
- Moro nationalism** – as prominently advanced by Muslim liberation movements, is generally viewed as caused by ethnic identity assertion and Islamic identity building formation in southern Philippines.
- Moro nationalist history** – explains the Moro struggle and their quest for separate national identity and political independence as advanced by Moro movements.
- Nationalism** – a “state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation-state.”

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Indigenous Peoples in Politics and Governance

Athena Lydia Casambre

In pushing for the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples, civil society must double its efforts to amplify the communities' voice and must guard against becoming barriers in the policy dialogue or unwitting instruments of political compromise.¹

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, the student should be able to:

1. Discuss the concept of "indigenous peoples."
2. Compare the state's and indigenous peoples' concepts of land ownership.
3. Discuss the role of political opportunity structure in the indigenous peoples social movement.

The Concept of Indigenous Peoples

In 1994 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly declared the International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples. This declaration followed a recommendation from the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993 to extend the International Year of Indigenous People, which was ending. The UN goal was "to strengthen international cooperation to solve the problems faced by indigenous people in such areas as human rights, the environment, development, education, and health."

These international declarations indicate the level, extent, and success of political mobilization for more than two decades by indigenous peoples worldwide to claim inclusion in both national and international governance and politics. The very fact that the International Year of Indigenous Peoples (1993) extended into an International Decade (1994-2003) attests to the increased significance of indigenous peoples as political actors.

1. Mazina Tanya M. Hamada, "Between the State and Indigenous Communities: Civil Society as Political Arbitrators," *TAN-awan* 4, no. 2 (July-September 2001).

A widely accepted definition of indigenous peoples (IPs) is the one adopted by the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the UN Sub-Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1993 and often referred to as the Martinez Cobo definition, after the author of the study:

Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with preinvasion and precolonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.²

In the Philippines, where indigenous peoples "account for about 18 percent of the national population,"³ both the government and advocates for indigenous peoples have adopted the UN usage of the term "indigenous peoples." Long before this usage was proposed in the UN and adopted by the Philippines, however, those now referred to by this term were referred to by other names such as "ethnic minorities," "cultural minorities," "tribal Filipinos," and lately, "indigenous cultural communities." It is well to note the transition from the reference to "minorities" and "tribal" to "cultural communities" and "peoples."

This transition in naming signifies a transformation in academic and formal political status. Why were Filipinos such as the Igorot, Aeta, Mangyan, Badjao, and Maranao called "minorities"? The word "minority" is a relational term—by itself, it provides the information that these Filipinos belonging to different ethnic groups exist as a minority in relation to a majority. The question arises: minority in what aspect—in numbers, or in status? Moreover, how did this minority-majority condition come about? The historian William Henry Scott has written about "the creation of [a] cultural minority"⁴ to illustrate the process by which through acculturation occasioned by their submission to a single colonial ruler, previously dissimilar peoples of different language groups became a majority, while the group which resisted colonial domination became a minority. In other words, those who became acculturated and assimilated into the colonial society became the majority, while those who resisted colonization became the minority, many of them in the uplands or pushed farther into the interior.

After Martial Law and the adoption of the 1987 Constitution following the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, there was a change in terminology to "indigenous cultural communities." This is found in the

2. Quoted in *IAS Newsletter* 35, November 2004. 3. This definition is resonated in IPRA (RA 8371—Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, 1997) par. H, sec. 3, chapter II, 21.

3. http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hr_report/philippi.html. This 18 percent figure for the number of IPs in the Philippines lies within the range given by different sources, from an average 10 percent to a high 20 percent.

4. William Henry Scott, *Cracks in the Parchment Curtain and Other Essays in Philippine History* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1982), 28ff.

totally new constitutional provision on the establishment of autonomous regions for the Cordillera in Northern Luzon and Muslim Mindanao on the basis of these areas "sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics."⁵ The inclusion of this provision in the new constitution can be attributed to the successful lobbying of advocates for indigenous peoples' rights, e.g., the Cordillera People's Alliance (CPA) for Cordillera regional autonomy. This demonstrates two important things: first, the conscious adoption of the term "indigenous cultural communities" which neither "minoritizes" nor marginalizes indigenous peoples, and second, the significant role of active advocacy by pro-IP groups and alliances in gaining positive political recognition for indigenous peoples. (See table 1, for the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples [NCIP] Listing of Ethnolinguistic Groups by Region, and table 2, Classification of Indigenous Communities.)

The role and participation of indigenous people in Philippine governance and politics can be seen to be in the mode of social movement political participation. Social movements, particularly New Social Movements (NSM), have emerged and flourished in recent decades as part of the societal response to developments in the contemporary state.⁶ Indigenous peoples, along with other social forces, have been mobilized to address political issues to and from the state, and as we see in the instance of the new constitutional provision as well as subsequent legislation like the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) promulgated a decade later in 1997, the political engagement of social movements for indigenous peoples has produced political results.

To understand the role of indigenous peoples in Philippine governance and politics, we shall address the following questions: 1) what is the main political issue raised by indigenous peoples? 2) how have they pursued their advocacy? and 3) what have been some of the results of the advocacy and activism of the IP social movement in the Philippines?

Land Ownership and Indigenous Peoples

Land ownership is the main issue of IPs, whether in the Philippines or in other countries (in the Americas—North, Central, South—in Africa, and Asia). The mobilization against the Chico River dam project in the mid-1980s produced a leader and hero in Kalinga chief Macli-ing Dulag, whose assassination in April 1980 is now commemorated by the IP movement in the Cordillera. What he said distills the issue of land for the indigenous peoples:

5. 1987 Philippine Constitution, Art. 10, Sec. 15.

6. Keith Faulks, *Political Sociology: A Critical Understanding* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999).

Table 1.
Ethnolinguistic Groups by Region⁷

Ethnolinguistic Groups	Regions	Ethnolinguistic Groups	Regions
Applai	CAR; Region 1, 2, 3	Bantoanon	Region 4
Bago	CAR; Region 1, 2, 3	Dumagat	Region 4
Balangao	CAR;	Alangan Mangyan	Region 4
Bontok	CAR; Region 1, 2, 3	Balangan Mangyan	Region 4
Bugkalot	CAR; Region 1, 2, 3	Hanunuo	Region 4
Gaddang	CAR; Region 1, 2	Iraya	Region 4
Ibaloi	CAR; Region 1, 2, 3	Alii	Region 4, 6, 7
Ibanag	CAR; Region 1, 2, 3	Tagbanua	Region 4
Ifugao	CAR; Region 1, 2, 3	Remontado	Region 4
Ikalahan	CAR; Region 2, 3	Mangyan	Region 4
Itawes	CAR; Region 1, 2	Ati/Bantoanon	Region 4
Ivatan	CAR; Region 1, 2	Aeta-Abiyon	Region 5
Kalinga	CAR; Region 1, 2, 3	Isarog	Region 5
Kankanaey	CAR; Region 1, 2, 3	Tabangon	Region 5
Karao	CAR	Magahat	Region 6, 7
Malauug	CAR; Region 2	Bukidnon	Region 6, 7, 10
Aeta	CAR; Region 1, 2, 3, 4, 5	Sulod	Region 6
Agta	CAR; Region 1, 2, 3, 4, 5	Badjao	Region 7, 9, ARMM
Tinguian	CAR; Region 1, 2, 3	Sama	Region 9
Yogad	CAR; Region 2	Samal	Region 9, ARMM
Maeng	CAR; Region 3	Kalibugan	Region 9, ARMM
Adasen	CAR	Yakan	Region 9
Banac	CAR	Higaonon	Region 10, 12, 13
Masadit	CAR	Bagobo	Region 11, 12
Mabasa	CAR	Blasan	Region 1, 12
Balaloc	CAR	Kalagan	Region 11
Binongan	CAR	Mandaya	Region 11, 13
Gubang	CAR	Munguwan	Region 11
Inlaud	CAR	Tagakaolo	Region 11
Danao	CAR	T'boli	Region 11
Hanglulo	CAR	Manobo Billi	Region 11
Tuwali	CAR	Bagobo-Tagabawa	Region 11
Ikaluna	CAR	Bagobo-Guingan/Ciata	Region 11
Dumagat	Region 2, 3	Manobo/Ubo	Region 11
Iwak	Region 3	Ata/Magsalag	Region 11
Abellin/Aborlin	Region 3	Ilianan	Region 12
Bakula	Region 3	Kalagan	ARMM

7. National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, April 2005. http://www.ncip.gov.ph/resources/ethno_regist.php. Note: This is not an exhaustive listing, even as other listings by the NCIP in its website, e.g., alphabetically, or by regional population, include group names not listed in the By Region listing. e.g., Tiruray from Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat. Nongovernment groups (e.g., AnthroWatch) have published other classifications of IP groups. The choice to publish the problematic NCIP chart is meant to underline the point of the contestability of "data" on IPs, particularly as these are generated by bureaucracies vis-à-vis IPs advocates and academics, and the problems for politics implied by this.

8. Developmental Legal Assistance Center. *Laws and Jurisprudence Affecting the Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines* (Quezon City: DLAC, 1990), chapter 2, sourced from "International Solidarity Conference in the Cordillera," *Tribal Forum* 3, no. 1, January-February 1987. Indigenous People's Situationer, KAMP.

Table 2.
Classification of Indigenous Communities⁸

Tribal Filipinos	Muslim Filipinos
Cordillera/Igorot Tribes – 6 major different ethnolinguistic groups inhabiting the Cordillera mountains in Northern Luzon	Maranaos – ("lake dwellers") found in Lake Lanao in Central Mindanao
Caraballo/Cagayan Tribes – 5 ethnolinguistic groups inhabiting the Caraballo/Cagayan mountain range in Eastern Central Luzon, along with the Negritos	
Negritos and Agtas – 13 different groups spread throughout the country, with concentrations in the Sierra Madre mountains in the eastern coast of Luzon, the Tarlac-Zambales mountains in Central Luzon, and the mountains of Panay, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and northeastern Mindanao	Maguindanao – reside in Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat
Mangyans – 6 ethnolinguistic groups in Mindoro	
Palawan hilltribes – 5 distinct groups of non-Muslim tribes of Palawan islands	Tausugs – ("people of the current") inhabit the Sulu archipelago, the coastal areas of Zamboanga, and Southern Palawan
Mindanao Lumads – non-Muslim hilltribes of Mindanao, comprising 18 ethnolinguistic groups	

You ask us if we own the land. And mock us. "Where is your title?" When we query the meaning of your words you answer with taunting arrogance. "Where are the documents to prove that you own the land?" Title. Documents. Proof (of ownership). Such arrogance to speak of owning the land when you shall be owned by it? How can you own that which will outlive you? Only the race owns the land because only the race lives forever.

To claim a place is the birthright of every man. The lowly animals claim their place, how much more man? Man is born to live. Apu Kabunian, lord of us all, gave us life and placed us in the world to live human lives. And where shall we obtain life? From the land. To work (the land) is an obligation, not merely a right. In tilling the land you possess it. And so land is a grace that must be nurtured. To enrich it and make it fruitful is the eternal exhortation of Apu Kabunian to all his children. Land is sacred. Land is beloved. From its womb springs our Kalinga life.⁹

Clearly, the indigenous peoples have a concept of land ownership that is radically different from, and conflicts with, the concept held by the state, i.e., legally titled land (in the Philippines, through the Torrens System, introduced through the Land Registration Act 496 of 1902 soon after the United States acquired the Philippines from Spain).¹⁰ The state concept of land is based on the Regalian Doctrine,

a legal fiction based on the belief that in 1521, Ferdinand Magellan claimed ownership of the entire archipelago on behalf of the King of Spain. Barring a grant from the sovereign which was evidenced by a piece of paper, all lands were believed to be owned by the king.¹¹

This doctrine, by which the state claimed ownership and control over the public domain, was retained during American rule through to the 1935 Constitution, which was ratified in 1947 after the Philippines gained independence from the US. During Martial Law, Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree 389, declaring all land 18 percent in slope or more as permanent forests or forest reserves.¹² The IPs, many of them living in upland areas, felt like "squatters in [their] own land."

The Regalian Doctrine is reflected in the constitutional provision on national patrimony,¹³ which reserves to the state ownership, full control, and supervision of "all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests, or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources."

Interestingly, the 1987 Constitution carries new provisions aimed at addressing the IPs' stance on land. Article 12, Section 5, states:

9. Leonardo N. Mercado, ed., *Working with Indigenous Peoples: A Philippine Source Book*. (Manila: Divine Word Publications, 1994), using quote included in Ponciano L. Bannagan, "Tribal Filipinos," 71-72, in *Indigenous View of Land and the Environment*, ed. Shelton H. Davis. The World Bank Discussion Papers, no. 188, 1993.

10. Carlos M. Gaspar, "Globalization and the Indigenous Peoples: Focus on Malaysia, the Philippines and Mexico," *Kasarinlan* vol. 12, no. 4, 2nd vol. 13, no. 1 (3rd Quarter, 1997), 81.

11. Developmental Legal Assistance Center, 1990, 40.

12. Gaspar, "Globalization and the Indigenous Peoples," 81-82.

13. 1987 Philippine Constitution, Art. 12, Sec. 2.

The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.¹⁴

Also, Article 14, Section 17, provides that

The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.

It would appear that the land issue—which is at the root of IPs' political position, often asserted against the state—is no longer salient. However, it should be noted that the formal recognition of indigenous peoples' rights in the constitution is contingent, meaning that its realization in actuality depends on two conditions: first, it is "*subject to the provision of [the] Constitution and national development policies and programs*"; second, the applicability of customary laws governing property rights is determined by the legislature as "*Congress may provide.*" The provision in Article 14, Section 17, that the State "*shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies*" is considerably weakened by an earlier provision¹⁴ that State protection of rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands is "subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national development policies and programs."

Clearly, there is tension between the state's claim to territorial sovereignty (internal, in relation to indigenous peoples) and indigenous communities' claims to rights to the land—i.e., "ancestral lands" and "ancestral domain"—that antedate the colonial historical period, from which the Philippine state emerged. As a postcolonial state, the Philippine state was born out of "nationalist" struggle, and faced "national integration" as one of its first functional requisites. The anti-Marcos struggle, culminating in the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution and the adoption of a new constitution, provided the avenues for the assertion of indigenous peoples' rights. The new constitutional provisions cited above, which nonetheless remain ambivalent and equivocal in the attempt to both claim the state's rights and recognize indigenous peoples' rights, are a testament to the advocacy of indigenous peoples' rights movement.

The clash between the state's concept of land ownership and that of indigenous peoples' concept emerged as a political issue in many instances in the past, such as the Chico River dam project in the Cordillera, the Cellophil

14. 1987 Philippine Constitution, Art. 12, Sec. 5. *Laws and Jurisprudence Affecting the Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines* (Quezon City: DLAC, 1990) is a very useful compilation of relevant provisions on ancestral lands, land titling, tenurial rights, recognition of ancestral domain, etc., from different legal documents.

Resources Corporation logging concession in Abra, the Mount Apo Geothermal Project, and the entry of Western Mining Corporation in Columbio, Sultan Kudarat. These examples illustrate the range of development projects like energy generation (hydroelectric and geothermal), logging, and mining.¹⁵

More recent instances of conflict between IPs on the one hand and the state and state-sanctioned or state-protected entities on the other, are those between a Manobo tribal community in Barangay San Nicolas, Don Carlos, Bukidnon, and land-reform beneficiaries on Marcos crony-owned corporations,¹⁶ and between a Manobo tribe backed by a civil-society group, PEACE Foundation, and the Department of Agriculture and Philippine Coconut Authority over a hybrid coconut nursery project in Agusan del Sur.¹⁷ The enactment of Republic Act 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995), upheld to be constitutional by the Supreme Court in 2005, can be expected to occasion conflicts between state agencies and indigenous communities, reprising the mobilizations in the 1980s against government development projects that threatened indigenous communities' tenure on the land.¹⁸

In all instances, the conflict is between the IP demand for respect, recognition, and protection of their ancestral lands and/or ancestral domain, and the state's position on land ownership, defined in the constitutional provision on national patrimony which adheres to the Regalian Doctrine. The state claim to national patrimony accords with the principle that territory is an essential element of the state. This has taken the form of two rationales for state action seen to curtail IP rights: national development and national security. In the state's pursuit of economic development, extractive activities like logging, mining, and large-scale agricultural cultivation, as well as energy generation, have been licensed, often to the disregard of indigenous communities' claims to prior occupation of the affected lands. The protection of these licensed activities by government forces is seen to be part of the pursuit of national security. The physical and sociopolitical-economic marginalization of indigenous communities owing to the terrain and their distance from economic and political centers, and the ensuing material poverty, have made the IPs communities inviting hosts for insurgent (antistate) activities. This, in turn, has led to the "militarization" of many areas where indigenous communities live.¹⁹

Theories of IPs Rights Advocacy

New social movements (NSM) have been recognized in academic scholarship as one of the sources of challenges to the state in the late twentieth century.²⁰ These include social movements which have raised relatively new issues,

15. See "Land—Our Lost Heritage: How Do We Regain It?" *Tribal Forum* 6, no. 5 (September–October 1985), special issue, for case studies and reports of indigenous communities' plight and struggle in Davao del Norte, Agusan del Sur, the Cordillera, Anipolo and Tanay; B.R. Rodil, *The Minorization of the Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago*, Philippine edition (Davao City: Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao, Inc., 1994) for case studies of Mt. Apo and Datu Inong Awa, and Agus 1 Hydroelectric Plant. See also TAN-awan 4, big. 2 (July–September 2001), special IPRA issue, for report on the B'laans of Columbio, Sultan Kudarat.

16. See "The Lion Roars to Fight the Manobo Land," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, February 7, 2005.

17. "Farmers Vow Legal Action to Stop Agusan Cacao Project," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, April 28, 2005.

18. See for example, "Stay Away from Ancestral Lands, Groups Warn Mining Companies," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, February 7, 2005; "Cordillera Rebs Urge Tribes to Unite vs Mining," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, March 17, 2005.

19. See *Tribal Forum* 6, no. 5 (September–October 1985), special issue; Rodil, *The Minorization of the Indigenous Communities*.

20. Faulks, *Political Sociology*.

particularly in the context of the state in the modernized, western democracies; the most prominent of these new issues are those on the environment, women, and cultural communities, including indigenous peoples and immigrant populations. The attention given these advocacies for the environment, women, and indigenous peoples has resulted in an extensive body of literature, which includes theorizing and case studies of new social movements in different parts of the world.

The practice of indigenous peoples rights advocacy in the Philippines and the study of this advocacy have benefited from the resurgence of international scholarship on new social movements. Theories toward the understanding of the emergence and growth of social movements have produced diverse explanatory factors including: 1) individual-psychological variables, 2) resource mobilization, 3) social-psychological variables, and 4) political opportunity structures.²¹

The variety of explanatory frameworks enumerated above suggests the following questions, the answers to which form an explanatory account of the role and participation of indigenous peoples in Philippine governance and politics. The first would suggest the question: do the individuals involved—e.g., activists, participants, sympathizers—have individual personality characteristics and/or attitudes that explain their propensity for involvement? The second would suggest questions regarding what resources (e.g., funds, organization, leadership, time, etc.) were available and successfully mobilized by the movement. The third would suggest questions about the influence of political attitudes—like grievance, political efficacy, trust in government, and interpersonal trust—in the successful mobilization on the particular issue. These explanations of social movements usually involve quantitative research, in which concepts such as attitudes and resources are observed as quantifiably measurable.

Finally, the examination of a social movement could focus on the study of the opportunity structures (political, cultural) that may have served as positive environmental factors for the social movement. An interesting twist comes in the form of the suggestion that “opportunity structures” work as such principally based on their being perceived as such, first of all, followed by their being successfully utilized as opportunities. Thus it is possible that a study of the role of opportunity structures in some social movement may indicate “pseudo-success” or “pseudo-failure.” The former would refer to the incorrect attribution of a social movement’s success to the efforts—i.e., utilization of opportunity structures—by the movement, while the latter would refer to the incorrect attribution of a social movement’s failure to the presence or absence of negative or positive opportunities, respectively, in the form of state action.²² Studies of social movements in relation to opportunity structures are frequently qualitative, taking the form of case studies tracing the political process of mobilization given an environment of opportunity structures (or the lack thereof).

21. See Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

22. Doowon Suh, “How Do Political Opportunities Matter for Social Movements?” *Sociological Quarterly* 42, no. 3 (2001): 437-60.

Political Opportunity Structures and the IP Social Movement in the Philippines

Unnoted by the vast majority of Filipinos, one of the significant outcomes of the transition from the Marcos regime to the post-Marcos regimes has been the revitalization of the mobilization of indigenous peoples and communities. When Corazon C. Aquino became president following the EDSA People Power Revolution in February 1986, she was unequivocal about making the return to democracy as the hallmark of her presidency. Rejecting autocracy as the mark of the authoritarian regime of Marcos, President Aquino opened up to all social forces that had been repressed by the state, notably left-leaning and left-identified groups. Significant groups, such as the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA)—an alliance of twenty-seven groups that had just joined forces to hold the first Congress of the CPA two years earlier, in June 1984—took President Aquino at her word and invited her to a meeting in April 1986 at which issues on violations of Igorot rights by the past regime and programs to remove the structures that promoted them were to be discussed.²³ In turn, President Aquino received a CPA delegation to Malacañang, and the latter came away from the initial meetings impressed with the president's sincerity.²⁴ Despite disappointments, such as the eventual nonappointment of CPA nominees to the Constitutional Commission, the Cordillera Peoples Alliance pursued the strategy of pushing their advocacy for Igorot rights by lobbying the Constitutional Convention for the regional autonomy. The CPA's utilization of a political opportunity structure in the form of a democratizing regime (the post-Marcos Aquino presidency), whose first order of business was the drafting of a new constitution, bore fruit. Article 10, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution provided for the establishment of autonomous regions for the Cordillera and Muslim Mindanao on the basis of "...share[d] common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics." This was the result of vigorous campaigning on the part of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance for the inclusion of such a provision.

In addition to grasping the political opportunity offered by the democratic space opened by President Corazon Aquino, the CPA undertook the project of "ethnicity entrepreneurship," bursting into a vigorous campaign to promote Igorot rights. To push for this political agenda, the CPA constructed an indigenous ethnic identity it called "Kaigorotan." The failure of its campaign, as the call to a Kaigorotan unity remained unheeded by Igorot communities (as witnessed in the failure of attempts to establish an autonomous region), suggests that the construct "Kaigorotan" failed to efface the reality of diversity among Igorot peoples. To this day, discussions in public fora of Cordillera regionalism, particularly in relation to the incursions of national imperatives (e.g., integration, development, security), are stymied by the diversity of indigenous forms of

23. A.L. Casambre, "Interpretation of the Debate on Cordillera Autonomy," *Governance and Public Policy Research Program Conference, Cordillera Studies Center, UP College Baguio, May 1990*. A telling sign of the fluidity of discourse on IPs is the nuanced variability in the nomenclature for CPA: sometimes appearing as Cordillera People's Alliance, other times as Cordillera Peoples Alliance, or Cordillera Peoples Alliance. An internet check shows that the current preferred name of the group, indicated in its Home page, is "Cordillera Peoples Alliance."

24. *Dalman Review* 35, nos. 5 & 6 (1987), cited in Casambre 1990.

governance. While all agree on the claim to indigenous land rights and customary law, there remains no agreement on a regional form of governance, as each ethnic group remains faithful to their indigenous practices; e.g., the Kalinga peace pact, *bodong*, which found its way into the Organic Act courtesy of the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA), is alien to other Igorot communities.

Ironic twists marked the Cordillera autonomy's political opportunity structures. By the time of the first referendum on a proposed Organic Act for a Cordillera Autonomous Region in January 1990, the players' positions had turned around totally: the CPA, which had been responsible to a large extent for getting regional autonomy written into the constitution, were now campaigning for a "No" vote in the referendum. In September 1986, President Aquino entered into a *sipat* (peace agreement) with ex-priest Conrado Balweg, who led the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, a group that had broken away from the New People's Army (NPA) earlier in April, at the same time that the CPA was in dialogue with President Aquino. The president's taking notice of the CPLA (which later established its presence at the Executive Mansion House compound in Baguio City) became a negative political opportunity structure to the CPA, as these two groups regarded each other with animosity. This was principally because the CPA was aligned with the Cordillera national democratic front movement, while the CPLA was a breakaway group from the NPA, which is the armed group of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

What comes through in this scenario is the reality that, first, social movements are not necessarily without internal fractures, and second, as shown in this instance, social movements are often layered. For example, while the CPA and the CPLA both sought to promote indigenous peoples' rights, each group's indigenous peoples' rights program was nonetheless linked to other—and in this instance, conflicting—political movements.²⁵ Hence their opposite positions on the referendum for the proposed Organic Act for an autonomous Cordillera region.

A second referendum on a proposed Organic Act in 1998 failed approval as well. In 2000, the governing agencies of the interim Cordillera Administrative Region established by Executive Order 220 and mandated to "prepare for the establishment of the Autonomous Region in the Cordilleras" ran out their tenure without results and without any hope of extension. The failure to establish the autonomous region almost two decades after the adoption of the constitutional provision is a major setback in the IP rights social movement.

Changing Political Opportunity Structures for IPs Movement

Setbacks are to be expected in social movements. But these do not discourage the true believers in a cause, who will continue to adjust to the

25. The phenomenon of "frame alignment" refers to a "micro-process" where mobilization groups seek to ensure success by reaching out to pools of potential participants through aligning their "frames" with those of others, including non-committeds, and those already committed to other movements. See David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micro-mobilization and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review*, August 1986. This concept would apply, for instance, to the frame alignment between Cordillera Peoples Alliance and the Cordillera People's Democratic Front.

political environment to find ways of promoting their cause. The example of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance illustrates the perseverance required by changing political opportunity structures. Perseverance here means a sustained pursuit through time as well as the adjustments that allow such durability.

Local Government Code of 1991

As regional autonomy remained in limbo, advocates of IPs rights like the CPA faced a redefined political opportunity structure. The national government, responding to the problem of national-local government relations, passed a new Local Government Code in 1991 (RA 7160). Among the code's provisions that were salient to IPs were those on expanded revenue creation and civil-society representation. The resource and revenue arrangements between the national government and the local government units would have implications on extractive activities of agriculture, forestry, and mining as these touch ancestral lands. The provision for Local Special Bodies expands the opportunities for representation of IPs. The Cordillera Peoples Alliance, almost two decades after the debacle of the initial debate on Cordillera regional autonomy, has recognized the opportunity structure presented by the code, revising its rhetoric to address the question of the code's impact on indigenous peoples.²⁶ While remaining staunch defenders of indigenous peoples' rights, including their right to ancestral land and to their practice of self-governance through indigenous forms of conflict resolution, the CPA has nonetheless recognized that as a given reality, the new local government code presents an opportunity for empowering indigenous communities, e.g., through representation in the local special bodies, as well as an opportunity for critical assessment of the state's ability to serve indigenous peoples through local government services.²⁷

The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act

Besides the new Local Government Code, a piece of legislation that more specifically addresses the political demands of IPs or indigenous cultural communities (ICCs) is the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) or RA 8371 legislated in 1997.²⁸ It can be said to be a product of the political opportunity structure attendant to the democratizing administration of President Aquino and the modernizing administration of President Fidel V. Ramos, in particular the Social Reform Agenda in his Philippines 2000 program. Civil-society groups, organized principally as the Coalition for Indigenous Peoples' Rights and Ancestral Domain (CIPRAD),²⁹ persisted through ten years (1987-1997) and three Congresses (8th-10th), ultimately exerting "positive and beneficial" impact on the legislative.³⁰

26. Cordillera Peoples Alliance, *Indigenous Peoples and the Local Government: Building Good Governance in the Philippines* (Baguio City: Cordillera Peoples' Alliance, 2004).

27. *Ibid.*

28. RA 8371. An Act to Recognize, Protect, and Promote the Rights of Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and For Other Purposes.

29. CIPRAD is composed of indigenous peoples' organizations and NGOs. Among these are the Sagada Women's Group, Bamban Aeta Tribal Association, Bukidnon United Tribal Association, Dumagat Communities of Gen Timo and Gebaldon in Nueva Ecija, HAGURA Tribal Association, Kiangnan Ancestral Domain Council, Kalingban nga Asoasyon sang mga Tumanok sa Isla sang Panay, Kalinga Mission for Children and Youth Development Inc., LAKAS Zambales, Manobo Lumadong Panaguhsa ng Arakan Valley, Nagpapa Minomias Association, Nagkakaisang Tinio ng Palawan, National Indigenous Peoples' Council, Pambanzang Lupon ng Nakakalanda sa Tinio, Samahan ng Nagkakaisang Tribong Hanunoo, Center for Living Heritage Inc., ECHIP, Indigenous Peoples' Associates Nationwide, National Peace Conference, and PANLIP. See Bennagen, "Tribal Filipinos," www.ids.ac.uk/ids/cvscvfinal/philippines/phi10.doc (accessed June 18, 2005).

30. *Ibid.*

The diversity among the civil-society groups that pushed IPRA through Congress illustrates the role of frame alignment as a significant mobilization micro-process.³¹ Frame alignment refers to "the linkage of individual and SMO [social movement organization] interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs, and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary."³² The list of CIPRAD organizations indicate the frame bridging and alignment among the interests and values of women's groups, indigenous peoples' groups, church groups, and alternative law groups.³³

The passage of IPRA was not without controversy, its implementation not without difficulty. Retired Supreme Court Justice Isagani Cruz and lawyer Cesar Europa filed a case at the Supreme Court³⁴ in which they questioned the constitutionality of the ancestral domain provision and the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples' relationship with the Office of the President, and the discrimination against non-indigenous peoples entailed by the powers granted to the NCIP.³⁵ Since the seven (pro-Regalian Doctrine) to six (pro-IPRA) decision, with one disagreeing, on whether the complainants were the "proper parties" failed to produce a majority, the case was dismissed. In sum, according to the LRC, "the law is valid until the next challenge."³⁶

The optimism that marked the successful passage of IPRA through the legislative and the judiciary has not been sustained in the implementation phase. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, lead implementing agency, was hobbled by partisan politics. Functionally duplicate bodies (e.g., Presidential Adviser on NGO and PO affairs, Presidential Task Force on Ancestral Domain, Presidential Task Force on Indigenous Peoples) were constituted and placed in charge of the NCIP; the NCIP's budget was "withheld" and commissioners were being investigated in the aborted Estrada administration.³⁷ The Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center-Kasama sa Kalikasan's (LRC-KsK) assessment that "the record of the Commission during its first three years is history at the expense of indigenous communities," is echoed in a Philippine Peasant Institute publication:

Silence greeted the third anniversary of the signing of Republic Act (RA) 8731, also known as the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA) ... Silence from the side of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) ... and silence from the side of the intended beneficiaries themselves. ... They were not in a celebratory mood as there was *no accomplishment to speak of and no benefit to brag about*.³⁸

Even as the very first executive order (Executive Order 1) of the EDSA 2-installed administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo created the Office of the Presidential Adviser for Indigenous Peoples' Affairs (OPAIPA), this

31. David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review*, August 1986. See note 25.

32. Snow et al., 464.

33. The list of NGOs which joined the Oppose the Chico Dam campaign in the 1980s likewise illustrates frame alignment among diverse groups: UGAT (Ugnayang Agham-Tao or National Association of Anthropologists), TABAK (Tunay na Alyansa ng Bayan Alay sa Katutubo or Genuine Alliance for the IPAs), KAMP (Kalipunan ng mga Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas or Organization of IPs in the Philippines), PETA (Philippine Educational Theatre Association), ECTF (Episcopal Commission on Tribal Filipinos), NCCP-PACT (National Council of Churches of the Philippines-People Action for Cultural Ties) (Gasper 1997, 85).

34. Cruz v. NCIP, G.R. 13585 (December 6, 2000).

35. LRC-KsK/Friends of the Earth-Philippines, "A Divided Court: Casem Materials from the Constitutional Challenge to the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997," LRC-KsK, 2001, 3.

36. LRC-KsK, 2001, iv.

37. Hamada, "Between the State and Indigenous Communities," 2.

38. Carlos Aquino and Eugene Tecson, "Indigenous People's Rights Act—Is the Long Walk Over?" *Farm News and Views* (1st-2nd Quarter 2001), 4-24.

seemingly auspicious beginning merely served to clarify the situation for the IPs movement. With the NCIP and the OPAIPA, the IPs issue had become bureaucratized, susceptible to the limitations of workings within bureaucratic organization and culture such as “expertise.” On one hand, the NCIP, as a bureaucratic organization, is faced with the herculean task of rationalizing the identification of basic elements such as “indigenous people,” “ethnic group,” “ancestral domain.” In order to implement the provisions of IPRA, the NCIP had had to put in place rules for establishing the boundaries of ethnic communities and the ancestral domain to which they claim ownership—but this is, by nature of indigenous practices as traditional and customary, not subject to codifiable rules. In other words, there is inherent tension between the requirements of bureaucracy as an institution, and the requirements of ancestral or customary law claims.

Thus, despite the opportunity to participate in policy making through consultations with civil-society groups and leaders by OPAIPA, IP advocates now feel the need to make government realize that “the center must work with, not simply, for the periphery.”³⁹ Evidently, the

[r]esults of the partnership of government and civil society remain tentative and precarious. The dynamics of pushing for social reform has evolved into a more subtle and treacherous engagement of IP advocates with government. In pushing for the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples, civil society must double its efforts to amplify communities’ voice and must guard against becoming barriers in the policy *dialogue or unwitting instruments of political compromise*.⁴⁰

Summary

The advocacy of indigenous peoples’ rights in politics has intensified in the last decade, and is counted among the so-called New Social Movements phenomenon in contemporary politics. Mobilizations to protest development projects of the state, such as hydroelectric and geothermal energy generation, mining, and logging, have increased and intensified, as these state projects encroached on the most sacred possession of indigenous peoples—the land. State claims of national patrimony conflict with the indigenous concepts of ancestral domain and ancestral land. In the Philippines, the state claims ownership—based on the Regalian Doctrine—of all public land, that is, land that the state has not declared to be alienable and disposable, and available for private ownership through Torrens (land) titles. This clashes with the indigenous concept of land ownership, which includes communal private ownership and/ or private ownership within the bounds of customary law, based on occupancy “from time immemorial.”

39. Hamada, “Between the State and Indigenous Communities,” 4.

40. *Ibid.*, 5.

41. "Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples—refer to a group of people or homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed, and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions, and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social, and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, become historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who remain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains" (par. H, sec. 3, chap. 2, RA 8371 IPRA).

42. Quoted in Aquino and Tecson 2001, 9.

43. See, for example, "Tribes Tell Mining Foes: 'Leave Us Alone'" (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, May 8, 2005), which reveals that "village officials and tribal leaders from South Cotabato, Davao del Sur and Sultan Kudarat urged the Catholic Church and animating groups to stop meddling in their affairs." A similar example of "density among indigenous peoples" is cited in Nestor T. Castro, "Three Years of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act: Its Impact on Indigenous Communities," *Kasarinian: A Philippine Quarterly of Third World Studies* 15, no. 2 (2000): 35-54, as follows: "Because they had long lived in harmony with non-IPs like the Sugbuhanon, Hiligaynon, and Kiray-a, the Bukidnons at Mt. Kantolan Natural Park refused the suggestion of the Office of Southern Cultural Communities that they apply for a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, so as not to destroy their relations with the majority non-IPs. Thereupon, the NCIP organized a faction into another tribal council which duly applied for the CADT. When findings from subsequent investigations did not favor them, the latter tribal council chose not to cooperate with the Conservation of Priority Protected Areas Project."

Colonization and the subsequent establishment (e.g., by grant of independence) of a centralized state resulted in the marginalization of indigenous peoples. The text of the lengthy definition of "indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples" codified in IPRA (R.A. 8371) implies this history.⁴¹

The political opportunity structure in the past two decades, that is, principally the openness or repressiveness of the state, political elites, and the international community, explains the intensification of IPs rights advocacy. Frame alignment among diverse civil-society groups, e.g., democratization groups (such as anti-martial law and anti-Marcos groups), church-based groups, leftists, environmentalists, feminists, and IPs, also accounts for the upsurge in IPs rights advocacy. Thus for example, the mobilization against the Chico River dam project of the Marcos government carried over into the mobilization for regional autonomy addressed to the post-EDSA 1 Aquino-appointed Constitutional Convention. IPs rights advocacy was sustained over the next ten years, through two administrations (the Aquino and Ramos governments), bearing fruit in the passage of RA 8371 (IPRA). Meantime, the ill-fated Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) and the embattled Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) became additional venues for the debate and conflict involving indigenous peoples.

The unimpressive record of the National Commission for Indigenous Peoples as lead agency for the implementation of IPRA can be traced to two factors. First, there is inherent tension between the historical state, i.e., the nation-state and further, the postcolonial nation-state, on the one hand, and the age-old claims of indigenous peoples. The LRC-KsK assessment of the problem plaguing IPRA is that it is "[primarily] the legislative expression of the rhetoric of the State in favor of ecologically-sustainable socioeconomic development and secondarily as the legislative expression of State recognition of the historical marginalization of ICCs/IPs in the Philippine polity and the State's attempt to redress such marginalization."⁴² The state understands national interest in terms of national security, national integration, and national development, and would see issues such as indigenous peoples' rights in terms of these interests. It cannot be expected to see the issue of indigenous peoples' rights as the IPs see it. While liberal and democratic politics allow the encounter of essentially disjoint perspectives in the hope of dialogue and compromise, the emergent policy is contingent on the strength or weakness of the state on the one hand, and the vigilance and strategic abilities of civil society on the other. Apart from the disjuncture between state and civil society perspectives, there is the fragmentation within the IPs. This is seen in divergent positions held by indigenous communities regarding mining and other extractive activities by outsiders inside the territory of indigenous communities.⁴³

Second, there is inherent tension between the culture of bureaucracy on the one hand, and indigenous culture based on ancestral and customary law, on the other. This is seen in the unwieldy requirements of the implementing rules and regulations for IPRA (Administrative Order 1—Series of 1988), for example Rule 8 on Delineation and Recognition of Ancestral Domains, which has a section of “submission of proof” that includes “testimonies of community elders,” “oral historical accounts,” “written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions” and “political structures and institutions”; “anthropological data”; “genealogical surveys”; etc. that appear to require more systematized information than even existing research and educational institutions could provide. Disappointed and frustrated that three years later, “not a single CADT has been processed and issued by the NCIP since the enactment of IPRA,”—such dismal record attributed to lack of budget funding—some groups decided to engage in “self-delineation” with the assistance of anthropologists.⁴⁴

Customary law presents another problem. While bureaucratic procedures would favor the codification of customary law, anthropological expertise⁴⁵ would cast doubt on the feasibility of such a project. Prill-Brett argues that the nature of customary law is that of a “living tradition,” in which customary law decisions change from time to time, depending on the circumstances.

Finally, there is the irony of the unintended consequence of good intentions in the bureaucratization of the IPs issue by the state. Castro quotes an Ayta woman’s assessment of IPRA:

Prior to IPRA, we could approach the Municipal Agricultural Office when we were in need of seeds. We were assisted by the DSWD (Department of Social Welfare and Development) whenever we needed skills training. The local government unit was most willing to provide us with funds in cases of emergency. However, when IPRA was enacted, all of these offices told us that we had to approach the NCIP since it was now the mandated government office for indigenous peoples. When we approached the NCIP office, however, they told us that they didn’t have any funds. I think the situation before was *more favorable for us*.⁴⁶

The situation described by the Ayta woman illustrates the convoluted narrative of the role that IPs have played in Philippine politics and governance. They are indeed a marginalized sector of society that have had to struggle to assert their rights within the state. This was accomplished through mobilization that responded to the opportunities provided by both domestic and international contexts. Nonetheless, the gains won by the IPs movement from the state have not been totally satisfactory, in part because of the inherent tension between the state and civil society.

44. Castro, “Three Years of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act,” 48.

45. For example, anthropologist June Prill-Brett, PhD, holds this position regarding the ill-advisedness of attempting to codify customary law. Professor Prill-Brett’s many works on customary law are published by the Cordillera Studies Center, UP Baguio.

46. Castro, “Three Years of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act,” 49.

Guide Questions

1. What is the main political issue raised by indigenous peoples?
2. How have indigenous peoples pursued their political advocacy through social movement organization?
3. What have been some of the results of the advocacy and activism of the indigenous peoples social movement in the Philippines?

Glossary

Ancestral domain – all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, etc. (IPRA, section 3a).

Ancestral lands – lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains, but limited to lands occupied, possessed and utilized by the ICCs/IPs under individual or traditional group claims (IPRA, section 3b).

Frame – denotes “schemata of interpretation” that enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences within their life space and the world at large (Snow et al. 1986, borrowed from Erving Goffman [1974] Frame Analysis).

Frame alignment – the linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary (Snow et al. 1986).

Indigenous peoples – see Martinez-Cobo definition; defined in chapter 2, section 3, chapter 2 of IPRA (RA 8371) as follows: “*Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples*—refer to a group of people or homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous

on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.”

IPRA – RA 8731 (Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act), promulgated 1997.

New social movements – contemporary social movements, including feminism, environmentalism, indigenous peoples' movements, in contrast to earlier social movements like labor, suffrage, etc.

Political opportunity structure (also “structure of political opportunity”) – conditions that influence the “ability of social movements to translate potential for collective action into actual mobilization” (Doowon Suh 2001), including openness (or not) of formal institutional and informal structures and processes, elite allies and alignments, and a state's responsiveness, or capacity/propensity for repression (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996).

Regalian Doctrine – a legal fiction based on the belief that in 1521, Ferdinand Magellan claimed ownership of the entire archipelago on behalf of the King of Spain, used to justify state ownership of all lands of the public domain and natural resources

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The Philippine Peace Process

Miriam Coronel Ferrer

If we want peace, prepare for peace.

– Bertha Von Suttner, 1905 Nobel Peace Prize Recipient

An enduring peace based on justice is thus possible only if there are self-determined efforts toward a self-reliant development that benefits Filipinos—not just a few but the many who are powerless and poor.

– Ed Garcia, Filipino peace activist

■ Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, the student should be able to:

1. Critically appreciate the contribution made by civil society organizations in peace building in the Philippines including their impact on governance and democratization.
2. Identify the policies of the government and the various agreements reached in the peace negotiations between the government and the various rebel groups.
3. Explain the challenges in securing peace with armed groups in the country.

The Philippine peace process is anchored on the main agenda of finding a just and peaceful solution to the armed conflicts in the Philippines. It became part of the national agenda after the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1986. The democratic transition brought about by EDSA People Power Revolution created favorable conditions for building national consensus on the need for reforms that will break down the repressive apparatus of the martial law regime and address gaping social inequities. Recognizing that the rise and growth of the communist and Moro insurgencies were rooted in social injustices and gross violations of human rights, the Aquino administration opened the process of dialogue with the Moro and communist insurgent groups. Finding a just and peaceful settlement to the insurgencies and building peace thus became part of the post-Marcos democratic agenda.

The process has not progressed smoothly. Changing policy priorities of the post-Marcos administrations, conflicting demands of the domestic and global situation on the stakeholders, and obstacles related to procedures and substance of the political negotiations and other aspects of the peace process have deterred the just and peaceful resolution of the armed conflicts.

As such, the peace process remains one of the key elements of Philippine democratization. Democratization can be defined as the process of institutionalizing both substantive and procedural aspects of democracy, including the appropriate institutions and supportive norms. It necessitates sustained social and political reforms. The peace process provides additional mechanisms and an arena for consensus building on the needed reforms that would lead to the peaceful settlement of the conflicts, address their causes and impact, and bring about the healing and reconstruction of Philippine society. It has been sustained by a growing number of peace organizations and individuals whose collective efforts have generated what can be considered a national peace movement.

A peace process has been defined as "persistent peace initiatives involving the main protagonists in a protracted conflict."¹ A broader definition that is more aptly used in the Philippine context is: "[T]he totality of structures and processes, actors, roles and relationships, strategies, programs and activities involved, created and pursued in a non-violent manner by various sectors of Philippine society in response to armed conflicts, political violence and social unrest."²

This chapter will discuss two key aspects of the Philippine peace process, namely, civil-society peace building and political negotiations between the government and the different rebel groups. It undertook a review and trends analysis of these two interrelated aspects of the Philippine peace process. Concepts introduced were peace and related terms such as negative and positive peace, peace process, peace building, civil-society organizations, people's organizations, peace organizations, peace zones, political negotiations. Part 1 defined and gave examples of different types of peace building in the Philippines. These initiatives were classified into five types: constituency building, conflict-reduction efforts, conflict-settlement efforts, peace research and training programs, and social development work. Provided in part 2 is a matrix of the different agreements reached with the various rebel groups. These groups include the communist groups, namely, the National Democratic Front (NDF), the Revolutionary Proletarian Movement (RPM), and the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA); the Moro groups,

1. John Derby and Roger MacGinty, eds., *Contemporary Peacemaking, Conflict, Violence, and Peace Process* (UK and US: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 2.

2. Maria Lorenzana Palm-Dalupan, "A Proposed Framework for Documentation and Assessment of the Peace Process in the Philippines." Working paper prepared for the United Nations Development Program, February 20, 2000 (unpublished).

the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); and the military rebels who belonged to the Alyansang Tapat sa Sambayanan (ALTAS), the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM, renamed the Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa), Soldiers of the Filipino People (SFP), and the Young Officers Union (YOU). A preliminary analysis of the outcome of civil-society peace building and the political negotiations was made.

In the Philippines where the armed conflicts are deeply rooted in social and political inequities, the peace process has been defined more comprehensively. An example of a broad definition of the Philippine peace process is "[T]he totality of structures and processes, actors, roles and relationships, strategies, programs and activities involved, created and pursued in a nonviolent manner by various sectors of Philippine society in response to armed conflicts, political violence and social unrest."³ In practice, the Philippine peace process thus includes, but is not limited to, the "peace talks" between the government and the different armed groups. It entails generating a consensus on a national peace agenda. The widest efforts along this line were the series of national consultations conducted by the National Unification Commission in 1992-1993. The peace process also includes instituting the needed political, social, and economic reforms to eradicate the causes and manifestations of armed conflict and political violence. The comprehensive view of a peace process that aims to find long-lasting solutions to domestic wars also gives importance to the building of a culture of peace, the healing of wounds, and dissolving of prejudices in communities and families torn apart by the conflicts. It requires the transformation of social, political and economic relationships toward what have been envisioned as a *justpeace*, *peacefare* or *nonkilling society*.⁴ In the short term, it recognizes the need to respond to situations of direct political violence that give rise to indiscriminate acts victimizing civilians, internal displacement, and massive psychosocial trauma of communities, including women and children.

In brief, the Philippine peace process seeks to address both the desire for *negative* and *positive peace*. Negative peace pertains to the absence of direct, physical violence such as wars, while positive peace refers to the absence of structural violence such as injustice and poverty.⁵

This broad understanding of the peace process naturally flows from an equally comprehensive perspective of what peace building has come to mean in the country. Peace building is conceived as flowing from, or a necessary undertaking after, a successful peace process. In the Philippine context of protracted conflicts, cycles of relatively high and low levels of political violence even after the forging of peace agreements, and difficulties in consolidating democracy, it has been difficult to define conflict and postconflict phases. Peacebuilding in the present context is thus construed as the different programs and activities undertaken by individuals and groups (governmental and

3. Ibid.

4. John Paul Lederach, "Justice: The Challenge of the 21st Century," in European Centre for Conflict Prevention, *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World* (Utrecht, The Netherlands: The European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), 36; Glenn D. Paige, *Nonkilling Global Political Science* (Honolulu and Metro Manila: Center for Global Nonviolence and Kalyaan Cottage, Marikina, 2002), 1-24.

5. John Galtung, "Violence and Peace," in *A Reader in Peace Studies*, edited by Paul Smoker, Ruth Davies, and Barbara Munke (Oxford, England: Pergamon Press, 1990).

nongovernmental) to sustain the peace process. Collectively, these peace organizations and individuals have succeeded in generating a nationwide consciousness and campaign networks supportive of the goals of the peace process. They have brought about a nascent *Philippine peace movement*.

Peace building refers to long-term preventive, pre-hostility strategies, or measures to remove the internal causes of conflict and to strengthen structural stability in a country against the threat of civil war. Different interpretations emphasize pre-armed conflict and post-hostilities aspects.⁶

The Philippine peace movement, like the peace process, is a fairly new, post-Marcos phenomenon. Unlike other peace movements in Western countries that focus on global issues of disarmament and war, the specific conditions of the Philippines have oriented the evolution of its peace movement to the desire to settle long-standing domestic or *intrastate* conflicts. However, more recent initiatives like the campaigns against the war in Iraq, the rise of humanitarian and disarmament groups against the use and proliferation of landmines and small arms, and broad education campaigns on nonviolence, show a gradual broadening of the scope and orientation of the Philippine peace movement beyond its original roots in addressing the conflict between the state and the communist, military and Moro insurgent groups.

Philippine Civil Society Organizations and Peace Building

The different dimensions of conflict and peace building require different interventions on the part of change-agents in society. Among these change-agents are the civil society organizations (CSOs). Both government- and civil society-led efforts to advance the Philippine peace process despite the difficulties in sustaining the peace process in the last eighteen years (since 1986) have spurred the rise of more peace CSOs vertically and horizontally. Grassroots or community-based interventions link up with partners, and altogether build bigger formations, at the provincial, regional, and national levels. The rise in peace CSOs within and cutting across-Muslim, Christian, and *lumad* sectors is particularly phenomenal in Mindanao, where political negotiations have been undertaken with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) but where hostilities have periodically erupted and an unstable peace prevails.

6. Alex P. Schmid, *Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms* (London: Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, 2000), 59-60.

Civil Society Organizations is used to include organizations, institutions, and other collectivities working and organized autonomously from the state to respond to societal and political issues.

Peace CSOs refer specifically to a segment of this broad range of Philippine CSOs who have adopted a focused peace agenda—meaning, they frame their campaigns, services and other activities within a peace perspective or advocacy for peace, or at the least undertake peace-related activities and consider themselves peace organizations. Like most CSOs, “peace CSOs” generally undertake any or all of three roles in society—guardians of or watchdogs over the state, service provider, and advocates of alternative policies.

The concept of civil society is used in relation to the state (from which it is autonomous), and secondarily to the market (which is profit-oriented in contrast to the supposedly nonprofit and voluntary character of civil society). In the Philippines, CSOs include civic, religious, women’s, youth, sectoral, and professional organizations. In some categorization, CSOs can include social movement organizations, which in our country could mean to include armed revolutionary groups or legal organizations that are ideologically and/or organizationally affiliated with these armed revolutionary organizations. Since CSOs are best and often understood “as organizations autonomous from the state,” organizations affiliated with or aligned to the armed communist Left and Moro separatists certainly meet the qualifications of being CSOs, and have effectively engaged the state on various policy issues, including peace issues. However, peace CSOs operating in the context of domestic armed conflicts involving nonstate armed opposition groups engage not only the state but also the armed nonstate actors. Such a role is often described as a “third-party role” because they come in as mediators, interlocutors, or cooperators to both the state and the armed state challengers (who are called the “first parties” to the conflict, or sometimes as the “first and second parties”).

“People’s organizations” (POs) are a common type of CSO in the Philippine setting. POs are usually considered “solid” or “mass-based” organizations. They are “solid” because they are fairly tightly organized groupings of ordinary citizens banded together as a territorial (barangay, *sitio*, city, province) group, or sectoral (women, workers) unit for a common cause (community, environment, human rights, peace). In contrast, broader and looser networks undertake “sweeping” work addressed to the public at large. Nongovernment organizations (NGOs), dubbed “service providers,” are also distinguished from POs that are effectively recipients of NGO services. In general, NGOs comprise hired or voluntary staff

who are accountable to their board and funders, while POs are composed of individual members with a set of officers or leaders who are accountable to the mass membership.

A people's organization may be defined as "an organization of individuals drawn from among grassroots communities, sectors or other groupings, committed to advance their shared rights and welfare."⁷

Other staunch peace advocates would be the churches, through their regular organizations like the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) and the protestant National Council of Churches of the Philippines (NCCP). They were key participants in major peace undertakings such as monitoring the 1986 cease-fire agreement and the National Unification Commission consultations. Through various statements read and disseminated to the faithful in Sunday masses or released to the press, the CBCP and NCCP made known their support for the peace process and put pressure on concerned parties to pursue the track. Various programs and offices were put up to attend to the peace campaign, including a CBCP-NCCP Joint Peace Committee to coordinate local, national and international efforts. The CBCP's National Secretariat for Social Action, Justice and Peace (NASSA) remains an important coordinating/campaign agency for most of the CBCP's social action concerns, ranging from anticorruption, the environment, and peace. In Mindanao, interfaith dialogues continue to be undertaken through the Bishops-Ulama Forum and many other local counterparts.

NGOs play important facilitative and coordinative role in peace undertakings. The Metro Manila-based Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute (GZOPI) was put up in 1991 to document, support and sustain these peace initiatives. The GZOPI continues to be one of the most active and networked NGOs providing coordination services and secretariat support to various peace projects and campaigns. The Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID) with head offices in Davao City provides similar functions to Mindanao peace coalitions and various local, national, and international projects. The Assisi Development Foundation provides managerial support for Tabang Mindanaw, a high-powered relief and reconstruction program chaired by former Ambassador Howard Dee, businessman Fernando Zobel de Ayala, and publisher Alexandra Prieto-Romualdez. The Catholic Relief Services has extensive peace-building education and developmental programs in Mindanao.

Philippine civil society peace-building efforts or peace action can be organized into several types (see table 1).⁸

7. See Miriam Coronel Ferrer, ed., *Peace Matters, A Philippine Peace Compendium* (Quezon City: UP CIDS and UP Press, 1997), 21.

8. *Ibid.*, 30-31

Table 1.
Types of Civil-Society Peace Building or Peace Actions

Peace Action	Description
Peace Constituency-Building	Advocacy work, campaigns, organizing, networking, peace education, interfaith dialogues and other activities aimed at promoting a peace agenda, and/or a culture of peace, and organizing constituencies united or mobilized along these goals.
Conflict-Reduction Efforts	Activities aimed at deescalating the level of political violence and addressing the negative impact of violence on affected communities and individuals in order to enhance the conditions for sustainable peace, seek respite from violence, receive justice and reparation for human-rights violations, and heal the wounds of war inflicted on war-torn communities.
Conflict-Settlement	Activities geared at achieving a nonmilitary solution to the major armed conflicts, including facilitating, mediating, and advocating political negotiations and meaningful reconciliation.
Peace Research & Training Programs	Research efforts and studies on the impact of war, peace, conflict resolution, etc., and training in skills important to peace building, thereby supporting and building capacities for peace action.
Social Development Work	Economic, livelihood/development, environmental projects and implementation of actual social and economic reforms aimed at reconstruction and bringing about social redistribution of wealth, popular empowerment, and sustainable development.

Peace constituency building. The deepening and broadening of the peace constituency stem from the acknowledged need to expand reach and influence in order to have an impact on both state and rebel policy, and on the situation on the ground where the people affected by the conflict live. Such a broad peace constituency is crucial to generating the national consensus on the needed reforms and the desirable process of achieving peace by way of peace, so as to gradually reconstruct society, mend the social fabric torn by protracted conflict, and bring about sustainable development and governance reforms. Activities in building peace constituencies include campaigns, forums, organizing, and coalition building.

Since the late 1980s, more and more peace groups and peace programs have sprouted, especially in Mindanao. They have supported relief and reconstruction initiatives to help communities recover from the impact of armed conflict and regain control over their lives. A "tri-people" agenda promoted by concerned groups ensures that indigenous communities are able to assert their rights over their ancestral domain and protect their ways of life alongside Muslims and Christian settler communities. Other groups promote the participation and welfare of the Bangsamoro civil society, the youth and women. Former MNLF communities, on the other hand, formed peace-and-development cooperatives to usher in a postconflict phase of reconstruction, which also saw MNLF combatants being integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

and the police force as part of the terms of the 1996 Peace Agreement. Christian and Muslim religious organizations such as the Bishops-Ulama Forum conduct interfaith dialogues to promote interreligious harmony and erase biases among and between religious communities.

Significantly, war-affected communities on their own have taken steps to stop the violence and sustain peace in their neighborhoods. A good example of such initiatives is the creation of "peace zones." Peace zones are community-based initiatives to stop and prevent violence, and to gradually restore and enhance peace in the community. The peace zones were usually formed in response to an upsurge of traumatic violence. In Sagada, Mt. Province, these were the 1988 killing of two children by drunken soldiers in the town center followed by the death of a pupil in an attack waged by the New People's Army (NPA) on AFP soldiers encamped on the grounds of the town's public high school. The formation of the Tinoc Peace Zone in Ifugao Province was precipitated by the NPA raid on the municipality's arms cache. The Cantomanyog Peace Zone in Negros Occidental was put up by people returning to their communities after forcible evacuation resulting from the AFP's "Operation Thunderbolt" in 1989. With the help of the parish priest, the community firmly resolved to return to their community. To ensure their safety, they called on the AFP and the NPA to respect their decision.

Peace Zone in the Coalition for Peace primer is defined as "a geographic area within which war and any other forms of armed hostility may no longer be waged, and where peace-building programs will address roots and manifestations of the conflict in the community."⁹

Peace zones rely largely on moral persuasion to impose their declaration and the strength of their community organization to be able to negotiate with the parties in conflict. Over time, they assumed names like demilitarized zone (DMZ), *matagoa-ni* (or zone of life), ZOPFAN (zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, ZOPAD (zone of peace and development), free zone, neutral zone, spaces for peace, sanctuaries of peace. Community-based peace zone formation includes the following:

1. Precipitating factors such as period or incidents of violence (clashes between government and rebel forces, tribal wars, inter-ethnic conflicts, forced evacuation).
2. Catalysts could include the local community leaders (elders, religious, individuals, local government, local community groups, charismatic individuals) or external groups (NGOs, funding agencies).

9. Reprinted in Ed Garcia and Carolina Hernandez, eds., *Waging Peace in the Philippines. Proceedings of the 1988 International Conference on Conflict Resolution* (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1989), 226-29.

3. Leadership mechanisms could be in the form of peace councils, tribal councils, task forces, or local coalition.
4. Territorial coverage is a defined zone, a village/sitio, barangay, cluster of families or sitios, cities, municipalities.
5. The activities they undertake include *mitigating direct violence* (e.g., calling for/monitoring the ceasefire/peace pact, pullout of armed personnel, ban on firing and/or display of guns, ban on detachments and troop deployment, ban on recruitment into the armed group, providing sanctuary for the wounded and other humanitarian assistance, addressing specific incidents of violence by investigating and extracting accountability); *promoting community processes and participation* through dialogues and various activities, and by enhancing local dispute-resolution mechanisms, promoting respect for customs, traditions and rights, *organizing and building a solid peace constituency*; and *developmental activities* such as promoting/mobilizing relief, rehabilitation, and undertaking community development projects.

From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, more than ten communities have declared peace zones in which no armed groups, state or nonstate, may enter. These early peace zones ranged from sitio, and barangay to towns or cities. The citywide Naga Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality was declared in 1988 as the first peace zone. Although not the actual battleground, armed encounters in the city's suburbs and the spate of NPA bombings on bridges and main roads in Bicol during those years caused uneasiness in the urban populace. Most of these first-wave peace zones are in areas directly affected by the conflict between the government and the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA) such as in Mt. Province, Kalinga, Abra, Bicol, Negros Occidental, and North Cotabato. Some of these were declared during the Ramos administration as Special Development Areas and were given development funds, which in some areas produced conflict within the organization.

Table 2.
First Wave of Community Peace Zones (1988-1994)

Peace Zone	Date Founded/ Declared	Coverage
Naga Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality	September 1988	City in Camarines Sur Province (Bicol Region)
Sagada Demilitarized Zone	November 1988	Municipality in Mt. Province in Northern Luzon/Cordillera
Tabuk, Kalinga Matago-an ("Zone of Life")	October 1989	Municipality in the Province of Kalinga in Northern Luzon/Cordillera

Table 2, cont.

Peace Zone	Date Founded/ Declared	Coverage
Cantomanyog Peace Zone	December 1989/ January 1990	Sitio in Barangay Haba, Candoni, Negros Occidental
Tulunán Zone of Life - Bituan Peace Zone - Miatub Peace Zone - Nabundasan Peace Zone - New Alimodian Peace Zone	November 1989	Four barangays in Tulunán, North Cotabato Province, Mindanao
Cadiz City	Late 1980s/ Early 1990s	City in Negros Occidental (short-lived)
Tinoc Peace Zone		12 barangays in the Municipality of Tinoc in Ilugao Province, Northern Luzon (Cordillera)
Tamlang Valley Demilitarized Zone	1991	Tamlang Valley in Negros Oriental
Bangilo, Abra	1993	Gubang tribal community in the Municipality of Bangilo in Abra
Irosin Peace Zone	July 1992	Municipality in Sorsogon Province (Bicol Region)
Barangay Mahaba, Marihatag Peace Zone	January 1994	Barangay in Marihatag Municipality, Surigao del Sur Province, Mindanao

* First wave: mostly in areas affected by the communist insurgency

There has been a new wave of peace-zone building, mostly in areas affected by hostilities between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF. "Sanctuaries of Peace" and "Spaces for Peace" are more recent variations on the peace zone. The aim of stopping and preventing violence and building the infrastructure for peace remains, but the process of their formation may have been different. For example, their formation may have been facilitated by government and other civil society organizations (church, NGO) and not largely by the community acting on its own. Also, there might have been a more realistic attitude on the part of the community that even as armed men (soldiers, rebels) or a degree of militarization remain in their communities, it is possible to start building spaces for peace, beginning with the rehabilitation of the affected populace. The Spaces for Peace were declared by several communities (thirteen sitios in five barangays) in Pikit, North Cotabato, a predominantly Muslim town, with the support of the local parish office, after the 2000 wave of violence. Christian and Muslim communities from other barangays of Pikit also transformed themselves into Spaces for Peace after another round of conflict in 2003.

Sanctuaries of Peace were declared in some fifty-six communities in Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and Lanao del Sur, with the help of Tabang Mindanaw, a coalition of various organizations that have been providing relief and rehabilitation to areas in Mindanao affected by natural and man-made disasters. The process of forming a Sanctuary of Peace begins in evacuation centers through community organizing and education. Once consolidated in the desire to return to their community, a peace declaration is made, followed by negotiations with both national and local defense and army officials of the government as well as the MILF leadership. Upon their return, the community is supported by rehabilitation funds for the reconstruction of their homes and the installation of basic services such as potable water and roads. Tabang Mindanaw calls this approach the "Integrated Return and Rehabilitation Program."

Another cluster of peace zones was put up with the help of the Community Organization Multiversity and funding from foreign governments. These are located in seven barangays in Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, and Sultan Kudarat, in the vicinity of the former MILF Camp Abubakar. In June 2003, these peace zones organized an inter-area alliance called Sindaw Ko Kalilintad (light of peace). Independent "peace zone" building has also taken shape in other places. The peace zone in Barangay Bual, Isulan, Maguindanao, was in response to a Christian-Muslim feud by the community in 1998, and was eventually recognized in a barangay resolution in 2001. Other peace zones have been declared in barangays Dinas, Zamboanga del Sur; and Maladeg, Sultan Gumandar, Lanao del Sur. Each one has its unique circumstances, leadership, and combination of catalysts, as well as size, coverage, and specific conflicts being addressed (tribal wars, tripeople or Moro-migrant hostilities).

Table 3.
Second Wave of Community Peace Zones (2000-2005¹)

Name	Date Founded	Coverage
Clusters (Mindanao)		
Pikit Spaces for Peace (parish-led)	2000 2003	Several communities (13 sitios in 5 barangays including Nalapaan) in Pikit, North Cotabato Bgy. Panicupan, Pikit (Note: currently made up of 7 barangays and collectively called the GINAPALADTAKA Spaces for Peace)
Sanctuaries of Peace (assisted and networked by Tabang Mindanaw)	2002-2003	56 communities spread out in the municipalities of Matanog, Datu Montawali (previously Pagagawan), and Pagalungan in the province of Maguindanao; the municipalities of Kabacan, Matalam, and Carmen in the province of (North) Cotabato; the municipality of Kaptagan in the province of Lanao del Sur

Table 3, cont.

Name	Date Founded	Coverage
Sindaw Ko Kallintad (Light of Peace) – a network of peace zones supported by the CO-Multiversity with assistance from the Canadian government formalized in June 2003	2000-2003	Seven barangays in Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur in the vicinity of the former MILF Camp Abubakar (Barangay Barorao, Balabagan, Lanao del Sur; B. Daguan, Kapatagan, Lanao del Sur; Bgy. Makir, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao; Silito Cagarawan, Bgy. Tugaig, Barira, Maguindanao; Bgy. Mataya, Buldon, Maguindanao; Bgy. Bayanga Norte, Matanog, Maguindanao; and Bgy. Chua, Bagumbayan, Sultan Kudarat.)
Solo Variations (Mindanao)		
Bgy. Maladeg, Sultan Gumander, Lanao del Sur Peace Zone	1998	1 sq. km. zone in Bgy. Maladeg, Sultan Gumander, Lanao del Sur, led by Bob Anton. Expanded later to include Liyangan, Pindulunan, Turayas, Sambayanan, Malico, Malalis, Mapialupa, Bolocaon, and Kaludan for a total of 15 sq. km. zone.
Bgy. Lipas, President Roxas, North Cotabato	March 2000	A peace agreement between Manobo and Moros in the barangay formed with the assistance of the Tribal Filipino Apostolate of the Diocese of Kidawapan and maintained by a peace council called Task Force Kallintad.
Bgy. Bual, Isulan, Maguindanao Peace Zone	2001	Bgy. Bual, Isulan, Maguindanao (passed by a barangay resolution)
Bgy. Dinas, Zamboanga del Sur Peace Zone		Bgy. Dinas, Zamboanga del Sur
Jolo Peace Zone	December 2004	Jolo town, Sulu province
Outside Mindanao		
Mountain Province Peace Zone Cluster	November 2003	Municipalities of Sabangan, Bauko, Tadi-an, Sadanga, Besao and Bontoc and the Sagada peace zone, in Mountain Province
Infanta and General Nakar Zone of Peace, Freedom and Development (ZOPFAD)	September 2004	Infanta and Gen. Nakar towns, Quezon Province
Benguet and Baguio Malago-an ("Zone of Life")	February 20, 2005	Municipality of Benguet and Baguio City; declared by elders of the Guina-ang and Lubuagan tribes of Kainga in Baguio City as peace zone areas among tribal members
Baras Peace Zone		Two barangays on Negros Island: Bgy. Bantayan in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental; and Bgy. Baras in Dacu, Negros Oriental

* Second wave: mostly in areas affected by the Moro insurgencies

Peace zones whose constituency and mechanisms were declared by local government officials, instead of the community and their other supporters from civil society, were not sustained. In any case, local government and AFP support for community-initiated peace zones—support for the suspension of fighting being more tenable if confined to small spaces—was also important for the functioning of the peace zones.

Peace education is an important part of peace-constituency building. An increasing number of schools are initiating awareness-development programs on the values of peace and social responsibility. At least eight schools have declared themselves “peace zones.” School activities have included ceremonial burial/burning of war toys, the creation of peace gardens, peacemaking trainings, setting up of a “reconciliation tent” in school as an exercise in conflict management and resolution, public protests against violence in television, candlelight vigils for peace (during the Gulf War), and community-oriented dialogues with soldiers and police.

Table 4.
Schools that Have Been Declared as “Peace Zones” in the Early 1990s

Peace Zone	Coverage
Miriam College	School in Quezon City, Metro Manila
Jose Abad Santos Memorial School	School in Quezon City, Metro Manila
Polytechnic University of the Philippines	University in Manila
Assumption College in San Lorenzo	College in Makati City
Ateneo de Manila University	University in Quezon City
Quezon City Science High School	Public school in Quezon City
St. Scholastica's College Grade School	Grade school in Manila
Saint Bridget's College	College in Quezon City
San Beda College	College in Manila
Colegio de Sta. Isabel	College in Naga City, Camarines Sur
Naga Parochial School	School in Naga City, Camarines Sur

Conflict-reduction efforts. In the Philippine situation of protracted peace process and continuing conflict, some peace CSOs focus on mitigating the violence and its impact on the communities. War weighs heavily on civilians, especially in nonconventional warfare where enemy lines are not clear and civilians are not easily distinguished from combatants. Peace groups have thus campaigned hard for the observance of human rights (e.g., rights against arbitrary arrests, torture, execution) and international humanitarian law principles in the conduct of war (e.g., stopping forced evacuations, pillage, and the use of child soldiers and landmines). They have urged armed parties to cease hostilities through unilateral cease-fire declarations or bilateral agreements. They have mobilized and provided (physical, psychosocial, and material) relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance to war-torn communities.

Bantay Cease-fire is an example of a citizens' initiative aimed at stopping direct violence. It actively ensures that the cease-fire between the GRP and the MILF will be sustained. Many of the Mindanao peace groups provide the backbone of the Bantay Cease-fire, which supplements the work of the GRP-MILF Joint Monitoring Committees and the provincial Local Monitoring Teams. The Bantay Cease-fire organized four missions in 2003. Its findings and recommendations were submitted to the GRP-MILF Joint Monitoring Committee. They have contributed significantly to the sustenance of the cease-fire agreement in the affected areas of Mindanao. A newer, similar initiative is the Sulong CARHRIHL (Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law), which seeks to promote compliance to the Agreement by both the government and the National Democratic Front (NDF).

A number of NGOs and campaign groups are linking gender, human rights, children's rights, disarmament, environment, foreign policy, education and social reform issues to the peace process. The Philippine Coalition Against the Use of Child Soldiers has been formed to campaign against the recruitment of children in armed forces. The Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines engages both the government and the different rebel groups to stop using antipersonnel mines. The Philippine Action Network on Small Arms campaigns against the proliferation of small arms.

Conflict settlement. To achieve the specific goal of achieving a peaceful settlement of the conflicts, political negotiations between the government and the different armed groups are under way. Peace coalitions have put pressure on all parties to the conflict to stay on the negotiation track, and to sustain the process through confidence-building measures and firmer commitment to the peace process. This way, civil-society groups act as "third party" to the conflicts. They accompany the two parties in their negotiations and serve as watchdog, critic, provider of alternatives, or cooperator, as the case may be. They intervene in defining the negotiation agenda to safeguard the interest of all stakeholders. (See section on Political Negotiations for details of the peace talks with the different armed groups.)

Coalitions and networks correspond to what has been called the "network of effective actors" or a "collection of representative actors from the political, social and structural fields concerned with peace building in a specific conflict, whose purposes are to enhance effectiveness through fostering a holistic approach to peace building and to foster the development of new 'theories of action' that necessitate collaboration."¹⁰ The primary function of such a network is "to supplement the limited theory of action of any one organization by fostering opportunities for diverse organizations to learn from one another, bring different information for planning and analysis and thus expand the range of possible actions that can be taken to advance peace building."¹¹ They have also been

10. Robert Ricigliano, "The Need for Networks of Effective Action to Promote More Effective Peace-Building," *Toward Better Peace-Building Practice, On Lessons Learned, Evaluation Practices and Aid and Conflict*, ed. Galama Annske and Paul van Tongeren (Utrecht, The Netherlands: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2002), 216-17.

11. *Ibid.*

referred to as “unofficial supplements to negotiation” or those among the broader population who comprise the civil society in the country in conflict; are normally not part of the negotiation process and yet part of the conflict and its potential solution; include organizations, groups (religious institutions, business and labor interests, peace groups) and individuals who have their own processes, communication channels and expertise of which negotiators can avail themselves; and can function as supports for, or alternatives to, the talks process itself.¹²

Among the first peace coalitions in the country was the Coalition for Peace (CFP), set up by leaders of twenty-two Metro Manila-based organizations from several ideological formations in December 1986 shortly before talks between the NDF and the Aquino administration broke down. The CFP aimed to serve as a vehicle of citizen participation in the peace process. The CFP co-organized the National Peace Conference (NPC) in October 1990, which issued a seven-point National Peace Agenda that was presented to the GRP and the NDF. The NPC participated in government-initiated national consultations, which resulted in the 1993 Social Pact for Empowered Economic Development and the 1995 Social Reform Agenda.

Coalitions at the provincial level like the Hearts of Peace (HOPE) in Bicol, Paghilusa sa Paghidaet in Negros Occidental, the Peace Advocates Zamboanga (PAZ), and the Cordillera Peace Forum address pressing concerns, sustain peace initiatives within the community, and link up with national efforts. Their respective memberships are drawn from the active and politicized sectors of the community and are expanded to include a broader range of community people and existing institutions in the locality (NGOs, academe, religious institutions, and community organizations).

In Mindanao, various coalitions have sprung up in the last two decades. Recently, these have converged into an even larger umbrella called the Mindanao Peaceweavers. Organized in 2003 and publicly launched in October 2004, the Mindanao Peaceweavers brought together eight peace networks, namely, Agung Network, Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society, Mindanao Peace Advocates' Conference, Mindanao People's Caucus, Mindanao People's Peace Movement, Community and Family Services International, the Metro Manila-based Mindanao Solidarity Network, and the Zamboanga-based Interreligious Solidarity Movement for Peace. It aims to promote people's participation in the peace process, undertakes campaigns and dialogues, and lobby for peace and development in Mindanao.

Third-party intervention at the regional or national level is more directly attuned to the dynamics of the official political negotiations but are supplemented by similar, perhaps more informal, third-party mediation that takes place at the lower levels. Religious leaders and diocesan social action centers in the provinces play active citizen-mediation roles. Bishops and priests in conflict-affected areas are asked to facilitate the release of rebel or government soldiers or officers taken into custody by the other party, or to allow the safe passage of people

12. Peter Harris and Ben Rilly, *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators* (Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998), 110-12.

retrieving bodies and/or personal belongings of dead combatants. In the Cordillera, the traditional *bodong* (peace pact) associations and the councils of tribal elders have also performed citizen-mediation roles. Notable among these indigenous leadership formations are the Kalungaya elders in Tinoc and the Kalinga Bodong Council composed of tribal peace-pact holders. The *bodong* is an indigenous conflict resolution mechanism to settle tribal conflicts. It has been transformed to also address the presence of armed conflict between the state and antistate forces. Peace-zone communities also operate as mediating bodies engaging both the state and the rebel groups. Mediating bodies include the barrio peace councils, municipal peace committee and liaison team put up, for example, in the Sagada peace zone, and the interpeace zone committee in the Bituan Zone of Life.

Peace research and training. The attainment of peace is a goal that requires continuing research and training of practical and analytical value. Database building, descriptive and comparative analyses of local and foreign experiences, and theorizing on peace and the ways to peace—all these guide everyday action and contribute to the world body of knowledge and learning essential to national and global peace. Trainings equip leaders, activists, government workers, and community residents with skills needed in conflict prevention, management, resolution, and transformation. In the last two decades, several research and training institutes and programs have evolved to undertake these goals.

Social development work. Developmental work, reconstruction of communities, and provision of alternative livelihood projects are increasingly being integrated as part of peace building, especially in areas affected by the conflict. They involve activities beyond provision of relief or temporary shelter to displaced communities toward generating greater self-reliance and more sustainable livelihoods. They contribute to the more strategic need to address the economic roots of the armed conflict.

Impact of civil-society peace building

Civil society input to government policy making has brought about laudable policy frameworks such as the “Six Paths to Peace” and the “Social Reform Agenda,” and noteworthy legislation such as those creating the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) and the National Indigenous Peoples Commission (NIPC). With pressure put to bear by the peace coalitions, the negotiation track between the government and the different rebel groups has been pursued. They have sustained the high visibility of the peace process in the national consciousness, including at the level of government policy and the mass media. In terms of representation, lobby work undertaken by peace advocates has put women and indigenous peoples in the government negotiating panels. Specific concerns like the release of political prisoners (held by both sides) were also effected with civil-society pressure.

The high human, financial, and environmental costs of continuing conflict have inspired more and a variety of initiatives in the last decade. More schools are introducing peace education in their curricula and universities are instituting peace research centers. The Peace Education Network (PEN) provides an umbrella for teachers and NGO workers interested in advancing peace education and conflict-resolution skills. Miriam College's Center for Peace Education serves as its secretariat. PEN has members in different universities and they include organizations like Pax Christi, Aksiyon para sa Kapayapaan at Katarungan (AKKAPKA), and the Children for Peace. In Mindanao, the pioneers in peace education include the Zamboanga-based Silsilah, Cotabato-based Notre Dame University, Ateneo de Davao and de Zamboanga, and the Mindanao State University campuses in Marawi, Iligan and General Santos, and the Western Mindanao State University in Zamboanga. All these universities have their peace or intercultural studies centers. The Catholic Relief Services conducts annual training on peace and conflict resolution in Mindanao.

Psychosocial trauma services and programs are being made more available to survivors of the armed conflicts, with the Balay Rehabilitation Center, the defunct Children's Resource Center, and the University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS) Program on Psychosocial Trauma as the pioneers in the field. Many diocesan organizations and NGOs have incorporated these services in their programs.

However, continuing governance problems cited in the previous section did not bring about the thorough reforms demanded by a comprehensive peace agenda. Also, policy making remains the domain of the powerful; it is a process that is not only affected or determined by inputs or interventions from civil society, which may in fact be the weakest factor in some cases.

Even as national policy and reform implementation remain problematic, peace-building efforts directed at addressing the needs of the people on the ground where the conflict takes place have been significant and essential. Campaigns have supported the holding and maintenance of cease-fires. Human-rights violations were mitigated and addressed through advocacy and fact-finding and relief missions. NGO and church intervention efforts along the lines of psychosocial rehabilitation have helped restore a measure of peace needed to start the rebuilding of lives and communities. Gains in specific communities include improvements in health, sanitation, and housing conditions; educational services and facilities, and the healing of wounds and the bridging of divides (e.g., Christian-Muslim-lumad relations in Pikit, Cotabato). Consequently, the empowered communities themselves are taking a proactive role in conflict prevention and peace building, and have enhanced their own capacity to respond to human-rights violations and emergencies.

Peace building is long-term norm transformation and norm building. Indicators of positive changes in norms (as reflected in perceptions, attitudes, behaviors)

on the part of government and armed groups include a perceived greater consciousness on the part of the contending parties to respect and observe human rights and international humanitarian law over and above their military objectives. However, these are just incremental changes in some areas. On the whole, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law continue.

While still an uphill climb there is a growing active peace constituencies indicated by : 1) the increasing number of peace organizations being formed, 2) the generation of more peace advocates and more awareness of people of their human rights and concern for justice and peace issues, and 3) growing interest in peace studies in the academe.

Political Negotiations

Political negotiations or peace talks are aimed at conflict resolution. They have a higher potential for success when the motivational orientation between the contending parties is transformed from competitive (the party desires to do better than the other and as well as it can for itself) or individualistic (the party is concerned with doing well for itself and is not concerned about the welfare of the other) to cooperative (the party has a positive interest in the welfare of the other as well as its own).¹³

Political negotiations or peace talks are aimed at conflict resolution, which has been defined as "a state of affairs wherein the contending parties voluntarily find a satisfactory way of regulating basic disagreements so that military confrontation becomes unnatural and mutual recognition of each other's existence ensues."¹⁴

Since 1986, the Philippine government has engaged the following armed opposition groups in political negotiations:

- the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) which represents allied organizations, notably the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People's Army (NPA)
- the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA) led by former NPA rebel Conrado Balweg, the Cordillera Bodong Administration (CBAd), and the Montañosa National Solidarity (MNS)
- the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), with its military arm, the Bangsamoro Army
- the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, with its army, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF)

13. Morton Deutsch, "Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social and Cultural Influences," in *New Directions in Conflict Theory, Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*, ed. Raimo Vayrynen (London, California, New Delhi: Sage Publications and the International Social Science Council, 1991), 39-40.

14. Peter Wallensteen, "Theory and Perspective of Conflict Resolution: An International Perspective," in Garcia and Hernandez, *ibid.*, 46.

- the combined group of military rebel organizations, namely, the Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa (RAM), Soldiers of the Filipino People (SFP), and the Young Officers Union (YOU)
- the military rebel group loyal to deposed president Ferdinand Marcos, called the Alyansang Tapat sa Sambayanan (ALTAS)
- the breakaway group from the CPP, the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas (RPM-P)/Revolutionary Proletarian Army (RPA)/ Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB), which later divided into the RPM-P and the RPM-Mindanao.

The outcomes of these negotiations

An important mechanism used by the government for consensus-building was the NUC (National Unification Commission) nationwide consultations, which produced a significant document popularly called the "Six Paths to Peace." This document effectively stands as the framework of the GRP's peace policy, although different administrations manifested different appreciation for its elements and had different priorities.

The "Six Paths to Peace" defined the elements of the comprehensive peace process as: 1) the pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms; 2) consensus building and empowerment for peace; 3) peaceful negotiated settlement with different rebel groups; 4) programs for reconciliation; 5) addressing concerns arising from the continuing hostilities; and 6) building and nurturing a climate conducive to peace. (See NUC Report and Executive Order 125 signed by President Fidel Ramos on September 15, 1993.)

The government bodies tasked with overseeing the different aspects of the process are:

- Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) – the main office which supervises and manages the comprehensive peace process, including providing secretariat support to the government negotiating panels. The Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process enjoys Cabinet rank. (See www.opapp.gov.ph.)
- Government Negotiating Panels – members are appointed by the president and some have included civil-society representatives. A negotiating panel for each of the armed groups has been formed, and membership has changed from one administration to another. Government panels are provided technical support by OPAPP and various technical working committees made up of consultants and experts from different government agencies. They also institute the formation of joint committees that operate with counterparts of the other party. Examples are the Joint Reciprocal Working Committees tasked with drafting the four sets of agreements with the NDF (human

rights and international humanitarian law, social and economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms, and cessation of hostilities), and the Joint Monitoring Committee that supervises the GRP-MILF cease-fire agreement.

- National Reconciliation and Development Council – manages the reconciliation programs for rebels opting to return to the mainstream. Their services include the Balik-Baril Program where guns are exchanged for a fee, and livelihood assistance programs to rebel returnees.
- National Amnesty Commission – created in July 1994, it receives and processes applications for amnesty.
- National Anti-Poverty Commission – coordinating agency of the national government created by Republic Act 8425 to formulate and enforce policies and programs for social reform and poverty alleviation, notably the Social Reform Agenda that resulted from government-civil society meetings held during the Ramos administration.

Trends and assessment of the political negotiations

Efforts to achieve peaceful settlements of the armed conflicts during the Aquino administration did not prosper because of the overall instability during this period. The military establishment and the US did not support the negotiations with the NDF. The unprecedented peace talks were cut abruptly after eighteen peasant-protesters near Malacañang Palace were killed in January 1987. The first GRP-NDF sixty-day cease-fire lapsed the next month and fighting resumed, with massive human rights violations reported in the next three years. During the same period, the promised autonomy to the MNLF and the CPLA entered the legislative process. The new constitution required the drafting of Organic Acts for the autonomous regions in Mindanao and the Cordillera, which were to be ratified by affected provinces in a plebiscite. Both the CPLA and the MNLF were dissatisfied with the new laws and the outcome that delimited the territorial scope of autonomy.

The relative stability during the Ramos administration and its defined “peace and development thrust” resulted in the major agreements with the military rebels and the MNLF (see table 5). The military rebels settled down upon reintegration in the service or to private life. But the “Oakwood Mutiny” of July 2004 indicated that the problems of politicization, corruption, and adventurism in the AFP require deeper reforms. The GRP-MNLF Agreement forged in 1996, although resisted by many Mindanao-based non-Muslim politicians and their constituents, ushered in a wave of foreign-funded development projects, and transformed Misuari and the MNLF from government enemy to a partner in development and governance, enjoying the patronage of the ruling party. However, Misuari’s poor leadership as administrator and governor-elect did not endear him to succeeding

administrations who courted other sections in the MNLF leadership. The MNLF leadership broke into the pro-Misuari loyalists and the new Council of 15, with the former joining Misuari's short-lived rebellion, and the latter supported by the Arroyo administration for leadership of the newly constituted Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 2001.

Formal negotiations with the MILF began during the Ramos administration. The first GRP-MILF cease-fire agreement was forged in 1997. Three items on the negotiating agenda were set: cessation of hostilities, rehabilitation, and ancestral domain. Negotiations were disrupted under the Estrada administration when the AFP, wary of granting recognition to MILF camps, launched major offensives in 2000. The same policy of talking-while-fighting took place when the Arroyo administration assumed office in late January 2001. Fresh rounds of promising negotiations, including the signing of the 2001 Tripoli Peace Agreement, were replaced by war offensives directed at MILF strongholds in February 2003, again resulting in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of families, destruction of property in pursuit of military goals by both camps, and disruption of development programs instituted after the 1996 peace agreement with the MNLF. In 2004 the negotiation track was resumed, and the mechanisms for the cease-fire (the Coordinating Committee for Cessation of Hostilities and the Local Monitoring Teams) were strengthened. Cooperative reconstruction efforts were also undertaken between the MILF-initiated NGO—the Bangsamoro Development Agency—and government counterparts.

The framework for the GRP-NDF negotiations was laid out in the Hague Declaration issued by both parties in The Netherlands in September 1992. The joint communiqué outlined four substantive items to guide future negotiations: human rights and international humanitarian law; social and economic reforms; political and constitutional reforms; and end of hostilities and disposition of forces. In 1995, the Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) and the Joint Agreement on Formation, Sequence and Operationalization of the Reciprocal Working Committees (JARWOC) were forged. The JASIG provides mechanisms to guarantee the safety of NDF negotiators and staff, while the JARWOC provided for the sequential process of reaching agreements on the four defined items on the agenda, and the creation of the needed mechanisms. In 1998, the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) was finally signed.

GRP-NDF negotiations have been incremental in progress. The government remains wary of any agreement's implication on its sovereign powers while the NDF asserts recognition of its political authority. The NDF also emphasizes the issue of foreign domination of the economy and politics of the country as a root cause, and its alternative vision is fundamentally incompatible with that of the government. The government's attempt in 2002-2003 to hasten the process with a single comprehensive agreement, instead of the previously agreed-upon

series of agreements was resisted by the NDF. With the active facilitation of the Government of Norway, a breakthrough was achieved in 2004. The mechanisms for the implementation of the CARHRIHL were put into effect with the formation of the two parties' respective Monitoring Committees and Secretariats, and the issuance of guidelines for the functioning of the Joint Monitoring Committee. Meanwhile, both parties have issued their respective draft Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms, and are starting work on the next set of political and constitutional reforms. Formal negotiations remained suspended over the inclusion of the NPA and CPP founder Jose Ma. Sison on the US and EU list of terrorists/terrorist organizations, and the government's suspension of the JASIG in September 2005.

The GRP-RPMP/RPA/ABB agreement, which was signed shortly before the collapse of the Estrada administration, drew controversy from peace groups in Negros Occidental who objected to the deputization of RPA combatants and their suspected dealings with local political elites. For most parts, the reintegration and development objectives of the agreement are being put in place, both in the case of the RPMP and the RPMM. The RPMs and the CPP continue to engage in gun battles over control of territory and influence.

To conclude, advance and retreat characterize the government's peace policy. At other times the government has been described as fighting with the right hand and talking with the left. For the most part, government has vacillated from one approach to another, producing inconclusive results and discontinuities. Oquist identified three such competing policy positions in government: pacification (an end to hostilities and demobilization of insurgent groups with only a few concessions made by government), victory (to defeat or marginalize the rebel groups militarily), and institutional (construction of policies and institutions for peace in all aspects through consultative and participatory mechanisms).¹⁵ The overall effect is that the political negotiations have suffered from lack of continuity due to differing appreciation and conflicting policies from one administration to another, or shifts in thrusts depending on priority political interests of the moment.

The global context defined within the parameters of the US-led war on "terrorism" has also interfered with local dynamics, threatening to put the local conflicts under this overarching ambit and confrontational approach, and also leading to renewed US military presence in different parts of the country, under the legal framework of the US-RP Agreement on "joint military exercises." Government also has to secure full consensus within its ranks on a preference for the peace-over-war strategy, given the deep inculcation of a national security framework that has been directed against internal "enemies of the state," and military corporate interests that are sustained by war (for example, bigger budgets and US foreign assistance for the AFP and rank promotion from war exploits). Local government officials and the general

15. Paul Oquist, "Mindanao and Beyond: Competing Policies, Protected Conflict and Human Security" (Fifth Assessment Report, Multi-Donor Group Support for Peace and Development in Mindanao, September 2002).

public are also divided on whether peace can best be achieved through war or peace. Insurgent leaderships, meanwhile, remain wary of being coopted or “divided and ruled.” The NDF, in particular, sees the peace initiatives as only secondary or complementary to the more strategic goal of attaining total victory through a protracted people’s war.

Also, certain conflictive issues have time and again bedeviled the talks. In the GRP-NDF negotiations, these include issues like the arrest of CPP cadres, the CPP assassination of political figures and, more recently, the inclusion of the NPA and Sison on the US list of terrorists. In the MILF talks, irritants include the occupation of the military of former MILF camps, the filing of murder charges against the MILF leadership, and the alleged coddling of criminal and foreign Islamic extremist groups by the MILF. These issues, while reflective of the complexity of the negotiation process and the nature of the conflicts themselves, have clouded the more fundamental goal of achieving consensus on substantial reforms and workable mechanisms to nurture a more cooperative relationship committed to instituting meaningful representation and participation of all parties in social transformation.

Overview of Signed Agreements. The Philippine government forged conclusive agreements with the CPLA in 1986, the RAM-SFP-YOU in 1995, the MNLF in 1996, and the RPMP/RPA/ABB in 2001. Initial agreements have been forged with the MILF and the NDF.

Table 5 describes the contents of the conclusive agreements and key developments that took place after the agreements were signed.

The agreements dealt with significant aspects of reintegration in mainstream society, notably the provision of rehabilitation assistance and special development programs, return to government service in the case of the military/police rebels, or integration into the AFP/PNP in the case of a select number of MNLF combatants. The economic development aspects were addressed through different mechanisms, such as the creation of the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) for the MNLF or a development fund in the case of the RPMP/ABB/RPA. On the political aspects, regional autonomy through the two-phased process was again guaranteed the Moros, and transitory mechanisms were put up for the future Cordillera autonomous government (see chapters on the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera Autonomous Region for fuller assessments). Specific political demands like amnesty for military rebels and release of political prisoners for the breakaway communist group were also granted.

As of September 2004, several preliminary but no conclusive agreements have been reached with the other groups. Table 6 lists and describes the major preliminary agreements and key developments that have taken place since the signing.

Table 5.
Concluded Agreements between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Rebel Groups

Agreement	Contents	Post-Agreement Key Developments
GRP-CPLA/CBA/JMNS	<p>November 1986 agreements</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ceasefire between the CPLA and the AFP - cancellation of the Chico River Dam and Cellophil Resources projects - exploration of regional autonomy 	<p>President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) 220 creating an Interim Cordillera Regional Autonomy and a transitory structure called the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). Its implementation was delayed until late 1987. Several suits were filed in the Supreme Court to nullify EO 220. A Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission was then constituted to draft a law to create the Autonomous Region in the Cordillera but this was met with controversy over membership selection. Congress passed RA 6766 or the Organic Act creating the Autonomous Region. In the 1990 referendum, only in Ifugao province was there a majority vote in favor of inclusion. Thus the Autonomous Region could not be constituted. RA 8848 introduced amendments to the Organic Act. In 1988, another referendum was held. Again, only one province, Kalinga, voted for inclusion. Only the CAR is currently in place. Its operation has been greatly hampered by subsequent major budget cuts.</p>
GRP-ALTAS Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Aiyansang Tapat sa Sambayanan in the matter of the disposition of ALTAS forces	<p>Art. 1 - Cessation of Hostilities. Both parties agree to cease hostilities and endeavor to strengthen peace and working relations between them.</p> <p>Art. 2 - Equipment and Weapons Retrieval. The Second Party shall turn over all equipment, firearms, ammunitions and explosives in their possession.</p> <p>Art. 3 - Amnesty. Members of the Second Party in annexed certified list shall be given a general and unconditional amnesty for crimes committed in pursuit of political beliefs from February 26, 1986, to April 30, 1994.</p>	<p>Since the forging of the Agreement and implementation of its provisions, no major controversy has erupted. ALTAS leaders and personnel have effectively been mainstreamed in Philippine society, and ALTAS became moribund. However, during the Macapagal Arroyo administration, some of its leaders were implicated in alleged coup attempts.</p>

Table 5, cont.

Agreement	Contents	Post-Agreement Key Developments
<p>- Signed on May 29, 1985, by former ambassador Fortunato U. Abat (GRP panel chair) and BGen. Jose Ma. Carlos Zumei (ALYAS panel chair) with Hon. Manuel Yan (PAPP) attesting</p>	<p>Art. 4 – Disposition of Police and Military Personnel. A Committee of four persons coming from the two parties shall review individual cases and recommend reinstatement, retirement or separation from military service.</p> <p>Art. 5 – Government Assistance. First Party shall extend support and material help to members of the Second Party.</p> <p>Art. 6 – Continuation of Talks. Respective negotiating panels shall continue to meet as necessary to discuss "issues of Grave Concern" identified by the Second Party. These issues are the establishment of "an efficient and honest government; constitutional amendment; equal administration of justice; unconditional return of the remains of the late President Ferdinand Marcos; comprehensive agrarian reform program; energy program; institution of genuine reforms in the AFP; proposed strategy for countryside development; relevance of the Board of Investments; deregulation of the transportation and communication industries to improve services and lower costs of goods; more benefits to GSIS/SSS members; and election by the entire membership of the board of financing institutions such as the GSIS, SSS, RSBS, MBAI and the AFP/SLAI, to safeguard members' interest.</p>	
<p>GRP-RAM/SFP/YOU General Agreement for Peace between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa / Soldiers of the Filipino People / Young Officers</p>	<p>Art. 1 – Cessation of hostilities. Both parties shall cease hostilities, and strengthen mutual respect and commitment to peaceful democratic processes.</p> <p>Art. 2 – National reforms. Both parties shall jointly and within legal bounds implement national reforms in the areas of electoral reforms, good government, national economic development, social justice and national defense and security.</p> <p>Art. 3 – Disposition of Weapons. Second party shall turnover within 90 days all weapons, armaments, munitions, equipment and other material which they are not allowed lawfully to possess, to the Adhoc Committee on</p>	<p>RAM leader Gregorio Honasan was elected to the Senate. Other RAM members have gone back to military service or private life, some have subsequently been appointed to other government posts.</p> <p>In July 2003, several young military officers, mostly Philippine Military Academy graduates staged a mutiny at the Oakwood Mansions in</p>

Table 5, cont.

Agreement	Contents	Post-Agreement Key Developments
<p>Union - Signed on October 13, 1985, by the GRP panel chair and members, namely, Fortunato U. Abat, Jose Rollo Golez, Candido Junio, Jose Percival Andion, and Alfredo Filler; and the RAM-SFP-YOU panel chair and members, namely, Edgardo Abenina, Proceso Maligalig, Billy Bibit, Danilo Lim, and Zosimo Jesus Paredes, Jr.</p>	<p>Weapons and Material Disposition made up of representatives from the two parties.</p> <p>Art. 4 - Amnesty. Members and supporters of the Second Party in the submitted list shall be granted general and unconditional amnesty for all offenses committed in pursuit of political beliefs from February 22, 1986, to the signing date, except crimes against chastity and other crimes committed for personal ends.</p> <p>Art. 5 - Disposition of Personnel. An Adhoc Committee on Personnel Disposition shall review individual cases to determine retention, reinstatement, reintegration/reentry, retirement, or separation from the service of the concerned military, police, or civilian personnel.</p> <p>Art. 6 - Assistance. The First Party shall extend livelihood support, material and technical assistance to the amnestied members and supporters of the Second Party.</p>	<p>Makati. Coup leaders are in jail awaiting court martial proceedings. Senator Honasan, implicated in the mutiny, went into hiding for a few months. He ran and lost in the 2004 senatorial election. He was again implicated in the alleged coup attempt against the Macapagal-Arroyo administration in February 2006, along with Danilo Lim, who was in active service.</p>
<p>GRP-MNLF The Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference - Signed on September 2, 1996, by former</p>	<p>Two implementation phases: Three-year Transitional Phase (Phase 1) - A Special Zone for Peace and Development in Southern Philippines (SZOPAD) will be set up and be the locus of intensive peace and development efforts. It will cover the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, Zamboanga del Sur and del Norte, North and South Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte and del Sur, Davao del Sur, Sarangani, and Palawan; and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Zamboanga, and Puerto Princesa. A Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) will be established to monitor, promote and coordinate the development efforts in these areas, in coordination with local governments, the regional government (ARMM) and relevant government agencies. A Consultative Assembly composed of the SPCPD chair, officials</p>	<p>The SZOPAD, SPCPD and Consultative Assembly were established by virtue of EO 371 (issued October 2, 1996), with Nur Misuari as SPCPD chair. Misuari was supported by the LAKAS-NUCD administration party in the ARMM election, and he served concurrently as SPCPD chair and ARMM governor until 2001.</p> <p>In 1999, the amendment to RA 6734 was passed by Congress as RA 9054. It was ratified in August 2001, with five provinces and one city endorsing inclusion in the new ARMM (Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Basilan, and Marawi City).</p>

Table 5. cont.

Agreement	Contents	Post-Agreement Key Developments
<p>ambassador Manuel T. Yan (GRP panel chair), and MNLF chair Nur Misuari (MNLF panel chair), with Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas and AIC secretary-general Hamid Al-Gabid as witnesses.</p>	<p>of the ARMM and local governments, representatives of the MNLF and various sectors shall be set up to serve as a forum for ventilation of issues and concerns. The Joint Monitoring Committee with the OIC shall continue to meet and monitor the process. A program will allow the integration of 5,750 MNLF members into the AFP, and 1,500 others into the PNP.</p> <p><u>The New Regional Autonomous Government (Phase 2)</u> – a law amending or repealing RA 6734 (Organic Act of ARMM) shall be passed with the GRP recommending enhanced provisions on the nature and powers of the Executive Council and Legislative Assembly; Muslim representation in national bodies; the establishment of a Special Regional Security Forces for the Autonomous Region; and other provisions pertaining to education, the economic and financial system, mines and minerals, and the shari'ah and judiciary.</p>	<p>In November 2001, Misuari MNLF loyalist forces staged an armed revolt in Zamboanga, Sulu, and Cotabato City, causing deaths to 100 people and injuries to more. Misuari escaped to Malaysia, was captured and sent back to the county in January 2002. He remains in jail in a government facility in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.</p> <p>The November 2001 ARMM election transferred governorship to Farouk Hussein, who now heads the MNLF Council of 15.</p> <p>In September 2004, the Congress approved the postponement of the ARMM election to 2005 due to lack of government funds to hold the election. In 2005, the governorship was won by a scion of the powerful Muslim political clan, the Ampatuan.</p> <p>By 2001, integration of former MNLF fighters into the AFP and PNP was effected.</p>
<p>GRP-RPMP/PA/ABB Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the <i>Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa</i>.</p>	<p><u>Cessation of Hostilities</u> – Both Parties will declare a ceasefire between them once the Peace Agreement takes effect. A maximum of 100 officers and members of the Second Party shall be given a special license and permit to carry firearms in accordance with the law. The Second Party, its affiliates and supporters commit to the disposition of forces and arms to the GRP within the schedule fixed by the Joint Enforcement and Monitoring</p>	<p><u>Cessation of Hostilities</u> – The Implementing Guidelines was forged on February 18, 2003, followed by a set of procedures and guidelines on the issuance of license to possess and special permit to carry firearms outside of the residence of members of the armed group.</p>

Table 5, cont.

Agreement	Contents	Post-Agreement Key Developments
<p><i>Philippine/Revolutionary Proletarian Army/Alex Boncayao Brigade</i> – Signed on December 6, 2000, in Quezon City, by GRP panel chair Edgardo J. Angara and RPM-PRPA /ABB panel chair Nilo dela Cruz in the presence of: Edgardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., intervener for the peace process; GRP panel members Anthony P. Dequina, Julio A. Ledesma IV, Anselmo S. Avenida, Jr., Bishop Camilo S. Gregorio; and RPM-PRPA/ABB members Veronica Tabara, Ariel Sabandar, Manuel Calizo, Jr., and witness Eddie Quitorano.</p>	<p>Committee (JEMC) and without prejudice to maintaining peace and order in JEMC-identified areas.</p> <p>Contingence-Building Measures – The GRP shall release 35 political prisoners in the priority list (Annex A), and subsequently process the release of the remaining 200 political prisoners in Annex B; drop charges filed against the panelists and consultants of the RPM-PRPA/ABB, mentioned in Annex C; and implement a two-phased Impact Development Projects—initiating projects identified in Annex D under the first phase, and completing these under the second phase.</p> <p>Release of Political Prisoners – Prisoners in Annex A will be released, followed by the processing of the release of those in Annex B. Members and officers of the Second Party not included in Annex C and are currently subject to prosecution shall have the charges against them dismissed in due course and in accordance with law. To assist members of the Second Party and the reintegration in society of the released political prisoners, GRP undertakes and commits to release a Php 10 million Reintegration Fund, which shall be released in accordance with a Work and Financial Plan to be adopted by the JEMC. The GRP shall restore all civil and political rights to the released prisoners.</p> <p>Development Projects – GRP further commits to release over a period of three years, a Php 500 million Development Fund to support three agricultural projects in Mindanao, three agricultural projects in the Visayas, and two urban development projects in Luzon as identified in Annex D. The Development Fund will be used for livelihood projects, housing assistance, education and training, primary health care, agriculture and irrigation facilities, farm-to-market roads, postharvest facilities, microfinance and credit programs, transport and hauling facilities, among others in the selected sites. GRP shall direct its concerned offices to set aside respective budgets for such funds.</p>	<p>Release of Political Prisoners – The Guidelines for the Management and Utilization of the Reintegration Fund and the Guidelines for the Release of Alleged Political Offenders/Political Prisoners (APOs/PPs) were subsequently issued. The latter took effect on February 18, 2003. Beneficiaries of the fund are the APOs/PPs under Annexes A and B of the Peace Agreement. Some 80 released APOs/PPs (30 percent of total beneficiaries) have received Php 10,000 immediate assistance each while 102 APOs/PPs were provided with micro-enterprise livelihood assistance worth about Php 3 million as of September 2004. The cases of 21 detained APOs are being evaluated.</p> <p>Development Projects – The Guidelines for Development Projects was subsequently issued. It identified sources of funds, and defined mechanisms for projects and funds management, and monitoring and evaluation of projects. Development projects amounting to Php 6.6 million were launched in some 22 barangays in Iloilo, Aklan and Negros Occidental in September 2004 through the National Anti-Poverty Commission's KALAHI Program. The RPMP Foundation was put up to receive and manage the funds. Beneficiary barangays received Php</p>

Table 5. cont.

Agreement	Contents	Post-Agreement Key Developments
	<p>Policy Reforms – Both Parties shall, after signing the Agreement, start substantive talks on policy reforms in the areas of fiscal reforms (to lessen the tax burden on the marginalized population and encourage maximum use of the country's resources), economic measures that would protect particular sectors, and policies that would promote actualization of empowerment of the marginalized sectors in governance.</p> <p>Joint Enforcement Monitoring Committee – The five-person JEMC (two nominated by each party and one jointly endorsed) shall be established immediately. The GRP shall provide a budget and office space for the JEMC and its permanent secretariat.</p> <p>Other Provisions – Both Parties shall deliver documents and perform the needed acts to implement the Agreement. Any breach entitled the aggrieved Party to demand rectification or nullification of the Agreement.</p>	<p>300,000 each. In all, some Php 29 million is expected to be released.</p> <p>Joint Enforcement Monitoring Committees – The Manual of Instructions of the JEMC Local Monitoring Team was issued on June 25, 2003.</p>

Table 6.
Initial Agreements between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Other Rebel Groups

Agreement	Contents	Key Developments
<p>GRP-NDFP Comprehensive Agreement on the Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRHL)</p> <p>– Signed on March 16, 1998, in The Hague, The Netherlands, by GRP panel chair and members Howard Dee, Jose Yap, Silvestre H. Bello III, Feliciano Carifio, and Zenaida Pawit; and NDF panel chair and members Luis Jalandoni, Fidel V. Agcaoili, Coni K. Ledesma, and Astero B. Palma; with Jesus G. Dureza, Teresita L. de Castro, Jose Ma. Sison, and Romeo Capulong as witnesses</p>	<p>Respect for Human Rights – Both parties affirmed commitment to international instruments on human rights, in particular, enumeration of the right to self-determination; the right to a just, democratic, and peaceful society; to seek justice for human rights violations; right to life; right to liberty; to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures; right not to be subjected to physical or mental torture; right not to be held in involuntary servitude; right to substantive and procedural due process; right to equal protection of the law; right to freedom of thought and expression; right to free speech and assembly; right to privacy; freedom of movement and domicile; right not to be subjected to evacuations, blockades, bombings, strafing, and use of landmines; right to information; right to universal suffrage; right to own property; right to humane and gainful employment; right to education and health care; right to freely engage in scientific, literary, and artistic pursuits; right to form a marital union and to found a family; right of women; right of children and disabled; and right of minority communities to autonomy, ancestral domain, and representation in political and social life. Other provisions deal with the claims of human rights victims under the Marcos regime; political prisoners; repeal of repressive laws and decrees; review of jurisprudence; taking special steps to protect the rights of marginalized sectors.</p> <p>Respect for International Humanitarian Law – Both Parties affirmed commitment to principles and standards of international humanitarian law. The provisions identified persons to whom the commitment applies (civilians, hors de combat, persons deprived of liberty for reasons related to the conflict, and relatives and duly authorized representatives of these persons); and specific prohibited acts (violence to life and person; denial of due process; forced disclosure of information; desecration of remains; failure to report the identity and conditions of persons deprived of liberty</p>	<p>CARHRHL took effect on August 7, 1998, upon signing by President Joseph Ejercito Estrada of Memorandum Order 9. But the Joint GRP-NDF Monitoring Committee (JMC), and its Joint Secretariat were formed only in April 2004, following talks held in Oslo in early 2004 with the Government of Norway as facilitator.</p> <p>The CPP/NPA and CPP founder and NDF consultant Jose Ma. Sison were listed as “foreign terrorists” in August 2002 by the US, the Netherlands, and the Council of the European Union. The “terrorist label” remains a serious prejudicial question to the continuity of formal negotiations. In August and again in October 2005, the government suspended the safety and security guarantees to NDF negotiators and staff provided under the Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG). The NDF, for its part, intensified guerrilla operations and called for the ouster of the Macapagal Arroyo government. While the CARHRHL remains in effect, the JMC has not been functional in the absence of rules and procedures governing its operation.</p>

Table 6, cont.

Agreement	Contents	Key Developments
<p>GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities</p> <p>- Signed on July 18, 1997, by Former Ambassador Fortunato U. Abat for the government, and Ghazali Jaafar for the MILF</p>	<p>for reasons related to the armed conflict; denial of rights of relatives/representatives to inquire reasons for detention of a person; forcible evacuation or reconcentration of civilians; supporting paramilitary groups; allowing participation of civilians in military operations).</p> <p>Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) - The JMC shall receive complaints of violations; upon approval by consensus, request the investigation of a complaint by the Party concerned and make recommendations; and by consensus, make reports and recommendations on its work to the Parties. A Joint Secretariat shall provide staff support.</p>	
<p>GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities</p> <p>- Signed on July 18, 1997, by Former Ambassador Fortunato U. Abat for the government, and Ghazali Jaafar for the MILF</p>	<p>Whereas peace talks between the two parties and an informal cease-fire were already in place, it was now necessary to agree on a general cessation of hostilities. As such, 1) the GRP and MILF forces have agreed to cease hostilities; 2) their respective Sub-Committees on Cessation of Hostilities are directed to meet on July 30, 1997, and, for a period not exceeding two months, to finalize guidelines and ground rules to implement the Agreement; and 3) the two parties shall resume peace talks in a mutually agreed upon venue.</p>	<p>Armed hostilities in Cotabato and Maguindanao broke the cease-fire. Another agreement signed on September 3, 1997, halted the fighting and allowed the talks to resume. The GRP agreed to gradually reposition its forces in (MLF's camp) Rajamuda and its environs to their original positions before June 16, 1998. The AFP continued to secure the Cotabato City-Davao City highway. Evacuees, including MILF elements, were allowed to return to their homes. The MILF acknowledged that the GRP shall be primarily charged with law enforcement in these areas, but in consultation or coordination with the MILF.</p> <p>The <i>Implementing Operational Guidelines</i> issued on November 15, 1997, listed prohibited hostile acts and prohibited provocative acts. The <i>Implementing Administrative Guidelines</i> issued on September 12, 1997, meanwhile created the</p>

Table 6. cont.

Agreement	Contents	Key Developments
<p>GRP-MILF Tripoli Peace Agreement</p> <p>– Signed on June 22, 2001, in Tripoli, Libya, by GRP panel chair Jesus G. Dureza and MILF panel chair Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, with Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations chair, Salir Al Islam Gaddafi as witness.</p>	<p><u>Security Aspect</u> – The Parties will consider normalizing conditions by implementing all agreements; consulting with the Bangsamoro people; inviting OIC representatives to monitor the implementation of previous agreements (on the cease-fire and dealing with criminal elements, notably).</p> <p><u>Rehabilitation Aspect</u> – The Parties recognize that to observe international humanitarian law and human rights, and to protect evacuees and displaced persons reinforce the Bangsamoro people's fundamental right to determine their own future and political status. Also, the MILF shall determine, lead, and manage rehabilitation and development projects in conflict-affected areas, except when public funds are involved, in which case government procedures/rules will be observed. The Parties shall ensure the safe return of evacuees to their place of origin and provide assistance and reparations. To</p>	<p>Coordinating Committees on Cessation of Hostilities (CCOH), which shall monitor and supervise the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. Also provided for was the creation of the CCOH Secretariat, and the Independent Fact-Finding Committee (IFFC) to be composed of members from civil society.</p> <p>To define areas of control and accountability, seven major MILF camps were jointly recognized, with 39 others identified by the MILF. From April to July 2000, the AFP launched major offensives on MILF camps. The MILF's camps including its main Camp Abubakar, were captured and destroyed. Peace negotiations were suspended for the rest of the presidency of Estrada.</p>
	<p><u>Security Aspect</u> – The Parties will consider normalizing conditions by implementing all agreements; consulting with the Bangsamoro people; inviting OIC representatives to monitor the implementation of previous agreements (on the cease-fire and dealing with criminal elements, notably).</p> <p><u>Rehabilitation Aspect</u> – The Parties recognize that to observe international humanitarian law and human rights, and to protect evacuees and displaced persons reinforce the Bangsamoro people's fundamental right to determine their own future and political status. Also, the MILF shall determine, lead, and manage rehabilitation and development projects in conflict-affected areas, except when public funds are involved, in which case government procedures/rules will be observed. The Parties shall ensure the safe return of evacuees to their place of origin and provide assistance and reparations. To</p>	<p>In August 2001, the Implementing Guidelines for the Cessation of Hostilities was signed in Kuala Lumpur with President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed in attendance. It reactivated the Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities and consequently provincial-level local monitoring teams have been put up.</p> <p>The implementing guidelines on the humanitarian, rehabilitation, and development aspects was issued on May 7, 2002, in Malaysia. Development</p>

Table 6, cont.

Agreement	Contents	Key Developments
	<p>allow for relief and rehabilitation, both Parties agree to implement the 1997 cease-fire agreement.</p> <p>Ancestral Domain Aspect – The Parties agree to further discuss this aspect to address the humanitarian and economic needs, and reserve the rights and heritage of the Bangsamoro people.</p> <p>Activation of Committees – The Parties agree to activate the working committees in accordance with all past agreements.</p>	<p>needs have been identified for support by foreign donors. Intermittent clashes between government and MILF troops continued but some clashes appear to be due to other causes such as local/clan feuds.</p> <p>In February 2003, fighting escalated between AFP and the MILF, with AFP's burst of attack directed at the MILF's camp in Bulok (North Cotabato/Magindanao border). More displacement and violence such as the series of bombing incidents in Davao and Cotabato cities and provinces followed. Rehabilitation efforts were subsequently undertaken and informal negotiations resumed from late March 2004. MILF chair Salamat Hashim died in July 2004 and was replaced by Al Haj Murad Ebrahim.</p> <p>Foreign monitoring teams from Malaysia and Brunei have come to Mindanao and a local civil society "Bantay Cease-fire" initiative have helped sustain the cease-fire. In December 2005, formal talks were resumed in Malaysia. Technical working groups were created to address the agenda on ancestral domain.</p>

The building of peace in the country has been marred by eruptions of conflict, delays in instituting major societal reforms, and overall weaknesses in governance. The regional autonomy structures instituted by law in Mindanao and the Cordillera have not provided a fully functional mechanism to strengthen self-rule and channel all competing interests at the local and national arenas into these political institutions. The rise of the Abu Sayyaf, a small radical Islamic group that degenerated into banditry, and the Arroyo administration's support for the US-led war on terrorism, have put the country within the ambit of the global war against terror, thus complicating local dynamics. The arrest orders on national democratic members of the House of Representatives and the people in the JASIG list during the week-old state of emergency in February 2005 has scuttled the talks between the government and the NDF. Factionalism in the ranks of the CPP-NPA-NDF has also added to the multiplicity of armed nonstate actors. Intermittent political crises, corruption, and long-standing economic difficulties have created conditions for the growth of the insurgencies and the recourse to extraparliamentary actions like EDSA 2 or the forced resignation of former President Joseph Estrada, and the July 2003 mutiny of young AFP officers. The general public also remains divided on the best way to achieve lasting peace in the country.

Operationalizing these agreements and moving on to the next stage of negotiations toward a comprehensive settlement have been fraught with difficulties arising from conflicting interests and unmet needs of the parties. The political arrangement for self-rule of MILF constituents remains problematic, with some sectors asking for a UN-supervised referendum that could lead to independence, or a shift to a federal system that would require constitutional change. Many other factors outside of the negotiating table complicate the armed conflicts between the state and its challengers.

In the end, the peace process can reach fruition only with the consolidation of democracy in the Philippines. The peace question is thus related to all reform areas associated with democratic consolidation—electoral reform, agrarian and other asset reforms, security sector reform, good governance, rule of law, delivery of justice, constitutional accommodation, and sustainable development that will eradicate poverty and equalize access to resources and opportunities.

Guide Questions

1. What are the peace-building efforts of Philippine civil society? What goals have they achieved? What are its impact on governance and democratization?
2. How have the policies of the government facilitated conclusion of agreements with the various rebel groups?
3. What are the major obstacles or challenges experienced by the government in securing peace with armed groups?
4. To what extent have the government's political negotiations succeeded or failed to forge peace with armed groups such as the MILF and the CPP-NPA?

Glossary

- Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)** – include organizations, institutions and other collectivities working and organized autonomously from the state to respond to societal and political issues.
- Peace building** – the different programs, and activities undertaken by individuals and groups (governmental and non-governmental) to resolve and settle the armed conflicts and prevent their resurgence.
- Peace CSOs** – a segment of this broad range of Philippine CSOs who have adopted a focused peace agenda—meaning they frame their campaigns, services and other activities within a peace perspective or advocacy for peace, or at the least undertake peace-related activities and consider themselves peace organizations. Like most CSOs, “peace CSOs” generally undertake any or all of three roles in society—guardians of or watchdogs over the state, service provider, and advocates of alternative policies.
- Peace process** – “persistent peace initiatives involving the main protagonists in a protracted conflict.” Such initiatives may be formal or informal, private or public, subject to public endorsement or restricted to elite-level agreement, sponsored by external parties or can arise from internal resources.¹⁶
- Peace Zone** – the Coalition of Peace defines it as “a geographic area within which war and any other forms of armed hostility may no longer be waged, and where peace-building programs will address roots and manifestations of the conflict in the community”.¹⁷
- Political negotiations or peace talks** – aimed at conflict resolution, which has been defined as “a state of affairs wherein the contending parties voluntarily find a satisfactory way of regulating basic disagreements that military confrontation becomes unnatural and mutual recognition of each other’s existence ensues.”¹⁸

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16. Darby and McGinty, *Contemporary Peacemaking, Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, 2.

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The Media and Philippine Politics

Perlita M. Frago

The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others is so energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power.

– John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, the student should be able to:

1. Identify the various roles and functions that the media play in Philippine politics and society.
2. Be familiar with the historical evolution and development of the media from the Spanish colonial period to the post-Martial Law era.
3. Examine the current and lingering issues and challenges that have been confronting the media since the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution.
4. Develop an interest in the important contribution/s of the media to the country's pursuit of democratization, good governance, and development.

Democracy necessitates the active involvement of the citizenry in running the affairs of government. In order to be meaningfully involved, the public needs to make enlightened choices that are only possible through discernment of relevant information. Access to information is vital in the public discourse especially in a democracy. And as the recent wave of democratization shows, the media are more than neutral sources of information. They are instrumental in the realization of democratic ideals and the recognition of democratic challenges by the citizenry. Ironically, they can also be partly responsible for the public's growing cynicism and discontent in government with their tendency to accentuate the negative.

Media and their Role

Mass media form part of a typical Filipino's existence. Television, radio, newspapers, and the Internet have become daily sources of information, opinion, entertainment, instruction, and advertising. The media are fondly referred to as the "gatekeepers" or "watchdogs" of democracy. They are important because they pass on a legacy of values from one generation of a democratic society to another.

The traditional role of mass media is apparent. Mass media, which are means of communication directed to a large number of people, make information immediately available to them in print and through electronic media (broadcast or telecast). But it can be said that the media have served various roles from one society to another.

Three Roles of the Media in a Society

Pharr observed that the media play three apparent roles in a democratic society: First, the media as spectators—more or less neutral conduits for the flow of information among the various "real" players in politics. The general public and the overwhelming majority of media specialists reject such a view, but most social science research must accept it... Second, the media as a major independent force in politics—a "fourth branch of government"—that work as a watchdog on behalf of society to protect the public interest. Third, the media are ultimately servants of the state which forge a consensus on social and political values and generate support for a regime.¹

The media play a significant role in elections and party politics. As a scholar aptly puts it:

(t)here is no mistaking the awesome influence that [the] media wield in shaping the process of decision making or in coaxing public acceptance of any decision emanating from such process...

Within the context of national realities, [the] media do not serve to strengthen the Gross National Product, but they do mold public opinion, however artificial it is. Whether that opinion weighs for any particular group or interest would depend on whose service [the] media are being utilized for.²

Undeniably, the media can be a powerful instrument of persuasion or manipulation. They can serve the interests of the most dominant body controlling it. Equally interesting is that mass media reflect society, just as society mirrors the

1. Susan Pharr, "Introduction: Media in Politics in Japan—Historical and Contemporary Perspectives," in *Media and Politics in Japan*, ed. Susan J. Pharr and Ellis Kraus (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), 5.

2. Antonio Ma. Nieva, "Mass Media and Its Role in Philippine Society," in *Labor and Mass Media in the Philippines*, ed. V.A. Tacodiso, P.B. Badaynal Jr., and J.C. Paredes (QC: UP School of Labor and Industrial Relations, 1986), 21.

type of media it possesses. “Through the mass media, one can read, hear, or see” a nation’s political, economic, and social existence.³ After all, words that are heard or read can easily translate to opinions that may give a glimpse of the entire nation.

From a more pragmatic view, mass media may be seen as instruments that enable the governed Filipinos to communicate with their governors or leaders. The media may also be used by the state to disseminate public information. Apart from these, the media may also serve the interests of their corporate owners to increase readership, hence, earn profits in the process. Traditionally, the media were conceived as neutral entities whose main function was to record and provide information on noteworthy events and circumstances. They may also link those who are separated by visible (i.e., spatial and geographical) and invisible (i.e., psychological, cultural) barriers.⁴

Functions of the Media

If providing information were the only function of media, what would explain the emergence of, for instance, a new paper in an already crowded field of endeavor? Would it not be redundant? Apart from commercial reasons and the media fever that coincides with periods of turbulence and uncertainty, every paper or medium aims to offer its own line of thinking—often justified in the name of public service and as a new venue for the expression of public interests. After all, mass media in all their forms have two basic functions. Their first and primary function is to serve as “watchdogs” in order to maintain the stability of or monitor the performance of the players in the political system. This function is also referred to as the *surveillance* function. Their second function is called the *agenda-setting* function. This function manifests in their ability to set the public agenda by prioritizing and projecting, in a positive or negative manner, individuals, organizations, and issues that are worthy of public attention and media coverage. It is in the performance of the second function that the media become powerful tools of influence.

A relevant study comparing the power dimensions of different forms of media shows that radio and television tend to have more impact on the less privileged and less powerful who are most frequent clients of these forms of media.⁵ It can be said, however, that in Philippine society all these forms of media tend to complement each other and supply the Filipino’s avid and daily quest for information. However, among the various forms of media, the print media directly and explicitly “engage every individual as a participant in a public dialogue.”⁶ It can be asserted that the print media “may have much more influence on the political process because they are avidly read by politicians, public officials, corporate executives, and other decision makers and agents of change in the society.”⁷ On the other hand, though electronic

3. Crispin Maslog, “Society and Communication, Communication and Society,” in Crispin Maslog, *Communication, Values and Society* (QC: New Day Publishers, 1992), 17.

4. Glorfa Feliciano and Crispulo Izban Jr., *Philippine Mass Media in Perspective* (QC: Capitol Publishing House, 1967), vi.

5. Judith Lichtenberg, “Introduction,” in Judith Lichtenberg, ed., *Democracy and the Mass Media* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 6.

6. *Ibid.*

7. Melinda O. De Jesus, “Media and Society: News Media in a Democracy,” in *The Filipino Press and Media, Democracy and Development/Ang Pamahayagan at Media, Demokrasya at Kaunlaran sa Pilipinas*, ed. Luis Teodoro and Melinda Quintos De Jesus (QC: UP Press, 2001), 23.

media may be less powerful, they are more intrusive and inescapable as they thrust themselves upon active or passive viewers while reading definitely requires more engagement, effort, and concentration from the readers.⁸ This chapter focuses on the print media because they form part of these vital sources of opinion among the traditional sources of information.

The Mainstream and Alternative Tradition of Philippine Media

Teodoro cites the two main traditions of the Philippine press:

- 1) *Mainstream Press*. These are established newspaper publishing houses whose ownership may include various political and economic interests. It is susceptible to pressures from advertisers. Likewise, it is driven by the survival instinct of making money or reducing losses.
- 2) *Alternative Press*. A press that exists during periods of great political crises or upheavals. It usually arises when the interests that rule mainstream media prevent it from resisting foreign or domestic tyranny.⁹

Nature of Media Control

Complications arise when the interests of media owners conflict with public interests. It is, therefore, essential to consider the nature of media ownership in understanding the politics of media. Information dissemination is not possible without the funds that provide its lifeline. Invariably, the media become beholden to their sources of sustenance. There are basically three kinds of media control or ownership: public, semipublic, and private.¹⁰ Public control or public ownership means that government controls the media. Semipublic control of the media is manifested when they are privately and publicly financed and controlled at the same time. Private control of the media refers to ownership of media operations by individuals or private corporations.

To understand the power of the media is to understand them within the context of their ownership and controllership. It is worthy to analyze them against the backdrop of Philippine society. For it can be said that

[the] fundamental failings [of the press] are the fundamental imperfections of our social system as a whole. Just as the means of livelihood of the vast Filipino masses are owned and controlled by a small conglomeration of feudal landowners, compradors, bureaucrat capitalists ... the means of popular communications in our country today are almost entirely in the hands of the same class.¹¹

⁸ Lichtenberg, "Introduction," 6.

⁹ Luis Teodoro, "A Briefing on the State of the Media," A paper presented in a Forum of the Center for Media and Freedom Responsibility, August 23, 2000, Filipino Heritage Library.

¹⁰ George Kourvetaris, *Political Sociology* (MA: Allyn & Bacon, 1997), 104-5.

¹¹ Manuel Almanso, "The Press as Social Critic," in *The Filipino Press and Media, Democracy and Development/Ang Pamahayagan at Matiyas, Demokrasya at Kaunlaran sa Pilipinas*, ed. Luis Teodoro and Melinda Quintos De Jesus (QC: UP Press, 2001), 18.

The Media and Politics

The relationship between politics and the media is “dependent and almost parasitic.”¹² The government, politicians and political groups communicate their agenda to the people through the media, whereas the media “feed on politics for audience share” and “higher ratings” in the name of public service.

The media have always checked “excesses” or irregularities committed by public officials.¹³ They have played an adversarial role alongside political powers. Consequently, governments have a stake in the media. Governments must somehow devise ways to maintain harmonious relations with the media or “regulate” the media. The Philippine government has regulatory agencies for broadcast, film and video—the National Telecommunication Commission (NTC), the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), and the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB), respectively. However, there is no formal government regulatory agency that monitors print journalism. The absence of a regulatory agency for the print media has not stopped the government from finding other means to enforce compliance as the Japanese and Martial Law periods in Philippine history would show.

The Press in Philippine Politics

So much has been said in the name of the public’s right to know. What role did the press portray in consolidating democracy in the country? Did it participate in the process of making democracy “broadly and profoundly legitimate” to the people?

Teodoro, a prominent Philippine media scholar, points out that the press has long been caught in two conflicting traditions.¹⁴ History shows that the media have had a twofold response to the demands of the times. The “dissident” tradition makes revolution possible. On the other hand, the “pro-establishment” tradition prevents its consummation. The former stokes the fire, the latter attempts to put it out.

The awakening: A nationalist press

Table 1 shows the different print materials that came out during the Spanish period. Most of the publications that came out at the time were predominantly pro-Spanish or had a Spanish orientation. It was only during the nineteenth century, that the print media began to veer away from the pro-establishment outlook. Nationalist sentiments that were previously repressed found expression with the publication of the *La Solidaridad* and the *Kalayaan*. The founders of the *La Solidaridad* opened the discussions about assimilation and reform while the Katipunan members who published *Kalayaan* saw revolution and separation from Spain as vehicles of genuine change.

12. Heinz Bulo, “Old Politics, New Media,” in *The Web Philippines*, March 2001, 28.

13. Fernan Adriano, “Media and Politics in the Philippines,” in *Media and Politics in Asia: Trends, Problems and Prospects*, ed. Carolina Hernandez and Werner Plennig (QC: UP CIDS, 1991).

14. Luis Teodoro, “The Philippine Press between Two Traditions,” in *The Filipino Press and Media, Democracy and Development/ting Pamahayagan at Midya, Demokrasya at Kaunlaran sa Pilipinas*, ed. Luis Teodoro and Melinda Quantos De Jesus (QC: UP Press, 2001), 31.

Table 1.
The Pro-Establishment and Dissenting Press in Philippine Politics*
A.1. The Colonial Period: Spanish Occupation

The Colonial Period	The Press (Print Media)	
	Pro-Establishment (Mainstream Press)	Dissenter (Alternative Press)
S P A N I S H O C C U P A T I O N	<p><i>Doctrina Cristiana</i> (early 17thC)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "xylographs"; first book to be published in the Philippines • done by Chinese craftsmen working under the directions of friars 	<p><i>La Opinion</i> (pre-revolutionary period)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • defiantly attacked the friars; urged the ouster of the archbishop • founded by Julian de Poso and Jesus Polanco; Pablo Feced (a.k.a. Quiaquiap) wrote satirical articles in this paper
	<p><i>Sucesos Felices</i> (1637)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • first Philippine newspaper, more aptly newsletter; appeared only once • published by Tomas Pinpin 	<p><i>Diariong Tagalog</i> (1882)**</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • founded by Marcelo H. del Pilar
	<p><i>Del Superior Gobierno</i> (1811)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the first regularly issued newspaper publication in the Philippines • kept the <i>peninsulares</i> informed about happenings in the Spanish <i>cortes</i> and the war between Spain and France • edited by Spanish proconsul Governor Manuel Fernandez del Folgueras 	<p><i>La Solidaridad</i> (1889-1895)**</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • published in Spain, written in Spanish • supported secretly by Filipino intellectuals • edited by Graciano Lopez Jaena then Marcelo H. del Pilar • advocated reform and assimilation
	<p><i>La Esperanza</i> (1846)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • published discussions on philosophy, religion, and history • first newspaper daily • edited by Felipe Lacorte and Evaristo Calderon 	<p><i>Kalayaan</i> (1896)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • newspaper written in Tagalog • put out by Andres Bonifacio, Pio Valenzuela and Emilio Aguinaldo • advocated separation from Spain and revolution** • inspired other revolutionary leaders to publish "Filipino" newspapers: <i>Republica Filipina</i> (put out by Pedro Paterno); <i>La Revolucion</i> (sponsored by the citizens of Jaro); <i>La Independencia</i> (edited by Antonio Luna; staffers included: Leon Ma. Guerrero, Rafael and Jose Palma, Epifanio delos Santos, Cecilio Apostol)
	<p><i>Diario de Manila</i> (1848)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • edited by Felipe del Pan El Comercio (1848) • chief competitor of <i>La Esperanza</i> 	

* Data were extracted from Castro, Jose Luna, "Press" in *Philippine Mass Media in Perspective*, ed. Gloria Feliciano and Crispold Ibarra, Jr. (QC: Capitol Publishing House, Inc., 1967).

** Data were taken from Teodoro, Luis V., "The Philippine Press: Between Two Traditions" (originally titled "Re-examining the Fundamentals), *Philippine Journalism Review* 2, no. 2 (April-June 1998): 22-26, taken from a collection of published materials edited by Luis Teodoro and Melinda Quintos De Jesus, *The Filipino Press and Media, Democracy and Development/Ang Pamahayagan at Midya, Demokrasya at Kaulanaran sa Pilipinas* (QC: UP Press, 2001).

La Solidaridad

Of-mentioned is the fact that the Filipino press was born with the publication of the *La Solidaridad*. Its content not only awakened the nationalist sentiments of Filipinos, they also shaped the future role of the press in the Philippine society, as can be construed from the following excerpts:

Our program... is very simple: to fight all reaction, to hinder all steps backward, to applaud and accept all liberal ideas, and to defend progress; in brief, to be a propagandist above all of the ideals of democracy so that these might reign over all nations here and beyond the seas.

*We shall pay special attention to the Philippines because those islands need the most help, having been deprived of representation in the Cortes. We shall thus fulfill our patriotic duty in the defense of democracy in those islands.*¹⁵

The growth: A pragmatic press

The Philippine press that developed during the American period was part of the cultural apparatus, which helped make the US colonial experiment so successful. "Soft power"—the conquest of the subject people via a captive consciousness—was as instrumental as brute force had been in the colonization of the Philippines...¹⁶

The contemporary Philippine media system, its business operation and mass circulation, is largely a product of American influence. Table 2 shows the significant papers that came out and continued to be published during the American occupation. *La Independencia*, the paper that had criticized the Spanish government, maintained its anti-establishment stand during the period of yet another colonial power. Most of the papers that came out at this time were significantly a product of commercial interests. A renowned writer puts it,

(t)he foundations of modern-day newspapering in the country were laid in the beginning of the 20th century by American colonizers who introduced American notions of a commercially run, profit-oriented press, brought in modern printing technology, and schooled a generation of Filipino journalists in US-style reporting. By the 1920s, newspapering was a profitable business, with the expansion of the readership and advertising market. The most important US innovation in the press field, wrote historian Lewis Gleeck, took place in the first decades of this century: "the conversion of Filipino journalist of opinion run by politicians into newspapers run as business enterprises."¹⁷

15. Almario, "The Press as Social Critic," 32.

16. *Ibid.*, 33.

17. Sheila Coronel, "Lords of the Press," in *From Loren to Marimor: The Philippine Media in the 1990s*, ed. Sheila S. Coronel (QC: PCU, 1999), 7.

Table 2.
The Pro-Establishment and Dissenting Press in Philippine Politics*
A.2. The Colonial Period: American and Japanese Occupation

The Colonial Period	The Press (Print Media)	
	Pro-Establishment (Mainstream Press)	Dissenter (Alternative Press)
A M E R I C A N O C C U P A T I O N	<p><i>La Democracia Consolidacion Nacional</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> political party papers devoted to party issues rather than to the larger problem of discussing and supporting the fight for independence 	<p><i>El Renacimiento</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> counterpart of the nationalistic papers of the late nineteenth century anti-Federalist
		<p><i>Muling Pagsilang</i> <i>La Vanguardia</i> <i>Taliba</i> <i>El Debate</i> <i>La Opinion</i> <i>Los Obreros</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> organs that reflect nationalist sentiments supported campaign for independence from the US
	<p><i>Manila Times</i> (1898)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> founded by Englishman, Thomas Gowan, on October 11, 1898 acquired later on before 1930 by Alejandro Rocas, Sr. 	<p><i>Liwayway, Bisaya, Hiligaynon, Bikolano, and Bannawag</i> (1920s)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> prewar vernacular magazines founded by Ramon Rocas
	<p><i>Manila Daily Bulletin</i> (1900)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> founded by Carlson Taylor 	
	<p><i>Cable News</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> owned by Israel Putnam 	<p><i>Herald</i> (1920)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> was put up by millionaires (Vicente Madrigal, Earnshaw brothers, Ramon Fernandez, Juan Alegre, Carmen Ayala Roxas, Mauro Prieto, Teodoro Yangco, and with Conrado Benitez as editor) through the campaign of Quezon who agitated for expanded autonomy organized as a Filipino-owned and Filipino-produced paper
	<p><i>Philippines Free Press</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> founded by Judge Kincaid oldest magazine; the only national English-language magazine its competitor was the <i>Graphic</i> (later known as <i>Kislap</i>) which was founded by Ramon Rocas 	<p><i>Tribune</i> (1925)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> founded by Alejandro Rocas, Sr.
J A C U P A N E S E O N	<p><i>The Tribune</i> (1942)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> controlled by the Japanese depended exclusively on the Japanese-operated <i>Domei News Agency</i> <p><i>Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> contained proclamations, notifications and orders 	<p><i>Taliba</i> and other clandestine publications</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> printed by the underground

* Data were extracted from Jose Luna Castro, "Press," in *Philippine Mass Media in Perspective*, ed. Gloria Feliciano and Crispulo Ibañan, Jr. (QC: Capitol Publishing House, Inc., 1967).

Henceforth, press operations were primarily there for business and press ownership was concentrated in a few hands. These realities had made it difficult for the press to maintain its “objectivity” because

(w)ith these vested interests behind media ownership, it would be naïve for us to say that [the] media would be an “objective observer” of events especially those affecting government policies which may not run consonant with the interests of media owners.¹⁸

The press had become a strong instrument of influence that was utilized to further the aims of its private owners. Manipulation by foreign interests was done through the strict implementation of legislations on libel. These kept dissidence at a tolerable level. The controversial “Aves de Rapiñas” (Birds of Prey), which was published in *El Renacimiento*, was one of the classic examples of the victims of manipulation as cited by scholars. The article contained symbolic derisions such as vultures to refer to erring and corrupt American government officials.

When World War II broke out, the Japanese took over the media industry and put out a tabloid version of the *Tribune* (see table 2). It contained news that mostly were wired to the country by the Japanese-run Domei News Agency.

During this period, the Japanese used one of its major papers, the *Tribune*, as a “propaganda sheet” and kept its cost affordable amidst inflation. This newspaper was also used to instill fear in the conquered people. For instance, there was the announcement in the said newspaper that announced “death” to those who would harm or kill a Japanese soldier.¹⁹

The *Taliba* showed its dissent to the Japanese occupation by featuring in its pages a picture of sinking Japanese navy ships that somehow projected a negative image to the Japanese.²⁰ Some members of the *Taliba* were executed for their subversive views.²¹

The coming of age: A conservative press

The Philippine press for much of the postwar period,

was ...so strongly a rampart of elite and foreign interests, echoing all the dominant political prejudices, and conservative to the point of reaction. In that exercise of “objectivity” the Philippine press contributed to the maintenance of the unjust political and social structures... that kept the country poor, and the “special relations” between the Philippines and the United States, which kept it a neocolony despite the “grant” of independence on July 4, 1946.²²

During this period, the Philippine media had been recognized as the freest in Asia.²³ There was a proliferation of newspapers during the first few months of the liberation of Manila and the growth of the “big” newspapers in the 1960s. The

18. Orlando Mercado, “Media and Politics: Seeking a Better Relationship,” in *Media and Politics in Asia: Trends, Problems and Prospects*, ed. Carolina Hernandez and Werner Plösch (QC: UP CIDS, 1991), 44-45.

19. Clod Leones, “The Press during the Japanese Regime,” in *The Filipino Press and Media, Democracy and Development/Ang Pamahayagan at Midya, Demokrasya at Kaunlaran sa Pilipinas*, ed. Luis Teodoro and Melinda Quintos De-Jesus (QC: UP Press, 2001), 72-73.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*

22. Almarino, “The Press as Social Critic,” 33.

23. Jovito Salonga, “Keynote Address,” in *Media and Politics in Asia: Trends, Problems and Prospects*, ed. Carolina Hernandez and Werner Plösch (QC: UP CIDS, 1991), 3.

Japanese occupation had created a hunger for intrepid sources of information and news that were absent during World War II. There were papers that showed bias in favor of the establishment and American interests, and papers that remained steadfast in their desire to be true to newly gained independence. Table 3 below shows the position of some papers on political issues. There were some papers that were pro-US but not necessarily pro-establishment, like the *Philippines Free Press*, which was owned by Englishman McCulloch Dick and American F. Theo Rogers. The *Manila Daily Bulletin* was American-owned and pro-US. It sometimes praised the Roxas administration as in the case of the parity-rights issue and criticized the Quirino administration as being corrupt when Quirino put the US in a bad light.

Table 3.
The Pro-Establishment and Dissenting Press in Philippine Politics'
B. Early Postwar Period

Early Postwar Period	The Press (Print Media)	
	Pro-Establishment (Mainstream Press)	Dissenter (Alternative Press)
P O S T W A R	<i>Yank, Daily Pacifican, Stars and Stripes</i> (1945) • put out by the US Armed forces who also distributed copies of the <i>Time</i> and <i>Newsweek</i>	<i>Philippines Free Press</i> (1945) • Manglapus's article exposed US military censorship on reality about Manila (i.e., Manila was left dirty, Osmeña was slow, etc.)
	<i>Manila Free Philippines</i> (1945) • edited by Fritz Marquadt	<i>Philippine Liberty News</i> (1945) • owned by Manahan • antiestablishment; criticized newspapers that supported Roxas as "financed by the old vested interests and (preachers) of semilascist regime"
	<i>The People's Newspaper</i> (1945) • later known as the <i>Chronicle</i> • published by Manuel Villanueva • Eugenio Lopez acquired this in 1947	<i>Star Reporter</i> (1947) • critical of the parity rights
	<i>Evening News</i> (1945) • Manila's first afternoon newspaper • founded by Ramon Rocas	<i>The Morning Sun</i> (1947) • asserted that the "economic effects of parity would be the 'stark evidence of what independence is not...'"
P E R I O D	<i>The Manila Times</i> (1947) • "supported unequal economic and military agreements between the Philippines and the US"	<i>Bagong Buhay</i> (1947) • Asserted that the ratification of the parity rights would be "tantamount to national suicide"
	<i>Manila Chronicle</i> (1947) • stood with America on the RP-US agreements	<i>Philippines Herald</i> (1949) • revived by Vicente Madrigal • served Filipino political interests
	<i>Manila Daily Bulletin</i> (Taylor resumed its operation in 1947) • was on the affirmative side regarding the parity issue • described the act as "democracy at work in the true sense"	

* Data were taken from Rosalinda P. Otrero, *The Manipulated Press: A History of Philippine Journalism since 1945* (Mandulayong: Cacho Hermanos, Inc., 1984).

The 1960s show how the press can make or unmake a Philippine president, like what they surreptitiously did to Roxas, Quirino, and Magsaysay. This was done "through manipulation of elections and the press."²⁴ The latter part of the postwar period depicted the anti-Vietnam and antisocialist stance of the media, leading most to believe that the Philippines, long after it became independent, remained "subservient" to US interests. The American maneuvering

was blatantly seen when MacArthur engineered Roxas's rise to power, thereby consolidating the hold of the landed oligarchy; when the Parity Amendment and unequal military agreements were imposed; when the Huks were crushed by CIA-directed and landlord-supported counterinsurgency operations; and when Philippine foreign policy was reduced to an extension of the United States'...²⁵

It should be added, though, that other factors made all these possible. These factors are: the "willingness" and cooperation of the native elite, the "vulnerability of corrupt government officials," the "miseducation" of the Filipinos, and the effectiveness of the Cold War propaganda."²⁶

The crisis: A manipulated press

The praises that major papers so generously gave to Ferdinand Marcos in 1965 were also taken back during the height of youth activism in 1971. However, *Manila Daily Bulletin* showed support for the establishment with its anti-youth activism stand and so did the *Herald*. The *Chronicle*, which was co-owned by Marcos's erstwhile running mate, Fernando Lopez, was disgusted with the administration, and thus supported the youth activists. And the *Manila Times*, which was pro-Benigno Aquino, was clearly anti-Marcos and pro-youth activism.²⁷ One of the earlier criticisms on the Marcos administration came out in an issue of the *Philippines Free Press* on July 5, 1969. A portion of a reader's reaction that showed discontent in the said administration stated:

(Mr. Maglantay's article) exaggerates the import of Mr. Marcos's achievements. First of all, has land reform really made us self-sufficient in rice and our farmers richer? As any disgruntled *kasama* will tell you, land reform has never been seriously implemented. The "land reform" that appears in the newspapers is merely *palabas!*²⁸

With the declaration of martial law in September 1972, government control of media became most apparent. With Letter of Instruction 1, Marcos ordered the closure of all newspapers, magazines, radio, and television facilities, and the mass arrest of dissenting journalists in the print media.²⁹ Among the papers that were closed down were: the Roces clan's *Manila Times*, *Daily Mirror*, and the *Taliba*; Eugenio Lopez's *Manila Chronicle*; the Locsins' *Philippines Free Press*; Araneta's

24. Rosalinda Ofraneo, *The Manipulated Press: A History of Philippine Journalism since 1945* (Mandaluyong: Cacho Hermanos, Inc., 1984), 10.

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*, 135

27. *Ibid.*, 136-37.

28. A portion of Alfonso Besan's reaction in the *Philippines Free Press*, July 5, 1969, 57.

29. Rosalinda Ofraneo, "The Press Under Martial Law," in *The Filipino Press and Media, Democracy and Development/Ang Pamahayagan at Midya, Demokrasya at Kaunlaran sa Pilipinas*, Luis Teodoro and Malinda Quintos De Jesus (QC: UP Press, 2001), 124.

Graphic, and the Jacintos' *Asia-Philippines Leader*. However, there were papers, such as the *Bulletin*, the *Express*, and the *Journal*, that continued their publication but evidently as "government-controlled press."³⁰ Among the journalists arrested were publishers Joaquin Rocas and Eugenio Lopez, editors Amando Doronila and Luis Mauricio, columnists Maximo Soliven and Ernesto Granada, and reporters Napoleon Rama and Roberto Ordoñez.³¹

Marcos created regulating bodies purportedly to purge the remnants of the "Old Society" in the media. First, there was the Mass Media Council (MMC), which was later replaced by the Media Advisory Council (MAC).³² There was also the Bureau of Standards for Mass Media.³³

The preponderance of the sentiments of government in the mainstream press left no room for alternative and revolutionary views. Illicit albeit truthful information found its voice through the following alternative press, more aptly referred to as the "mosquito press": *Mr. & Ms.*, *WHO*, *Business Day*, *Malaya*, and the *Philippine Times*.³⁴

The redemption: A cathartic press

The Aquino administration restored democracy and freedom of the press. The people power uprising of 1986 transformed the structure of media ownership in the Philippines.³⁵ During the dictatorship, the media had been owned by Marcos's kin and cronies. After Marcos, there were virtually no government controls on the press.

A media explosion occurred, tripling the usual number of newspapers and causing "cutthroat competition" among the disseminators of information.³⁶

Upon closer inspection, though, press ownership remains concentrated in the hands of the elite few, especially in the case of the Manila press.³⁷ (See table 4.) The hard truth about media control is that those who own these media companies usually own other conglomerates. Although they only comprise a small fraction of the entire Filipino population, the power they possess by virtue of their wealth makes them a formidable pressure to contend with.

The metamorphosis: More than a global press

The changing world has spawned a new journalistic culture that seems so distant from its roots and origins. The conduct of news may change, but the role ascribed to it is still the same.³⁸

The dualistic categorization of the role of the press in past politics had been quite apparent during the colonial and Martial Law periods. With the restoration of democracy, several typologies of media have emerged. The media in the Philippines do not merely inform, entertain, serve the interests of the public or its owners, they also present insights and opinions that have predictive and persuasive value. The significant role played by the media in the two People Power movements was quite apparent. Prior to the consummation of the two historic events, Filipinos

30. "The Press Under Martial Law," 125

31. *Ibid.*, 124.

32. *Ibid.*, 125.

33. *Ibid.*, 126.

34. *Ibid.*, 133.

35. Sheila Coronel, "Media Ownership and Control in the Philippines," in *Current Issues 4/98*, 6 pages, http://www.waac.org.uk/waac/layout/set/print/publications/media_development/archive/1998_4/media_ownership_and_control_in_the_philippines (accessed March 31, 2008), 35. *Op. cit.*, 19.

36. Coronel, "Media Ownership and Control," 1.

37. Hernando Abaya, "Our Vaunted Press: A Critique," in *The Filipino Press and Media, Democracy and Development/Ang Pamahayagan at Midya, Demokrasya at Kaunlaran sa Pilipinas*, Luis Teodoro and Melinda Quintos De Jesus (QC: UP Press, 2001), 9.

38. Lichtenberg, "Introduction," 25.

Table 4.
Ownership of Manila's Major Newspapers³⁹

Major Newspapers in the Philippines	Publication	Current Owner(s)
<i>The Manila Times</i> (previously <i>Manila Tribune</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • first published in 1923; resumed publication in 1945 • used to be owned by the heirs of Don Alejandro Roces, Sr.; the Gokongwei family 	Dante Ang
<i>The Manila Chronicle</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • first put out in 1945; acquired and run by the Lopezes in 1947 	Eugenio and Fernando (the VP) Lopez
<i>Philippine Daily Inquirer</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • founded in 1986 by Eugenia Apostol 	Prieto Family
<i>The Philippine Star</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • founded in 1986 by Betty Go-Belmonte 	Miguel Belmonte
<i>Malaya</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • founded in 1981 by Jose Burgos Jr. 	Amado "Jake" Macasaet
<i>The Manila Daily Bulletin</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • founded in 1900 by Carlson Taylor • continued its publication until it was bombed by the Japanese • Taylor resumed its publication in 1946 • acquired by Hans Menzi in 1957 	Emilio Yap
<i>The Manila Standard</i>		The Soriano family and the Razon family own 50 percent each

Source: Data from Abaya in Teodoro and Quirino De Jesus, 2001, 9.

turned to their immediate source of information—the media. In the two decades of the Marcos regime, they had the alternative print media that gave them the courage to face the reality of a rule that had gone sour. In People Power 2, Filipinos once again ousted a president that broke their trust, but this was to be distinguished from the first one. While the first populist movement was catalyzed by radio broadcasting, the last one mobilized people with a lot of help from the power of text messaging.³⁹ The new information technology expanded the venue for citizens' participation and empowerment. The public's curiosity and thirst for information and exchange of ideas were satisfied through the web or the Internet. It was a new medium that gave people quick access to information. Various voices utilized the

39. Abigail Louise Latorre and Aileen Toribio, "Machine Uprising," in *The Web: Philippines Politics and Technology: E-Rivol!* March 2001, 18.

power of the web and empowerment found a new interactive medium. For example, one innovative campaign for the ouster of President Joseph Estrada was the "e-lagda," an electronic petition movement in the information highway that found overwhelming support from the four corners of the globe. The power of this new interactive media cannot be underestimated.

Conclusion

The Philippine media, the fourth estate in Philippine society, are largely privately owned. This social institution is not immune to the control and manipulation of the elite few who enjoy dominant ownership. Control and manipulation make it difficult for the media to assume an objective or impartial stance. The conflict between the public interests of the citizenry and the private interests of those that control them is real.⁴⁰ The media serve the interests of both the public and their private owners. This poses no problem when their interests coincide, but when there is conflict, whose interests do the media tend to promote?

When control or manipulation emanates from the center, the neutrality and reliability of the mainstream press become questionable. During periods of political crises, the Philippine press assumed different "identities" or forms, from an underground press to a new interactive medium, in order to remain a bastion of freedom. It has been every authoritarian and corrupt regime's tough enemy to contend with. As repressive regimes force their opinions on the public or hold on to vital information, the media find a way to disseminate and report the truth to the discerning public, more so with the advent of information and communication technologies. Despite the tradition of manipulation in the country, a segment of the media has striven to serve the interest of the governed public by responsible reporting. However, in the absence of political crises, the media have a tendency to slacken their grip on the rope in the tug-of-war for democracy when faced with the realities of "cutthroat" competition.

On the other hand, if the media decide to merely focus on the marketability of information, they may actually cultivate the growth of public apathy. When the media report the daily activities of government in a sensational fashion, this adds to the public's loss of confidence in government, for example, making them perceive government corruption as a vicious cycle. Reports on electoral fraud make the public doubtful of the potency of using their right of suffrage. Moreover,

(t)he bias for bad news and the exclusion of "non-disasters" from the news agenda give rise to a superfluity of negative images, combined with the pictures of the bizarre, the out-of-ordinary elements that fill up so much news space. Fallows argues for building in "an awareness of the parts of life that go right" so human efforts in public engagement can continue to find justification and rationale.

40. Kourvetaris, *Political Sociology*, 104-5.

Over time, such news casts a permanent view in the public mind. The expectation for relief and resolution for all kinds of problems dims. Such a negative view of things results in lower public engagement and civic participation, as people turn inward with their feelings of helplessness and powerlessness.⁴¹

It is noteworthy that failures in democracy are not the sole responsibility of media. After all, the media,

(a)lthough themselves in possession of great powers... are only half of what may well be democracy's decisive partnership; the other half is government. There is a relationship of infinite subtlety; two institutions, allied yet adversarial, meant to work for the same public good in a manner likened to the push and the pull, the accelerating and the breaking, that make for a careful forward movement. It therefore requires of each partner a capacity for reasonable compromise, which develops from a high sense of responsibility, morality, ethics, and professionalism.⁴²

Guide Questions

1. What entities comprise the media in the Philippines?
2. What are the typical functions that the media play in a democratic polity?
3. What was the role of the press during the following historical periods:
 - a. Spanish colonial period
 - b. US and Japanese occupation
 - c. Postwar period/pre-Martial Law
 - d. Martial Law
4. What are the issues and challenges that confronted the media after democratic rule was restored in 1986?
5. How do the current media contribute to the country's process of democratization as well as its pursuit for good governance and development?

Glossary

Alternative press – the press that usually arises during periods of political crises and which differs from the interests ruling mainstream press.

Democracy – a form of government organized in accordance with the principles of popular sovereignty, political equality, popular consultation, and majority rule.

Democratization – the transitional phase of democratic development; process of asserting or consolidating democracy

41. Lichtenberg, "Introduction," 29.

42. Vergel Santos, "Philippine Media in Transition," in *The Filipino Press and Media, Democracy and Development: Ang Pambayagan at Midya, Demokrasya at Kaunlaran sa Pilipinas*, Luis Teodoro and Melinda Quintos De Jesus (QC: UP Press, 2001), 154.

Mainstream press – the type of press which is more susceptible to pressures from owners or advertisers.

Mass media – instruments or means of communication.

Media – a term interchangeably used with “the press.”

Politics – the activity by which groups reach binding collective decisions through attempting to reconcile differences among their members.

Power – the currency of politics, i.e., power enables collective decisions to be enforced. It is also viewed as the production of intended effects.

Press – more commonly refers to the printed medium of news but may also encompass all forms of media.

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The Middle Classes in Philippine Politics

Temario C. Rivera

“The very position of the middle classes, in between the elites and the masses, makes for considerable ambiguity in the perception of their class interests. . .”

– Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens, 1992

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, the student should be able to:

1. Explain the historical and sociological bases of the emergence of the middle classes in Philippine society.
2. Explain the role of the middle classes in postwar Philippine politics particularly during and after the Marcos authoritarian period.
3. Understand the different political trajectories of middle-class participation in Philippine politics as shaped by varying cultural, ideological, and socioeconomic situations and the political opportunities for political action opened up during specific periods.
4. Summarize the results of a survey on the attitudes of the middle classes in the Philippines on a range of key political and socioeconomic issues.

Politics and Social Classes

In most societies, particularly in developing ones, the most salient and enduring basis of cleavage and conflict typically rests on class relations. One major approach to understanding the political process examines how people situated in different class structures get to be organized to pursue conflicting interests shaped by society's class relations. Class relations provide the major constraints in defining the capacities and interests of actors in society, but such relations are always mediated by political practices and institutions, and historical experiences that also differ in various societies.

There are two basic approaches in understanding the concept of social class: a gradational and a relational one.¹ In a gradational approach, classes differ by the quantitative degree of some attribute such as income, status,

1. For a discussion of the contrast in gradational and relational approaches to class, see Erik Olin Wright, *Classes* (London: New Left Books, 1985), 34-37. Consumer-research companies and public-opinion polling institutions in the Philippines such as the Social Weather Stations (SWS) and Pulse Asia typically use the gradational approach to class. For instance, SWS and Pulse Asia identify classes as A, B, C, D, and E. Because of their relatively smaller sample size, the upper and middle classes as represented by A, B, and C are typically combined as ABC in the analysis of results and constitute about 10 percent of the total sample with class C (the middle classes) making up about 7 percent. The categories D and E refer to the lower and poorest classes, respectively.

education, and quality of housing materials. In this approach, the names of classes also have a quantitative character such as upper class, upper-middle class, middle class, lower-middle class, and lower class. Relational concepts of class seek to situate classes in the overall context of understanding trajectories of social change and argue that classes are linked in social relations of production that are essentially antagonistic and exploitative. In this view, class relations generate opposing interests and the realization of these interests necessarily results in some kind of conflict.

The middle class constitutes an interesting concept in understanding class structures and class formation because there are contested ways in situating it within the traditionally accepted class structure in the development of both capitalist and noncapitalist societies. For instance, within the relational approach to social classes, there are at least five contending ways of understanding the middle class.² The "simple polarization" approach argues that class positions in capitalist societies such as those of professional and managerial wage earners, which do not seem to belong to either the capitalist or working class, are really part of the working class, albeit a privileged stratum of this class. A second approach contends that the "middle classes" such as those engaged in supervisory and "mental" labor are really closer structurally and ideologically to the traditional petty bourgeoisie (self-employed owners of physical means of production but without subordinates) and should thus be considered as a "new petty bourgeoisie." A third way results in classifying those engaged in professional and managerial work as belonging to a "new class" by virtue of their special role in the reproduction of capitalist class relations, particularly in their relationship to cultural production of class relations. A fourth school of thought accepts that there are certain social positions that are outside of the basic class relations and should simply be considered as "middle strata" rather than as middle classes. Finally, Wright proposes a new concept of "contradictory locations," to refer to those positions with a multiple-class character driven by inherently contradictory interests. For instance, in such "contradictory locations" the middle classes can be both exploiters and exploited in capitalist relations of production.

Such contradictory locations experienced by the middle classes in varying degrees as both exploiters and exploited also define the strategic choices open to them in the overall class struggle and political conflicts in society. As shown by concrete historical situations, they have sought political alliances with either the dominant exploiting classes or the main exploited classes or have joined the exploiting classes in their capacity as individuals. Moreover, in extraordinary conjunctures, they can be leaders and active participants in broad multiclass alliances against a common political target. This activist middle-class role was showcased in the EDSA 1 and 2 mass protests that led to the ouster of Presidents Marcos and Estrada in 1986 and 2001, respectively.³ However, in understanding the political role of the middle classes, it should be stressed that this class is not

2. For a concise discussion and critique of these varying approaches, see Wright, *Classes*, 38-57. See also Nicos Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (London: New Left Books, 1975); Alan Hunt, ed., *Class and Class Structure* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1977).

3. Named after the major highway in Metro Manila where the massive peoples' mobilization and protest that ended the Marcos dictatorship took place in February 1986, EDSA 1 was triggered by a military mutiny. EDSA 2 forced an early end to the Estrada presidency in 2001 when a huge popular mobilization was followed by the withdrawal of support by the top generals of the military and police. In both instances, middle-class personalities and organizations played highly visible and leadership roles in the mass mobilizations.

a homogeneous entity but is in fact divided into fractions whose concrete political practices and tendencies are further shaped by factors such as religion, ideology, cultural traditions, gender, political institutions and other nonclass elements.

The Middle Classes in the Philippine Context⁴

Reflecting the lack of sustained high economic growth in the country during the last three decades in contrast with that of East Asia and the more robust economies of Southeast Asia, the middle classes in the Philippines constitute a smaller proportion of the population. Surveys and studies using either the gradational or relational methodological approaches to social class in the Philippines estimate that the middle classes by the end of the 1990s range from 10 to 12 percent of the working population or of total households.⁵ There is a much higher proportion of middle-class households living in urban centers and in Metro Manila in particular. One study published in 1983 using market survey methodology estimated that 20 percent of all urban households can be considered as middle class.⁶ Various studies in the 1990s showed that middle-class households in Metro Manila constituted between 32 and 40 percent of all households although a major surveying organization, Trends MBL Inc., had a lower estimate of 24 percent.⁷

While small in numbers, the middle classes have in fact played important political roles in varying periods since the declaration of independence in 1946. There are a number of important factors that account for the political role of the middle classes in the country on a scale seemingly out of proportion to their actual numbers. First, an educated middle class highly concentrated in Metro Manila and later in the major urban centers emerged as early as the American colonial period due to a combination of a number of factors. Manila's role as a center of the export and import trade in the country spawned a lot of diverse professional and technical services. In this context, American colonial policy introduced a system of mass public education and initiated the Filipinization of the civil service, which opened up new opportunities for employment as professionals in the civilian bureaucracy. Thus, by the twilight of American colonial rule in 1939, one author estimates that those employed as professionals (accountants, engineers, lawyers, physicians, and college professors), teachers and government civil servants including those performing clerical tasks constituted 18 percent of the labor force in Manila.⁸

By the 1950s, a remarkable economic growth initially propelled by exchange controls and import substitution which saw the manufacturing sector growing at an average annual rate of 12 percent, nurtured a generation of new middle classes rooted in the private business sector and outside the state bureaucracy. This economic growth also sparked an education boom at the tertiary level,

4. This section on the politics of the middle classes from the postwar period to the Ramos administration (1992-1998) is based on a revised version of the author's "Middle Class Politics: The Philippine Experience," *The Journal of Social Science* 45 (September 2000): 1-22.

5. Surveys conducted in the Philippines by the Social Weather Stations and Pulse Asia as well as several consumer research companies best typify gradational approaches to identifying social class which use key indicators of socioeconomic status such as the durability of the home, maintenance of the house, condition of the yard, type of neighborhood, educational attainment and occupation of the household head, and home facilities. The relational approach to class divides into Marxist and Weberian perspectives with the former defining class primarily in relation to production; the latter accommodates this definition but stresses market skills and capacity as the crucial determinant of class position. In actual empirical studies, both Marxist and Weberian relational approaches have used occupation as one indicator of class with Marxist researchers combining it usually with indicators of autonomy, supervision, and decision-making powers in the workplace. For a comprehensive discussion of methodological issues involved in defining social classes in the Philippine context, see Cynthia Bautista, "Methodological Notes of the Philippine Middle Class Survey," in *Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia*, ed. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (Taipei, Taiwan: Academia Sinica, 2001), 41-69.

6. See E. Roberto, *Applied Marketing Research* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1987).

7. The findings of these various studies using the gradational approach are summarized in Bautista, "Methodological Notes of the Philippine Middle Class Survey," 45-47.

8. See Daniel F. Doepfers, *Manila, 1900-1941: Social Change in a Late Colonial Metropolis* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1984), 53.

resulting in the proliferation of numerous colleges and universities providing relatively cheap education, albeit of very uneven quality. As economic growth slowed down and later stagnated in the ensuing decades, the relatively large sector of college-educated individuals with middle-class outlooks who could not find stable and satisfying jobs proved to be a potent factor for the political activism of this segment of the middle classes.

A second factor for the significant political presence of the middle classes lies in the country's legacy of a formal electoral democratic system, which allowed for a far greater space in articulating and organizing class interests of various kinds. Thus the country's history of regular electoral contestations, free media, and formal guarantees of civil and political rights have also served to develop the political skills and confidence of key fractions of the middle classes. For instance, not even the authoritarian rule of Mr. Marcos effectively stifled the activism of civil society organizations even while many were forced to go underground at the height of martial rule.

Finally, the development and growth of a significant segment of the new and old middle-class fractions outside of the direct control of the state has enhanced the role of the middle classes in waging political actions. Even the lower-middle classes directly nurtured by the state such as the huge numbers of public school teachers and other civil servants have not developed any strong sense of professional or institutional loyalty to the state, making them more open to oppositionist activities against the state itself. In contrast, the state in the newly industrializing economies (NICs) of both East and Southeast Asia exerted a more direct and pervasive control in the growth of its own middle classes. Nurtured by greater economic affluence and constrained by authoritarian political environments, the middle classes in these states developed stronger loyalties to their state elites and at the same time faced more daunting conditions for activist and reformist politics.

While the developments discussed above have served to condition the politics of the middle classes in the Philippines, it must also be made clear that there is no distinct and predictable role associated with middle classes.

In actual historical circumstances, middle-class political propensities and practices have ranged from right-wing conservatism and radicalism to liberal and left-wing political causes.

Since the postwar years, a number of outstanding features and tendencies have underpinned middle-class politics and social behavior in the Philippines. First, all of the major oppositionist political projects and movements during these years had middle-class leaderships. In turn, these activist movements

relied strongly on constituencies of university students and college-educated professionals as their initial base of political support even while such projects self-consciously aimed at organizing other social classes and sectors for their ultimate political goals. Second, these major organized political movements led by middle-class personalities have been invariably influenced by the following ideologies: Marxist-Communist, conservative and radical schools of Christianity, syncretic versions of liberal-pluralist views, and in particular in southern Philippines, Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism. Third, as noted earlier, there is a substantial concentration of middle-class households in Metro Manila (with estimates ranging from a low of 25 percent to a high of 40 percent) which, when combined with the other sociopolitical factors, partly explains why this region has traditionally served as the country's political and cultural center. Fourth, there has been a significant rate of out-migration whether as permanent residents (mainly to the United States, Canada, and Australia) or overseas contract workers (Middle East, Southeast Asia, Japan, and Europe) particularly by the educated fractions of the middle classes. Finally, a new generation of middle-class families have emerged, sustained primarily by incomes from substantial number of Filipinos who have been working abroad during the last three decades.

Middle-Class Politics during the Period of Formal Electoral Democracy, 1946-1972

During the postwar period up to 1972, middle-class involvement in politics ranged from conservative to moderate and radical projects. Among the educated progressive middle classes during this period, the most compelling political issue focused on fleshing out a nationalist and democratic alternative political program to what was perceived as a government run by the country's most powerful dynastic political clans largely subservient to American political and economic interests. In the context of the economic downturn that overtook the manufacturing growth in the '50s, two major oppositional political responses emerged. The first was Marxist-Maoist inspired and gathered strength with its militant youth-student organizations in the '60s and climaxed with the launching of a new communist party in 1968. Of the thirteen founding members of the new communist party, ten came from middle-class families, and the founding chairman, Jose Ma. Sison, while born into a small landed clan, worked as a university professor.⁹ Moreover, during the formative years of the new party, the overwhelming majority of the party's initial core of cadres were university students and intellectuals from middle-class families. The guerrilla movement founded by the new party in 1969 also gained its momentum with cadres recruited from militant student and youth organizations. Under the direct influence

9. For background historical material on the new Communist Party of the Philippines, see Jose Ma. Sison, *The Philippine Revolution: The Leaders View* (New York: Crane Russak, 1989); Gregg R. Jones, *Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989); Francisco Nomenzo, "Racialization Process in the Philippine Communist Movement," in *Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia*, ed. Lim Joo-Jock and S. Vani (Hampshire, England: Gower, 1984); and Kathleen Weekley, *The Communist Party of the Philippines, 1968-1993: A Story of Its Theory and Practice* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2003).

of the new party, several sectoral and people's organizations were formed in the '60s and '70s and most of these were also led by cadres with middle-class backgrounds.

The second significant oppositional political response to the crisis of the '60s and '70s centered on a grouping of parties and organizations directly inspired by Christian reformism and radicalism. These church-based movements also emerged as a direct response to what was then perceived as the developing hegemonic political threat posed by Marxist-inspired organizations.¹⁰ Among the Catholic-based organizations, the influence of the social activism of the papal encyclicals of the '60s was significant, with much of the initial political guidance coming from Jesuit priests and theologians. One concerted attempt to develop a formal national political party anchored on principles of Christian social democracy was exemplified by the founding of the Christian Social Movement in the '60s and later the National Union of Christian Democrats. Among the Jesuit church-inspired organizations with middle-class leaderships that continue to have a political presence in current politics are the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) and the Democratic Socialist Party of the Philippines (PDSP). A more radical version of Christian activism also emerged under the influence of Marxism, Maoism and the liberation theology of Latin America and took root with the founding of the Christians for National Liberation (CNL) in the early '70s. Like the Marxist inspired parties and organizations that were formed during the '60s, the church-based reformist and radical movements were also led and staffed by middle-class professionals and college graduates.

A third strand of middle-class politics during the '50s and '60s was seen in the reformist liberal activism of professionals and business entrepreneurs who founded citizen's parties for good government or sought to safeguard and reform the electoral process. For instance, during these decades there sprouted several middle class-based Citizens' for Good Government parties that actively contested local elections in Manila and other key cities. The best example of a middle-class organization best known for its continuing project of monitoring electoral processes and results is the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). Founded in 1951 under American auspices and staffed by professionals, church and business personalities, the organization has succeeded in institutionalizing itself as the country's unofficial guardian of electoral contests, particularly of the counting of votes. Middle-class liberal activism during this period was also dramatized by the mobilization of political support for many independent candidates during the election in 1971 for members of the Constitutional Convention to draft a new constitution.

The '50s and '60s also marked the second wave of out-migration of substantial number of Filipino professionals to the United States.¹¹ Most of the professionals who immigrated to the United States at this time were nurses and

10. Philippine-Church state relations are analyzed in the following books: Wilfredo Fatros, *The Church and Its Social Involvement in the Philippines, 1930-1972* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1987); Robert L. Youngblood, *Marcos Against the Church: Economic Development and Political Repression in the Philippines* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Mario V. Botasco, *Points of Departure: Essays on Christianity, Power and Social Change* (Manila: St. Scholastica's College, 1994).

11. The first cycle of migration to the United States took place under American colonial rule during the '20s and '30s involving primarily cheap labor for the plantations of Hawaii and California and canneries of Alaska. During this period, the labor-migrants were mostly young men from the rural areas of Luzon. The third wave of migration to the United States occurred during the '70s and '80s involving this time the parents and immediate relatives of the professionals who had immigrated after the war (the second wave of migration) and had become citizens of their adopted country.

medical doctors. During this period, Filipinos constituted the biggest number of nurses in the United States while the medical doctors were the second-biggest group of migrant doctors, next only to those from India. The prewar and postwar wave of migrations have in fact made the Filipino community in the United States the fastest-growing group of immigrants from Asia. This "brain drain" first to North America and later to various countries of Asia, the Middle East, and Europe was facilitated by official state policy starting with the Marcos administration and by the continuing demand for Filipino labor and expertise by various countries. However, the root of this phenomenon lies in the country's continuing inability to provide stable and decent jobs for its people, particularly for its college-educated population.

During the liberal democratic period, middle-class political activism made its most dramatic impact with the popularization of a nationalist consciousness and political program articulated through both Marxist revolutionary idioms and Christian social activism. Moreover, by propagating the nationalist program through the use of Pilipino, the national language, these political movements advanced immensely the acceptability of a common language for everyday discourse. In light of the practice of the elites in using English as the official means of communication and the traditional hostility of other major ethnic linguistic groupings to the use of Pilipino, this political popularization of the national language by nationalist and revolutionary organizations was an important contribution to national consciousness and identity.

Finally, reflecting their structural weakness as a political constituency, the middle class-led political movements during this period deliberately sought and cultivated systematic linkages and coalitions with other social classes and sectors, primarily those of the peasantry and agricultural workers, and the urban poor and industrial workers. Whether as a product of conscious ideology and strategy or a pragmatic political response, these political and organizing efforts by the middle class-led political movements and parties largely defined their political credibility and organizational strength.

Middle-Class Politics during the Authoritarian Rule of Marcos, 1972-1986

During the authoritarian rule of Marcos, middle-class politics took shape in the context of the struggle against the dictatorship. Rooted in the earlier alignment of political forces during the '60s, the organized involvement of middle-class fractions against authoritarian rule was mediated through three basic political forces: 1) the Marxist-Maoist-inspired organizations under the leadership of the new communist party and the much smaller independent Marxist-socialist organizations; 2) the Christian-rooted political movements and parties, with the

more militant ones adopting variations of Christian social democratic ideologies; and 3) the organizations propelled by liberal democratic ideologies such as KAAKBAY (Movement for National Independence and Sovereignty) headed by the well-known liberal oppositionist politician, Sen. Jose W. Diokno. Along the same mold were organizations such as MABINI and the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) made up of human rights lawyers opposed to the dictatorship.

In the southern part of the country in Mindanao, middle-class opposition to authoritarian rule took on a special dimension due to the region's unique history of internal colonialism and marginalization, religious ethnic factor, and international Islamic ties. Among the ethnic Muslims, middle-class participation in the struggle was principally mediated through the originally separatist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) whose leadership also included many university-educated intellectuals and students including its founding head, Nur Misuari, who once taught at the University of the Philippines.

A new process of middle-class radicalism took place during the period of authoritarian rule with the politicization of the military. As an institution, the military in the Philippines has an officer corps comprised overwhelmingly of recruits from lower middle-class families. By the early '80s, the protracted war with the communist-led guerrillas and the separatist Muslim armed parties in the context of the cronyism and lack of professionalism of the top loyalist Marcos generals had demoralized the younger battle-hardened officer corps. Spearheaded by the class 1971 graduates of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), a reformist faction identified with then-Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile developed within the military. This constituted the nucleus of the mutinous faction that ignited the February 1986 uprising. Unlike other processes of middle-class activism whose success usually required systematic linkages and coalitions with other social classes and sectors, the middle-class military officers saw little need for a social and political base at least in the initial stage of seizing power.¹² However, all the seven coup attempts launched by various factions of the military against the Aquino administration failed. But at the same time, the politicization of the military has become an enduring problem that has bedeviled all the post-Marcos administrations.

In terms of the composition of the middle classes, another important feature of authoritarian rule under Marcos was the rapid expansion of the state bureaucracy. With its direct intervention and control of various aspects of the economy, the Marcos administration created several government-owned and -controlled corporations (GOCCs). In 1975, employment in GOCCs totalled 41,250; by 1984, employment in these same government corporations reached 134,453, an increase of 226 percent. During the same period, the entire government civil service also experienced a 145 percent increase, from 533,284 in 1975 to 1,310,789 in 1984 (Civil Service Commission 1986). Among the civil servants, public school teachers at varying levels proved to be the most responsive

12. Various aspects of the politicization of the military are analyzed in the following works: *The Final Report of the Fact Finding Commission* (pursuant to R.A. No. 5832), October 1990. This was the report of the presidential commission created by President Aquino to conduct a fact-finding investigation of the 1989 military rebellion and the involvement of military and civilian officials and private persons in this failed project. *Kudeta: The Challenge to Philippine Democracy* (Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1990); and Felipe B. Miranda, "The Military: At the Crossroads of Politicization," in *Duet for EDSA 1986: Looking Back, Looking Forward*, ed. Lorna Kalaw Tirol (Manila: Foundation for Worldwide People Power, Inc., 1995), 63-87.

to the antidictatorship struggle and a number of both aboveground and clandestine militant organizations emerged from their ranks.

In 1983, the assassination of oppositionist senator Benigno Aquino Jr., who was returning from political exile in the United States, provided a decisive turning point in the struggle against authoritarian rule. Aquino's murder took place in the context of an intensifying economic crisis and more than a decade-long struggle against the dictatorship by communist-led armed guerrillas in the countryside and several legal and clandestine organizations in major cities and town centers all over the country. The assassination of the well-known opposition leader further fractured the remaining elite support for the dictatorship and opened up new opportunities for coalitional politics among various parties and organizations of different political persuasions. With the emergence of a far broader and more determined opposition, many sectors traditionally cowed by the dictatorship were emboldened to join open actions of defiance against authoritarian rule. Thus during the twilight years of the authoritarian regime, some of the most vivid open protests erupted in the very centers of high commerce and finance involving the professionals, white-collar workers, and the anticony business personalities.¹³

Through four days of military mutiny and a people's uprising from February 22-25, 1986, the struggle against the dictatorship climaxed with Mr. Marcos fleeing to Hawaii under American auspices.¹⁴ It has become fashionable to refer to the four days of mutiny and uprising in February 1986 as the "middle-class revolution" that signaled the end of the dictatorship. It is, of course, true that many of those who played leadership roles during the uprising, particularly in the EDSA¹⁵ part of the confrontation, were professionals and middle-class personalities, including the mutinous military officers and the ubiquitous priests and nuns. It is also true, however, that in other areas of the popular uprising, in particular the Mendiola area in the vicinity of the presidential palace, left wing-organized labor organizations had a pronounced political presence. What needs to be explained more carefully is the genuinely popular nature of the uprising that galvanized the participation of the people from all walks of life, rich and poor alike, at that dramatic juncture.¹⁶

In the struggle against the authoritarian rule of Marcos, middle-class leadership was pervasive among all opposition groups across ideological and political lines, with the exception of the political parties led by anti-Marcos politicians from conservative, long-established political and economic clans. It was difficult, however, to construct stable coalitional linkages among various groups of competing ideological outlooks and political strategies. For instance, the assassination of Aquino provided excellent opportunities for coalitional politics against the dictatorship. In another sense, however, by pushing the Marcos administration into a politically defensive stance, this same event opened up the democratic space that allowed smaller, less ideological opposition groups

13. See, for instance, Ma. Cynthia Benzon Bautista, "The Protest Movement and White Collar Workers of Makati after the Aquino Assassination," UP Department of Sociology Paper, Series No. 1, 1985.

14. For a comprehensive analysis of the rise and fall of the Marcos dictatorship, see Aurora Javate De Dios, Patronio Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw Tirol, eds., *Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People's Power* (Metro Manila: Conspectus Foundation, Inc., 1988).

15. EDSA stands for the initials of the highway named after Epifanio de los Santos, a historian of the Philippine revolution against Spain. The major part of the people's uprising in February 1986 converged at a portion of EDSA which runs between the two major military camps where the rebellious factions of the military launched their mutiny against Marcos. A religious shrine was subsequently built in one section of EDSA and has served as the convergence point for many political rallies and mass services including the mobilizations against Estrada.

16. Seeking a more culturally nuanced explanation for the participation of workers and the urban poor in the popular uprising, Ping Michael Pinches deploys the notion of *communidades*. This captures the extraordinary sense of camaraderie generated by the event while explaining the management of shame in its contradictory aspects of resistance and accommodation to the established order. See his "The Working Class Experience of Shame, Inequality, and People Power in Tatalon, Manila," in *From Marcos to Aquino: Local Perspectives on Political Transition in the Philippines*, ed. Benedict J. Kerkvliet and Resil B. Mojares (Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1991), 166-86.

to be less dependent organizationally on the much bigger political formations. On the whole, the struggle against the Marcos dictatorship showcased the political strengths and weaknesses of the middle classes in their political practices as class fractions.

As a source of political leadership, the middle classes, especially its most educated segment, have indeed responded to all kinds of political projects: as technocrats of the Marcos dictatorship, cadres of revolutionary parties, or army coup leaders.

But it is this same flexibility and contradictoriness that stresses the limitations of the middle class as a constituency for political action.

Middle-Class Politics during the Post-Marcos Period since 1986

With the restoration of formal democratic rule following the popular ratification of a new constitution and the holding of elections in 1987, the electoral system once again became the main arena for legitimizing political contestations in the country.¹⁷ The transition to democratic rule, however, has been extremely contentious and protracted. Reflecting the problem of a politicized military, the Aquino-led successor administration to authoritarian rule had to weather no less than seven coup attempts in its first four years in office. It took the next administration under former General Ramos, elected as president in 1992, to successfully conclude a political settlement with the military rebels in 1995 and a peace accord with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996. However, political negotiations to end the armed conflict with the local communist movement, now close to four decades in armed opposition, have failed so far. Moreover, the government also continues to pursue peace talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a breakaway armed movement from the MNLF.¹⁸

For many middle class-led organizations and middle-class personalities, the opening up of democratic space and the restoration of electoral contests in the post-Marcos period signaled a serious reexamination of strategies and tactics for political practice and contestation. Many have opted to explore the opportunities and possibilities provided by electoral politics in spite of all its faults and weaknesses. The passage of the Local Government Code in 1991 further provided incentives for NGOs and smaller, new political parties to contest political power at the local levels of government. With the revival of the electoral process, much of the moderate strand of middle-class activism centered on the

17. For an assessment of developments ten years after the formal restoration of democratic rule in 1986, see Lorna Kalew Troi, ed., *Duet for EDSA 1996: Looking Back, Looking Forward* (Manila: Foundation for Worldwide People Power, Inc., 1995).

18. For a discussion of the political negotiations between the government and the National Democratic Front (NDF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), see Ternano C. Rivera, "In Search of Peace: Political Negotiations between the Government and Armed Movements in the Philippines," in *Evolving Concepts of Peace-building: From Asian Experiences*, ed. Kazuo Takahashi (Tokyo: International Christian University, 2005), 83-108.

revival and strengthening of NAMFREL as the electoral watchdog particularly during national elections.

In taking advantage of these new arenas of organizing and mobilizing, many developmental NGOs and people's organizations (POs) have formed political networks to support progressive candidates or work out coalitions with the existing political parties. More recently, these networks have formed new political parties in response to the party-list system, resulting in the first set of elected party list candidates in the lower house of Congress in the 1998 national elections. In the 2004 elections there were twenty-four elected representatives representing sixteen different party-list organizations. Another tendency has been reflected in simply maximizing the political and organizational reach of developmental and advocacy NGOs and people's organizations but uncoupling this effort from any armed political movement. A good example of this is the political activism that has animated the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), the country's biggest single developmental NGO.¹⁹

These new possibilities for political action and strategy sparked by the transition to a more open polity highlights the most crucial aspect of policy debates across all political and ideological spectrums: does the newly opened-up political space provide enough opportunities to pursue fundamentally transformative sociopolitical projects without resorting to armed struggle? In its various manifestations, this contested claim has been one of the major reasons for the internal debates that have split the armed communist movement in the country since the early 1990s.²⁰ After the ouster of the Estrada administration, however, almost all the major Marxist-inspired left-wing political formations, including those aligned with the underground Communist Party of the Philippines, had put up their own legal political parties to contest the elections, particularly the party-list system.

In response to the restoration of formal democratic rule, all of the oppositional formations and parties influenced by Christian social activism have embraced the electoral system as the legitimate arena for political contestation. Following the successful peace negotiations concluded with the government in 1995, the once-clandestine military rebel formations have also come out in the open. With the active participation of personalities with military backgrounds in electoral contests, a new generation of soldier-politicians has in fact emerged.²¹ However, the continuing politicization of the military is a serious problem as shown by the abortive coup launched in July 2003 by some 300 junior military officers and soldiers who called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and top defense and military officials. This restiveness within the military has been fueled by massive corruption perpetrated by both military and civilian elites, and the overall weakness and loss of credibility of political institutions.

One important area for further understanding middle-class behavior lies in the phenomenon of overseas contract labor. In the search for better work

19. Various aspects of the activities of NGOs, and peoples organizations and their relations with the state are analyzed in: Marlon A. Wui and Ma. Glenda S. Lopez, eds., *State-Civil Society Relations in Policy-Making* (Quezon City: The Third World Studies Center, 1997); Miriam Coronel Ferrer, ed., *Civil Society Making Civil Society* (Quezon City: The Third World Studies Center, 1997).

20. For a discussion of the problems that have beset the communist-led armed revolutionary movement in the country since 1986, see Joel Rocamora, *Breaking Through: The Struggle Within the Communist Party of the Philippines* (Metro Manila: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 1994); Patricio N. Abinales, ed., *The Revolution Falters: The Left in Philippine Politics After 1986* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1996).

21. Aside from General Ramos who was elected president in 1992, other former military officers elected to national positions include: former colonel and coup leader Gegerio Honasan and former generals Rodolfo Biazon, Panfilo Lacson, and Alfredo Lim who were all elected to the Senate. A few others have been elected to the lower house of Congress and local government positions.

opportunities abroad, Filipinos have served as overseas contract workers in significant numbers. One study shows that "the number of processed Filipino contract workers increased twenty-fold over a sixteen-year period, from just over 36,000 in 1975 to almost 700,000 in 1991."²² From 1991 to 2003, an average of 733,000 Filipinos were deployed annually as overseas workers.²³ For the last few years, remittances by these overseas Filipinos are equivalent to about 10 percent of the country's gross domestic product (close to US\$ 8 billion in 2004), about 20 percent of gross export earnings and more than the total value of foreign direct investments.

The extent of middle-class participation in the overseas Filipino workers (OFW) phenomenon can be inferred from data on their educational backgrounds. One study completed in 1983 shows that over 50 percent of the Filipino migrant workers surveyed had completed college, or had at least taken some college subjects.²⁴ An important aspect of the OFW experience that needs to be systematically studied lies in the way this process has reconstituted identities and transformed the social, economic, and political positions of the workers and their families.²⁵ For its political implications, it may be argued that the OFW phenomenon has provided a safety valve that undercuts the social basis for political activism and militancy. On the other hand, it may have also produced a new generation of community leaders with political skills and more diverse resources, more receptive to progressive political projects, and less tolerant of the traditional ways of doing things.

Another significant arena of middle-class politics lies in the support for charismatic religious movements, in both their Catholic and Protestant variants. While not new in the country's cultural and religious tradition, these charismatic movements took on a special fervor starting in the mid-'80s with the founding of El Shaddai, the biggest Catholic charismatic movement claiming a card-carrying membership of half a million.²⁶ Among the other Christian ecumenical groups, the most influential are the Jesus is Lord Fellowship and Jesus Miracle Crusade. Spawmed during periods of economic and political crisis, these movements have thrived due to their ability to address some popular need or longing, either ignored or unattended to by established institutions including the government.

An important indicator of middle-class support for these religious movements can be inferred from the socioeconomic profile of the regular listeners of radio station DWXI, which regularly airs the El Shaddai programs. During the Monday to Friday airings of El Shaddai's programs, one survey reveals that 40 percent of the regular listeners belong to Class C, which is the equivalent of the middle classes in the classification scheme used by consumer research organizations in the country.²⁷ Showing organizing and mobilizing skills and the sophisticated use of mass media, these religious movements have started to showcase their ability to influence political contests. For instance, during the last presidential

22. Benjamin B. Cariño, "Migrant Workers from the Philippines," in *Philippine Labor Migration: Impact and Policy*, ed. Graziano Battistella and Anthony Paganoni (Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center, 1992), 6.

23. National Statistical Coordination Board, *Philippine Statistical Yearbook 2004* (Makati City, Philippines: NSCB), 11-31.

24. Katherine D. Gibson, "Contract Labour Migration from the Philippines: Preliminary Fieldwork Report," Department of Human Geography, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, cited in Benjamin B. Cariño, "Migrant Workers from the Philippines" (1992).

25. Some studies that address the various aspects of this phenomenon include: Anne-Marie Hilsdon, "The Good Life: Cultures of Migration and Transformation of Overseas Workers in the Philippines," *Philippines*, no. 29 (Fall 1997): 49-62; R. Perrier, ed., *Remittances and Returns: The Cultural Economy of Migration in Ilocos* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1992); and Noel D. Vasquez, "Economic and Social Impact of Labor Migration," *Philippine Labor Migration: Impact and Policy*, ed. Graziano Battistella and Anthony Paganoni (Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center, 1992), 41-67; *Hearts Apart: Migration in the Eyes of Filipino Children*, a joint project of the Episcopal Mission for the Pastoral Care of Migrant and Itinerant People of CBCP/Apostleship of the sea-Manila, Scalabrini Migration Center, and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), 2003-2004.

26. For a study of El Shaddai, see Grace R. Gorospe-Jamon, "The El Shaddai Prayer Movement: A Study of Political Socialization in a Religious Context" (PhD dissertation, University of the Philippines, 1999).

27. Survey findings by the Asia Research Organization and cited in Grace R. Gorospe-Jamon, "The El Shaddai Prayer Movement." This same survey shows that 56 percent of the regular listeners of the radio station belong to class DE, the equivalent of the low-income and poor social classes.

elections in 1997, the El Shaddai, through its leader Brother Mariano “Mike” Velarde, endorsed Estrada, the presidential winner, while the other movements supported other candidates. In the presidential elections in 2004, Eduardo Villanueva, the founder of Jesus is Lord Movement launched a new political party, Bangon Pilipinas (Arise Philippines), and ran for the presidency.²⁸

With the restoration of elite democratic rule in the post-Marcos years, much of middle-class activism has veered toward open, legal, and electoral means of struggle. The political opening, however, has taken place in the context of continuing economic malaise and the government’s inability to negotiate a political settlement with two protracted armed challenges: the communist-led guerrilla movement and the separatist Muslim movement in the south now represented by the MILF. Since the period of independence, middle-class leadership of various kinds of political organizations, movements, and parties have been pervasive and significant. A more open political arena is no doubt congenial to the exercise of political leadership over various kinds of organizations by middle-class fractions, especially of its most educated sectors. But the working-out of successful coalitional political arrangements between the middle classes and other classes and sectors to achieve long-term sociopolitical ends is a more difficult process. -

The Middle Classes and the Rise and Fall of Estrada²⁹

Riding high on a populist appeal to uplift the poor majority in the country, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, better known as “Erap,” won the presidential elections in May 1998. He received 40 percent of the total votes cast and a huge margin of more than six million votes over his closest rival.³⁰ A popular movie star who cut his political teeth as a town mayor, then as a senator and vice president, Estrada overwhelmingly won the support of the lower and poor classes which constitute about 88 percent of the voting households. Using a catchy, populist slogan of “Erap para sa Mahirap” (Erap for the Poor),³¹ Estrada won almost half (47.7 percent) of class E, the poorest households which make up 25 percent of the voting population and almost 40 percent (37.9 percent) of class D, the lower classes which account for about 63 percent of total votes.³²

What was surprising about Estrada’s electoral victory was his creditable performance among the upper- and middle-class voters, a small fraction of the voting population (only about 12 percent) but its most moneyed and educated sector.³³ Spurned by the influential Cardinal Sin and the Catholic church hierarchy for his well-known womanizing and profligate lifestyle, dismissed by many educated upper and middle classes for his lack of a college degree, a lackluster legislative record, and lack of managerial skills, Estrada had not been expected to do well with the class ABC voters. However, he ended up receiving the

28. Brother Eddie Villanueva, as he is more popularly known, was one of five presidential candidates in the 2004 elections and received close to 2 million votes or a little over 6 percent of total votes cast. The declared winner, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, later faced impeachment charges on having rigged the election results.

29. This section is based on a revised version of the author’s “The Middle Classes and Democratization in the Philippines: From the Asian Crisis to the Ouster of Estrada,” in *Southeast Asian Middle Classes: Prospects for Social Change and Democratization*, ed. Abdul Rahman Embong (Bangi, Malaysia: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia), 230-61.

30. A total of eleven candidates contested the 1998 presidential elections but only four got more than 10 percent of the total votes cast: Estrada, who received 39.86 percent of the votes, was followed by the following: former speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, 15.87 percent; Senator Raul Roco, 13.83 percent; and former Cebu Governor Emilio Osmena, 12.44 percent. These figures are from official electoral results issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

31. “Erap” is Estrada’s adopted nickname popularized by his movie roles, and the name “Estrada” itself is actually his adopted movie name. His real family name is Ejercito and after becoming president, he was officially called Joseph Ejercito Estrada.

32. The data on Estrada’s electoral performance by socioeconomic classes used here are from the Social Weather Stations (SWS) 1998 National Exit Poll (see <http://www.sws.org.ph/estpdc.htm>). Unfortunately, the Commission on Elections does not generate election data correlated with social classes.

33. If class ABC is disaggregated, class AB would be about 2 percent, and class C, 10 percent of the voting population.

second-highest percentage of votes from class ABC, trailing Senator Roco, the winner of this voting segment, by only 3.1 percent.

A confluence of two major developments can explain Estrada's relatively good showing among the class ABC voters. First, a major political party headed by Senator Edgardo Angara (who ended up running as Estrada's losing vice-presidential candidate) decided to ally with Estrada, thus allaying to some extent the fears of the middle classes about a lightweight presidency.³⁴ Another important support for Estrada's candidacy and eventual accession to the presidency emerged when a core of middle-class intellectuals, some developmental NGOs, and party-list groups decided to work for Estrada's campaign.³⁵ A number of these middle-class intellectuals are graduates or faculty members of the University of the Philippines and four of them ended up being appointed to key cabinet and subcabinet positions.³⁶ This group of middle-class intellectuals who actively supported Estrada may be loosely grouped into three broad political tendencies: those who had been professional politicians or worked mainly with mainstream, established political leaders or power brokers; those who had worked with activist or reformist people's organizations and NGOs, including revolutionary organizations in the past; and those recruited mainly for their technocratic skills and managerial reputations. The more idealistic of the middle-class intellectuals saw the populist Estrada presidency as an opportune vehicle for defining and shaping a progressive vision and agenda for the people. Little did they know, however, that they would be largely marginalized by Estrada who depended more on his crony business and political associates—most of whom had no official accountabilities—for crucial government policies and decisions.

Coming into power in 1998, about a year after the Asian economic crisis first erupted in Thailand, the newly elected Estrada administration faced at least four major interrelated problems crucial to democratic consolidation: crafting a strategic economic strategy to address the economic crisis and spur economic growth; resolving the continuing armed challenges (communist and Islamic) to central government; improving governance practices and procedures by strengthening key public institutions; and decisively addressing an endemic culture of corruption and cronyism. On all counts, Estrada performed badly. He dissipated his initial base of political support and legitimacy by a thoroughly inept leadership style and a hedonistic lifestyle fueled by corruption at the highest levels. Before his midterm incumbency was over, Estrada succeeded in provoking a wide-based multisectoral opposition that brought together key players and organizations from the left-wing parties and formations, Christian churches, organized business, civil society and peoples' organizations and the opposition mainstream political parties. This unprecedented coalition of forces against a sitting president eventually forced the withdrawal of military support from Estrada in the aftermath of sustained peoples' demonstrations following an aborted impeachment trial in the Senate.

34. For the upper and middle classes, Angara's record as a well-established lawyer, former president of the University of the Philippines, and former senate president, provided some balance to what was perceived as Estrada's lack of intellectual and managerial skills.

35. The May 1998 national elections also saw the implementation for the first time of the constitutional mandate for the election of party-list representatives which will make up 20 percent of the total membership of the lower house of Congress. A political party running under the party-list system must win at least 2 percent of the total votes cast for the party list to be entitled to a seat in the lower house. In the 1998 elections, of the 123 parties accredited by the Commission on Elections for the party-list elections, only 13 parties succeeded in getting at least 2 percent of the votes cast. For a preliminary assessment of the 1998 party-list elections, see Agustin Martin G. Rodriguez and Dolorina Velasco, *Democracy Rising? The Trials and Triumphs of the 1998 Party-List Elections* (Quezon City: Institute of Politics and Governance and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1998).

36. Those appointed to key government positions included: Felipe Medalla, director-general of National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA); Benjamin Diokno, budget and management secretary; Leonor Briones, national treasurer; and Horacio Morales, agrarian reform secretary. The first three are all professors at the University of the Philippines while Morales, also a UP graduate, headed the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), the country's biggest development NGO. All four decided to stick it out with Estrada and resigned only the day before the president was forced out of power.

As early as 1999, calls for Estrada's resignation started to be aired by various civil-society organizations and personalities alarmed by increasing cases of corruption, cronyism, and the overall mismanagement of government. The former president coddled the Marcoses and their cronies, pursued a divisive move to revise the constitution, harassed the country's leading newspaper for its critical stance, allowed the flourishing of various forms of gambling, and protected his business cronies and relatives implicated in corrupt practices and shady deals. By his second year in office, Estrada embarked on a costly militarist approach to the Islamic secessionist movement in southern Philippines, which drained the government's budget and caused thousands of refugees. The war policy, however, simply forced the Islamic militants to shift to a deadlier guerrilla strategy. Meanwhile, the administration had nothing significant to show for its poverty program by way of food security and agricultural modernization, land reform, housing for the poor, and the alleviation of poverty of the poorest 100 families in each town and city, which were all touted as the government's priorities.

All of these damaging practices laid the groundwork for the mass mobilization against Estrada that reached a critical stage with Ilocos Sur Governor Insongson's revelations in October 2000 about the former president's criminal involvement with organized illegal gambling. Initiated by the House of Representatives and formally tried by the Senate, the impeachment process got aborted when a majority of senators aligned with Estrada decided to disallow the opening of a crucial bank document as evidence against Estrada, triggering the walkout by the prosecution staff. Within three hours after this event was broadcast in the media and multiplied in cell-phone text messages, hundreds of thousands would converge at the EDSA shrine, climaxing in a massive people's march four days later toward the presidential palace, effectively forcing Estrada out of office.

The ouster of Estrada stands out for a number of landmarks in the history of recent popular mobilizations in the country. First, the struggle against Estrada brought together an extraordinary political relationship among normally antagonistic groups which saw left-wing and right-wing parties, big business and labor unions, upper and middle classes and the urban poor, Christians and Muslims, communists, and anticommunists, coming together to topple the administration. Unlike its marginal role in the final days of mobilization against Marcos in 1986, the organized Left, particularly those rooted in Marxist traditions, played a leading role not only in activating its own forces but in initiating broad alliances and participating in joint multisectoral political actions.³⁷ Among the more dramatic instances of collective forms of resistance and alliances cutting across class lines were the mutually agreed-upon actions between management and labor unions to go on strike against the government.

In the fall of Marcos, a military mutiny triggered the peoples' mobilization, endowing the military leaders and their civilian patrons a contested heroic

37. The Sanlakas, one of the left formations, and *Buktanan ng Manggagawang Pilipino*, whose main base of support is the labor sector, pursued a dissonant call for the resignation of all public officials and the holding of new elections. Nonetheless, both organizations participated actively in the mass mobilizations against Estrada.

claim to ending the dictatorship. No such claim could be sustained by any military leader or faction in the expulsion of Estrada since it was the peoples' mobilization that pushed the military heads to abandon the president at the last minute. One military faction in alliance with some opposition politicians claims to have prepared a plan for a mutiny against Estrada.³⁸ However, this was overtaken by the determined peoples' march to Mendiola (site of the presidential palace), a crucial decision that effectively sealed the president's fate as he and his family hurriedly left the palace. Nonetheless, the military's intervention through the top generals' withdrawal of military support for Estrada marked another stage in the continuing politicization of the military.

Another remarkable feature of the peoples' resistance that forced Estrada out of power was the decentralized spontaneity of the mass mobilizations. There was no single hegemonic center of leadership, whether of a party or an individual. There were visible national leaders such as Cardinal Sin and former presidents Aquino and Ramos but they were in no position to define the tempo or tempo of the mass actions. Instead, there were intersecting political initiatives from several political groups and formations of diverse ideological leanings but united by a shared interest of ousting Estrada who had come to embody everything they did not want of a leader at that period in time.³⁹ No doubt, this multicentered leadership and decentralized mobilization were facilitated by the technology of modern communications, which enabled tens of thousands to be informed and mobilized in a matter of minutes. This also allowed for an easier and far wider process of mobilization outside of Metro Manila, particularly in key urban and town centers.

Reflecting the contradictions of globalization in its compression of time and space, the ouster of Estrada also accentuated how a seemingly local-national political struggle can incorporate a more inclusive notion and practice of citizenship with the active participation of Filipinos dispersed the world over. A collective resistance transcending national sovereign borders becomes a reality as an "imagined" Filipino community is enriched in the process of struggle by both communities of immigrant families and contract workers abroad. Linked interactively with each other and various Philippine political networks through Internet websites, electronic discussion groups and related instruments of modern satellite communications, the Filipino diaspora has become an immediate continuing presence, intervening in and interrogating even the most local struggles. While their presence in the past was acknowledged mainly in economic discourses or in glib praises of their being "modern heroes," their electronic yet real interventions in Estrada's ouster compel a rethinking of a future that incorporates both their present and future aspirations.

As in the downfall of the Marcos dictatorship, the middle classes once again played important roles in Estrada's ouster. While middle-class politics

38. For a discussion of the mutinous plans of a military faction identified with Lt. Gen. Edgardo Espinosa of the Philippine Marines, see Carillo Pablo, "Go Count the People," in http://www.inq7.net/na/2001/feb/25/na1_4-1.htm.

39. The major political groupings involved in the mass mobilizations against Estrada include the following: 1) the left parties with a Marxist-heritage including Bayan, Sanlakas, Akbayan, and their affiliate organizations; 2) KOMPEL II, a broad multisectoral formation of several NGOs, peoples' organizations, church-related groups, labor federations, and the social-democratic left parties; 3) the Council for Philippine Affairs (COPA), a grouping of politicians, businesspersons and military contacts, and headed by Jose Cojuangco, former representative and brother of former president Aquino; 4) the Kangkong Brigade, composed mostly of local government officials led by Governor Jose Lina; 5) the various Christian churches, both Catholic and Protestant; 6) the business sector led by the Makati Business Club; 7) the Philippine Consultative Assembly, a grouping identified with former President Ramos and General Almonte; and several other more or less autonomous smaller organizations in the Metro Manila area and in other urban and town centers in various parts of the country. Universities and colleges served as major sources of demonstrators as shown by the huge numbers of students in attendance in the rallies and marches.

partakes of different ideological persuasions from radical to liberal and conservative streams, it may be considered an embodiment of some kind of a modern consciousness acquired through higher education and standards of living and varying forms of contact with and appreciation of Western modernity. A possible exception to this tradition may be the middle-class Muslim intellectuals who have embraced an anti-Western, Islamic identity and fundamentalism. Such an outlook, however, is probably best understood not as a repudiation of modernity but as a redefinition of its meaning in light of local cultures and its antagonisms with Western practices. In the language of one historian, the middle classes "lust for the tranquility promised by an idealized modernity," but in many developing countries this lusting is often compromised and constrained by realities of poverty and political instability.⁴⁰ For the middle classes, this quest for varying aspects of modernity gets to be articulated and filtered through various political idioms (conservative, reformist, or revolutionary). Or, in the case of the Philippines, this "lusting" also seeks fulfillment in the promises of foreign shores.

Metro Manila is a particularly volatile place for the acting out of middle-class dreams and frustrations because in its own contradictory and grotesque ways, it is the closest thing to an "idealized modernity" within the grasp of many middle-class families. Moreover, there is in Metro Manila a significantly large concentration of middle-class households estimated from 24 percent to as high as 40 percent of all households. Even while an influential segment of the middle-class intelligentsia initially supported Estrada's rise to power, the unraveling of the presidency increasingly made clear the threat and danger that his administration posed to middle-class lifestyles and aspirations. The economic downturn that accompanied each scandal and corruption case in the administration not only made it difficult to maintain middle-class amenities but also assailed its prevailing values of justice and fairness.

To succeed, however, middle-class activism, whether in its reformist or revolutionary forms, must typically find support from other social classes and institutions to anchor its aspirations and interests.

It helped a lot, of course, that the political struggle against Estrada was waged in an environment of formal democracy with legal guarantees for the exercise of civil and political rights. Moreover, the Filipino middle classes in both the public and private sectors have not developed a sense of either institutional loyalty or deference to the state in contrast, for instance, with those of Singapore and Malaysia, where aggressive state policies have deliberately underwritten modernity projects for their middle classes.⁴¹

40. See Brian P. Owensby, *Intimate Ironies: Modernity and the Making of Middle-Class Lives in Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). I thank P.N. Abinales for alerting me to this book and its useful insights on middle-class lives.

41. For an illuminating study of how the Malaysian state systematically used foreign female domestic workers to underwrite the "modernity" project of its middle classes and command its political support, see Christine B.N. Chin, *In Service and Servitude: Foreign Female Domestic Workers and the Malaysian "Modernity" Project* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

In the mobilization against Estrada, middle-class intellectuals and professionals assumed leadership roles in the struggle—whether of the various left-wing parties of either the Marxist tradition or of Church-inspired radicalism, to the thousands of NGOs and peoples' organizations of different political persuasions, to the business executives and professionals of Makati-based companies and the stock market, and the many sectoral organizations of professionals, urban poor, industrial workers, women, peasants and fisherfolk, and the ethnic minorities. During this period, the closest thing to a constituency that expressed the concentrated sensibilities of a middle-class outlook is perhaps best represented by the members of electronic discussion groups who discussed with each other over the Internet.⁴² The Internet and cell-phone texting have become the political armaments of choice of the middle classes. Of course, the upper classes also have easy access to these instruments but they have not used it with the same fervor that marked middle-class practices. Thus, in the four climactic days of struggle against Estrada, a national crisis enabled the people through their various organizations, many led by middle-class intellectuals and professionals, to transcend their fragmented identities and interests, temporarily to be sure. But let it not be forgotten that the most sophisticated intellectual defenders of Estrada also count some of the best middle-class lawyers and professionals in the country, stressing once again the manifold entanglements of middle-class politics.

42. Among the most active electronic discussion groups during the mobilization against Estrada were: *neveragain@egroups.com*, *etagsda@yahoo.com*, *pinoytok@egroups.com*, and *Uperapresign@egroups.com*.

43. For a detailed discussion of the survey study and results, see Tamano C. Rivera, "Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Government," in *Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia*, ed. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2001), 209-65.

44. The Philippine survey received financial support from Academia Sinica of Taiwan, the Center for Integrative and Development Studies (CIDS) of the University of the Philippines, and the UP Foundation. Prof. Ma. Cynthia B. Bautista served as the coordinator of the Philippine study.

45. In the Philippines, the *barangay* is the smallest political-administrative unit. *Barangay* officials are elected every three years. In the methodology and classificatory scheme of consumer research studies, class-C barangays represent the middle-class communities.

Survey Findings⁴⁵

The last part of this chapter summarizes the key attitudes of the middle classes in the country on a number of major political, economic, and social issues as seen from the results of a comparative survey exercise conducted in four Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand).⁴⁴ Completed in 1999, the survey data used for the Philippine study were obtained from a sample of 800 household heads or spouses living in Metro Manila's class-C barangays.⁴⁵ The households were randomly chosen from a total of sixty barangays in six of Metro Manila's cities and municipalities. Sample sizes were allocated in proportion to the number of C-households in the city or municipality registered in the 1990 census. In addition to the survey, supplementary data from a random sample of 100 D/E households in a barangay located in an industrial site and sixty-six households belonging to the AB-class were obtained for comparative purposes.

In the survey, 652 actual respondents were classified as members of the middle classes after a cross-tabulation of occupation and employment statuses and the consideration of other variables such as supervisory powers in the workplace, income, and size of company. Those classified as new middle class

include professionals, managers and administrators; the old middle class include those self-employed in the nonagricultural sector and small employers with less than ten workers; and the marginal middle class include those relatively lower-paid and low-skilled white-collar workers like clerks and secretaries in government offices. However, those working as clerks, secretaries, and executive assistants in big corporations were classified as new middle class because of more stringent educational and qualification requirements as well as higher compensations. Two comparator groups of thirty-four capitalist respondents and forty-five working-class respondents are included in the survey. In the study, the new middle classes make up 43 percent of the total sample; the old middle classes, 28 percent; and the marginal middle classes, 18 percent.

Based on the survey data, the following most important views of the middle classes on society, politics, and the economy may be inferred. First, the MCs are highly conscious of class divisions and differences in Philippine society and the difficulty of class mobility. However, this perception about the potential for class-based conflicts rooted in a strong class awareness is tempered by a firm belief that such class differences may be addressed through education and the cultivation of a work ethic (industriousness). Moreover, a huge majority of the MCs also consider their political ideas as "definitely close to the center," further implying that they will most likely address issues of class differences and conflicts through moderate political practices.

The middle classes tend to favor giving workers more power in government, respecting workers' rights during labor strikes, and ensuring that management does not openly exploit workers even while making profits. However, middle-class support tends to be more cautious and ambivalent in actual conflict situations involving labor and management, particularly in cases where the MCs are called upon to provide concrete and direct forms of support and involvement. At the height of the mass protests against Estrada, some of the most uncanny mobilizations resulted in mutually agreed-upon walkouts by both capitalists, managerial staff, and workers against the government. One people's march from the provinces also culminated in a public lunch hosted and joined in by the capitalists and business executives of the country's leading financial center (in Makati) and residents of nearby upper-class communities.

There is also strong middle class support for government assistance to small- and medium-sized business companies as against the big corporations. On the practice of government operation of business corporations, the MCs show a split opinion as to its impact on wages and jobs, with about half agreeing as to its favorable impact and the other half disagreeing.

In terms of involvement with interest groups and social movements, the MCs give their highest level of support to environmental issues and organizations, followed by human rights and student concerns. Since environmental issues also command the highest level of involvement and support from the capitalist

and worker respondents, this suggests the possibility of the environment becoming the focal point of a broad basis of political unity and action across all social classes.

The middle classes share with both capitalist- and worker-respondents a remarkable consensus on the first four national problems perceived to be the most serious: corruption, environmental pollution, public safety and crime, and prostitution. While these perceptions have to be situated within the context of the period when the survey was conducted and completed (early 1997), the consensus does reflect a set of persistently intractable national problems. Remarkably, it was the corruption exposé against Estrada that triggered the sustained mass mobilizations which led to his downfall.

An overwhelming majority of the middle classes perceive the Philippines as a democratic country and recognize that a democratic form of government is suitable for the development of Philippine society. In the same breath, however, a significant majority (seven out of ten) is not averse to accepting any form of government, democratic or not, as long as it does a good job for the country. This potential middle-class constituency for an authoritarian project is further seen in a majority of MC views affirming that government can disregard public opinion as long as it knows what is best for the country. It must be pointed out, in this regard, that middle-class support for authoritarian rule under Marcos was strongest during its first two years, when the government used an iron hand in dealing with public disorder and the economy temporarily benefited from the rise in prices of the country's major export commodities.

Consistent with the country's historical voting record, the middle classes show an impressive voting turnout (eight out of ten). However, other forms of electoral practices—supporting political parties, attending public rallies, passing flyers for candidates, and donating money to candidates—indicate quite a low level of participation from the middle classes. This is partly explained by the weakly institutionalized political parties which are unable to provide a continuing fulcrum for mass political education and mobilization. It must also be pointed out, however, that other forms of political action and practices not limited to electoral activities are not captured by the questionnaire. One such form of direct political action, the mass mobilizations that led to Estrada's ouster, shows an extraordinary participation by the middle classes from various fractions.

The middle classes show a healthy self-image and a very high regard of their contribution to the development of Philippine society. Considering themselves as the "vanguard of democracy," they strongly deny that they have been indifferent to the demands of the poor or more concerned with political freedom than economic growth. In their ranking of their most preferred goals for the country, they share with both capitalists and workers the view that maintaining a high rate of economic growth and political order in the nation are the two most important.

Finally, in comparing the findings of the historically grounded analysis offered in the first part of the paper with that of the survey data, one theoretical and empirical gap stands out. Given its own theoretical assumptions and levels of generalization, the survey data are unable to address and explain the process of middle-class radicalization that took place during three recent historical conjunctures in Philippine society: 1) the breakdown of formal elite democratic rule during the '60s and early '70s, and 2) the struggle against authoritarian rule and the transition to formal democratic rule during the Marcos and post-Marcos periods, and 3) the mass mobilizations leading to the downfall of the Estrada administration. However, without glossing over differences in theoretical assumptions and logic of analysis between the historical study and the survey data, a closer reading of the survey findings contributes to a better understanding of the politics of the middle classes in Philippine society.

Conclusion

The middle classes played important roles in the two most recent historic episodes of mass political struggles in the country: the fall of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986 and the ouster of Estrada in 2001. With their special skills and training, a sharpened sense of "modernity" and the particular political opportunities opened up during these conjunctural struggles, the middle classes assumed leadership roles in various organizations and movements. Their participation, however, was articulated and pursued through different political idioms and political alliances, dramatizing the many contradictory aspects of their social, economic, and political embeddedness.

In the struggle against Estrada, the participation of the middle classes was enhanced by the largely decentralized nature of the mobilization process, reflecting the presence of many centers of political initiative. Moreover, the middle classes were able to effectively use modern means of communications such as mobile phones and the Internet in the mobilization process. Further reflecting the contradictory aspects and opportunities opened up by globalization, the struggle against Estrada also marked for the first time the active and systematic participation of the Filipinos overseas, made possible by the technology of advanced global communications.

While showing the continuing vibrancy and militancy of the peoples' movement and civil society, the ouster of Estrada, however, also underscores the weakness of existing political institutions. With the continuing ineptness of state agencies and the irresponsibility of many of the elites, middle-class participation in politics can assume a number of trajectories. It could lead to a cynical depoliticization in which the middle classes would try to prosper without consciously engaging the effete state agencies or by simply voting with their

feet by further exploring opportunities outside the country. It could also push the middle classes to explore other forms of political alliances—for instance, with a politicized and radicalized faction of the military—in a variation on a “revolution from above” project. Within a reformist agenda, the middle classes could try to reinvigorate existing political institutions, particularly the electoral process and political parties through alliances with reformist politicians and bureaucrats. Finally, in a more revolutionary mode, middle-class militancy and skills may be harnessed to strengthen and deepen the class capacities of the poorest and most disadvantaged classes.

As shown in past historical conjunctures, middle-class fractions can provide the leadership for almost all kinds of political projects. They are politically important not because of their numbers or cohesiveness, certainly insignificant in the Philippine context, but because of their possession of technical competencies and political-organizational skills, highly prized by both the elites and oppositional movements of the disadvantaged classes. Organically linked to other social classes or political movements, middle-class competencies, skills, and aspirations can have a far-reaching impact on the state and society.

Guide Questions

1. Explain briefly the various contending approaches to defining the “middle class.” Which approach do you find most appropriate for the Philippines?
2. What important socioeconomic and political developments in the country can best explain the emergence of the middle classes in the Philippines?
3. Do you agree that a new generation of middle classes is being produced by the phenomenon of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs)? Is this development sustainable?
4. Explain briefly the various political roles performed by the middle classes in each of the major political periods (postwar to the Estrada administration) identified in the paper. Why have the middle classes participated in seemingly contradictory political causes, organizations, and movements?
5. Give an example of a middle class-based organization in the country today. Can you identify what kind of politics (conservative, reformist, revolutionary) it has largely pursued particularly in periods of intense political struggles in the past or in the present?
6. Do you think that globalization and the advent of new communications technology have led to more effective forms of political interventions by the middle classes, including those living and working outside the country?
7. Do you think that any of the middle-class attitudes identified in the 1999 survey have significantly changed as of today? What can explain these variations or changes?

Glossary

- Class formation** – the process by which organized collectivities are formed within the class structure on the basis of the interests shaped by that class structure. Class-based collectivities may be organized, disorganized, or reorganized within a given class structure without there necessarily being any fundamental change in the class structure itself.
- Class structure** – the structure of social relations into which individuals or families enter and which determine their class interests.
- Gradational notion of class** – classes differ by the quantitative degree of some attribute such as income, status, education, or housing quality, and the names of classes also have a quantitative character such as upper, middle, or lower classes.
- Middle classes** – contradictory locations in the class structure that partake of both exploiting and exploited characteristics such as those seen in professional, managerial, and supervisory positions in capitalist societies.
- Relational notion of class** – classes are seen as linked in social relations of production that are essentially exploitative and antagonistic, and thus the realization of class interests necessarily results in conflict. The classic examples are relations between landlords and tenants, and capitalists and workers.

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Women and Politics in the Philippines

Maria Ela L. Atienza and Ruth Lusterio Rico

Women

*We have a purpose in our lives
to be part of history, of a new dawn
to be an overflowing river
that waters the world
which belongs to all, equally.*

From the song “Women” by the Shakti Group

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, the student should be able to:

1. Define and differentiate the basic concepts and approaches regarding gender, feminism, and the global developments regarding women's issues.
2. Describe the general status of women in Philippine society and politics as well as the major issues or problems they confront.
3. Evaluate available policies on women and their implementation.
4. Assess the roles, contributions, and activities of women's groups in relation to Philippine history, politics, and society, with emphasis on the process of democratization and development.

It is often said that women in Philippine society are on a pedestal. They are often assumed to occupy high status in society. But until today, many issues confront women in the Philippines, such as inadequate political participation, unfair treatment or discrimination in the family and in the workplace, and sexual abuse. Women's groups and activists continue to fight for genuine equality in all areas of society.

This chapter introduces students to some important concepts and perspectives on gender and feminism as well as the international context of women's rights; gives an overview of the general status of women and the attendant issues in

Philippine society and politics; presents available policies on women and their levels of implementation; and offers an assessment of the roles and contributions of women and women's groups to Philippine society and politics.

Concepts, Approaches, and the International Context of Feminism, Gender, and Women's Issues

Feminist aspirations have been expressed since ancient times. However, it was not until the emergence of the women's suffrage movement in the 1840s and 1850s in the West that feminist ideas reached a wider audience. This was also known as "first-wave feminism." Women's suffrage was achieved in most Western societies in the early twentieth century. In the 1960s, "second-wave feminism" emerged. This strain was more radical and sometimes revolutionary. Feminist theories and doctrines are thus diverse (see box 1 for a brief discussion of the different types of feminism), but their unifying feature is "a common desire to enhance, through whatever means, the social role of women." Feminism's underlying themes are: 1) that society is characterized by sexual or gender inequality, and 2) that this structure of male power can and should be overturned.¹

Feminism – A perspective or ideology committed to promoting the social role of women and, in most cases, dedicated to the goal of gender equality.

It is also important to distinguish between the terms **gender** and **sex**. On the one hand, **sex** refers to a person's biological identity; it is meant to signify the fact that one is either male or female. On the other hand, **gender** refers to "the socially learned behaviors and expectations that are associated with the two sexes."² Thus, while maleness and femaleness are biological facts, becoming a man or a woman is a cultural process. Also, according to Andersen, while "one's biological sex usually establishes a pattern of gendered expectations," one's biological sex is not always the same as one's gender identity. Femininity and masculinity are cultural concepts; thus, they "have fluctuating meanings, are learned differently by different members of culture, and are relative to the historical and social settings in which they emerge."³

Gender refers to "the socially learned behaviors and expectations that are associated with the two sexes." But **sex** refers to the person's biological identity; it is meant to signify either male or female.

1. Andrew Heywood, *Politics*, 2nd edition (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 61–62.

2. Margaret L. Andersen, *Thinking about Women: Sociological Perspectives on Sex and Gender*, 3rd edition (New York: Macmillan, 1993), 31.

3. *Ibid.*, 31.

Different Feminist Traditions

At least four major contrasting feminist traditions can be identified.⁴ Liberal feminism tended to understand female subordination in terms of the unequal distribution of rights and opportunities in society. Hence, this "equal-rights feminism" is essentially reformist and concerned more with reform in the "public" sphere, i.e., enhancing the legal and political status of women and improving their education and career prospects rather than reordering "private" or domestic life. In contrast, Marxist feminism typically highlights the links between female subordination and the capitalist mode of production, drawing attention to the economic significance of women to a family or domestic life where they, for instance, "relieve male workers of the burden of domestic labor, rear and help to educate the next generation of capitalist workers, and act as a reserve army of labour."⁵ By eradicating social classes, sexism will be eliminated. But Marxist feminism was challenged in the 1970s by socialist feminism. The latter tradition concluded that women's oppression is not due to capitalism and economic class relations alone, although they are significant sources of oppression. Gender relations are equally important in determining women's status. Still taking the feminist discourse further, radical feminism believes that gender divisions are the most fundamental and politically significant cleavages in society. All societies, past or present, are characterized by patriarchy, where males control females. Thus radical feminists proclaim the need for sexual revolution that will restructure the personal, domestic and family life.

As feminist movements interact with global and local developments, feminist theories have increasingly been linked with other issues and ideas, hence producing other variants of feminism.⁶ For instance, ecofeminism locates the origin of the ecological crisis in the system of male power or patriarchy, where men are less sensitive than women to natural processes and the natural world.⁷ Black feminism, meanwhile, is situated in antiracist activities. In contrast to white women, black feminists see race, class, and gender exploitation as intersecting in their lives. Third-world feminism, for its part, seeks to challenge the universalizing language of the Western feminists and developmental state discourses about women, the state, and the struggle.

4. Heywood, *Politics*, 62; Andersen, *Thinking about Women*, 275-351.

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*, 283-85; Shirin Rai, "Women and the State in the Third World," in *Women and Politics in the Third World*, ed. Hala Alshar (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 25.

7. Heywood, *Politics*, 62.

Before going into the specifics of the situation of Filipino women, it is fitting to set the global context first because it also relates to developments in the country. From the First World Conference on Women in Mexico (1975) to the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995), women have increasingly brought their agenda to United Nations' (UN) conferences. These include not only women's conferences but also other conferences. It is becoming apparent that women's issues can no longer be separated from other spheres. For instance, the Rio Earth Summit (1992), the Vienna Conference on Human Rights (1993), and the Cairo Conference on Population (1994) linked women's issues with the environment, human rights, and population and development. Other UN conferences in the 1980s and 1990s as well as parallel conferences run by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) widened the concerns and issues being addressed by women activists.

Women-in-development (WID) Approach – An approach used by development agencies from the 1970s and 1980s. It assumes that the neglect of women could be remedied and their situation improved by including or integrating them in development projects and programs.

In the area of women and development, a number of approaches were developed to include women in the development process. By the mid-1970s particularly in 1975 (the International Year of Women), a new policy to integrate women in development caught the attention of many development agencies. The assumption was that the neglect of women could be remedied and their situation improved by including or integrating them in development projects and programs. This policy came to be known as the women-in-development approach.⁸ However, WID approaches that include equity, antipoverty, and efficiency did not question the model of development based on economic growth and determined by male policy makers and planners with little input from women. Consequently, the WID approach has been criticized since the late 1970s, particularly by feminist researchers and activists. WID has allegedly failed to challenge the following: the prevailing development model, its view of women as untapped labor source that could be used to stimulate economic growth and industrialization, its focus on paid employment for women without taking into consideration the huge amount of unpaid work women were already doing, its top-down interventions, and most important, its failure to include women's perspectives in planning and policy making.⁹

8. Marilee Karl, *Women and Empowerment: Participation and Decision Making* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd.; United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service, 1995), 97.
9. *Ibid.*, 100.

Gender-and-development (GAD) Approach – A critique of the WID approach; a development approach that looks at the roles and needs of both women and men and at how these are interrelated, and thus lessens the risk of marginalizing women.

In the mid-1980s, there was a shift from the integration of women to the mainstreaming of women. This was accompanied by the shift in focus from women to gender. In contrast to the WID approach, this new approach is called gender-and-development (GAD). The focus on gender "looks at the roles and needs of both women and men and at how these are interrelated, and thus lessens the risk of marginalizing women." However, the GAD approach does not in itself question the prevailing development paradigm. Its potential to do so is dependent on how it is interpreted and applied.¹⁰

Gender Mainstreaming – A global strategy adopted in 1995 in Beijing for achieving gender equality. This describes efforts to scrutinize and reinvent processes of policy formulation and implementation across all issue areas and at all levels from a gender-differentiated perspective to address and rectify persistent and emerging disparities between men and women.

By 1995 in Beijing, gender mainstreaming has emerged as a global strategy for achieving gender equality. Gender mainstreaming describes efforts "to scrutinize and reinvent processes of policy formulation and implementation across all issue areas and at all levels from a gender-differentiated perspective to address and rectify persistent and emerging disparities between men and women." Taken together, mainstreaming initiatives balance the goal of gender equality "with the need to recognize gender difference to bring about a transformation of masculine-as-norm institutional practices in state and global governance." In addition, the process of gender mainstreaming involves many actors working in multiple settings: governance institutions, within epistemic and activist communities, in local and global civil society.¹¹ In Beijing, 187 states signed the Platform for Action on gender mainstreaming. While this is a significant achievement in itself, signatory states are also expected to honor their commitments.

Globally, women's movements have also devised creative means of pushing for women's issues and causes. For instance, after the 1985 Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi, the International Women's Action Rights Watch was formed to monitor, analyze, and encourage reforms in accordance

10. *Ibid.*, 102.

11. Jacqui True, "Mainstreaming Gender in Global Public Policy," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 5, no. 3 (November 2003): 369.

with the 1976 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). In preparation for the Rio Summit in 1992, the Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) formed a parallel forum, the Women's Caucus, which analyzed developments at the Rio Summit and lobbied at the summit. Still another effort was the Global Tribunal on Violation of Women's Rights, which was a dramatic mechanism of bringing women's testimonies to the world stage.

Filipino Women's Issues and Laws Addressing Them

It has been a common observation that Filipino women are the most liberated in Asia and one of the most empowered. A number of comparisons with other women (see tables 1 and 2 for statistical comparisons with other countries in Asia) and some historical and cultural data support this observation.¹² For instance, since pre-Spanish times, Filipinos have traced kinship bilaterally. Filipino women hold the purse. There are no traditions such as bound feet unlike in China, bride burning unlike in India, and walking several steps behind a man unlike in Japan. Filipino women enjoy equal billing in folktales like "Malakas at Maganda," played one of the most important community leadership roles as the *babaylan* in precolonial times, ruled provinces like Princess Urduja of Pangasinan and Queen Sima of Cotabato, and had their share in leading revolts like Gabriela Silang who led the Ilocos Revolt and Trinidad Tecson who earned the rank of brigadier general during the Spanish era.

Compared to their Asian counterparts, Filipino women fought inequalities like writing the Spanish colonial government to open up schools for women as exemplified by the Malolos women and taking to the streets in the 1930s to demand and to eventually win their right to vote in 1937. Women have legal right to inherit family property. Filipino women have held important positions in government and in the private sector. In more recent times, the Philippines has already had two women presidents.

But despite these so-called advantages of Filipino women, closer inspection of the actual conditions of women shows that gender inequalities and discrimination against women exist in Philippine society.

Context and issues confronting Filipino women

In terms of population, family and housing, the 2000 data of the National Statistics Office (NSO) show that there were slightly more men (38,524,267 or 50.4 percent) than women (37,979,810 or 49.6 percent).¹³ Filipino women also have a high marrying age by developing country standards. The 1998 NSO data show that the median age at first marriage of women aged 24-49 years was 22.1 years.¹⁴ Education seems to influence the marrying age as educated women are

12. Center for Legislative Development (CLD), "Women around the World" (March 2000) (Special Issue), Center for Legislative Development, <http://www.cld.org/waw3.htm> (accessed December 7, 2004).

13. National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW), *Facts and Figures: Population*, NCRFW, http://www.ncrfw.gov.ph/insidepages/inforesource/w_population.htm (accessed December 7, 2004).

14. *Ibid.*

Table 1.
Filipino Women in Comparison with Women in Other Selected Asian Countries
Using the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI)

HDI Rank	Country	GDI Rank	GDI Value	Female Life Expectancy at Birth Years (2002)	Female Adult Literacy Rate (% ages 15 & above) 2002	Female Combined Gross Enrolment Ratio for Primary, Secondary, & Tertiary School Levels (%) 2002	Female Estimated Earned Income (PPP US\$) 2002	HDI Rank Minus GDI Rank*
9	Japan	12	0.932	85.0	-	83	16,977	-3
23	Hong Kong	23	0.898	82.7	89.6	70	18,805	0
25	Singapore	28	0.884	80.2	88.6	75	15,822	-3
28	South Korea	29	0.882	79.2	96.6	85	10,747	-1
33	Brunei	-	-	78.8	91.4	75	-	-
59	Malaysia	52	0.786	75.6	85.4	72	5,219	-1
76	Thailand	61	0.766	73.4	90.5	72	5,284	1
83	Philippines	68	0.751	71.9	92.7	82	3,144	3
94	China	71	0.741	73.2	86.5	64	3,571	5
111	Indonesia	90	0.685	68.6	83.4	64	2,138	-1
112	Vietnam	87	0.689*	71.4	86.9	61	1,888	3
130	Cambodia	105	0.557	59.5	59.3	53	1,622	-1
132	Myanmar	-	-	60.1	81.4	48	-	-
135	Laos	107	0.528	55.6	55.5	53	1,358	0

*The HDI ranks used in this column are those recalculated for the countries with GDI values.

Source: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2004*, New York: UNDP, 2004, 217-20.

Table 2.
Filipino Women in Comparison with Women in Other Selected Asian Countries
Using the Gender-Empowerment Measure (GEM)

Country	GEM Rank	GEM Value	Seats in Parliament Held by Women (% of total)	Female Legislators, Senior Officials and Managers (% of total)	Female Professional & Technical Workers (% of total)	Ratio of Estimated Female to Male Earned Income
Singapore	20	0.648	16.0	26	43	0.50
Philippines	37	0.542	17.2	58	62	0.59
Japan	38	0.531	9.9	10	46	0.46
Malaysia	44	0.519	16.3	20	45	0.40
Thailand	57	0.461	9.6	27	55	0.61
South Korea	68	0.377	5.9	5	34	0.46
Cambodia	69	0.364	10.9	14	33	0.77
Hong Kong	-	-	-	26	40	0.56
China	-	-	20.2	-	-	0.66
Indonesia	-	-	8.0	-	-	0.51
Vietnam	-	-	27.3	-	-	0.69
Laos	-	-	22.9	-	-	0.65

Source: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2004*, New York: UNDP, 2004, 221-24.

likely to marry later and have less children. In terms of households, the percentage of female-headed households has been increasing from 10 percent in 1970 to 12.2 percent in 2000. But in 1995, female-headed households tend to be smaller-sized (average size of four persons) than male-headed households (average size of 5.2 persons). Interesting also is that there are more poor households among the male-headed ones (30.7 percent) than among female-headed households (17.7 percent).¹⁵ Another important aspect is that women continue to outlive men as shown by their higher life expectancy at birth. Based on the 2003 NSO projections, females' projected life expectancy is 72.5 years, while that of males is 67.2 years.¹⁶

Beyond these figures on population, health, and households, violence against women is increasingly becoming an issue. Based on reported cases alone, in the first semester of 2002, the Philippine National Police (PNP) recorded 4,190 cases of violence against women. Of this total, 67 percent were cases of physical abuse/wife battering, 11.9 percent were rape cases, and 7.9 percent were acts of lasciviousness. During the first half of 2003, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) served a total of 3,471 "women in especially difficult circumstances" (WEDC). Most of these cases were on physical abuse/maltreatment and battering (31.4 percent). One in every 10 (9.1 percent) WEDC cases served were on sexual abuse. Of the sexually abused, 68.1 percent were rape cases, 29.6 percent were on incest, and 2.2 percent were acts of lasciviousness cases. According to the DSWD, there was a 31.5 percent increase in the number of WEDC cases served from the first half of 2002 to the same period in 2003. The incidence of violence against women is attributed by the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) to the unequal power relations between men and women.¹⁷ These may be traced to the Spanish period, which established a tradition of subordinating women as manifested in women's generally submissive attitudes and double standards in sexual conduct.

In education, the Philippines ranks very high in terms of literacy and other educational indicators. There are no marked differences in the educational status of Filipino men and women compared to other developing countries because there is no general discrimination of girls in education. In 2000, the literacy rate of women stood a little higher (92.7 percent) than men's literacy rate (92.5 percent), although there was a significant decrease in the literacy rates from the 1994 figures for both women (94 percent) and men (93.7 percent). But according to the NCRFW, the issue is in the gender-tracking of fields of study and specialization and its outward translation into the workplace where men generally occupy the highest ranks and the highest paying positions. For instance, in 2000, women outnumbered men in trade, craft, and industrial occupation (83.6 percent), service trades (76.2 percent), and mass communication and documentation (69.4 percent) courses; but they were a minority in religion

15. *Ibid.*

16. NCRFW, *Facts and Figures: Health*, NCRFW, http://www.ncrfw.gov.ph/insidepages/inforesource/ff_w_health.htm (accessed December 7, 2004).

17. NCRFW, *Facts and Figures: Violence against Women*, NCRFW, http://www.ncrfw.gov.ph/insidepages/inforesource/ff_w_vaw.htm (accessed December 7, 2004).

(11.9 percent), engineering (22.2 percent), and architecture and town planning (26.2 percent) courses.¹⁸

Women's participation rates in labor and employment show what is observed in education. Filipinas have been joining the labor force due to economic necessity and as a response to economic opportunities. Women managers rose from 33 percent in 1995 to 59 percent in 2003.¹⁹ But there are wide gaps in female and labor force participation rates. Based on the NSO's October 2002 Labor Force Survey (LFS), women's labor force participation rate (51.7 percent) still lags behind men's (80.8 percent). This low women's labor force involvement may be a reflection of the greater preference given to the employment of men over women, especially married ones with children. For the major industry groups in October 2002, there were more women in education (75.4 percent), health and social work (71.8 percent), and wholesale and retail trade (62.6 percent) industries, while men continued to dominate the construction (97.9 percent), transportation, storage and communication (95.4 percent), and fishing (93.7 percent) industries. Men also constituted majority of the country's paid workers. They accounted for 65.5 percent of the total own account workers and 61.7 percent of the wage and salary workers. In contrast, more women comprise the unpaid workers at 54.8 percent.²⁰ Furthermore, a qualitative aspect of the economic condition of women is the double burden. Employed women have this double burden because most men relegated household tasks to women, even those with work outside the home.

The continuing labor migration flow to other countries has also affected Filipino women. The NSO's 2002 Survey on Overseas Filipinos shows that there were more male overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) (52.5 percent) than female OFWs (47.5 percent). But the number of female OFWs has been steadily increasing through the years. Majority of the deployed female OFWs in 2002 are domestic helpers (31.7 percent), followed by composers, musicians and singers (19.7 percent), and choreographers and dancers (15.8 percent). Domestic helpers and entertainers are paid lower compared to male OFWs, most of whom are working as drivers and mobile plant operators. Thus, male OFWs' remittances are still much higher than that of female OFWs.²¹ Beyond these figures, Filipino women are also victims of trafficking in and violence against migrant workers. According to GABRIELA, a women's advocacy NGO, 5,000 Filipino mail-order brides enter the United States every year. This means a total of 55,000 cases from 1986 to 1997.²²

Existing policies and levels of implementation

In terms of international commitments, the Philippines in the 1970s responded to the call of the UN for a decade-long action for the full development of women through Presidential Decree (PD) 633 in 1975 by establishing the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women. The NCRFW is the first of

18. NCRFW, *Facts and Figures: Education*, NCRFW, http://www.ncrfw.gov.ph/insidepages/inforesource/ff_w_education.htm (accessed December 7, 2004).

19. Statement of Imelda M. Nicolas, Secretary-General/Lead-Convener, National Anti-Poverty Commission, Philippines, to the 49th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), United Nations, New York, March 7, 2005. <http://www.un.org/webcast/csw2005/statements/050307philippines3-e.pdf> (accessed May 2, 2005).

20. NCRFW, *Facts and Figures: Labor and Employment*, NCRFW, http://www.ncrfw.gov.ph/insidepages/inforesource/ff_w_employment.htm (accessed December 7, 2004).

21. NCRFW, *Facts and Figures: Overseas Employment*, NCRFW, http://www.ncrfw.gov.ph/insidepages/inforesource/ff_w_o_employment.htm (accessed December 7, 2004).

22. CLD International, *Legislative Women's Watch* (May 2004). CLD, <http://www.cld.org/> (accessed February 26, 2005).

its kind in Asia. This was in preparation for the UN International Conference on Women. The Philippines also signed the CEDAW on July 15, 1980, and ratified it on August 5, 1981. As a signatory to the Convention, the Philippines reports regularly to the UN Commission on CEDAW. The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on Transnational Crime; the Optional Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea; and the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

A number of the international commitments on women's issues have been put into national law. Article 2, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution recognizes the role women play in the task of nation building and gives to the state the task to "ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men." Furthermore, the Constitution provides for women's representation (as one of the nine marginalized sectors) in the legislature through the party-list system. In addition, the 1991 Local Government Code (Republic Act or RA 7160) puts importance on the role of women in the process of decentralization and empowerment. It allows the explicit entry and membership of NGOs and people's organizations (POs)—women's groups included—in the structure and processes of local governance through the local development councils and local special bodies. In addition, a women's representative is among the three sectoral representatives that should be included in every local *sanggunian* or legislative council.

Women in the post-1986 Congress, with the support of women's groups, also promoted a legislative agenda that reflected many women's concerns, including WID, GAD, gender equality, women's reproductive health, the indivisibility of women's rights and human rights, action on various forms of violence against women, and the protection of the increasing number of women working abroad. Women legislators worked to establish a Committee on Women with its own secretariat staff as well as an oversight function over the implementation of laws that have been passed. With male colleagues, they have also established a network of women's resource and livelihood training centers strategically placed throughout the country.

Some of the most notable achievements of the post-EDSA Congress were declaring March 8 as the day for celebrating women's achievements through the Women's Day Law (RA 6949) in 1990 and passing the Women in Development and Nation-Building Act of 1991 (RA 7192), which recognizes the role of women in nation building, gives women the right to enter into contracts without having to seek their husbands' permission, opens the Philippine Military Academy and other military and police schools to women, and reserves for gender and development programs at least 5 percent of the budget of government departments. Other legislative gains for women include increasing the maternity

benefits for women in the private sector (RA 7322) signed in 1992; the Women in Small-Business Enterprises Act (RA 7882), the Party-List Act (RA 7941), the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act (RA 8042), and the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act (RA 7877) in 1995; the Anti-Rape Law that reclassifies rape as a crime against persons (RA 8353) in 1997; the Child and Family Courts Act (RA 8369) in 1997; the Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act (RA 8505) and the National AIDS Policy Act in 1998.

In the Twelfth Congress (2001-2004), there was not much attention to women's issues. Out of the total 10,346 bills and resolutions introduced in both Houses, only 365 (3.5 percent) pertained to women's concerns. But among these bills, three were successfully passed and signed into law. These are the Anti-Trafficking Act (RA 9208), the Anti-Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act (RA 9231), and the Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children Act (RA 9262). RA 9208 provides sanctuary to victims and prevents the continuous contravention of women's rights. RA 9262, meanwhile, intends to protect women from being abused by their intimate partners.

Some of the laws took almost a decade and three Congresses to pass. For instance, women's groups led by Sama-Samang Inisyatiba ng Kababaihan sa Pagbabago ng Batas at Lipunan (SIBOL) spearheaded the advocacy for the passage of legislation that will address violence against women and children. RA 9262 was signed into law only after more than seven years of lobbying work. But this proves that many women both inside and outside of government persevered and stood together to put some key important bills through the legislative process.

The limitations of the laws addressing women's concerns must also be recognized.²³ For instance, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law applies only to employer-employee situations in office and school settings but not to colleagues. The Anti-Rape Law implicitly recognizes that rape may occur within marriage but its forgiveness clause absolves husbands of the crime of rape once their wives forgive them. A related issue to legislation on women's issues is that despite the lobbying of women's groups and the vigilance of some legislators, there are many bills on women's concerns that have not yet been passed. These include the National Commission on Women bill, the new population policy bill, the Women Empowerment Act reserving for qualified women at least a third of the appointive positions in national and local governments, and an enabling bill for elections of women's representatives to local councils to support the sectoral representatives' clause in RA 7160. Specifically, bills on divorce and population control have met strong resistance from the heavy lobbying of the influential Catholic Church and other conservative groups.

The Philippine executive has initiated a number of plans and frameworks for the implementation of national laws. The Philippine Plan for Gender Responsive Development (1995-2025), adopted through Executive Order 273,

23. "Mabuhay ang Filipino! Mabuhay ang Kalayaan!" Filipino Women in Politics and Governance. <http://www.kababaihan.org/herstory> (accessed September 25, 2004).

is the National Plan for Women that consolidates the action commitments of the Philippines during the Beijing Conference on Women. Meanwhile, the Gender and Development Budget further expands the 5 percent allocation in RA 7192 to cover the total budget appropriations, not only development funds, of all government agencies and local government units. The Philippine government has also institutionalized gender mainstreaming through the Framework Plan for Women (FPW). The FPW is focused on three distinct but interrelated themes: promotion of women's economic empowerment; advancement and protection of women's human rights; and promotion of gender responsive governance.²⁴ Philippine governmental agencies are now required to follow specific guidelines to implement gender mainstreaming in their programs, activities, and projects, which are reflected in their respective GAD Plans. In addition, the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), together with NCRFW and the Overseas Development Assistance-Gender and Development Network, developed the Harmonized GAD Guidelines for Project Development, Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation, which serves as a tool for all government agencies, development practitioners, and international donor organizations to ensure that gender concerns are fully integrated in the various stages of the project cycle.

There are now collaborative partnerships among certain national and local government agencies, the academe, NGOs, and POs to address specific women's issues and concerns. For instance, Women and Children's Desks have been established by the PNP in every police station all over the country, and the Women and Child Protection Units are run by the Department of Health (DOH) in many hospitals. These DOH-run units conduct regular training for doctors and health professionals on gender-based violence and forensic medicine in relation to crimes against women. There is also a National Policy on Violence Prevention Program, a community-based program focused on preventive strategies to educate local communities, especially the male population, on the negative impact and repercussion of domestic violence in the family. The Gender Justice Awards were also institutionalized to raise the quality of court decisions and to inspire judges to be gender-sensitive in hearing and deciding on cases. Efforts to address the problem of trafficking at the local level include community-based information dissemination campaigns in cooperation with NGOs, in popular media formats like radio and street theater presentations, alert advisories on illegal recruiters, as well as community dialogues and meetings. There are also innovative projects dealing with the demand-side, like posters and television and radio infomercials addressed to men not to treat women as sex objects and to prevent domestic violence.

However, there are remaining issues and obstacles in implementing the gender-sensitive laws already available. About a decade ago, Feliciano wrote about the remaining issues and obstacles in the legal status and protection of

24. Statement of Aurora Javate de Dios, Chair, NCRFW, to the 47th Session of the CSW, Geneva, March 5, 2003, NCRFW, http://www.ncrlw.gov.ph/insidepages/intcommitment/sdj_statement.htm (accessed December 7, 2004).

Filipino women.²⁵ While there have since been changes, e.g., more progressive laws on women passed in the past decade, more collaborative efforts among different sectors on increasing gender awareness among the population, and greater support for victims of abuse and violence, some of the issues and obstacles mentioned by Feliciano remain relevant today.²⁶

First, there is inadequate enforcement and monitoring of the implementation of laws addressing women's issues. This can be linked to the low priority given to women's concerns and compounded by inadequate government resources for implementation and monitoring.

Second, there generally is a low level of consciousness on women's concerns. Despite the growing number of women politicians and leaders, the low consciousness continuously manifest itself in the tendency of appointing authorities to favor male candidates for high-level positions, the tendency of women to flock to traditional and low-paying jobs, and inadequate access to justice. The low level of consciousness may be attributed to the lack of information on laws and regulations. This means that the gender information and literacy campaigns being done by government agencies, the academe, NGOs, and POs should continue and reach a wider audience. These education campaigns are critical in empowering Filipinos to fully implement gender equality.

Third, reports on the rate of incidence of forms of violence against women, e.g., rape, domestic violence, sexual harassment, incest, prostitution, etc., are still inaccurate. Of course, more and more women have been coming forward to report cases due to the support and encouragement of women's groups, progressive legal groups, and concerned government agencies. The legal and law enforcement agencies are also receiving gender-awareness trainings. However, concerned groups should continue to focus on changing the culture of silence that surrounds violence against women.

Fourth, while trafficking in and prostitution of women are prohibited by laws and tradition, the problem continues amidst precarious sociopolitical conditions and high unemployment. Young women migrants from poor rural areas without the skills to compete in the urban, business-oriented and foreign market often occupy the lowest paid and marginalized jobs in both the domestic and overseas labor market. Government agencies and other concerned sectors should not merely address the problems of trafficking and prostitution but also the sociopolitical and economic conditions in the country that force women to be victims of such problems.

Thus, despite the existence of a number of progressive laws and initiatives recognizing women's rights and equal role in society, the struggle for genuine gender equality and mainstreaming continues. The persistent issues confronted by women in different spheres of society discussed previously prove that there are still many obstacles to full achievement of gender equality.

25. Myrna Feliciano, "Legal and Political Issues Affecting the Status of Women, 1985-1993," *Review of Women's Studies* 4, no. 1 (1993-1994): 13-31.

26. *Ibid.*, 25-28.

Women's Participation in Philippine Politics

Women play dual political roles in the country—as qualified voters and as candidates to elective and appointive positions in the government service. Aguilar identified five forms of participation of Filipino women in politics. These are in: 1) voting, 2) campaigning for a particular candidate, 3) running in elections as candidates, 4) assuming positions in the Cabinet, and 5) organizing and mobilizing women for political empowerment.²⁷ Filipino women were granted the right to vote in 1937 after years of hard work and struggle.²⁸ The election law that was passed by the Philippine Commonwealth on September 15, 1937, extended the right to vote to all citizens, twenty-one years of age, and able to read and write unless they are disqualified by law.²⁹

Voting trends showed that in general, women have more actively participated in elections through voting since the 1978 elections. The turnout for women voters had been consistently higher as compared to men. For instance, in the 1998 and 2001 elections, the voter turnout rates for women were 87 percent and 76.7 percent, respectively, while for men, the voter turnouts were 85.7 and 75.9 percent.³⁰

According to the NCRFW, there has been an unprecedented rise in the participation of women in politics over the past decade. Both the executive and legislative branches of government showed a steady posting of women officials.³¹ In the legislature, Filipino women have been elected as senators and members of the House of Representatives since the time they were granted suffrage. From 1946 to 1971, the number of women elected in Congress ranged from one to six.³² When there were no elections because of the declaration of martial law in the country, women were still actively involved in politics, particularly in the antidictatorship struggle and the communist movement. When elections were held in 1978, only ten positions in the *Batasang Pambansa* were won by women out of the 165 elective seats. In the 1984 elections, women candidates garnered ten out of the 181 seats in the legislature.

A slight improvement in women's representation in the legislature was experienced in the post-Marcos period. There were two women senators and nineteen women members of the House of Representatives who were elected in the Eighth Congress (1987-1992). However, although there was improvement in women's representation, this was still inadequate considering that women occupied less than 10 percent of the seats available in the two chambers of Congress. From 1987 to the present, women's representation in the legislature has not exceeded 17 percent (see table 3). In fact, at no time in Philippine history has women's political representation reached the critical mass of 30 percent, which is the target endorsed by

27. Carmencita Aguilar, "Filipino Women in Electoral Politics," in *Filipino Women and Public Policy*, ed. Proserpina D. Tapales (Manila: Kalikasan Press, 1992), 22.

28. NCRFW, *Filipino Women in Public Affairs*, 1985, 15.

29. *Ibid.*, 16.

30. NCRFW, *Fact Sheet on Filipino Women*, 2003; See also <http://www.ncrfw.gov.ph>.

31. See Center for Legislative Development, "Women in Politics and Governance," <http://www.cld.org>.

32. NCRFW, *Filipino Women in Public Affairs*, 1.

the UN Economic and Social Council.³³ Moreover, while Filipino women took an unprecedented active role in the political events of the past decade, their participation in politics and governance continues to be limited; they continue to work harder to influence policy and decision making as legislators, chief executives, and top administrators at both the national and local levels.³⁴

Table 3.
Women's Representation in Congress (In percentage)

Congress	Period	Number of Women Senators	Percentage	Number of Women Representatives	Percentage
Eighth	1987-1992	2	8.3	19	8.9
Ninth	1992-1995	4	16.7	23	10.7
Tenth	1995-1998	4	16.7	24	10.6
Eleventh	1998-2001	4	16.7	27	12.3
Twelfth	2001-2004	3	12.5	36	17
Thirteenth	2004-2007	4	16.7	36	15

Sources: Center for Legislative Development, 2002, for data from 1987 to 2001 and NCRFW, <http://www.ncrfw.gov.ph>, for data from 2001 to present.

In the executive branch of government, women were traditionally appointed to head the Department of Social Welfare. During Martial Law, women headed two out of the eighteen line ministries. These were the Ministry of Human Settlements and the Ministry of Social Services and Development. The Ministry of Human Settlements was headed by then First Lady Imelda Marcos.

In the post-Marcos period, the number of women who were appointed as cabinet members slightly improved. However, as in the legislature, the percentage of women who headed executive departments did not exceed 17 percent. Table 4 shows the number of women cabinet members from 1987 to the present.

Table 4.
Women in the Cabinet, 1987 to Present

Period	Number of Women in Cabinet	Number of Cabinet Members	Percentage of Women in Cabinet
1987-1992	1	28	3.6
1992-1995	2	18	11.1
1995-1998	3	24	12.5
1998-2001	2	16	12.5
2001-2004	4	24	17
2004-present	4	25	16

Sources: Center for Legislative Development, 2002, for data from 1987 to 2001 and NCRFW, <http://www.ncrfw.gov.ph>, for data from 2001 to present.

33. CLD, "A Policy Paper on Promoting Gender Balance in Political Representation," CLD, 2002, <http://www.cld.org> (accessed September 20, 2004).

34. NCRFW, Fact Sheet on Filipino Women, 2003.

To date, the Philippines has had two women presidents: Corazon Cojuangco Aquino (1986-1992) and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-present). Despite this, very few women have been appointed to head the different departments of the executive branch of government. At present, women head only two out of the twenty-five departments. These are the Departments of Labor and Employment, and Social Welfare and Development.

At the local level, the percentage of seats won by women has increased over time (see table 5). However, it should be noted that the percentage of seats won and occupied by women politicians at the local level has not exceeded 20 percent. The highest percentage has been achieved during the 2004 elections when 19.2 percent of gubernatorial seats were won by women.

Table 5.
Women in Local Government (in percentage)

Period	Governor	Vice-Governor	Mayor	Vice-Mayor
1987-1992	5.5	10.81	7.5	6.03
1992-1995	6.8	no data	6.5	no data
1995-1998	11.8	17.11	8.1	8.27
1998-2001	17.3	11.5	14.5	11.13
2001-2004	15.2	12.7	15.5	13.1
2004-present	19.2	12.8	14.6	17.1

Sources: NCRFW, Fact Sheet on Filipino Women, 2003; NCRFW website, <http://www.ncrfw.gov.ph>.

In the bureaucracy, the number of female government personnel is slightly higher than that of the male. Out of almost 1.5 million government personnel, 53 percent are women; but there are more male personnel in government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) and local government units (LGUs). According to category of service, there are more women in the career service compared to men (694,364/1,250,510). In contrast, there are more men in the noncareer service (123,743/194,988). Looking at the level of positions within the bureaucracy, only second-level positions (technical positions to division chiefs) are dominated by women who hold 71.9 percent of these positions. The first- and third-level positions as well as nonexecutive career positions are dominated by men.

Women are also a minority in the judiciary, both in the Supreme Court as well as in the lower courts. At present, only four out of fifteen justices in the Supreme Court are women and out of the total 1,505 incumbent judges, only 352 or 23.4 percent are women. Considering that women have not occupied more than 30 percent of the positions in this branch of government, these present figures are already considerable improvements as compared to previous years. Table 6 shows the number of women justices in the Supreme Court from 1987 to the present.

Table 6.
Women Justices in the Supreme Court

Period	Number of Women Justices	Total Number of Justices	Percentage of Women in the Supreme Court
1987-1992	2	14	14.3
1992-1995	1	15	6.7
1995-1998	1	15	6.7
1998-2001	2	15	13.3
2001-2004	1	15	6.7
2004-present	4	15	26.6

Sources: Center for Legislative Development, 2002 for data from 1987 to 2001 and Supreme Court website, <http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph> for 2004 to current data.

On the whole, the data on women's participation in politics show that women have not had an equal share of the positions of influence as compared to men. Women tend to dominate the lower-rank positions in the bureaucracy and have not occupied more than 30 percent of the elective positions both in the national and local levels. This is in spite of the fact that women are perceived to be better public officials than men. A national survey conducted by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) in November 2004 found out that most Filipinos see women as better than men as public officials not only in promoting women's welfare, but also in terms of efficiency, sensitivity to the environment, selflessness, and honesty.³⁵

Women's Movements and the Struggle for Democracy

The types of women's groups that have been involved in Philippine politics vary—most of them are either issue-oriented or election-oriented. Women's groups have been formed since the Spanish period. Many of them have been involved in the education of women, delivery of basic services, campaigning, protesting against existing governments, and empowering women. However, while the origins of women's groups can be traced back to as early as the nineteenth century, these women's groups did not necessarily belong to a single group that adhered to one ideology or a particular type of feminist ideology.

The Logia de Adopcion, founded in 1893, was one of the earliest women's groups in the Philippines. The group was linked to the Philippine revolutionary movement against Spain and its membership comprised intellectuals and upper-class women who were sympathetic to the revolution.³⁶ Another important women's group during the period was the women's bureau of the Katipunan, which produced women leaders like Gregoria de Jesus, Trinidad Tecson, Teresa Magbanua, and Melchora Aquino.

During the American period, a number of women's groups were formed principally to deliver basic services to women and address the cause of women's

35. Sherame M. Ancajas, "SWS November 2004 Survey: Women Are Considered Superior to Men as Public Officials, in Most Respects," Social Weather Stations, <http://www.sws.org.ph> (accessed May 20, 2005).

36. Leonora C. Angeles, "Feminism and Nationalism: The Discourse and Politics of the Women's Movement in the Philippines" (MA thesis, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, 1989), 109.

suffrage. The *Asociacion de Damas de la Cruz Roja* (Women's Red Cross Association) was established to coordinate the humanitarian services provided by women. It was headed by Hilaria Aguinaldo, the wife of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo. The *Liga Femenina de la Paz* (Philippine Women's League for Peace) was formed and called upon by the Americans to aid in their pacification campaign. In 1905, the *Asociacion Feminista Filipina* (Feminist Association of the Philippines) was founded by Concepcion Felix Rodriguez and other women who belonged to the upper class of Philippine society. The primary goal of this group was to deliver social services, lobby for prison, education and labor reforms, campaign against prostitution, gambling and other vices, and lobby for the appointment of women to municipal and provincial boards of education and electoral precincts.³⁷ The Society for the Advancement of Women was formed in 1912 to seriously address the cause of women's suffrage. However, later in its existence, the name of this group was changed to Club Damas de Manila (Women's Club of Manila) and became more active and influential in their social welfare activities. The group that became the vanguard of a more successful suffrage movement from 1921 to 1937 was the National Federation of Women's Clubs in the Philippines, which was established in 1921 to promote interest in civic improvement, social betterment, intellectual advancement, economic independence, and mutual cooperation among women.³⁸ Other women's groups that actively worked on the suffrage campaign were the *Liga Nacional de Damas Filipinas* (National League of Filipino Women) and the Philippine Association of University Women (PAUW).

In general, the women's groups that existed during the American period were founded, composed of, and dominated by middle- and upper-class women who were influenced by their higher education and exposure to liberal-democratic structures established by the Americans. This trend continued until the postwar period when women's groups were formed mainly to support the candidates' political campaigns. Most of these groups were also linked to the major political parties at the time. The Nacionalista and Liberal parties formed their respective women's brigade during elections. According to Angeles, women's groups at the time served mainly as auxiliaries to male-dominated organizations.³⁹ Examples of these groups are the Women's Auxiliary of the Liberal Party, the Women's Magsaysay-for-President Movement, and the Blue Ladies that campaigned for the presidency of Ferdinand E. Marcos.

During Martial Law, most of the women's groups that thrived in mainstream politics were those organized by the government, particularly by Mrs. Marcos. In the late 1970s, the government formed the NCRFW as part of the government's commitment to the UN Declaration of International Development Decade for Women in 1975. The commission was formed principally to assess the role of women in the country and tap their development potentials. Another group of women formed during the period was the National Organization of Women

37. *Ibid.*, 112.

38. *Ibid.*, 114.

39. *Ibid.*, 121.

(NOW), which was organized under the banner of the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO). The membership of this group consisted mainly of women politicians and wives of politicians who belonged to the upper and middle classes. It can be said that this group was formed mainly to campaign during elections since nothing was heard about it after its leader, Eva Estrada Kalaw, was elected to the *Batasang Pambansa* in 1984.⁴⁰

Another set of women's groups that became involved in politics during Martial Law consisted of groups that were active in the protest movements against Marcos as well as those that were organized by women political activists. Some of the prominent groups were the *Malayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan* (MAKIBAKA), the Concerned Women of the Philippines (CWP), the Alliance of Women for Action and Reconciliation (AWARE), the Women for the Ouster of Marcos and Boycott (WOMB), the *Samahan ng Malayang Kababaihang Nagkakaisa* (SAMAKANA), PILIPINA, and the *Katipunan ng Kababaihan Para sa Kalayaan* or KALAYAAN. These women's groups varied in terms of their composition, objectives and guiding ideologies. The group MAKIBAKA was formed in the early 1970s by a group of feminist activists "to advance the national democratic struggle."⁴¹ Founded by student activist Lorena Barros, this group adhered to the national democratic ideology of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Another group, the CWP founded in 1978, took a stand regarding human rights issues during the Martial Law years. It also campaigned for a "No" vote in the 1981 plebiscite on constitutional amendments as well as for a boycott of the 1981 presidential elections. AWARE was founded by upper-class women and eventually became the backbone of the Cory for President Movement in 1985. WOMB was more associated with leftist groups since it was founded and led by women political activists and professionals. SAMAKANA was one of the first grassroots women's organizations that eventually became part of GABRIELA (General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action), an umbrella organization of women's groups. PILIPINA and KALAYAAN were known as the first feminist groups.⁴² The founders of PILIPINA were mostly involved in social development work especially in organizing cooperatives and training. PILIPINA's overall goal was "to work for the acceptance by Philippine society of the central significance of the women's question in the nation's struggle for social transformation." KALAYAAN's founders were political activists who were engaged in research, writing and education. Eventually, this group became instrumental in the formation of GABRIELA.

In addition to the women's groups that organized to oppose the Marcos dictatorship, the activist nuns of the Catholic Church also became actively involved in the human rights movement, the protest movement against the dictatorship, and the mass movements leading to the EDSA People Power Revolution. In her book, Roces pointed out that the role of the activist nuns are often relegated to the background or even neglected when discussing the women's movement.⁴³

40. *Ibid.*, 177.

41. *Ibid.*, 147.

42. *Ibid.*, 179.

43. Mina Roces, *Women, Power and Kinship Politics: Female Power in Post-War Philippines* (Pasig City: Anvil Publications, 2000), 124.

It should be noted that these nuns were politically active even if they did not aim for formal political power.

All the groups identified above were actively involved in the protest movements against the Marcos dictatorship. Although they differed in terms of their ideologies, it can be said that the unifying factor of these groups was the objective to unseat the dictator. Moreover, most of these groups aimed for the empowerment of Filipino women in political and social spheres. After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, some of these groups eventually changed their names or merged with other women's groups.

The consequent restoration of democratic institutions and processes in the country following the assumption to the presidency of Corazon C. Aquino witnessed the establishment of an all-women political party. This was the Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), which was organized in 1986. The party participated in the 1987 elections but failed to win political positions in the local and national levels. The party's failure was attributed to the women's relative isolation from patronage politics, their lack of political experience, and the fact that the patron-client system of politics implied that women had to rely on the male-dominated network in order to win.⁴⁴

In 1998, the party-list system was institutionalized in the Philippines. This was in accordance to RA 7941 or the Party-List Law. Women's groups participated in the election of party-list groups. Abansel Pinay, which was formed by PILIPINA, succeeded in having one representative elected in the Eleventh Congress.⁴⁵ Consequently, GABRIELA also succeeded in electing one party-list representative in the Thirteenth Congress.⁴⁶ Aside from working to advance the women's agenda in the legislature, GABRIELA is also actively involved in protest rallies and mass actions, especially in the movement to oust President Joseph Estrada in 2001.

Considering the number and nature of women's groups discussed above, it can be concluded that women have made significant contributions to Philippine society and politics. However, it should be noted that much more still has to be done in terms of attaining the main goal of women's groups to achieve gender equality and equity. Moreover, more specific goals such as ensuring the effective implementation of legislations concerning women, having a women's vote, and unifying women's groups into a potent political force are still to be achieved. Women must overcome the challenges and obstacles toward the attainment of these goals.

Conclusion

The achievements of Philippine women, groups and movements are widely recognized. Throughout history, various women's groups have done a great

44. *Ibid.*, 107.

45. This was Representative Rina Jimenez David who served from 1998 to 2001.

46. This is Representative Liza Maza.

deal in empowering women and attaining gender equality. They have developed legislations, institutions and structures to increase gender awareness among both men and women. But despite the inroads that women have made in the male-dominated field of politics, challenges persist. Significant political reforms are necessary to free women from marginalization, subordination, stereotyping, and violence. More important, obstacles that hinder women, particularly those from the lower-income groups, from exercising their right to political participation must be addressed. At present, women in politics consist mainly of those from political families, the educated and the middle class.

While the statistics presented in this chapter indicate the increasing role of women in politics, what is not indicated is the quality of women's participation in politics and governance. For example, while there are more women in the bureaucracy, it can be observed that women tend to occupy second-level positions. The key managerial and executive positions are still dominated by men. Furthermore, as already noted, the percentage of women in government both at the national and local levels has not reached the critical mass.

In the context of Philippine politics, women have not traditionally been the holders of power. Although steps toward women empowerment have been taken, how far these would go depends largely on the will of those who hold power, the support of the people, and the conscious effort of women to work for the achievement of political, economic and social equality.

Guide Questions

1. Define feminism, gender, and gender mainstreaming.
2. Why are women's issues becoming more important in the Philippines and worldwide?
3. What is the general status of women in Philippine society? What are the positive and negative aspects of women's status in the area of population, family, education, and employment?
4. Discuss the performance of the post-1986 Congress in terms of women's issues. What are the achievements and the obstacles encountered regarding legislation on women's issues?
5. What are the obstacles and lingering issues in implementing gender equality laws?
6. In what ways have women participated in politics?
7. What do the data regarding women's participation in politics say about women's status in the political system? Would you consider that the role of women in politics has significantly improved? Why or why not?
8. What are the contributions of women's groups in Philippine society and politics?
9. Identify the obstacles and challenges to women's participation in politics.

Glossary

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) – the United Nations Convention that emerged from the First Decade of Women (1975-1984). It sets principles and standards to achieve equality between men and women, and to eliminate discrimination against women in all spheres of life.

Feminism – a perspective or ideology committed to promoting the social role of women and, in most cases, dedicated to the goal of gender equality.

GABRIELA – General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership, and Action; an umbrella organization of women's groups. It succeeded in electing a representative in the Thirteenth Congress through the party-list election.

Gender – the socially learned behaviors and expectations associated with the two sexes. Unlike sex, gender roles change from one place and culture to another and across time.

Gender-and-development (GAD) Approach – a critique of the WID approach; a development approach that looks at the roles and needs of both women and men and at how these are interrelated, and thus lessens the risk of marginalizing women.

Gender Mainstreaming – a global strategy adopted in 1995 in Beijing for achieving gender equality. This describes efforts to scrutinize and reinvent processes of policy formulation and implementation across all issue areas and at all levels from a gender-differentiated perspective to address and rectify persistent and emerging disparities between men and women.

KAIBA – Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan; the first all-women political party organized in 1986. It failed in electing women in national and local posts in the 1987 elections.

National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) – established in 1975 through PD 633 and the first national machinery of women in Asia. From providing assistance to women for livelihood and other basic needs programs in the 1970s, its work now focuses on mainstreaming GAD concerns in the bureaucracy and partnerships with women NGOs and civil society.

Party-list System – a type of proportional representation. Electors vote for parties, not for candidates. Parties are allocated seats in direct proportion to the votes they gain in their election.

PILIPINA – known as the first feminist group in the Philippines; its founders were mostly involved in social development work. It formed Abanse!

Pinay for the first party-list elections held in 1998. It succeeded in electing one representative in the Eleventh Congress.

Sex – a person's biological identity; meant to signify the fact that one is either male or female.

Women-in-development (WID) Approach – an approach used by development agencies from the 1970s and 1980s. It assumes that the neglect of women could be remedied and their situation improved by including or integrating them in development projects and programs.

Further Reading

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The Environmental Movement and Philippine Politics

Ruth Lusterio Rico

You forget that the fruits belong to all and that the land belongs to no one.

– Jean-Jacques Rousseau,

from *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les homes*, 1755

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, the student should be able to:

1. Explain the global and domestic context of the emergence of environmental issues as a concern for the Philippine government.
2. Identify the state of the Philippine environment.
3. Define and explain the concept of sustainable development.
4. Identify and evaluate key policies and programs of the Philippine government toward protecting the environment.
5. Assess the role of non-governmental groups in addressing issues concerning the environment.

Introduction

Concern for the environment spans a range of interlocking issues affecting the local and the global. Environmental awareness, advocacy, and activism had risen globally since the 1970s. This can be attributed to the effects of massive environmental destruction being felt worldwide. Consequently, groups that advocate environmental conservation and protection have generated what has been called an environmental movement, one of so-called new social movements that offer alternatives to existing conditions, perspectives, and power relations.¹

This chapter introduces students to some views regarding the environment and the relationship between environment and politics, provides a background on the state of the Philippine environment, and discusses the emergence of the environmental movement in the Philippines.

1. Timothy Doyle and Doug McEachern, *Environment and Politics* (London: Routledge, 1998), 56-62.

The term "environment" is frequently used to "refer to the whole of the natural world—from ecosystem to biosphere—within which human beings and all other parts of the plant and animal world have their being."² The environment includes forests, coastal and marine resources, agricultural lands, freshwater resources, energy use, urbanization, and industries. However, "environment" is often constructed differently in different cultures and is used in different ways by different peoples.³ The different views regarding the environment have implications on how human beings should protect and conserve the environment for future generations. At least three main views on the environment can be identified. These are: 1) the anthropocentric or human-regarding view, 2) the ecocentric view or ecosystem-regarding view, and 3) the biocentric or life-regarding view. The anthropocentric view has two strands. First, there is the view that human beings stand "over and above nature."⁴ This is also referred to as "strong anthropocentrism." This view sees nature as solely for human use and consumption. Human needs and wants are considered paramount and nature exists to satisfy them. The second view sees humans as stewards of the environment, hence they do not "unconditionally own parts of the planet but hold them on trust."⁵ The principle of stewardship includes: 1) the responsibility for the whole earth, 2) solidarity of all people, and 3) the need to take a long-term view.⁶ This view is also called "enlightened anthropocentrism." The principles of utilitarianism are used as the basis of the ecocentric view. In particular, utilitarianism is used to justify animal rights and vegetarianism. Utilitarianism upholds that actions should be judged by their consequences rather than their intrinsic rightness.⁷ The biocentric view upholds respect for life.⁸ These different views on the environment indicate particular ways by which nature and its resources are valued. The differences in views with regard to the environment are reflected in the environmental agenda of rich and poor countries. In developed and industrialized countries, the focus of the environmental agenda is the protection of the environment against the excesses of human development.⁹ Hence population control, species extinction, global climate change, and deforestation are considered as high-priority problems. In the case of poor and developing countries, the emphasis of the environmental agenda is solving environmental problems that have an impact on basic levels of standard of living and quality of life.¹⁰

Protection of the environment and access to natural resources are determined by the policies adopted and implemented by the state. This clearly shows the direct relationship between environment and politics. Environmentalists in developing countries such as the Philippines link the protection of the environment to the effort to democratize access to natural resources.¹¹ Furthermore, Philippine environmental groups have asserted that the environmental issue in the country is, more than anything else, an equity issue.¹²

2. James Connelly and Graham Smith, *Politics and the Environment* (London: Routledge, 1999), 8.

3. Doyle and McEachern, *Environment and Politics*, 2.

4. Connelly and Smith, *Politics and the Environment*, 11.

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*, 12.

7. *Ibid.*, 13.

8. *Ibid.*, 15.

9. *Ibid.*, 2.

10. *Ibid.*, 3.

11. Francisco A. Magno, "The Growth of Philippine Environmentalism," *Kasarinian* 9, no. 1 (3rd Quarter 1993): 7.

12. *Ibid.*, 8.

The origin of the environmental movement in the Philippines is traced back to the period of authoritarianism when the state was unable to protect the environment and resolve environmental issues. Broad and Cavanagh note that ordinary people such as poor peasants can be considered as the first environmentalists in the Philippines.¹³ These people became the catalysts for halting the plunder of the environment and initiators of sustainable alternatives.¹⁴ Communities became involved not only in the protection of their environment, which is a source of their livelihood, but also in demanding for their place in "negotiating tables." As civil society groups, citizens mobilized themselves to "ensure that resource plunderers...do not flaunt the laws, ignore the limits and circumvent the bans."¹⁵

On the whole, the state is viewed as both the steward and manager of the country's natural resources. But the experience of the Philippines shows that the state had been unable to properly balance the achievement of development and the protection of the environment. For many years, the country's natural resources, particularly the forests, have been used as the main instruments to achieve the goal of national development. From the Spanish period to the Marcos years, the country's environment had been plundered to serve the interests of the ruling class, the elite, and the cronies.

The unequal access to natural resources, the threats posed by environmental degradation on human security and the goal of sustainable development are among the reasons why environmental nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and people's organizations (POs) have protested against state-sponsored, foreign-funded and pollution-causing development projects such as the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant.¹⁶ Environmental groups had served as watchdogs of society and supported communities and indigenous peoples in their effort to maintain the integrity of the ecosystem. The conditions under authoritarianism provided the impetus for the growth of the environmental movement and this developed and flourished during the period of democratization after 1986.

The Goal of Sustainable Development

Beginning in the 1970s, environmental concerns have been emphasized in various international forums. However, the issues concerning the environment have not been made integral parts of the planning processes within some states and international institutions. In 1972, the United Nations Conference on Human Environment held in Stockholm, Sweden, brought to the attention of the international community the urgency of incorporating environmental concerns in the overall concept of development. The term sustainable development was then used to refer to the strategic approach to integrate environment and development.¹⁷

13. Robin Broad with John Cavanagh, *Plundering Paradise: The Struggle for the Environment in the Philippines* (Oxford, England: University of California Press, Ltd., 1993), 57.

14. *Ibid.*, 71.

15. *Ibid.*

16. The Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, located in Morong, Bataan, was started to be built in 1975. After Marcos was ousted from power, the Aquino administration stopped the project because of allegations of corruption and the perceived threats of the nuclear plant's operation on human and environmental security. However, the Philippine government continues to pay Westinghouse, the company that built the plant.

17. Conchita M. Regragio, "Sustainable Development, Environmental Planning and People's Initiative," *Kasarianian* 9, no. 1 (3rd Quarter 1993): 36.

However, it was only in the late 1980s when sustainable development gained currency through the work of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), also called the Brundtland Commission. In the Commission's report entitled *Our Common Future* (1987), sustainable development was defined as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."¹⁸ Therefore, the Brundtland Commission's definition of sustainable development implies that it requires developing economies to be firmly rooted in their ecological bases and that these roots be protected and nurtured so that they may support growth over the long term.¹⁹ The concept of sustainable development was widely adopted and its use further flourished in the 1990s with the holding of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992 and the subsequent publication of *Agenda 21*. Since then, many governments, including the Philippine government, declared their adoption of the concept of sustainable development and claimed that it would be incorporated in their policies.

The discourse on sustainable development has been criticized for not really being a radical environmental or "green" concept.²⁰ This is because of sustainable development's acceptance of the prime need for economic growth and the dominance of human welfare over the needs of the environment. It conceives of the relationship between humans and nature in terms of the use of the environment by and for humans. Nevertheless the adoption of the concept of sustainable development required a change in the state's policy framework, which is often opposed by businessmen and economists. In the case of the Philippines, the government adopted sustainable development as its development framework in 1989. This allowed for the increased participation of various groups in making and shaping policies. Sustainable development includes the idea that democratization will bring about conditions in which people would be able to help themselves.

The State of Philippine Environment

If wealth were measured by the diversity of life, the Philippines could be considered as one of the richest in the world. The country is home to over five hundred species of land mammals, birds, reptiles, and amphibians. However, the Philippines also has more endangered species of mammals than any other country in the world. It has also been ranked highest among sixty countries in percentage of mammal species threatened and third highest in percent of bird species threatened.²¹ The combination of rich diversity and a high degree of threat to diversity have given the Philippines a reputation as one of the hot spots in the world. Thus the country has been identified as one of the top three

18. World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 43.

19. Rraggio, "Sustainable Development," 37.

20. Doyle and McEachern, *Environment and Politics*, 35.

21. The ranking was made by ecologists during the World Economic Forum in Switzerland. For reference, see <http://www.bwl.org/papers/Calvo/Nature2000/phiio.html> (accessed September 30, 2002).

places in the world to prioritize protection because it has a large number of endemic species struggling to survive in degraded habitats.

The range of activities that prove detrimental to the environment includes the emission of substances by industrial establishments and vehicles that contain dusts, chemicals, smoke, and other toxic matters in harmful quantities; improper dumping techniques and untreated mine tailings; and use of banned fertilizers. All of these contribute to the level of pollution. Furthermore, the clearing of mangrove swamps and forests, harvesting of banned tree species, and the hunting of endangered species contribute to large-scale deforestation and destruction of marine resources. All these actions are considered violations of a society's right to a life-supportive environment.²²

One of the major threats to diversity in the Philippines is rapid deforestation. In 1575, forest cover in the Philippines was almost 92 percent of the country's total land area or an estimated 27.5 million hectares. By the 1900s, the percentage of the country's total land area covered by old growth rainforest declined to 70 percent and in 1934, only 17 million hectares or 57 percent of the total land area remained forested. From the 1920s to the 1960s, the Philippines was Asia's largest exporter of rainforest timber.²³ The peak of deforestation was in the late 1960s at 300,000 hectares per year. In the early 1980s, deforestation rate declined to 150,000 hectares per year because the country's forest cover continued to dwindle and because timber from other countries filled the export market.²⁴ In the 1990s deforestation rate further declined because of the ban on logging in many parts of the country, the reduced number of timber concessionaires and an intensified reforestation program.²⁵ However, despite the decline in deforestation, roughly 7 percent was left covered by old growth rainforest in 1997. Moreover, the World Economic Forum Index identified the Philippines as having the highest rate of deforestation. At present, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) records the annual rate of forest denudation at 87,556 hectares or 1.49 percent.²⁶ The state of Philippine forests is obviously critical. The latest estimates place the country's remaining forest areas at 5.4 million hectares.²⁷ This forest cover is roughly 18.6 percent of the country's total land area and is far below the ideal forest cover which is 54 percent of the total land area.

The degradation of Philippine forests is largely attributed to commercial logging, "slash-and-burn" or swidden agriculture (*kaingin*) and mining activities.²⁸ From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, the Philippines' forest industry based primarily on the export of logs and lumber reached its peak output. Logging contributed 29 percent of the total export earnings of the country in the 1960s and this was the same period when the highest deforestation rate was reached.²⁹ Furthermore, it was also during this time when the Timber License Agreement (TLA) system was used by President Marcos as an instrument of patronage, i.e., to reward his supporters, friends, and family.³⁰ Through the TLA system, the

22. Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, *Batas ng Buhay, Buhay ng Batas: Isang Primer Para sa Kalikasan* (Manila: Haribon Foundation, 1989).

23. Marites Dañguian Vitug, *The Politics of Logging: Power from the Forest* (Pasig City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1993), 13.

24. *Ibid.*, 13.

25. *Ibid.*

26. Department of Environment and Natural Resources, <http://www.denr.gov.ph> (accessed March 22, 2002).

27. IBON Foundation, *The State of Philippine Environment* (Manila: IBON Foundation, 2000), 2.

28. Herb Thompson, "The Economic, Political and Biological Degradation of the Philippines," Working Paper No. 184, School of Economics, Murdoch University, Australia, January 2001, <http://www.murdoch.edu.au> (accessed February 15, 2005).

29. Vitug, *The Politics of Logging*, 25.

30. Vitug, *The Politics of Logging*, 13; Thompson, "The Economic, Political and Biological Degradation of the Philippines," 5.

state limited its regulatory and fiscal functions in forest management by granting vast forest concessions to private timber companies which engaged in direct extractive and management activities. Marcos's relatives and cronies were granted timber concessions and some of these concessions were managed for Marcos by his cronies. The vast exploitation of the country's forests resulted in an annual average export earnings of US\$ 300 million from 1969 to 1972.³¹ Allegations of widespread logging continued even after Marcos was ousted from power. During the Aquino administration, efforts to stop logging failed because some of the president's relatives were involved in the timber industry.³² Moreover, there were also reports that more than half of the members of the House of Representatives have interests in the logging industry.³³ Evidently, the state's failure to address the problem of forest denudation shows the strength of the linkages among power brokers in Philippine society. The country's experience of forest degradation also indicates the connection between political power and natural-resource exploitation.

Aside from the forests, the Philippines' rich coastal and marine resources are also under intense and increasing pressure. The country has the longest discontinuous coastline in the world and its coastal area covers sixty of its seventy-three provinces. There are twenty-four major fishing bays and gulfs in the Philippines and half of these fishing grounds have annual yield levels of 50 metric tons.³⁴ Today, the country's rich marine life is threatened by marine water pollution caused by intensive activities undertaken by both big and small businesses.

Another important concern for the Philippine environment is the pressure from the demand to provide energy, which is crucial for the country's industrial development. Although oil accounts for almost 50 percent of the country's energy consumption, other sources of energy such as geothermal, hydrothermal and coal pose adverse effects on the environment. Geothermal development usually occurs in mountainous areas with secondary forest growth and river systems. Its environmental impact includes devegetation, soil erosion and land alteration, especially during well testing and power generation.³⁵ Coal-fired power plants have also affected the environment, particularly air quality, because of the emission of sulfur oxide, flyash, and dust.

Toxic wastes also contribute to the Philippines' environmental problems. The areas covered by the military bases vacated by the Americans in Clark, Pampanga, and Subic, Zambales, have been found to be contaminated by toxic substances by a government task force on hazardous wastes. Toxic wastes (identified as "recyclable waste") from developed countries have reportedly been dumped in the country. In addition to this problem of toxic wastes is the issue of garbage disposal especially in Metro Manila and other urban areas. In July 2001, a garbage dumpsite located in Payatas, Quezon City, collapsed and killed more than a hundred people.

31. Vitug, *The Politics of Logging*, 25.

32. Thompson, "The Economic, Political and Biological Degradation of the Philippines," 5.

33. For reference, see the studies conducted by Vitug and Thompson.

34. IBON Foundation, *The State of Philippine Environment*, 36.

35. *Ibid.*, 72.

It can be said that the Philippine environment is in a state of crisis. Ironically, this condition is not at all alleviated by the presence of a policy framework that is supposed to be anchored on the concept of sustainable development.

The Policy Environment

The Philippine state's full control and supervision of the country's natural resources is mandated by Article 22, Section 2, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which states that:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

Because the state is both steward and manager of the Philippines' environment, it has to come up with policies that would ensure the proper utilization, management, and protection of the country's natural resources. Furthermore, the government's commitment to achieve sustainable development must be manifested through the policies it implements.

Several government agencies are involved in environmental management and protection. The Department of Agriculture (DA) implements soil conservation programs and measures to protect the marine ecosystem and regulates the use of pesticides and fertilizers. The Department of Health (DOH) is responsible for environmental sanitation and health while the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for the construction of flood-control systems, sewerage systems and garbage disposal sites. The Philippine Coast Guard enforces laws on marine pollution while the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) undertakes environmental research. However, the principal government agency tasked with the protection of the country's environment and natural resources is the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Executive Order 192 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on June 10, 1987, mandates the DENR "as the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, including those in reservations, watershed areas and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources utilization."³⁶ The following objectives serve as the basis for policy formulation to accomplish DENR's mandate: 1) assure the availability and sustainability of the country's natural resources, 2) increase the productivity of natural resources,

36. Executive Order No. 192, June 10, 1987.

3) enhance the contribution of natural resources for achieving national development and ecological integrity, 4) promote equitable access to natural resources, 5) maintain a desirable level of environmental quality, and 6) conserve specific terrestrial and marine areas representative of the Philippine natural and cultural heritage for present and future generations.³⁷

The DENR is headed by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. At present, the DENR secretary is assisted by five undersecretaries who are each assigned to a key functional office. These functional offices are as follows: 1) Management and Technical Services; 2) Policy, Planning, Research, and Legislative Affairs; 3) Lands; 4) Environment and Forestry; and 5) Mining and Legal Affairs. There are also six assistant secretaries who are in charge of the following offices: 1) Foreign-Assisted and Special Projects; 2) Policy, Planning, Research, and Legislative Affairs; 3) Environment; 4) Field Operations; 5) General Legal Services; and 6) Muslim Affairs. The following are the staff sectoral bureaus of the department: 1) Forest Management Bureau, 2) Lands Management Bureau, 3) Environmental Management Bureau, 4) Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau, 5) Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau, and 6) Mines and Geosciences Bureau.

The DENR line functions are decentralized to three levels, namely, the regional level (Regional Environment and Natural Resources Offices), the provincial level (Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices or PENRO), and the community level (Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices or CENRO). A regional office is established in each of the fifteen administrative regions of the country. There are currently seventy-three PENROs and 171 CENROs throughout the Philippines. There are also four PENROs and eight CENROs transferred to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) by virtue of Republic Act 6733.³⁸ In addition, there are also three agencies/corporations attached to the DENR. These are the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), the Natural Resources Development Corporation, and the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA).

As the primary government agency responsible for the sustainable use of the country's natural resources, the DENR is also tasked with implementing programs that are consistent with the goals stated in the Philippine Strategy for Sustainable Development, which is the government's response to environment and development issues with the purpose of reconciling the diverse and sometimes conflicting environmental, demographic, economic, and natural resource-use issues.³⁹ The passage of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC) also contributed to the creation of a favorable policy context for environmental protection programs at the community level. The LGC provides for the devolution of certain environmental functions to local government units (LGUs) as well as mechanisms where environment and natural resource committees could be

37. For reference and details on DENR's objectives, see the Department's website, <http://www.denr.gov.ph>.

38. Republic Act 6733 is entitled An Act to Amend Section 21, Title I, Book I of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 41, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, Granting Members of Both Houses of the Congress of the Philippines the General Authority to Administer Oaths, and for Other Purposes, July 25 1989.

39. Ragraño, "Sustainable Development," 46.

created. Book 1 Section 26 of the LGC requires all government agencies and government-owned and -controlled corporations (GOCCs) to consult with the LGUs "in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of nonrenewable resources, loss of crop land, range land or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species." Therefore, it was believed that the LGC would allow greater participation on the part of NGOs and communities in the formulation and implementation of environmental programs at the local level.

The opening of democratic space for people's participation as provided by the 1987 Constitution and the 1991 LGC allowed the passage of environmental laws, such as the Clean Air Act and the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act, through the active lobbying of various environmental groups. Furthermore, the development of a policy environment favorable to environmental protection can be attributed not only to international pressures but also to the active participation of environmental groups in Philippine politics. The context of democratization furthered the development of the environmental movement in the 1990s.

The Philippine Environmental Movement

In general, the environmental movement in the Philippines comprises groups that have some aspects related to the themes of environmental concern or ecological stability within their avowed statement of goals, mission, or objectives. The movement is seen as highly diverse. Various groups such as environmental NGOs, community-based organizations, and churches that have different ideological leanings are considered part of the environmental movement in the country.⁴⁰ According to Leonen, three historical trends identify the factors that have influenced the rise of the Philippine environmental movement.⁴¹ First, the emergence of the social movement that developed during martial law and immediately thereafter assumed the form of legal organizations dealing with environmental and ecological concerns. The second trend involved the process by which many conservation organizations took on a more developmental role, i.e., they were not simply concerned with environmental conservation but broadly with sustainable development. This trend had been largely influenced by the opening of democratic space under the Aquino administration as well as the significance given to the concept of sustainable development. The third trend was associated with the development of alliance building (e.g., Green Forum, Philippine Environmental Action Network, and the NGOs and POs that participated in the Philippine Council for Sustainable Development processes) and the fact that the governmental process of formulating master plans attracted the attention of a significant portion of the movement. In particular, this had to

40. Mervic M.V.F. Leonen, "NGO Influence on Environmental Policy," *Forest Policy and Politics in the Philippines*, ed. Peter Utting (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press and United Nations Institute for Social Development, 2000), 69.

41. *Ibid.*, 70-71.

do with the desire to make *Agenda 21* more concrete on both national and local levels.

An additional factor in the rise of the Philippine environmental movement is the influence of the so-called global environmental movement. Basically, the concern for the environment surged with the propagation of the concept of sustainable development. Because of the attention given to this concept many Philippine groups have included environmental desks in their offices. Funding for environmental projects became easily accessible as developed countries prioritized environmental concerns.

Environmental groups began to emerge in the Philippines in the 1970s, the period of authoritarianism. Environmental groups and coalitions protested against the development projects of the state that caused pollution and displaced communities. The first attempt to coordinate the efforts of environmental groups at the national level happened in 1979 when the First Philippine Environmental Congress (FPEC) was convened. As a result of this, a coalition called the Philippine Federation for Environmental Concerns (PFEC) was created. At its inception, the PFEC's environmentalism clearly exhibited a commitment to the politics of transformation and redistribution.⁴² The "Declaration of Environmental Concern" passed at the FPEC stated that "at the root of environmental problems are social, economic and political systems imposed upon this nation which allowed greed and exploitation to predominate over a proper respect for the well-being of present and future generations."⁴³

A prominent environmental group that traced its beginnings in the 1970s is the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources or Haribon. This environmental group was originally organized as a party of birdwatchers in 1972. The nature appreciation society evolved into a nature conservation organization until it became a conservation foundation involved in environmental research and advocacy in 1983.⁴⁴ Today Haribon claims to implement an "integrated, multidisciplinary, participatory, and science-based approach to conservation" through its four core programs, namely: 1) the Terrestrial Ecosystems Program, 2) the Marine Ecosystems Program, 3) the Institutional Partnership Development Program, and 4) the Communications and Membership Program. Since the 1980s, Haribon has been at the forefront of activities for the protection of the Philippine environment. In 1988, Haribon together with the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the DENR, signed the first debt-for-nature swap agreement.⁴⁵ During the same year, Haribon also launched the "Save Palawan" campaign to petition the state to ban the trade of timber and wildlife in Palawan. Haribon also played a significant role in the formation of the Green Forum, which is a national network consisting of 125 organizations (among them NGOs, people's organizations, churches, and cause-oriented groups) whose aim is to promote the principles of sustainable development, social equity, and grassroots democracy.⁴⁶ Green Forum links together large environmental NGOs

42. Magno, "The Growth of Philippine Environmentalism," 13.

43. *Ibid.*, 12.

44. Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, <http://www.haribon.org.ph>, (accessed September 30, 2002).

45. Magno, "The Growth of Philippine Environmentalism," 13. The debt-for-nature swap involves the sale by creditor banks of debt at a discount in the secondary market. NGOs in developed countries in turn purchase a portion of the discounted debt and then arrange to write off or forgive the debt in exchange for the debtor nation's commitment to allocate local currency for ecological preservation programs.

46. Green Forum Philippines, <http://www.ccasia.teri.res.in/country/philip/or/gforum.htm>, (accessed September 30, 2002).

like Haribon and development NGOs such as the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) with small NGOs immersed in communities. The most significant move of Green Forum to influence mainstream politics was in 1991 when it launched the Earthvote Philippines Project for the 1992 elections.

Other significant environmental groups and coalitions aiming for the achievement of sustainable development were established in the 1990s. One of these is the Philippine Sustainable Development Network (PSDN), which was incorporated in 1993 and composed of organizations actively involved in the pursuit of sustainable development. PSDN's objectives are: 1) to provide easier, more affordable and rapid access of information to users in governmental, research and educational, nongovernment and entrepreneurial organizations; and 2) to develop simple, cost-effective, and replicable information technology systems that would enhance the capacity for information networking of individuals and organizations in sustainable development. Environmental NGOs also pushed for the creation of the Philippine Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD), a multisectoral body which aimed to "put sustainable development in the map and consciousness of government planners."⁴⁷ President Fidel Ramos approved the establishment of the PCSD, which attempted to weave into the government's development plans a concern for the environment.

The Philippine environmental movement has reached significant achievements in the area of information dissemination, education and policy advocacy. However, important challenges confront the movement especially with regard to policy implementation and sustaining its political influence.

Issues and Challenges to Democratization

The proliferation of environmental NGOs in the Philippines over the last three decades raises the question concerning their political significance. Are environmental NGOs and their networks politically influential? Do they have enough financial and authoritative powers to realize policy changes? Have environmental NGOs challenged the state's monopoly of decision making concerning the environment? At present, these questions cannot be answered in the affirmative yet because there are still constraints on the structures and functions of NGOs that limit their capacity to challenge the state's monopoly over environmental policy making and implementation.

One example that can be cited is the experience in the passage of Republic Act 8749, more popularly known as the Clean Air Act. This law, enacted in June 1999, is considered by many as a landmark in environmental legislation. This is because of the involvement of the Philippine environmental movement in the various stages of the enactment of the law. Environmental groups' efforts to

47. Vitug, *The Politics of Logging*, 192.

lobby for the support of individual legislators, particularly within the Senate, were considered successful. But while the efforts of environmental NGOs in the passage of the Clean Air Act proved successful, these are now being challenged by efforts to hinder the implementation of the law. In fact, since the law's approval in 1999, its implementation has been piece-meal, ineffective and problematic. In 2001, the first phase was undertaken by the government by removing leaded gasoline. However, the second phase is currently being challenged by a move to defer it. In August 2001, Caltex Philippines Inc., the country's third-largest oil company, announced that it would ask the government to defer the implementation of the law.⁴⁸ Subsequently, in October 2002, the Philippine government announced its plan to defer the implementation of a provision of the Clean Air Act "that could boost pump and transport prices and leave its fuel supply more vulnerable."⁴⁹ At present, environmental groups continue to lobby for the implementation of the law by encouraging people to volunteer to be part of roadside anti-smoke belching enforcement teams.⁵⁰ In November 2004, Bantay Usok urged the House of Representatives to prioritize the amendments of the Clean Air Act to make the law more effective against smoke belchers and polluters.

The active opposition and mobilization of environmental groups was witnessed when the 1995 Mining Act (Republic Act 7942) was enacted by Congress. The law is part of the Ramos administration's Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) and it garnered strong support in Congress. Although the Mining Act is seen by policymakers as important for economic development, those opposed to it view the law's provisions as threats to the country's ecology. Environmental groups, led by the Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center-Kasama sa Kalikasan (LRC-KsK) actively opposed the implementation of the Mining Act by filing a case in the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of certain provisions of the law. Environmental groups sustained their opposition to the implementation of the Mining Act especially in light of the mining disaster caused by the operations of Marcopper Mining Corporation in Boac, Marinduque, in 1996. However, on February 1, 2005, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations with finality. The Mining Act aims to attract foreign investors in the mining sector, which the government views as a means to alleviate the country's economic and financial situation. However, the implementation of the law challenges the government's own declaration of achieving sustainable development.

The attempt to conserve and protect the country's environment is reflected in the policies formulated by the government. One of the most significant laws for environmental conservation is Republic Act 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) law, which took effect in 1992. This law gave greater protection and local community participation in the management of

48. Ronnel Domingo, "Caltex Wants Clean Air Act Deferred," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, August 5, 2001, <http://www.inq7.net> (accessed November 11, 2002).

49. "Manila Says May Delay Implementing Clean Air Act," Reuters, *World Environment News*, October 16, 2002, <http://www.planetark.org/avantgo/dailynewsstory.cfm?id=18193> (accessed November 19, 2002).

50. Gerald Lacuarta, "Wanted: Volunteers for Clean Air," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, November 10, 2002, <http://www.inq7.net> (accessed November 19, 2002).

national parks, marine reserves and wildlife sanctuaries. Moreover, it highlights the importance of partnerships between NGOs, LGUs, and communities in successful environmental protection and conservation. The experiences in the implementation of the NIPAS law show cases of success and failure on the part of NGOs and communities in environmental protection. Cases of success are those in which the protected area supervisor maintains good relations with the host NGO. These cases include the Batanes Protected Landscape and Seascape, Mt. Kanlaon Natural Park, Northern Sierra Madre Natural Park, and Mt. Kitanglad Natural Park.⁵¹ However, problems in fund management on the part of the NGO consortium, NGOs for Protected Areas Inc. (NIPA), are among the issues raised by the World Bank which provided funds for the implementation of NIPAS law in pilot sites, particularly on the failed cases. Another important concern is the financial sustainability of environmental programs and activities since most of these, which are undertaken under the NIPAS program, are donor driven.

The cases discussed above show the limitations of environmental NGOs and the challenges confronting them. Although there are cases in which environmental NGOs have been successful in influencing government action, the limitation of their political influence is still very much evident. Perhaps, the most significant limitation of environmental NGOs' political influence is the fact that they are operating outside the formal policy- and decision-making processes. These groups cannot make decisions and enact and implement laws. Hence, the government's openness to the participation and involvement of environmental groups is still an important factor in increasing their political influence. Another important concern is sustaining the activities of environmental NGOs since many of them depend on donations by foreign governments and multilateral development banks for their operational costs. This financial dependency also considerably weakens the NGOs' autonomy in their political action.

Conflicts over the use, control, and ownership of natural resources most often arise. In most cases, the conflicts involve communities, business groups, and the government. Environmental conflicts are also often complicated by the question of reconciling the sustainable use of environmental resources and providing the basic needs of people.⁵² This implies that significant changes must be introduced not only in terms of crafting and enforcing policies but also in improving the people's quality of life.

Conclusion

Thus far, the roles of Philippine environmental groups are to research environmental change, initiate debate, monitor environmental violations,

51. Yasmin Arquiza, "Tourists and Conservationists Help Preserve National Park," *Malaya*, December 14, 2004, <http://www.malaya.com.ph/dec14/mal01.htm> (accessed February 28, 2005).

52. Conflicts have also been experienced in protected areas targeted by the NIPAS law. Often, the conflict is between the NGO and the community or the DENR and the LGU. For a more detailed discussion of the implementation of the NIPAS law, see Yasmin Arquiza, "Turning Green in the Country's Last Frontier," in *Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, Patrimony: Six Case Studies on Local Politics and the Environment in the Philippines* (Pasig City: PCJ, 1996), 45-63.

and suggest alternative solutions for environmental issues and problems. Mobilization of citizen support to put pressure on government to accept and fulfill environmental commitments can be considered the most important contribution of environmental groups in the consolidation of Philippine democracy. However, in spite of the significant role played by environmental groups in the passage of important environmental legislations, their political influence is still very much limited especially in policy implementation. Moreover, there is still much to be desired when it comes to the active participation of environmental groups in campaigning for candidates who will push for green or environment-friendly policies. This is an area that the environmental movement needs to further work on especially since the victory of the green vote had been experienced before. In particular, environmental groups in Palawan and Tayabas, Quezon, served as effective checks to environmental abuse committed by local elites and national government officials.⁵³

Two important challenges confront Philippine society in general, and the environmental movement in particular. The first is to address the link between political power and resource exploitation, which is often the source of environmental degradation and environmental conflicts. Experiences in natural resource management have shown that the involvement of communities as stakeholders promotes environmental protection and their economic conditions. The second challenge is how to reach a balance between the achievement of economic development and environmental protection. To date, the question of how the goals of sustainable development can be realized remains largely unanswered.

Guide Questions

1. How did environmental issues emerge as a concern for the international community? What is the impact of the emergence of concern for the environment on Philippine domestic politics?
2. What is the state of the Philippine environment? Can it be aptly described as being in an endangered state? If so, how did this come about?
3. What is the essence of sustainable development? Is it merely concerned with preserving the environment per se or is it also concerned with other issues?
4. What are the key policies and programs of the Philippines in protecting the environment? Are these sufficient? If not, what are further needed?
5. What is the role of NGOs with regard to the environment issue? Do they play a substantive and productive role? How will you describe the relationship between these groups and the government?

53. For reference, see Sheila Corona's Introductory Essay in *Patrimony: Six Case Studies on Local Politics and the Environment in the Philippines* (Pasig City: PCLJ, 1996).

Glossary

- Environment** – the whole of the natural world—from ecosystem to biosphere—within which human beings and all other parts of the plant and animal world have their being. The environment includes forests, coastal and marine resources, agricultural lands, freshwater resources, energy use, urbanization and industries.
- Environmental movement** – in the Philippines, it is composed of highly diverse groups that have some aspects related to the themes of environmental concern or ecological stability within their avowed statement of goals, mission or objectives.
- Sustainable development** – a type of development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

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PHILIPPINE POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE: CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The Cooperative as a Vehicle for Empowerment, Development, and Democratization

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem

Empowerment aims to harness the people's own potential to allow them to take responsibility for their own development.¹

There can be no development without empowerment because the latter does not only refer to material benefits but more importantly, having control over one's destiny.²

... If we want to hasten the process of development where more people benefit from economic activities, there is no other way but to form cooperatives.³

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, the student should be able to:

1. Discuss the emergence of the cooperative movement in the Philippines.
2. Define the role played by the cooperative movement in addressing the issues of democracy and development in Philippine society.
3. Identify the strategies employed by the cooperatives in addressing the issues of democracy and development, and the factors which facilitated or hindered their effectiveness.

Introduction

The post-Martial Law period witnessed the rebirth of the cooperative movement. This is not attributed to government but to people's initiatives mainly through nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and people's organizations (POs) in search of viable livelihoods. Despite a history of failures, cooperatives remain among the more attractive options in providing the marginalized sectors of society a means of livelihood. For 2000, the Cooperative

1. Horacio Morales Jr., "The Problematic of an Alternative Cooperative Philosophy: A Challenge to All Cooperators," *Angkop*, March-June 1990, 21-22.

2. Michael Edwards, "How Relevant is Development Studies," in *Beyond the Impasse: New Directions in Development Theory*, ed. Frans J. Schuurman (London and New Jersey: ZED Books, 1993), 80.

3. Morales, "The Problematic of an Alternative Cooperative Philosophy."

Development Agency (CDA) statistics showed there were 57,470 registered cooperatives with a membership of at least five million individuals as compared to 1990, when there were only 212 cooperatives.⁴ In 2005, the number of cooperatives increased to 69,492.⁵ The most popular of these cooperatives are the multipurpose agricultural cooperatives, which increased from 134 in 1990 to 32,574 in 2000.⁶ In the first quarter of 2005, this increased to 36,373.⁷ Agricultural multipurpose cooperatives (AMCs), also comprised 57 percent of the total number of cooperatives in 1997, and in the first quarter of 2005 it constituted 52 percent of the total number of cooperatives.⁸ A far second, amounting to only 28 percent and 32 percent of the total number of cooperatives in 1997 and in the first quarter of 2005, respectively, are the nonagricultural multipurpose cooperatives.⁹

The large number of AMCs can be attributed to the fact that the Philippines is still a predominantly agrarian society in which agricultural cooperatives are considered crucial vehicles in alleviating the plight of the rural poor. More important, AMCs involve the farmer-beneficiaries themselves as participants.

This chapter will look into the factors that make the cooperative a potent force for empowerment, democratization, and development in Philippine society.

Underdevelopment impedes the democratization process in the country because poverty subjects the impoverished sectors of society, e.g., the farmers, to an indecent standard of living that hinders them from addressing factors which exploit them such as landlords, middle-traders and usurers. The only way to address this is to pave the way for development in the rural areas and to empower the farmers. Only when there is empowerment and development can democracy be attained. Such a concern also leads to more effective governance.

Governance here refers to "the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred."¹⁰ Furthermore, "the governance perspective also draws attention to the increased involvement of the private and voluntary sectors in service delivery and strategic decision making."¹¹

Cooperatives have been noted as one of the voluntary sectors that contribute to the governance process. This is because cooperatives have complemented or even taken over state responsibilities particularly in the areas where farmers are organized into an economic activity. Thus, one witnesses the "shift in responsibility, a stepping back of the state and a concern to push responsibilities onto the private and voluntary sectors, and, more broadly, the citizen."¹²

This chapter will discuss the post-Martial Law experiences of two NGOs, i.e., the People's Livelihood Foundation-Tarlac Integrated Livelihood Cooperative

4. Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), "Cooperative Monitoring Statistics," document as of September 30, 2001.

5. CDA, "Number of Registered Cooperatives: Per Type, Per Extension Office," document as of March 31, 2005.

6. CDA, "Cooperative Monitoring Statistics."

7. CDA, "Number of Registered Cooperatives."

8. CDA, "Cooperative Monitoring Statistics"; CDA, "Number of Registered Cooperatives."

9. *Ibid.*

10. Gerry Stoker, "From Government to Governance," in *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*, ed. Bernard E. Brown, 9th edition (New York: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000), 256. In Gerry Stoker, "Governance as Theory: Five Propositions," *International Social Science Journal*, no. 155 (March 1998): 187-95.

11. *Ibid.*, 258.

12. *Ibid.*, 259.

Inc. (PLF-TILCO) and the Cooperative Foundation of the Philippines Inc. (CFPI). The former was established by the founder of the New People's Army (NPA) Bernabe "Commander Dante" Buscayno and the latter was headed in 1986 by former National Democratic Front (NDF) head Horacio "Boy" Morales. To contextualize these cooperative experiments, the first part of the discussion will focus on the failure of the previous state-initiated cooperatives during Martial Law and before Martial Law.

The Government's Pre-Martial Law Cooperative Agenda

Underdevelopment has always been blamed for hindering the democratization process. In the Philippines, one reason for underdevelopment is the wide gap between the rich and the poor in terms of land ownership. One result of this socioeconomic inequality is widespread poverty in the agrarian sector. It is therefore understandable that the communist insurgency grew in the rural sector. The Philippine government in the 1950s realized that one way to deal with poverty and consequently quell the peasant rebellions was to introduce laws to establish a formidable cooperative movement in the country. One of these was Republic Act (RA) 821 in 1952, which established the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) to organize the farmers into Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Associations (FACOMAs) and to lend farmer-members credit through such associations. Section 11 of RA 821 declared the ACCFA's objectives as follows: 1) stimulating the development and operation of farmers' cooperatives, 2) minimizing the lack of credit as a limiting factor in the expansion of Philippine agriculture, and 3) freeing farmers from the economic and social domination caused by moneylenders for the use of capital.¹³

The ACCFA was specifically "authorized and directed to take charge of all government activities relating to the promotion, organization and supervision of cooperative associations in rural areas."¹⁴ Moreover, these FACOMAs engaged in four major fields of activity, i.e., warehousing, processing, marketing and commodity procurement. According to the ACCFA, the FACOMAs were mandated to:

unify efforts in agricultural production, storage and processing of farm products; enhance the bargaining position of small farmers in relation to landlords, middlemen and other social and economic groups or elements; and establish a producer-controlled marketing system that would enable the farmers to enjoy the additional income from the marketing (including storage and processing) of their products.¹⁵

The United States aid program was very active in ensuring the growth of the agricultural cooperative movement and invested heavily in this program. At

13. Eliseo J. Rocamora and Corazon Conti-Panganiban, *Rural Development Strategies: The Philippine Case* (Quezon City: Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University, 1975), 76.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Blondie Po, "Rural Organizations and Rural Development: A Documentary Study," in *Rural Organizations in the Philippines*, ed. Blondie Po, Cristina Montiel, Maria S. Fernandez (Manila: Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University, 1980), 59.

its peak, ACCFA was financing nearly 555 FACOMAs with more than 300,000 farmer-members. An unintended positive development brought about by the cooperative movement was its impact on social change in rural Philippines. That is, tenants and smallholders were brought into positions of community leadership by election to the FACOMA board of directors. Furthermore, the landlords' traditional techniques to direct community decisions were being frustrated.¹⁶

The Philippine government sought to address the problem of underdevelopment through the cooperatives via political and economic means. Politically, this was through the creation of the ACCFAs and FACOMAs and economically, this was through the extension of credit to the farmers through these two organizations. The end goals were also both economic and political. Economically, the cooperatives were to improve the lives of the farmers and in the process liberate them from their agricultural nemesis, such as the landlords, moneylenders, and the middlemen. Thus, development in this aspect is expected to bring about democratization.

The obstacles to the success of the FACOMAs and the ACCFAs were, however, also political and economic in nature. Severe economic problems confronted these two organizations. For the FACOMAs, this was the slow development of the cooperative principle of capitalization by the savings of members. Resources generally came from the ACCFA, its parent organization, and the collective savings of members had been quite modest. Aggravating this was the expansion of the price-support activities of ACCFA, which threatened to dissipate the resources of that agency. Political problems included the politicization of the FACOMAs as they were used as stepping stones to local political office. Thus, the economic functions of the cooperative movement were constantly threatened. Further damaging to the FACOMAs and the ACCFA were the findings of a survey done by US-based Arthur D. Little Inc., a firm of economic consultants, which revealed that of the Php 86 million of outstanding ACCFA loans at the end of 1958, two-thirds, or Php 57 million were unpaid. Loans to individual farmers accounted for only one-third of the delinquency, with the balance representing loans to the FACOMAs. All these point to rampant graft and corruption in these two government agencies, encouraged by an inadequate accounting system and gross negligence due to complacency.¹⁷ Moreover, because the FACOMAs were intended to serve the interests only of farmers and agricultural producers, this excluded from membership the rural workers, including sugar tenants, who comprised a significant portion of the rural populace. Those without the capital to buy their share from the cooperative were disqualified as members.

16. Ramiro Golez Jr., Jose Rene C. Gayo, and Imelda V. Legaspi, "A Survey of Agricultural Production Systems in Selected Countries," in Center for Research Commission, *Agrarian Reform: Experiences and Expectations*, 131. Papers and Discussions, Agrarian Reform Symposia, Manila, April 22-23, 1987, and May 23, 1987.

17. Frank H. Golay, *The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic Development Policy* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), 288-89.

The FACOMAs, therefore, replicated the inequality characterizing rural society.¹⁸ These political and economic obstacles, thus, prevented the pre-Martial Law cooperative to become a vehicle for development, democratization, and popular empowerment.

Martial Law and the *Samahang Nayon*

Despite the failure of the pre-martial law cooperative program, President Ferdinand Marcos did not underestimate the potency of cooperatives for alleviating poverty in the countryside. The government's policy on cooperatives was subsumed within the administration's land reform policy by Presidential Decree (PD) 2, issued on September 26, 1972, declaring the entire country a land-reform area. This decree required that all agrarian reform beneficiaries become members of a farmers' cooperative known as the *Samahang Nayon* (SN). Marcos saw the cooperative as replacing the landlord in the land reform program. The SN was mandated by the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389), which was passed in 1971, to "establish cooperative cultivatorship among those who live and work on the land as tillers" and to "create a truly viable social and economic structure conducive to greater productivity and higher farm incomes through a cooperative system of production, processing, marketing, distribution, credit and services."¹⁹ Thus the SN was basically a "corporate body composed primarily of small farmers residing and/or farming within the geographical limits of *barrio* (village) for the purpose of improving the quality of life of the people."²⁰ A Bureau of Cooperative Development (BCOD) was created to oversee the success of the SN.

The government's solution to the problem of development was the implementation of a comprehensive agrarian reform program and the cooperative was to act as the organization for enhancing the productivity of the farmers. For this to happen, political and economic structures were also instituted.

To avoid repeating the failures of the FACOMAs and the AFFCAs, the following objectives were emphasized. First, the SN members had to undergo training on courses which included the history and principles of cooperatives, the organization and technical aspects of agriculture. Second, capital buildup was addressed. In relation to this, there were two types of funds for investment in a cooperative that were introduced to establish a compulsory savings program. One was the Barrio Savings Fund (BSF), whereby an SN member was required

18. Po, "Rural Organizations and Rural Development: A Documentary Study," 62-63; David Wurfel, "The Bell Report and After: A Study of the Political Problems of Social Reform Stimulated by Foreign Aid," PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1960, 630 and 644-46, cited in Euseo J. Rocamora and Corazon Conti Panganiban, *Rural Development Strategies: The Philippine Case* (Quezon City: Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University, 1975).

19. Golez, Jose, and Legaspi, "A Survey of Agricultural Production Systems in Selected Countries," 132.

20. *Ibid.*

to contribute a membership fee of Php 10 and annual dues of Php 5. These contributions went to the SN general fund. The purpose of the BSF was to finance the cooperative rural bank (CRB). The other type of fund was the Barrio Guarantee Fund (BGF), which was to provide the initial capital to organize an area marketing cooperative (AMC). It was also partly intended to guarantee land amortization of members who were land-reform beneficiaries as well as partly for insurance premiums. The capital for this would come from the members' contribution of one cavan per member per season. Thus the AMC and the CRB were secondary and not primary organizations, being federations with the SNs as their investor-members.²¹ For the SNs, therefore, to be successful, emphasis was given on the economic need for capital buildup and savings mobilization. Of importance too was the education the farmers were to receive as SN members.

In general, the SNs did not perform up to par. A study by the University of the Philippines, Los Baños (UPLB), revealed that only 40 percent of the SN members surveyed considered the program a success while 11 percent said it was a failure. The rest viewed the program as having made no big difference.²² In a study commissioned by the Cooperative Foundation of the Philippines Inc. (CFPI), on the state of cooperative development in the Philippines, the obstacles to cooperative success included, foremost, the inability of the Barrio Guarantee Fund to pay for the liabilities of defaulting members. It became apparent that the major reason why farmers became members of the SN was because membership therein was a requisite to the issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT). SN members were also not interested in the Barrio Savings Fund and a reason for this was that the 5 percent (later on reduced to 3 percent) dues which the farmers were paying to the BSF did not go to productive use.²³ The same problem applied to the BGF. The SN program was able to establish only twenty-nine CRBs and fifty-six AMCs utilizing the BSF and the BGF, respectively. This explains mainly why the cooperative system failed in providing for services which the former landlords gave their tenants. As with the FACOMAs, there was also the problem of mismanagement.²⁴

Studies have shown that the weakness of the Samahang Nayon could be partly blamed on the nature of cooperative education and training which the farmers failed to grasp. Studies also revealed that there was a lack of dedicated leaders. Several of them did not attend to their duties because they were preoccupied with their work at home or in the office. A result of this was the leaders' dependence on the assistance of government agencies. The SN members were also to blame for the failure of the cooperative as they were mainly motivated by self-interest.²⁵ A major obstacle for the cooperative movement's success was the failure of the government to effectively implement a land reform program. The structure of social inequality continued to prevail. Aggravating this was the scheme that tied cooperatives with rural banks, commonly known to be owned and managed by landowning families.²⁶ The government's model

21. Golez, Jose, and Legaspi, "A Survey of Agricultural Production Systems in Selected Counties, 133.

22. Clemente Terzo, "Government Policies and Programs on Philippine Cooperatives," in Cooperative Foundation of the Philippines, Inc. (CFPI), *State of Cooperative Development in the Philippines: Critical Analysis of Existing Data* (Quezon City: CFPI, 1989).

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*

25. Leandro Rola, "Cooperative Education and Training: Issues and Problems and Recommendations," in CFPI, *State of Cooperative Development in the Philippines: Manual Bonifacio, "Some Sociological Insights on Cooperative Development,"* in CFPI, *State of Cooperative Development in the Philippines.*

26. Po, "Rural Organizations and Rural Development: A Documentary Study," 87.

of development cooperatives, therefore, assumed that rural communities are pluralistic and that all social classes had an equal chance to participate in the local economy. The reality, however, was that 70 percent of the population live in rural areas and 80 percent of land was controlled by a small elite.²⁷

The Political Vision for an Alternative Cooperative Movement

After the 1986 People Power Revolution, a faction of the Philippine Left chose to devote its energies into development work with the end goal of empowering the marginalized sectors in Philippines society. In the rural areas, the cooperative became one of the potent vehicles. Two major proponents of this were former NDF head Horacio "Boy" Morales and former NPA commander Bernabe "Commander Dante" Buscayno. Upon his release from prison in 1986, Morales became the Executive Director of the Cooperative Foundation of the Philippines Inc. (CFPI), a quasi-government agency.

Morales transformed the CFPI into a vehicle for improving the socioeconomic conditions of the people in a just and democratic environment. For him, this was only possible when the people had equal and direct access to and control over political and economic power for sustainable development.

It was in this context that the CFPI sought to promote, organize and develop cooperatives for the poor as instruments for social justice and people empowerment.²⁸ Such a view was also shared by Buscayno, although their strategies would differ. That is, Morales chose to focus his energies on improving the cooperative movement by networking with other players in the movement at the national level while Buscayno chose to devote his cooperative efforts on his home province of Tarlac and expanding to other neighboring provinces of Nueva Ecija and Pampanga with the help of the Aquino administration.

CFPI's advocacy campaign, together with other members of the cooperative movement, aimed to come out with a new cooperative code that would create an environment favorable to cooperative organizing. This was given an impetus when Morales was appointed by the Aquino administration to head a newly established task force after the 1986 People Power Revolution to assess the role cooperatives could play under the new political dispensation.

Together with other players of the cooperative movement, CFPI lobbied for new cooperative laws that bore fruit on March 10, 1990, when two laws on cooperatives were promulgated. These were RA 6938 known as the Cooperative Code of the Philippines, creating an organic law for cooperatives, and RA 6939,

27. "Cooperatives: Dreams and Reality." *Kabalikar: The Development Worker*, March 1990, 1, 4.

28. Anna Teh, "CFPI: Reaffirming its Commitment to People Empowerment," *Angkop*, March-June 1990, 6.

establishing the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) as the government agency to implement the Cooperative Code.

The CDA seeks to "foster and promote the growth and viability of cooperatives among people of limited means" with the objectives of "harnessing people power, assuring their self-reliance and nurturing their economic well-being toward the establishment of a just and equitable society."²⁹ (CDA Primer: n.d.)

This new code was significant in that it spelled out the relationship between the cooperatives and the government. It also got rid of having arbitrary rules and regulations for the different types of cooperatives. RA 6938 also emphasized the cooperative movement's autonomy vis-à-vis the CDA. Moreover, there was official recognition that cooperatives were autonomous, private organizations and must be primarily responsible for cooperative development. The role of the government was a supportive one, participating only in direct developmental activity when necessary.

Despite the implementation of a new code, the cooperative movement continued to lobby for more government support in cooperative development. These were mainly in the areas of financing and access to capital for cooperatives, infrastructural support, the creation of a favorable marketing environment for these organizations and the formalization and institutionalization of the cooperative movement.³⁰ The movement also needed to fill in gaps left by state agencies such as the CDA, the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Thus, the cooperative movement has sought to define the area of governance in the cooperative movement.

By doing so, it brings forth the reality of power dependence whereby the outcome of exchange is determined not only by the resources of the participants but also by the rules of the game and the context of the exchange.³¹ In this situation, the cooperative movement has defined its relationship with the government, particularly the specific responsibilities the government has to perform to help the cooperative movement. In return, the cooperative movement has shown to the government that it is also doing its share in strengthening these organizations.

An attempt of the cooperative movement in strengthening their bargaining position in a relationship of power dependence is seen in its move to create a more favorable environment for cooperative organizing by supporting candidates during the national and local elections who are deemed "pro-people" and "pro-cooperative." Upon the institutionalization of the party-list system, the cooperative organizations, such as the National Confederation of Cooperatives (NATCCO) and the Association of Philippine Electric

29. Cooperative Development Authority, *A Primer*, n.d.

30. Romualdo B. Galfud, "Cooperatives amidst the Current National Crisis," *Angkoop* 2, no. 5 (September-October 1990).

31. Stoker, "From Government to Governance," 290.

Cooperatives (APEC), also took it upon themselves to organize their own political parties to run for elections.

The political and economic strategies for cooperative empowerment

Creating a political environment favorable to cooperative organizing is only half the battle, the other half is to pursue economic strategies to render the cooperative feasible as well as sustainable. As noted, one proposition concerning governance is that it "identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues."³² This was a concern which both Morales and Buscayno shared. The major nemesis of the farmers remained to be the following: the middle-traders, the rice cartel, the rice hoarders and the usurers. Middle-traders act as the middle person between the producer and the consumer. They usually buy from the producer at a low price and sell to the consumer at a high price. Middle-traders are also accused of being rice hoarders. The National Food Authority (NFA) claims that twenty-three big-time traders control 22 percent of the rice stocks sold in Metro Manila alone.³³

As for the country's rice cartels, they currently control 90 percent of the palay (unhusked rice) trading in the country. These consist of 22,000 rice dealers. The biggest among these is part of the so-called Binondo cartel, which is run by Filipino-Chinese traders.³⁴ The rice hoarders, on the other hand, were generally perceived to be rice cartel members or middle-traders who keep the rice in their warehouses to create an artificial shortage of the product to increase the price.³⁵ As for the usurers, these are also usually the middle-traders, who lend to the farmers at exorbitant rates and buy their products at low prices.

Strategies for capital build-up for the cooperatives. For the CFPI, the ones that suffered most belong to the poorest sector of the cooperative movement, of which only 23 percent benefited from these economic ventures. Thus, a major aim of the CFPI through its Cooperative for the Poor (CFP) program was to show that even though the poor had low productive capacities, a big percentage of whatever surplus they produce was siphoned off by moneylenders and big traders who controlled the economy in the rural areas. Morales pointed out that this surplus could accrue to the poor themselves only if appropriate mechanisms to reduce the leakage of potential surplus were organized.³⁶ The CFPI also aimed to make the farmers aware of the need to mobilize their capital for production and loan purposes. By combining their money and assets, CFPI hoped that the poor might be able to free themselves from the exploitation of those who controlled the economy.³⁷ The emphasis was also on the cooperative's ability to initiate economic projects among the marginalized communities and its capability to generate its own capital and not to rely on outside loans.

For Buscayno, however, the strategy to generate capital for the cooperative was to access economic assistance by transforming the politico-economic elites from political to economic allies. The PLF-TILCO was a recipient of massive

32. *Ibid.*

33. Lindabue F. Romero, "Is There a Rice Cartel," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, August 8, 1995, 6.

34. Angkoop, November-December 1999.

35. Lynda T. Jumilla, "Government Helpless vs Rice Hoarders-Guingona," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, August 17, 1995, 4.

36. Morales, "The Problematic of an Alternative Cooperative Philosophy," 21.

37. Angkoop, 1991, 16-17.

amounts of government funding and technical assistance, which turned it into the Aquino government's model-cooperative. Politicians in general saw the cooperative as a means to attract "rebels back to the fold" by enticing them to engage in development projects.

Popular participation. For the cooperative movement, an important ingredient for the sustainability of the cooperative venture was popular participation, which seemed to have been sorely lacking in the state-initiated cooperative ventures such as the Samahang Nayon. Buscayno argued that state-initiated cooperatives did not succeed because of the failure of the government to initiate popular consultation and participation in the formulation of the project itself. There was thus an absence of initiative from the grassroots because of its inability to see the organization's relevance in solving the farmers' economic plight.³⁸ Like Buscayno, CFPI agreed that there was a need to address the top-down policy of organizing within the economic venture, which had propagated an elite bureaucracy. A reason for this was that most of the members belonged to the middle class. The NGOs also observed that the women were marginalized in these organizations. More important, these organizations did not pay attention to the important issue of agrarian reform.³⁹

Complementing this objective was the institution of education programs. In the past, cooperative mismanagement had been blamed on the inadequacy and the ineffectiveness of the government's training programs. Thus the NGOs saw the importance of carrying out educational programs that emphasized pre-membership seminars for cooperatives as well as follow-up seminars and close supervision of cooperative activities. The NGO's education program also sought to teach the farmers appropriate technology, e.g., the use of organic fertilizer instead of imported ones for agricultural production. For both Morales's CFPI and Buscayno's PLF-TILCO, educational programs, however, were not only economic in nature but also political. NGOs engaged in cooperative organizing also made the farmers aware of political issues such as the need to implement the government's agrarian reform program. Thus NGOs also carried out educational programs in this area, particularly in reorganizing tenurial relations and resisting land usurpation. More important, the ultimate stage of cooperative development was translating these economic gains into social reforms and the formation of social consciousness and values. It was hoped that these would bring about concrete socioeconomic benefits to its members.⁴⁰

Marketing strategies. Popular participation was seen as key to increasing the cooperatives' control over production and their market bargaining leverage. The CFPI believed, for example, that if the farmers sold their paly or rice all at the same time, they would be able to increase the price of the rice and such an increase would not land in the hands of the middle-traders or the rice cartel. The urban poor, on the other hand, could combine their resources to buy this rice directly from the producers. This would also enable them to escape the

38. Bernabe Buscayno, "Cooperative: A Self-Help Approach to Poverty Alleviation" (unpublished document, 1990).

39. Angkoo, 1990, 4.

40. Buscayno, "Cooperative: A Self-Help Approach to Poverty Alleviation."

increase in rice prices which the cartel would impose on the product. Thus, the cooperative would enable the poor to transact business in the market.⁴¹

An important strategy of the people-initiated cooperative movement is "to form an organization of viable and interlinking cooperatives for the poor which will lay the basis for the eventual emergence of associative economies." An associative economy is defined as " a system of linkages among socioeconomic institutions of the poor that have acquired a certain level of self-reliance, sustainability and better bargaining position with respect to other institutions."⁴²

The intention is for the target-beneficiaries to enjoy the increase of income accruing to them instead of this going to the middle-traders or private suppliers of inputs.⁴³ An end-goal of this strategy is to create a network of cooperatives at the grassroots that are federated at the municipal, provincial, regional and national levels. Politically, these municipal federations are deemed members of the municipal development council (MDC), a creation of the new local government code (LGC) aimed to effectively devolve political power to local government units (LGUs). It was noted that this could provide a vehicle for "claim making" and bargaining on the part of the cooperatives vis-à-vis the government and the private sector.⁴⁴ It is in this aspect that governance "identifies the power dependence involved in the relationship between institutions engaged in collective action."⁴⁵ In the aspect of marketing, another proposition of governance is "about autonomous self-governing networks of actors." It was also noted that "under governance, the ultimate partnership activity is the formation of self-governing networks..."⁴⁶ Furthermore, "Governance networks ... involve not just influencing government policy but taking over the business of government."⁴⁷

Formation of political alliances. It was hoped that the success of these marketing strategies will hopefully also spillover in solving political obstacles to the success of cooperatives such as elite control over the market. The previous government cooperative program did not do this because it assumed that everybody had equal presence in the market. But because "cooperative organizing can be seen as an act of assertion of autonomy by the less privileged, the preparation of prospective members for cooperatives takes on a primarily social and political character."⁴⁸ An important strategy whereby NGOs found a way to engage in their cooperative endeavor is by linking up with people's organizations (POs). The NGO is viewed as focusing on economic empowerment, e.g., generation of savings and marketing alliances, while the PO will deal with its political dimensions, e.g., advocacy for agrarian reform and rural development support from the government.

41. Angkoop, 1991, 16-17.
42. *Ibid.*

43. Teh, "CFPI: Reaffirming its Commitment to People Empowerment," 6.

44. Angkoop, 1990.

45. Stokar, "From Government to Governance," 260.

46. *Ibid.*, 261.

47. *Ibid.*

48. Erik Villanueva, "Revisiting Verhagen's Reinvention of the Cooperative Principles," Angkoop, June 1995, 19-22.

The Cooperative as a Vehicle for Popular Empowerment

Fifteen years after the 1986 People Power Revolution, statistics showed that the cooperative was still viewed as a viable vehicle for empowering the farmers. In the case of the PLF-TILCO, during its rice-producing stage (the cooperative had to shift to sugar-cane production after the Mount Pinatubo eruption), it showed the crucial role the NGO could play in accessing vital state support services in terms of capital, infrastructure and technical know-how for the cooperative. The strategy chosen was collaboration with the state in this endeavor, which was facilitated by the special relationship of the PLF-TILCO head, Buscayno, with President Aquino. For its capital buildup, the cooperative borrowed its production loans from the Land Bank of the Philippines and other government agencies. For the first time, the farmers were able to take out loans at a low interest rate of 2 percent as compared to the 5 percent or more interest rates of loan sharks to buy their production needs, i.e., fertilizers and pesticides. The cooperative had a 100 percent repayment record during its first three years of existence. State functionaries also trained the NGO employees on the day-to-day running of the cooperative. Government infrastructural support such as the building of farm-to-market roads and the establishment of post-harvest facilities (PHFs) all helped to increase the market value of the farmers' rice crop. At its peak, the PLF-TILCO had 10,000 farmer-members covering eighty-three barangays spread over 20,636 hectares. The cooperative also had 151 employees at one time.⁴⁹

The CPFI-assisted cooperatives, such as the Tarcan Mulawin Multi-purpose Cooperative Inc. (MPCI), the Kaunlaran MPCI, and the Bakabakahan MPCI, all of which were in Bulacan, were assisted by the NGO in the following manner:

- 1) Generate their own capital before borrowing through various strategies, e.g., cooperative dues and a savings mobilization drive.
- 2) The cooperatives' fund, which came from the shares of its members, were used to buy the agricultural inputs with a 2 percent interest rate. Previously, the farmers would borrow from users or dealers of fertilizers and pesticides who would charge as high as 5 percent per month for their loans. The cooperative had become a source of loan and alternative to borrowing from family members or users. The cooperative also attempted to reduce its expenses for agricultural inputs, e.g., by shifting to organic fertilizer and minimal use of pesticides.
- 3) Link them up with an alternative trading marketing association (ATMA) so they will not fall prey to the scrupulous middle-traders and also as a response to the inefficiency of government agencies to assist the rice-producing cooperatives in general.

49. See Terese S. Encarnacion, "Non-governmental Organization Approaches to Cooperative Development: Two Case Studies of the Philippines Experience," PhD dissertation, University of Hong Kong, 1997.

- 4) Fill up a vacuum that government agencies are supposed to perform in the following areas: a) cooperative management such as the teaching of self-management by developing the farmers' management skills, such as accounting and bookkeeping, so as to enable them to run their economic venture efficiently, as well as effectively; and, b) technical assistance in planting and harvesting.

For the Kaunlaran MPCl, a major concern was the need for the cooperative members to fight their former landowner who wanted her land back. The CFPI assisted the cooperative to thwart the landlord's attempt by linking up with a bigger network of other NGOs, cooperatives and farmer-organizations pursuing the implementation of the country's agrarian reform program through the Partnership for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development Services Inc. (PARRDS). Through this alliance, the Kaunlaran MPCl arranged a series of meetings between the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) as well as the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). The CFPI also trained the farmers to assert themselves and make them aware of their rights vis-à-vis these agrarian reform officials. The NGO also provided the farmers a lawyer in their court case against the landowner since the DAR could not provide them with one, although legally, the agency should. More important, such an action also benefited other farmers who were also affected by the claims of the same landlord but who were not members of the cooperative. These farmers joined efforts with the cooperative to fight the landlord as well. Thus this was one situation whereby the NGO transformed the cooperative from a purely economic enterprise into a vehicle for political advocacy.⁵⁰

Actors and institutions gain a capacity to act by blending their resources, skills and purposes into long-term coalition: a regime. If they succeed, they preempt the leadership role in their community and establish for themselves a near decision-making monopoly over the cutting-edge choices facing their locality. The establishment of a viable regime is the ultimate act of power in the context of an emerging system of governance.⁵¹

Challenges to Confront

Much, however, remains to be desired for the cooperative to attain its full potency. Based on the experiences of the PLF-TILCO and the CFPI, these are the following:

50. Encarnacion, "Non-governmental Organization Approaches to Cooperative Development."

51. Stoker, "From Government to Governance," 261.

The relationship of the state to the cooperative. PLF-TILCO farmers complained about the inefficiency of government services for their cooperatives. Particularly, they complained about the delay in the release of loans from the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC), which is supposed to insure the member's crop against destruction by rats or tungro (an insect disease), typhoons, floods and other natural disasters. Because of this, the release of their loans from the Land Bank of the Philippines was also delayed, forcing some of them to borrow from usurers. Thus the cooperative should continue to actively engage in advocacy work for government agencies to perform efficiently and effectively. In the case of the PLF-TILCO, excessive state support for the cooperative resulted in the members not looking at the cooperative as their own and the cultivation of patronage politics. This led to a substantial amount of loan default and farmers preferring to pay the usurers.⁵²

For the CFPI-assisted NGOs, on the other hand, there was need for more government support in terms of rural development services. Thus it was not enough that the farmers owned the land, but more important, there was need for them to eke out a viable form of livelihood. Although the cooperative helped them to a considerable extent, the reality was that more resources were needed that only the state could provide. Furthermore, favorable legislation to make the marketing of rice viable to these grassroots economic initiatives was also important. One CFPI-assisted cooperative casualty was the Baka-bakahan MPCl in Pandi, Bulacan, which fell prey to real-estate developers who offered them Php 1 million per hectare. This was an amount, they argued, they would never be able to earn in their lifetime. The selling of their land by members of the cooperative led to the cooperative's demise.⁵³

Management problems. In the case of the PLF-TILCO and the CFPI-assisted Tarcan Mulawin MPCl, there was dependence on the leader to do everything for the members. On the other hand, the farmers also complained about their leaders being "authoritarian," and about the absence of popular participation in decision making within the cooperative. Thus there was still much to be desired in professionalizing the manner in which the organization would be run. This was specially so in the cooperative that had problems with corruption.⁵⁴ In the PLF-TILCO, for example, there were instances of employees absconding with the cooperative's funds. Cooperative mismanagement in terms of pursuing the wrong policies also led to the members' massive loan default. The PLF-TILCO's rapid expansion, for example, witnessed the use of the farmers' production loans for planting for other purposes. These led the members to seek the assistance of usurers and the middle-traders. Thus, when payment time came, they understandably could not pay back their loans, foremost of which were to the cooperative.⁵⁵ With the CFPI strategy, the refusal to borrow and to solely rely on income

52. Encarnacion, "Non-governmental Organization Approaches to Cooperative Development."

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Ibid.*

55. *Ibid.*

generated from within proved to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it did not foster the dependency mentality on loans, though financial resources remained inadequate to enable the cooperative to expand. For the CFPI, there was also the need to adequately train the NGO workers to assist the cooperatives. As pointed out by a former CFPI officer, the bulk of the CFPI staff members were community organizers who did not have enough exposure to the workings of business enterprises. With regard to the establishment of an alternative marketing association (ATMA), a main problem for CFPI-assisted NGOs was the need for capital to set this up, which the cooperative could not get from its farmers. Another problem is that the middle-traders or rice cartels already had an "efficient" network to buy and sell rice, which made it difficult for the cooperatives to compete.⁵⁶

Adverse structural forces. Concerning the massive default on loans that the PLF-TILCO suffered, Buscayno attributed this to the "backward attitudes and cultural values" of the farmers who preferred to pay the usurers, middle-traders or rice cartel before the cooperative. The farmers reasoned that the loans they received from the PLF-TILCO were government loans, and since it was the duty of the government to support them there was no need to pay this back. Second, the usurers, middle-traders, and rice cartel had an "efficient" system of buying and purchasing rice, which also included lending to the farmers, which the cooperative members found more practical than the cooperative. This could have been avoided, however, if there were adequate government support as well as sound management in the cooperative.⁵⁷ Natural disasters also wreaked havoc on the cooperative. Typhoons were the most common source of destruction for agricultural crops. In the case of the PLF-TILCO, an unthinkable disaster, i.e., the Pinatubo eruption and the subsequent ashfall, destroyed the harvests of the cooperative-farmers, and the PLF-TILCO was unable to recuperate from this.⁵⁸

The PLF-TILCO experience also showed that cooperatives had been used by politicians as palliatives. Thus cooperatives competed with one another for funds instead of cooperating or complementing each other's activities. Cooperative reliance on the support of national politicians, therefore, strengthened the patronage system, which was related to the *palakasan* syndrome prevalent in Philippine society. The *palakasan* national sickness also resulted from the politico-economic elites' monopoly of the country's resources. In the case of the Kaunlaran MPC, one structural force that continues to undermine the cooperatives are landowners who do not want to abide by the country's agrarian reform program. This in itself undermines the very basis of agricultural cooperatives, i.e., the ownership of affected cooperative farmer-members of their land. Land ownership was generally the prerequisite to the Land Bank's lending to the cooperative's members.⁵⁹

56. *Ibid.*

57. *Ibid.*

58. *Ibid.*

59. *Ibid.*

Conclusion

Cooperatives could be a means to uplift the lives of the farmers not only economically but also politically. As a vehicle for development, both the government and NGOs/POs have used the cooperative as a means to create a source of livelihood for the farmers and a source by which to channel resources into the countryside with the major objective of alleviating poverty. Because the very nature of the cooperative is based on the participation of its members—not only in the decision-making process but also in the implementation of its livelihood projects—the organization is also viewed as an important source of popular empowerment. The members, in particular, can exercise control over production and increase their market bargaining leverage. Furthermore, as the experiences of the PLF-TILCO and CFPI-assisted cooperatives show, the cooperative is also a potent force in organizing farmers to address other issues affecting them, such as the advocacy for more government support for rural development and the effective implementation of the state's agrarian reform program as well as the fight against land usurpation. At the micro-level, the success of the cooperative may very well spell the end of the major agricultural nemesis of the farmers, i.e., the usurers, the middle-traders, and the rice cartel. By achieving this, cooperatives will inevitably help facilitate the democratization process in the country as it nurtures the economic well-being of their members, providing them with an instrument to go against any political or economic structures that threaten their viability. But the obstacles remain: patronage politics, dependence on one-man leadership, usurers, middle-traders and the rice cartel, and the lack of government support, e.g., economic and technical assistance. The fact, however, that the number of cooperatives has been increasing through the years, may be proof that such obstacles have not kept the Filipino farmer from viewing the cooperative not as a shibboleth but as a weapon to carve out a life of dignity against all odds.

Guide Questions

1. What alternative cooperative vision did the CFPI and the PLF offer Philippines society?
2. How was this alternative cooperative vision concretized?
3. What factors facilitated the goals and objectives of the CFPI- and PLF-TILCO-sponsored cooperatives?
4. What factors hindered the goals and objectives of the CFPI- and PLF-TILCO-sponsored cooperatives?

Glossary

- Cooperative** (as defined by Koenraad Verhagen) – an association of persons (or households), usually of limited means, who have agreed to work together on a continuing basis to pursue one or more common interests and who for that purpose, have formed an economic organization which is jointly controlled and whose costs, risks and benefits are equitably shared among the membership.⁶⁰
- Cooperative** (as defined by the International Cooperative Authority) – an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically controlled enterprise.
- Empowerment** – increasing the control that the poor and powerless people (and specifically the poorest and most powerless) are able to exert over aspects of their lives they consider important.
- Middle-traders** – those who act as middle-persons between the producer and consumer. They usually buy from the producer at a low price and sell to the consumer at a high price.
- Nongovernment organization (NGO)** – the Philippine National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) defines the NGO as “private, nonprofit volunteer organizations ... committed to the task of what is broadly termed ‘development’.” This is to differentiate it from its generic meaning, i.e., the NGO being all organized formations outside the government. This, therefore, includes rotary clubs, business groups, girl and boy scout groups, etc.⁶¹
- Popular participation** – the regulation of internal relations or the division of powers of decision and control between members, and the distribution of costs and benefits particularly in decision making, implementation, benefits, evaluation and control.
- Rice cartel** – a cartel is “an exclusive group of firms whose members collude to fix prices and manipulate supply.”⁶² Because of this, a cartel is also called a rice hoarder. The country’s rice cartels currently control 90 percent of the palay and rice trading in the country. These consist of 22,000 rice dealers. The biggest among these is the so-called Binondo cartel, which is run by Filipino-Chinese rice traders.⁶³
- Self-reliance** – enhancement of the countervailing power of cooperative organizations in terms of bargaining power with respect to the market, and claim-making power with respect to policies and nonmarket distribution systems. Furthermore, it also stresses the need for horizontal and vertical linkages among cooperatives in the economic and noneconomic aspects for further self-reliance.

60. Koenraad Verhagen, *Self-Help Promotion: A Challenge to the NGO Community* (The Netherlands: CEBEMO/Royal Tropical Institute, 1987).

61. National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), *Sharing in Development: A Program of Employment, Equity and Growth for the Philippines* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1974).

62. Lindabue F. Romero, “Is There a Rice Cartel,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, August 8, 1995, 1.

63. Angkoop, November-December 1989.

Usurers – people who lend to farmers at highly exorbitant rates. During the 1980s these rates may range from 5 percent interest to 10 percent interest per month.

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Overseas Employment from the Philippines: The Nexus Between Development and Governance

Jorge V. Tigno

Dubbed the country's modern-day heroes, Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) contribute a lot to the nation's growth and development. They have to leave their own families to work abroad as professionals, engineers, office and factory workers, and even as domestic helpers.

– OFW online

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, the student should be able to:

1. Sketch the historical experience and current status of overseas employment from the Philippines and have a rudimentary knowledge of the trends and impacts of overseas employment, including the specific contributions of Filipino migrant workers.
2. Explain the key policy objectives that guide the government's overseas employment program.
3. Determine and assess the factors that have led to these policy objectives.

Introduction

Overseas employment from the Philippines is a phenomenon that has captured the interest and imagination of many Filipinos. Since the early 1900s, Filipinos have gone to work in numerous capacities and in different countries throughout the world. However, it was only in the 1970s that concerted efforts have been made to institutionalize, regulate, manage, and coordinate the outward mobility of labor from the Philippines. The magnitude of labor out-migration has undoubtedly become a serious political and social challenge.

According to the Philippine Labor Code, the term "overseas employment" refers to the "employment of a worker outside the Philippines" (chapter 1,

art. 13). More specifically, *overseas employment* in this chapter refers to remunerated occupations performed by Filipino nationals outside the Philippines for a specified period of time and under specified conditions of residence and employment. The term "overseas employment" is also used synonymously with "labor migration."

This chapter distinguishes between overseas employment and other forms of migration. Overseas migration for purposes of securing temporary employment is different from permanent immigration, refugee migration, and other forms of forced or clandestine movements. However, it is possible for temporary migrant workers to become permanent immigrants. Filipinos engaged in overseas employment are called *Filipino migrant workers* or *labor migrants*. The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 defines a migrant worker as "a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident [and is] used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker" (section 3). Popular media would sometimes refer to them as *Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs)* which are to be distinguished from the much larger category of *overseas Filipinos* composed of all Filipinos outside the Philippines. Migrants can either be *newly hired* (i.e., employed abroad for the first time) or *returning migrants* (i.e., either they renewed their employment contracts or have taken on new job contracts abroad). The country that is the source of migrant workers is called the *sending country* or the *country of origin*, while those areas where migrants work are called *receiving countries* or *countries of destination*.

The chapter focuses on the more recent and dominant form of labor migration from the Philippines (i.e., between the mid-1970s up to the late-1990s and the turn of the twenty-first century). Moreover, the flows to be examined are actually movements of low-skilled, semi-skilled, and skilled workers, all of which comprise a significant proportion of the type of out-migration being examined.

Stock estimates (i.e., the estimated number of actual Filipinos abroad within any given period) indicate that there can be as much as 7.9 million Filipinos living abroad, with roughly 3.38 million being migrant workers. Filipinos can be found in practically every corner of the globe today as indicated in table 1.

A significant number of Filipino migrant workers are women. Table 2 shows that the ratio between male and female newly hired migrants is about 1:2.

Considering the high degree of selectivity among migrants, Filipinos who work abroad tend to comprise the highly productive and highly educated portion of the local workforce and overall population. About 80 percent of Filipino migrant workers had completed high school education while half have had some years of college education at least prior to going abroad. In contrast, only 20 percent of locally employed Filipinos have actually completed high school.¹ Around 50 percent of these Filipino migrants are in their early 20s and 30s, while this age group comprises only 25 percent of the total population.²

1. See Benjamin Cariño, "Migrant Workers from the Philippines," in *Philippine Labor Migration: Impact and Policy*, ed. Graziano Salsistella and Anthony Paganoni (Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center, 1992), 4-21.

2. See Charles Stahl, "Southeast Asian Labor in the Middle East," in *Asian Labor Migration: Pipeline to the Middle East*, ed. F. Arnold and N. Shah (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986).

Table 1.
Stock Estimate of Overseas Filipinos by World Region
As of December 2003

Region/Country	Permanent	Temporary	Irregular	Total
World Total	3,074,429	3,385,717	1,515,688	7,975,834
Africa	318	53,706	16,955	70,979
Asia, East & South	85,570	944,129	503,173	1,532,872
Asia, West	2,290	1,361,409	108,150	1,471,849
Europe	165,030	459,042	143,810	767,882
Americas	2,386,036	286,103	709,676	3,381,815
Oceania	226,168	55,814	31,001	312,983
Australia	209,017	716	2,923	212,656
Regions Unspecified		8,767		8,767
Sea-based Workers		216,031		216,031

Prepared by the Commission on Filipinos Overseas from CFO, DFA, POEA and other sources covering 192 countries / territories.

Legend:

Permanent – immigrants or legal permanent residents abroad whose stay do not depend on work contracts.

Temporary – persons whose stay overseas is employment related, and who are expected to return at the end of their work contracts.

Irregular – those not properly documented or without valid residence or work permits, or who are overstaying in a foreign country.

Table 2.
Deployment of Newly Hired OFWs by Gender (2002)

Gender	Female	Male	F/M Ratio	Total
Total	199,423	88,732	2	288,155
Percentage	69%	31%		

Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Statistics, <http://www.poea.gov.ph/docs/Deployed%20New%20Hires%20by%20Skill%20and%20Sex.xls> (accessed July 2005).

Moreover, quite a number of these Filipino migrant workers have had at least two years of local work experience prior to overseas employment. Many are married, while most (if not all) have sought overseas employment in order to support a family or some family members back in the Philippines. Many are employed in construction-related and production-process (i.e., manufacturing) work while a substantially growing number are involved in services (e.g., domestic work, entertainment, health, etc.).

Almost a Century of Migration from the Philippines

The country's large-scale labor out-migration experience began at the turn of the twentieth century with the movement of mostly low-skilled contract agricultural workers from northern Philippines (particularly the Ilocos region) to the sugar and pineapple plantations of Hawaii. Before this, there were Filipinos going to Europe and the Americas as carpenters and shipbuilders on Spanish galleons during the seventeenth up to the nineteenth centuries,

although these were not as substantial in numbers as those that took place in the succeeding century. Later, in the 1920s and 1930s, the destination country shifted to the United States mainland itself (in particular the farm belt), which spread farther out to include even the fish canneries in Alaska. Initially intending to work abroad only temporarily, the chances of these Filipino migrants returning became slimmer the longer they stayed in the US. In the beginning, the migrants were recruited on short-term work contracts. However, through a combination of financial incentives and deception, the labor recruiters and plantation owners managed to bring these Filipinos on a one-way passage to the US.³ Eventually, what had started out as an intended short-term stay abroad became a major pattern of permanent resettlement.

By the late 1940s, a sizeable Filipino community had been formed in the continental US, characterized mainly by their employment in the low-skilled, low-wage, and labor-intensive agricultural sector. The fascinating feel and flavor of that period was most evident in the hard and often desperate struggles of Filipino overseas migrants to organize and fight for their interests by establishing labor unions (and to some extent asserting their identity as Americans) in the US. This period was vividly captured in the biographical novel *America Is in the Heart* by Carlos Bulosan first published in 1946.

After World War II, many Filipinos, especially those veterans, sought American citizenship and eventually settled in the US. It was also during the immediate post-WWII period up to the early 1970s that family members of earlier migrants and professional workers (e.g., managers and health workers) from the Philippines began to migrate abroad. Almost half of the new entrants to the US during this period were professionals or relatives of earlier immigrants.⁴

The late 1970s saw a shift in the migratory phenomenon from permanent outward migration to temporary labor or contractual migration. Countries of the Gulf region became major destinations for Filipino OFWs. Labor migration to the Middle East during the period 1975-1979 was 25.9 percent of total outflows. During the period 1980-1984, however, this proportion increased significantly to slightly more than 60 percent as seen in table 3.

Since 1984 the rate of increase in annual Filipino labor deployments to West Asia or the Middle East, and particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, has continued to be significant despite increases in deployments in other regions particularly in East Asia itself as seen in table 4.

The partial decline in annual deployments to the Middle East beginning in the mid-1990s was compensated by increased deployments in other Asian labor markets as seen in tables 3 and 4. By the late 1980s, countries in the Gulf were experiencing significant economic transitions as a result of the termination of numerous infrastructure contracts in the region and because there was more

3. See Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), *The Labour Trade: Filipino Migrant Workers Around the World* (London: CIIR, 1987).

4. See Joaquin Gonzalez III, *Philippine Labour Migration: Critical Dimensions of Public Policy* (Singapore and Manila: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and De La Salle University, 1998).

attraction to hire cheaper migrants from South Asia or that there were no more funds available due to the recession after the oil crisis. At the same time, Asia, or specifically Northeast and Southeast Asia, became more attractive to Filipino migrant workers because of the fast pace of economic growth in these areas beginning in the late 1980s.

Table 3.
Outflows of Destination in Percent
1975-1995 (Land-Based)

	1975-1979	1980-1984	1985-1989	1990-1995
Africa	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.4
Americas	2.5	1.0	1.3	1.8
Asia	6.8	8.2	16.5	21.1
Europe	1.9	0.6	1.2	1.7
ME	25.9	60.7	53.1	40.2
Oceania	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Trust Terr.	0.4	0.5	1.1	1.3
Emigrants	31.0	12.8	11.1	9.0
Sea-Based	30.5	15.5	15.2	20.0
Unreported	0	0	0	4.4
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) Table 1, "Towards the 21st Century: Whither Philippine Labor Migration?" Stella Go, in *Filipino Workers on the Move: Trends, Dilemmas and Policy Options*, ed. Benjamin Carillo (Quezon City: PMRN, 1998), 11.

Table 4.
Deployed Landbased Overseas Filipino Workers by Major World Group
1984-2000

Year	Africa	Asia	Americas	Europe	Middle East	Oceania	Trust Territories	Total
1984	1,843	38,817	2,515	3,683	250,210	913	2,397	300,378
1985	1,977	52,838	3,744	4,067	253,867	953	3,048	320,494
1986	1,847	72,536	4,035	3,693	236,434	1,080	3,892	323,517
1987	1,856	90,434	5,614	5,643	272,038	1,271	5,373	382,229
1988	1,958	92,648	7902	7,614	267,035	1,397	6,563	385,117
1989	1,741	86,196	9,962	7,830	241,081	1,247	7,289	355,346
1990	1,273	90,768	9,557	6,853	218,110	942	7,380	334,883
1991	1,964	132,592	13,373	13,156	302,825	1,374	11,409	476,693
1992	2,510	134,776	12,319	14,590	340,604	1,669	11,164	517,632
1993	2,425	168,205	12,228	13,423	302,975	1,507	8,890	509,653
1994	3,255	194,120	12,603	11,513	286,387	1,295	8,489	517,662
1995	3,615	166,774	13,469	10,279	234,310	1,398	7,039	436,884
1996	2,494	174,308	8,378	11,409	221,224	1,577	4,869	424,259
1997	3,517	235,129	7,058	12,626	221,047	1,970	5,280	486,627
1998	5,548	221,257	8,210	15,682	226,803	2,062	6,483	486,045
1999	4,936	299,521	9,045	30,707	287,076	2,424	6,622	640,331
2000	4,298	292,067	7,624	39,296	283,291	2,386	7,421	636,363

Source: http://www.poea.gov.ph/Stats/st_dlbwg84-2000.html (accessed July 2005).

Not surprisingly, by the late 1980s, there emerged an appreciable increase in demand for foreign labor in a number of so-called newly industrialized economies (NIEs) within the Asia-Pacific region, which included Malaysia and Singapore as well as the established economies of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. As seen in table 3, the Asian market share of total outflows rose steadily and significantly from only 8.2 percent during the period 1980-1984 to a little over 21 percent by the period 1990-1995. In the meantime, the share of West Asia declined from 60.7 percent (1980-1984) to 40.2 percent (1990-1995).

The Impact of Overseas Employment on the Philippines

The significant effects of overseas employment on the Philippines are usually measured in terms of remittance earnings and job generation. Every year, billions of dollars from the incomes of migrant workers overseas are sent back to the Philippines from all over the globe. In 1982 remittances from migrants overseas totaled more than US\$ 810 million. Ten years later, these remittances reached more than US\$ 2 billion. By 2000, remittance inflows to the Philippines reached more than US\$ 5 billion annually as seen in table 5. These inflows are in addition to nonmonetary contributions sent by migrants back to their families in the Philippines through consumption and other durable goods.

Table 5.
Overseas Filipino Workers Foreign Exchange Remittances
1984-2000 (in US\$ millions)

Year	Land-based	Growth Rate
1982	642.34	67.43
1983	660.08	2.76
1984	472.58	-28.41
1985	597.89	26.52
1986	571.75	-4.37
1987	671.43	17.43
1988	683.31	1.77
1989	755.19	10.52
1990	893.4	18.3
1991	1,125.06	25.93
1992	1,757.36	56.2
1993	1,840.30	4.72
1994	2,560.92	39.16
1995	4,667.00	82.24
1996	4,055.40	-13.1
1997	5,484.22	35.23
1998	4,651.44	-15.19
1999	5,948.34	27.88
2000	5,123.77	-13.86
2001 (Q1)	1,081.66	-21.82

Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). May not add up to totals due to rounding off.

Compared with the country's other exports, these remittances are certainly not insignificant. In both 1998 and 1999, such inward remittances for the two years outranked four of the five top exports of the country, which include machineries, garments, mineral and coconut products as seen in table 6.

Table 6.
Top Five Philippine Exports
1997-1999

	1997		1998		1999	
	US\$ (millions)	% of total	US\$ (millions)	% of total	US\$ (millions)	% of total
Telecommunications equipment, electronics, electrical parts	13,028	51.6	17,388	59.0	21,165	60.4
Machinery and transport	2,885	10.6	3,329	11.3	4,951	14.1
Garments	2,349	9.3	2,356	8.0	2,267	6.5
Mineral products	762	3.0	592	2.0	645	1.8
Coconut products	835	3.3	831	2.8	466	1.3
Other	5,569	22.1	5,000	16.9	5,538	15.8
Total	25,228	100.0	29,496	100.0	35,032	100.0

Source: <http://www.hsbc.com.hk/hk/corp/mni/stat.htm> (accessed July 2005).

The lucrative nature of overseas employment led to the proliferation of private recruitment agencies that facilitate the process of securing overseas jobs for Filipinos. The Philippine Labor Code defines a private employment agency as "any person, partnership or corporation engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers for a fee which is charged, directly or indirectly, from the workers or employees or both" (rule 2). The number of private employment agencies increased from just 71 in 1977 to more than 750 by 1985 as seen in table 7.

Table 7.
Number of Recruitment Intermediaries by Type Land-based Only
1977-1985

Type of Agency	1977	1978	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Private Agencies	23	19	19	19	20	579	471	461
Authority Holders	22	20	162	16	nd	nd	nd	Nd
Provisional Authority Holders	nd	nd	nd	158	251	nd	nd	Nd
Authority to Negotiate	nd	nd	nd	137	208	nd	nd	Nd
Construction Contractors	26	88	150	266	234	231	208	163
Service Contractors	nd	nd	nd	nd	35	49	92	128
Total	71	127	331	596	748	859	771	752

Source: Alcega Abrera-Mangahas, "Commercialization of Migration," Social Weather Stations, October 1988, table 2, 25.

Also accompanying the phenomenon of overseas employment is a set of negative and positive effects for the country of origin. Table 8 illustrates some of the major positive and negative effects of labor migration on sending countries.

Table 8.
The Economic "Balance Sheet" for Countries of Origin

Positive Effects	Negative Effects
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides opportunities to workers not available in the home country. • May ease the effect on the domestic market of the supply of excess labor. • Inflow of remittances and foreign exchange. • Technology transfer, investments and venture capital contributed by diasporas. • Can contribute to increased trade flows between sending and receiving countries. • Stimulus to investment in domestic education and individual human capital investments. • Return of skilled workers may increase local human capital, transfer of skills and links to foreign networks. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loss of highly skilled workers and reduced quality of essential services. • Reduced growth and productivity because of the lower stock of highly skilled workers and its externalities. • Lower return from public investments in public education. • Selective migration may cause increasing disparities in incomes in the home country. • Loss of fiscal revenue from taxation of workers. • Remittances may diminish over time.

Source: Table IV.1 *World Economic and Social Survey 2004 International Migration*, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (New York: UN, 2004), 129. Partly based on Piyasin Wickramasekera, "Policy Responses to Skilled Migration: Retention, Return and Circulation," *Perspectives on Labour Migration*, 5th edition (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2002).

At the same time, technological developments in transportation and communications systems also accelerate the pace of overseas employment by allowing for increased mobility across national borders. The relative proximity of countries due to these technological advancements has made it easier for more people to travel longer distances.

The increased incidence of population flows is mainly due to a variety of reasons and factors to the extent that migration can no longer be seen in isolation from other social, political and economic forces. Poverty and unemployment are the principal economic causes for why people move. Political instability and social unrest can also force people to migrate. This is known as forced migration.

Migration is not only an effect, but can also cause new social and political issues to arise. The strict border regulations in countries of destination combined with the need for cheap labor in these areas have led to high incidences of human smuggling and trafficking. Human smuggling is the illegal crossing of a national border primarily for purposes of securing gainful employment. Both the smuggler and the migrant are liable under the law. On the other hand, trafficking of persons involves the use of deception or force in the transport of human beings across national boundaries for employment in the sex industry, labor-intensive occupations, or as sources for organ replacements. In such a

situation, the trafficked person is the victim and the trafficker is the criminal. Trafficking can be considered as one form of forced migration.

The Philippines is said to be "a source, transit, and destination country for internationally trafficked persons," according to the Consortium Against Trafficking of Children and Women in Sexual Exploitation (CATCH-WISE 2005).⁵ Women are trafficked to destinations in other Asian countries as well as Europe, the Middle East, and North America where they are forced to work in the sex industry.

Given the very lucrative nature of getting a job overseas, it is not surprising for people to be victimized by unscrupulous recruiters and labor brokers. As indicated in table 9, in 1984 the Philippine government, through the POEA, handled no less than 1,671 cases involving more than one thousand workers/complainants. By 2000, the number of cases handled was reduced to 573. However, the number of complainants involved actually increased to 1,327, indicating that many recruiters have resorted to victimizing workers on a larger scale. From 1995 to 2000, no less than 6,800 workers filed complaints of illegal recruitment with the POEA.

Overseas Employment from the Philippines: The Policy Framework

State authorities inevitably play a vital role in enhancing and sustaining overseas employment from the country. Throughout their experience with overseas employment, Philippine government agencies have essentially undertaken a policy outlook that seeks to benefit, in the main, from the economic contributions of migrants toward the achievement of ostensibly national development goals.

In 1974, President Ferdinand Marcos signed Presidential Decree 442 or the Labor Code into law. This was the year that overseas employment was officially established as a national development policy. The government has since embarked on a systematic labor export program "as a temporary measure to ease underemployment and will increasingly be restrained as productive employment opportunities are created" so as to prevent a kind of skills or brain drain on the domestic labor market.⁶

Part of the strategy to manage the overseas employment program had to do with regulating the private employment agencies. In the beginning, government sought to limit and eventually phase out private-sector participation or involvement in overseas employment. This phaseout policy meant that private labor recruitment agencies that were charging fees to workers would be replaced by one government agency, the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB), at the time. Private agencies were seen then as unable to develop strategic labor markets overseas and that government stood a better chance at sustaining and expanding the country's labor market potentials.

5. Philippine Conference against Trafficking of Children and Women in Commercial Sexual Exploitation, Consortium against Trafficking of Children and Women in Sexual Exploitation (CATCH-WISE 2005). Cebu City, http://www.humantrafficking.org/counres/asp/philippines/events/2005_02/background_paper.pdf (accessed February 10-11, 2005).

6. L. Lazo, V. Teodosio, and P. Sanio Tomas, *Contract Migration Policies in the Philippines*. International Migration for Employment Working Paper (International Labor Office, 1982), 4.

Table 9.
Status of Illegal Recruitment Cases
1984-2000

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Cases handled	1,671	1,231	1,452	1,785	1,184	1,295	847	712	797	770	650	439	607	562	716	603	573
Pending cases at the beginning	421	138	506	837	808	278	160	23	111	77	87	106	45	68	120	122	137
Cases received	1,250	1,093	946	948	376	1,017	687	689	686	693	563	333	562	494	596	481	436
Number of workers/ complainants involved	1,089	3,428	na	1,514	2,379	2,222	1,137	1,366	1,433	1,852	1,290	850	1,130	1,040	1,067	1,404	1,327
Cases acted upon/disposed	1,533	725	615	977	906	1,135	824	601	720	683	544	394	539	442	594	466	446
Complainants involved	na	na	na	na	1,790	na	na	na	1,479	1,730	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cases pending at the end	138	506	837	808	278	160	23	111	77	87	106	45	68	120	122	137	127
Disposition rate	91.74	58.9	42.36	54.73	76.52	87.64	97.28	84.41	90.34	88.7	83.69	89.75	86.8	78.65	82.96	77.28	77.84
Persons arrested	na	141	na	34	16	64	31	30	44	69	35	22	44	31	37	30	21
Establishments closed	na	132	na	55	98	41	19	4	6	0	3	3	1	3	2	4	10

Source: http://www.poa.gov.ph/Status_cases84-2000.htm (accessed July 2005).

Legend: na - not available

By the second half of the 1970s, however, the surge in the demand for migrant labor in the Gulf proved to be too much for government to handle by itself. Private recruitment agencies continued to increase in number as well as in their scope of operations. As seen in table 10, agency-hired workers greatly outnumber government-hired migrant workers more than fifty to one. In 1984, 98 percent of the total land-based workers processed for overseas jobs were recruited by private employment agencies. Since then, government recruitment has not gone beyond 5 percent of the total recruitment of land-based OFWs. The situation created the conditions that would eventually lead to a reversal of the attrition policy almost right after it was instituted.

Table 10.
Land-based Workers Processed by Type of Recruitment
1984-1995

Year	Agency-Hired	Government-Hired
1984	245,078	5,037
1985	169,415	11,530
1986	189,514	9,053
1987	230,089	13,188
1988	183,772	2,531
1989	169,736	4,181
1990	236,879	3,088
1991	314,824	4,514
1992	284,180	3,397
1993	252,857	2,524
1994	232,950	2,069
1995	128,825	2,102

Source: Overseas Employment Statistical Compendium 1982-1995, POEA.

By 1982, the organizational structures underlying the implementation of the overseas employment program in the country underwent a significant streamlining effort. Through Executive Order 797, a major reorganization was undertaken with the establishment of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration out of three different agencies (the OEDB, the Bureau of Employment Services or BES, and the National Seamen Board or NSB). The POEA, under the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), is now the agency tasked to regulate private-sector participation through the licensing and registration of recruitment agencies and other employment entities. Aside from the POEA, there used to be the Welfare Fund established in the late 1970s as a counterpart agency to look after the social welfare needs of Filipino migrants abroad. By 1987, the Welfare Fund had become the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), with essentially the same official functions as the Welfare Fund.

The overseas employment program began initially as a palliative or temporary measure to address the local economy's inability to provide jobs for workers. From this initial policy perspective, however, there occurred only minor changes in the practice of the policy outlook in later years. Under Marcos and President Corazon Aquino, the labor export policy became a program geared to provide "opportunities for others to move to better-paying jobs, stimulate local demand through the remittances of Filipinos abroad, enhance the country's foreign exchange position and create new employment..."⁷

However, in June 1991, President Ramos signed Republic Act (RA) 8042 (otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act) into law. RA 8042 contains a number of features that would distinguish it from PD 442. It is the foremost substantive instrument for protecting the rights of migrant workers in particular and Filipinos overseas in general, including their families. All of its forty-three sections convey a sense that migrants' rights need to be protected and upheld in all respects no less by the state. It mandates the state to "provide adequate and timely social, economic and legal services to Filipino migrant workers" (section 2, subsection [a]).

As a countermeasure against the abusive practices of private employment agencies and also against illegal recruiters (i.e., those unauthorized or unlicensed entities or persons engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas jobs), it is illegal for officials and employees of the DOLE, the POEA, the OWWA, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and other related agencies or their relatives "within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity" to engage (either directly or indirectly) in any business of recruiting migrant workers (section 8).

In addition, RA 8042 provides for a number of institutional changes in the manner of governance of the Philippine overseas employment program. In particular, nongovernment organizations (NGOs) as well as migrant workers themselves have the right to participate in the decision-making processes of the state and are allowed representation in the relevant bodies (section 2, subsection [f]). Moreover, the state is mandated to deploy migrant workers "only in countries where the rights of Filipino migrant workers are protected" (section 4).

New institutions and offices have been set up under the law to assist in the protection and advocacy of migrants rights. One is the Migrant Workers and Other Overseas Filipinos Resource Center within the premises of the Philippine Embassy in countries with a significant concentration of Filipino nationals (Section 19). The functions of such a center are wide-ranging and include counseling and legal services, orientation programs, medical and hospitalization services, among many others. Another is the Legal Assistant for Migrant Workers Affairs under the DFA responsible for coordinating all legal-assistance services to Filipinos in need (section 24).

7. International Labor Office, *Employment and Manpower in the Philippines* (Manila: ILO, August 1990), 7.

The Policy Contexts for Overseas Employment

Migration does not take place in a vacuum. As far as explaining the policy framework is concerned, there are certainly numerous variables to be taken into account in a matter as comprehensive, extensive, and complicated as overseas employment. The program was borne out of the increased demand for migrant labor in the Gulf countries beginning in the mid-1970s triggered mainly by the oil crisis of the period.

The partial decline in Philippine labor deployment shares to the Gulf by the 1980s was caused in part by the saturation of the labor market in West Asia by more competitive (i.e., cheaper) workers from South Asia (e.g., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka) as well as other countries in Southeast Asia (e.g., Indonesia and Thailand) and also by the termination of numerous construction projects in the West Asian region. Additionally, there was the greater financial attraction on the part of the rapidly expanding and much closer East Asian market. Such developments, however, did not put an end to the program of labor migration but merely shifted the geographical focus toward East Asia.

With the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2004 in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Gulf region has become a trouble area for Filipino migrant workers. Despite the closure of some labor markets there, however, Filipinos continue to seek jobs in these danger zones. In 2004, there was a series of kidnappings of Filipino nationals in Iraq and Afghanistan. The situation led Philippine labor officials to look more seriously for, as well as develop, safer alternative markets for Filipino migrant workers.

Within the last two decades at least, there has been a steady and substantial increase in the number of Filipinos who have opted to work and stay abroad. And over these several years there have been significant changes in the nature and dynamics of such flows not only in the case of the Philippines but also in other areas as well.⁸ One of these is the increase in the number of women migrant workers relative to male workers. Another is the increasing incidence of undocumented flows (including trafficking and smuggling activities).

How has the Philippines been able to manage/govern its overseas employment program? Is it in the national interest to pursue overseas employment? What collective interest is at stake in relation to migration? The main instruments to govern the overseas employment program are the Labor Code (PD 442) and RA 8042. While the Labor Code institutionalizes the "palliative" nature of overseas employment, the primary goal of RA 8042 is to reorient the overseas employment program away from one that emphasizes the notion of labor export toward the intention to protect migrant workers' rights and welfare. Realizing that overseas employment is no longer a simple palliative and temporary policy measure but a permanent feature of the government's development

8. For details on the changes in migration patterns, see Stephen Castles and Mark Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (London: MacMillan Press, 1993); Wayne Cornelius, Philip Martin, and James Hollifield, eds., *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); and Amara Pongsapich, *Recent Trends in International Migration in Asia* (New York: United Nations, 1995).

program, it has become necessary to further institute mechanisms and agencies to protect such rights.

RA 8042 was promulgated essentially as a political response to the Flor Contemplacion incident that once again called public attention to the serious plight of migrants and their families.⁹ It may be said that RA 8042 was simply a reaction to the public outcry over the Contemplacion affair and not really an effort to address the persistent problems and concerns of migrants.

The increasing incidence of undocumented migration as well as the growing number of women migrants now compel researchers and policy makers alike to examine and act on these new dimensions in the field.¹⁰ A whole new set of problems has now emerged that can seriously strain a country's relations with its neighbors as well as its own internal resource capacities. The Contemplacion incident clearly shows the strong potential of transnational migration as a significant variable for considering diplomatic and political relations between states.

While the country has benefited tremendously from the income remittances of Filipinos overseas, there appears to be a lack in an appropriate overall policy response to manage these remittance earnings. These income remittances are generated and utilized at the individual or household level. While there has been a high level of remittance earnings from this large overseas migrant workforce, there seems to be little evidence to show that such income has contributed to national development goals. To a great extent the foreign-exchange remittances have remained in household hands and their national impact greatly constrained by the absence of a genuine financial infrastructure support system. There has yet to emerge a viable program that can harness the collective benefits of migrants' earnings toward the achievement of national development goals.

Over the long term, overseas employment brings with it certain social costs that can greatly affect the quality of a country's social and human capital. The Philippine experience with overseas employment has yet to show any sign that sustainable self-sufficiency in human resources is indeed a prospect. If anything, more Filipinos have come to rely on migration as a short-term or quick solution to problems of unemployment and low income.

9. Flor Contemplacion was a Filipina domestic helper in Singapore accused of murder. She was tried, found guilty, and executed in Singapore in 1995 against calls for the stay of her execution coming from the Philippines. Her death became a political concern for the administration of President Ramos who had to remove two department secretaries (Labor and Foreign Affairs).

10. See Graziano Battistella and Anthony Paganoni, *Asian Women in Migration* (Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center, 1996).

■ Guide Questions

1. How has transnational migration from the Philippines evolved; what has been its outflow trend and its specific contribution to the Philippines?
2. Why does the government continue to promote overseas employment and in what ways has the Philippines managed its overseas employment program?
3. What were the factors that led to the policy objectives of the Philippine government?

Glossary

- Forced migration** – when people are forced to migrate due to political instability and social unrest.
- Human smuggling** – the illegal crossing of a national border primarily for purposes of securing gainful employment.
- Irregular migration** – those migrant flows that are not properly documented or flows involving migrants without valid residence or work permits, or who are overstaying in a foreign country.
- Migrant worker** – “a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident [and is] used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker.” Popular media would sometimes refer to them as **Overseas Filipino Workers**.
- Overseas Filipinos** – composed of all Filipinos outside the Philippines. Migrants can either be **newly hired** (i.e., employed abroad for the first time) or **returning migrants** (i.e., either they renewed their employment contracts or have taken on new job contracts abroad).
- Permanent migration** – flows involving immigrants or legal permanent residents abroad whose stay does not depend on work contracts.
- Private employment agency** – any person, partnership or corporation engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers for a fee which is charged, directly or indirectly, from the workers or employees or both.
- Sending country** – the country that is the source of migrant workers or the country of origin.
- Receiving countries** – those where migrants work or reside. Also called countries of destination.
- Temporary Filipino migrant workers or labor migrants** – persons whose stay overseas is employment related, and who are expected to return at the end of their work contracts.
- Trafficking of persons** – involves the use of deception or force in the transport of human beings across national boundaries for employment in the sex industry, labor-intensive occupations, or as sources for organ replacements.

Philippine Politics and Governance: Challenges to Democratization and Development

List of Acronyms

ABB -	Alex Boncayao Brigade
ACCFA -	Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration
ACES -	Agency for Community Education and Services
AFP -	Armed Forces of the Philippines
ALTAS -	Alyansang Tapat sa Sambayanan
AMC -	agricultural multipurpose cooperatives
AMRSP -	Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines
AMT -	Aguman ding Maldang Talapagobra
ANP -	Alliance for New Politics
APEC -	Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
ARMM -	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ATMA -	alternative marketing association
AWARE -	Alliance of Women for Action and Reconciliation
BCC -	Basic Christian Communities
BCOD -	Bureau of Cooperative Development
BGF -	Barrio Guarantee Fund
BIAF -	Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
BISIG -	Bukluran sa Ikauunlad ng Isip at Gawa
BSF -	Barrio Savings Fund
CAR -	Cordillera Autonomous Region
CARHRIHL -	Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
CARL -	Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
CATCH-WISE -	Consortium Against Trafficking of Children and Women in Sexual Exploitation
CBAd -	Cordillera Bodong Administration
CBCP -	Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines
CDA -	Cooperative Development Agency
CEDAW -	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

CENRO -	Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices
CFPI -	Cooperative Foundation of the Philippines Inc.
CIA -	Central Intelligence Agency
CIPRAD -	Coalition for Indigenous People's Rights and Ancestral Domain
CLT -	Certificate of Land Transfer
CNL -	Christians for National Liberation
COMELEC -	Commission on Elections
CPA -	Cordillera Peoples Alliance
CPLA -	Cordillera People's Liberation Army
CPP -	Communist Party of the Philippines
CPPCRV -	Catholic Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting
CRB -	cooperative rural bank
CSO -	civil-society organization
CWP -	Concerned Women of the Philippines
DA -	Department of Agriculture
DENR -	Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DFA -	Department of Foreign Affairs
DMZ -	demilitarized zone
DOH -	Department of Health
DOLE -	Department of Labor and Employment
DOST -	Department of Science and Technology
DPA -	deep penetration agents
DPWH -	Department of Public Works and Highways
DSWD -	Department of Social Welfare and Development
FACOMAs -	Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Associations
FFF -	Federation of Free Farmers
FFW -	Federation of Free Workers
FLAG -	Free Legal Assistance Group
FPEC -	First Philippine Environmental Congress
FPW -	Framework Plan for Women
FQS -	First Quarter Storm
GABRIELA -	General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action
GAD -	gender and development
GOCC -	government-owned and -controlled corporations
GRP -	Government of the Republic of the Philippines
GZOPI -	Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute

HOPE -	Hearts of Peace
Hukbalahap (Huk) -	Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon
IBP -	Interim Batasang Pambansa
ICC -	indigenous cultural communities
IID -	Initiatives for International Dialogue
INC -	Iglesia ni Cristo
IP -	indigenous peoples
IPRA -	Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
JAJA -	Justice for Aquino, Justice for All
JARWOC -	Joint Agreement on Formation, Sequence and Operationalization of the Reciprocal Working Committees
JASIG -	Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees
JUSMAG -	Joint US Military Advisory Group
KAIBA -	Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan
KALAYAAN -	Katipunan ng Kababaihan Para sa Kalayaan
KKK (Katipunan) -	Kataastaasan, Kagalangalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan
KM -	Kabataan Makabayan
KMP -	Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
KOMPIL -	Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilipino
KONFES -	Konsensiya ng Febrero Siete
KPMP -	Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magbubukid sa Pilipinas
LBP -	Land Bank of the Philippines
LGU -	local government unit
LLDA -	Laguna Lake Development Authority
LRC-KsK -	Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center–Kasama sa Kalikasan
M99 -	Masagana 99
MAC -	Media Advisory Council
MAKIBAKA -	Malayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan
MARO -	Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
MDC -	municipal development council
MILF -	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MIM -	Muslim Independence Movement
MMC -	Mass Media Council
MNLF -	Moro National Liberation Front
MNS -	Montañosa National Solidarity

MPKP -	Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino
MTPDP -	Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan
MTRCB -	Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
NAJFD -	Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy
NAMFREL -	National Movement for Free Elections
NAMRIA -	National Mapping and Resource Information Authority
NAPC -	National Anti-Poverty Commission
NASSA -	National Secretariat for Social Action
NATCCO -	National Confederation of Cooperatives
NCCP -	National Council of Churches of the Philippines
NCIP -	National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
NCRFW -	National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
ND -	national democratic
NDF -	National Democratic Front
NEDA -	National Economic and Development Authority
NFA -	National Food Authority
NGO -	nongovernment organization
NIE -	newly industrialized economies
NIPAS -	National Integrated Protected Areas System
NIPC -	National Indigenous Peoples Commission
NOW -	National Organization of Women
NPA -	New People's Army
NPC -	National Peace Conference
NSM -	New Social Movements
NSO -	National Statistics Office
NTC -	National Telecommunication Commission
OEDB -	Overseas Employment Development Board
OFW -	overseas Filipino workers
OIC -	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OPAIPA -	Office of the Presidential Adviser for Indigenous Peoples' Affairs
OPAPP -	Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
OPEC -	Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries
OWWA -	Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
PARO -	Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer

PARRDS -	Partnership for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development Services Inc.
PAZ -	Peace Advocates Zamboanga
PCEC -	Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches
PCIC -	Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation
PCSD -	Philippine Council for Sustainable Development
PEN -	Peace Education Network
PFEC -	Philippine Federation for Environmental Concerns
PHF -	post-harvest facilities
PKP -	Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas
PLF-TILCO -	People's Livelihood Foundation-Tarlac Integrated Livelihood Cooperative Inc.
PLM -	People's Liberation Movement
PMA -	Philippine Military Academy
PMS -	Presidential Management Staff
PnB -	Partido ng Bayan
PO -	people's organization
POEA -	Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
POS -	political opportunity structures
PRRM -	Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement
PSDN -	Philippine Sustainable Development Network
PSDP -	Philippine Democratic Socialist Party
RA -	reaffirmists
RAM -	Reform the Armed Forces Movement, renamed Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa
RCCP -	Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines
RJ -	rejectionists
RPA -	Revolutionary Proletarian Army
RPM -	Revolutionary Proletarian Movement
RPM-P -	Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas
SAMAKANA -	Samahan ng Malayang Kababaihang Nagkakaisa
SFP -	Soldiers of the Filipino People
SIBOL -	Sama-Samang Inisyatiba ng Kababaihan sa Pagbabago ng Batas at Lipunan
SMO -	social movement organization
SN -	Samahang Nayon
SPCPD -	Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development
SWS -	Social Weather Stations
SZOPAD -	Special Zone of Peace and Development

TFD -	Task Force Detainees of the Philippines
TLA -	Timber License Agreement
TNC -	transnational corporation
UFM -	United Front Movement
UN -	United Nations
UNIDO -	United Democratic Opposition
UOD -	Union Obrera Democratica
UP CIDS -	University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies
USAFFE -	United States Armed Forces in the Far East
VACC -	Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption
VPD -	Volunteers for Popular Democracy
VRB -	Videogram Regulatory Board
WCED -	World Commission on Environment and Development
WEDO -	Women's Environment and Development Organization
WID -	Women-in-development
WOMB -	Women for the Ouster of Marcos and Boycott
WWF -	World Wildlife Fund
YOU -	Young Officers Union
ZOPAD -	zone of peace and development
ZOPFAN -	zone of peace, freedom and neutrality

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